Mr Keith Farringdon (the defendant) has not enjoyed a life of privilege or good fortune. He was born into a home of modest means in June 1980, and is therefore aged 37. His mother was a factory worker, and his father was a labourer who abused alcohol and was violent when drunk. The latter died of lung cancer in 2011, and the former of a heart attack in 2016.
As a child, the defendant suffered from a problem with his eyes that makes him appear cross-eyed. He also suffered from learning difficulties, and was bullied at school as a result of each of those attributes. He attended a special school, and was diagnosed with a mild intellectual disability at an early stage (it is well known that that characterisation should not be misinterpreted as suggesting that the disability is trivial). He has been on a Disability Support Pension for the majority of his adult life as a result of his intellectual disability, and has rarely worked. His life has been marred by periods of loneliness and alienation. He commenced to abuse alcohol from an early age.
Surely the most damaging aspect of his upbringing is that, over a period of some years, he was the victim of penetrative child sexual assault committed by a close male relative. As a psychologist has recently remarked, I am well satisfied that those crimes at the least "partially shaped his aberrant sexual pre-disposition", which I shall now detail.
In 2008, when he was aged 28 years, the defendant enjoyed an intimate relationship with an adult woman. That gave him access to her young son from a previous relationship, who was aged seven and who suffers from cerebral palsy. On 29 September 2008, the defendant was in the company of the boy, along with his own niece, aged six. During a brief absence from a private home of all other adults, he committed acts of penetrative child sexual assault against those two victims.
The defendant pleaded guilty to two offences based upon that criminal conduct, along with two offences on a Form 1. On 19 March 2010, he was sentenced by Judge Neilson in in the District Court of New South Wales.
In his remarks on sentence, Judge Neilson emphasised the offender's position of trust in relation to the victims, the age and vulnerability of the victims (particularly in relation to the disabled child), and the objective seriousness of the offending.
Judge Neilson also considered the likelihood of re-offending, and concluded that the risk of re-offending was not great and that there were good prospects of rehabilitation. He also noted mitigating factors such as the offender's remorse, his prior good character, his awareness of the consequences of his actions, the utilitarian value of the pleas of guilty, and other subjective factors pertaining to the offender, including experiencing sexual abuse as a child by his close male relative.
It is noteworthy that Judge Neilson referred to the fact that the offender admitted to starting to fantasise about paedophilia sometime in 2007.
Taking into account pre-sentence custody that was not reflected by way of a formal backdate, his Honour imposed a total head sentence of nine years six months, to expire on 1 April 2018, with a non-parole period of five years six months to expire on 1 April 2014.
The defendant served that non-parole period. During his time in custody, he received therapy for his sexual offending, which appeared to progress satisfactorily. On the other hand, whilst serving that first sentence, the defendant formed an intimate relationship with another male prisoner who had also been incarcerated for sexual offences against children; inevitably, that relationship was of concern to the prison authorities.
The defendant was released to parole on 1 April 2014, and was living in the community with his aunt. He was also receiving therapy in the community, and, again, that seemed to be proceeding quite well.
In November 2014, however, the defendant revealed to a person in authority that he had been accessing child abuse material on the internet. Subsequently, he was frank enough to admit not only that he had accessed such material within weeks of his release on parole, but also that he had been accessing such material in the period before he sexually assaulted the two victims many years beforehand. Some of the material that he possessed was in category four of the well-known classification system; that is not the worst category, but some of the images depicted penetrative sexual intercourse between adults and children.
As one would expect, the defendant was charged with further offences, his parole was revoked, and he returned to custody on 11 November 2014. Subsequently, he was sentenced by Judge Hanley SC in the District Court for two offences arising from the child abuse material.
Judge Hanley spoke of the fact the offender was on parole at the time these offences were committed, the number and categorisation of the images located on the offender's laptop and mobile phone, and their role in determining the objective seriousness of the offences. He found that the defendant did not disseminate the images or make them accessible to others, and that the defendant acknowledged that the offences were not "victimless crimes". His Honour concluded that the first offence fell into the lower end of objective seriousness and the second fell below the midrange. Judge Hanley also considered the moral culpability of the applicant, his prior offending, the pleas of guilty, and his remorse.
It is noteworthy that Judge Hanley spoke of the likelihood of the defendant re-offending as being in the moderate to high range. His Honour also noted that the defendant indicated a desire to continue to undertake rehabilitation programs, however concluded that the he did not consider the prospects of rehabilitation to be good.
Judge Hanley imposed a total head sentence of imprisonment for three years, which commenced on 18 June 2015 and which will expire on 17 June 2018, with a total non-parole period of two years, which expired on 17 June 2017.
Again, it appears that things have generally proceeded satisfactorily whilst the defendant has been in custody.
The offender was recently granted parole earlier this year, but when it became clear that he had nowhere to live, that parole was revoked. The defendant did not seek to argue against that revocation.
In summary, the result of the criminal and custodial history of the defendant is that this intellectually disabled man has been continuously incarcerated since early October 2008 - a period approaching a decade - except for an intervening period in the community of a little over seven months.
[2]
Application
It is in that context that the State of New South Wales (the plaintiff) has moved upon a summons filed on 6 February 2018 seeking an extended supervision order (ESO) of three years to commence on the date upon which the head sentence of the defendant will expire. Fagan J made preliminary orders on 16 March 2018, and the matter came before me on 30 May 2018 for hearing.
On that occasion, the dispute between the parties was closely circumscribed. The plaintiff placed before me without objection a substantial body of documentary material, which had itself been usefully reduced because of the limited dispute between the parties.
Dr Adam Martin, forensic psychiatrist, had provided a report of 27 April 2018 in accordance with the orders of Fagan J, as had Mr Patrick Sheehan, forensic psychologist, by way of a report of 13 April 2018.
In a nutshell, Dr Martin expressed the opinion that the defendant suffers from a chronic sexual attraction to children that can formally be diagnosed as paedophilia.
The forensic psychiatrist also spoke of various aspects of the life and character of the defendant being "likely to result in him having an ongoing heightened risk of future sexual offending."
Dr Sheehan expressed the opinion that the defendant falls within the "Moderate - High" or "Above - Average" risk category "relative to other male sexual offenders in the sample population."
Each expert referred to the well-known limitations of static, factor-based risk analysis. So did Mr Samuel Ardasinski, senior psychologist within the Department of Corrective Services, who expressed the view that the most appropriate description of the risk of sexual recidivism posed by the defendant is the rating "Moderate - High".
Speaking more generally about the material from forensic psychiatrists and psychologists, the defendant has been frank enough to admit that he has a sexual attraction to children that is more intense than the one that he experiences for adults. He has put forward simplistic strategies that he would adopt on release in order to avoid offending again. And he has also been frank enough to admit that the offence he committed against the young son of his then-partner on 29 September 2008 was not an isolated assault upon him.
[3]
An extremely circumscribed dispute
At the hearing before me, counsel for the defendant (who is of significant experience in criminal and quasi-criminal matters, as is her instructing solicitor) made it clear that none of the formal or mechanistic pre-conditions to the making of an ESO pursuant to the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 NSW (the Act) were disputed on behalf of the defendant.
She also explicitly accepted that the central test for the making of such an order - to be found in s 5B of the Act - had been established, whilst accepting of course that that question remains a matter for me.
Nor did she dispute the length of the ESO proposed by the plaintiff, especially bearing in mind the flexibility as to variation to be found in s 13 of the Act.
In short, the only dispute between the parties before me was about some of the conditions proposed as part of the ESO. Counsel for the defendant submitted that there were many conditions proposed by the plaintiff that I would not "consider appropriate", that being the statutory test to be found in s 11 of the Act, as elucidated by the decision in Wilde v State of New South Wales [2015] NSWCA 28; 249 A Crim R 65 at [53]-[54]:
"Section 11 does not require that there must be a specific demonstrated link to the past offending which is the basis of the order made under the Act. Rather, the court must be satisfied, having regard to the scope, purpose and objects of the Act, that it is appropriate to impose a particular condition so as to address the risk of future offending of the type which was the basis of the order.
As the cases to which we have referred correctly state, it is not appropriate for the court under s 11 to impose conditions on a person directed to general future criminal conduct. But the condition does not have to have a 'demonstrated' link to the past offending in the sense submitted by the appellant."
[4]
Determination of undisputed matters
Turning first to essential formal preconditions for the making of an ESO pursuant to s 5B(a) of the Act, there can be no dispute that the defendant is a person who is over 18 years of age; who has been sentenced to imprisonment for a serious sexual offence; and who is in custody serving a sentence for an offence of a sexual nature, thus being a supervised offender (s 5I(2)(a)(i)-(ii)). I am satisfied of all of the formal pre-conditions to the making of an ESO.
Turning to the fulcrum of the application (that is, the test to be found in s 5B(d), as informed by s 5D of the Act), I am well satisfied, to a high degree of probability, that the defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision pursuant to an ESO.
I say that because the defendant is a man with an admitted sexual attraction to children. He has acted on that attraction by committing penetrative sexual offences against two of them. Five years and six months of incarceration did not deter him from acting upon that attraction again, by possessing child abuse material only weeks after that extended period of custody came to an end. Nor did therapy, engaged in whilst in custody for an extended period, prevent it. Those subsequent offences occurred when he was living in the community, receiving further therapy, and to all appearances was proceeding well.
Furthermore, child abuse material had been used by the applicant prior to the commission of the first set of offences in order to stimulate himself sexually. The intellectual disability of the defendant may not only make rehabilitative insight more difficult for him, it may also play a part in his attraction towards other unsophisticated persons; namely, children. As things stand, it seems that he is bereft of effective support within the community from family members or friends, and if he had been released recently would have been reduced to the instability of crisis accommodation or homelessness.
All of the expert opinion evidence placed before me - including risk assessments based on statistical analysis, the reports received by the persons appointed under s 7(4), the results of other assessments prepared by a qualified psychiatrist, registered psychologist or registered medical practitioner, and more generally - merely confirms the evaluation that one inevitably arrives at as a layperson: there is a real risk that, if living in the community isolated, unsupported, and unsupervised, the defendant, who has an intellectual disability and diagnosed paedophilia, may well act upon his sexual attraction again (s 9(3)(b)-(d),(i) of the Act).
Turning to discuss in more detail for a moment the mandatory factors for consideration to be found in s 9(2) of the Act, a risk management report prepared by Corrective Services NSW on 29 October 2017 identified risk factors and developed a risk management plan to enable the defendant to be practicably managed in the community. Some limitations to the plan were identified, such as resources to conduct field visits and difficulty in monitoring the defendant to ensure he does not come in to contact with children (s 9(3)(d1)). Such options, alongside those discussed by Mr Ardasinski as risk management strategies, were considered as options that might reduce the defendant's likelihood of re-offending (s 9(3)(e1). And I am satisfied that an ESO will go some way to preventing the defendant from re-offending, and thereby aiding his rehabilitation.
The defendant also participated in a "Self-Regulation Program - Sexual Offending" between 27 March 2012 and 25 October 2013, and re-entered the program after returning to custody in 2014. Ms Celia Langton prepared a report about the defendant's participation, and concluded that it was dependant on his mood, as he would rarely engage in coping strategies when in a low mood. Whilst some progress was noted, the defendant was reported as needing to implement the strategies in real life situations, as poor coping strategies such as rumination, self-harm and reliance on others to solve his emotions for him remained. The defendant has since completed the program on 24 April 2018 (s 9(3)(e)). As I have said, the failure of the defendant on parole after seemingly beneficial therapy sounds an inevitable note of caution with regard to his impeding release into the community again.
As previously noted, the defendant was released to parole on 14 April 2014. The parole of the defendant was revoked seven months later following the commission of the 2014 offences, following which the defendant admitted as recorded in Forensic Psychology Services Case Notes, that he had been accessing child pornography as soon as he had access to the computer and the internet, approximately two months after his release on parole. Clearly, the defendant did not comply with his obligations when previously released on parole (s 9(3)(f)). As for the likelihood of the defendant complying with an ESO, except for his viewing of child pornography, the defendant was able to comply with his other conditions whilst on parole. With increased supervision imposed by the ESO, that does increase the likelihood that the defendant will be able to comply with the conditions imposed (s 9(3)(e2)). I by no means regard the imposition of an ESO as a fruitless exercise, despite his previous failure on conditional liberty; quite the contrary.
The defendant, when released on parole in 2014, was subject to obligations pursuant to the Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000 (NSW) and the Child Protection (Offenders Prohibition Orders) Act 2004 (NSW). There is no evidence the defendant failed to comply with any of his obligations under those pieces of legislation; it is nonetheless clear that their conditions were not sufficient to prevent the defendant from re-offending (s 9(3)(g)).
In short, considering all of the factors to be found in s 9(2) of the Act, and thinking about the matter as a whole and in a common sense way, I accept the submission of counsel for the plaintiff, and the concession of counsel for the defendant, that the central test for the making of an ESO has been made out, especially bearing in mind that the safety of the community is the paramount consideration (s 9(2)).
Finally, for all the reasons that I have given immediately above, I consider that a duration of the ESO of no less than three years is appropriate.
That leaves only consideration of the proposed conditions of ESO.
[5]
Disputed conditions
Turning now to the real dispute before me, I am content to impose all of the conditions that were not disputed by way of the detailed submissions of counsel for the defendant.
In evaluating whether to make a disputed condition, I have considered its appropriateness, both individually and in the context of all other conditions. I have also borne in mind the test promulgated by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Wilde, as extracted at [28] of this judgment, namely whether the Court is satisfied, having regard to the scope, purpose and objects of the Act, that it is appropriate to impose a particular condition in order to address the risk of the type of future offending that forms the basis of the ESO.
In applying that test, I have also borne in mind that one can expect the "Departmental Supervising Officer" (DSO) who is responsible for the defendant to undertake his supervision in a common sense way, informed by a practical and constructive exercise of discretion.
Turning now to particular disputed conditions, counsel for the defendant disputed whether electronic monitoring was appropriate, bearing in mind that the defendant has never committed offences against "random" children (leaving aside those depicted in the child abuse material); rather, he opportunistically sexually assaulted children to whom he had access through relationships with adults.
So much may be accepted. But, at least as a starting point, bearing in mind how thoroughly the defendant failed on the last occasion when he was on conditional liberty, and the need for his life to be highly structured and monitored, at least in the period immediately after his release, I believe that electronic monitoring is appropriate (condition 5).
I also believe that a "sunset clause" in the form of electric monitoring for a limited period is inappropriate, because it would be too inflexible.
I also consider that it is appropriate for the defendant to provide a schedule of movements to his DSO (condition 6). I say that because it is to be recalled that there was an element of secretiveness, and deceit by omission, for many months whilst the defendant was on parole.
In similar vein, I respectfully think there can be no complaint about a condition calling upon the defendant to inform truthfully his DSO, and appropriate other persons, about his movements and activities (condition 9).
It is true that the defendant has not committed offences against strangers at night, or in the early hours of the morning. But I expect that this man on release will lead an isolated, lonely, unfulfilling life. Release from custody will also be a very large adjustment for him. There is nothing inappropriate about a requirement that he be at home between midnight and 6 am, unless approval to the contrary has been granted by his DSO (condition 11).
Furthermore, the defendant has not worked for years, and I expect that he will be living on his pension upon release. I think it perfectly appropriate that his DSO be empowered to direct him to engage in education, training, or personal development, in order to aid his rehabilitation (condition 20).
On the other hand, it is surely appropriate that the defendant not start employment, volunteer work, or education without the approval of his DSO, bearing in mind the fact that, in the past, he took advantage of access to children in order to commit very grave offences against them (condition 21).
As for alcohol, it is true that it has not been implicated in his offending. But he has spoken frankly to at least one expert of becoming a violent person when drunk. And speaking more generally, alcohol has a notoriously disinhibiting effect. I do not consider it inappropriate to permit his DSO a measure of control over his possession and use of alcohol (condition 22A).
In similar vein - and accepting that prohibited drugs have not played a criminogenic role in the life of the defendant - nevertheless I think it is soundly appropriate that this man - who has, after all been incarcerated for almost a decade, with a very short break - be prohibited from knowingly associating with persons who are in the process of administering, or under the influence of, such substances (condition 26).
In light of the comprehensive and concerning failure of the defendant on parole, despite everything seeming to proceed quite well on the surface, extensive search powers are, in my opinion, appropriate. And because of the well-known ability for a person to possess thousands of images on a very small USB stick, the power to search his person is also appropriate (condition 34 and 35).
Finally, in light of all that has gone wrong in the past, a restriction upon the defendant possessing certain kinds of pornographic material is, in my opinion, quite appropriate (condition 40).
In short, I consider that all of the conditions proposed by the plaintiff - as amended by its counsel at the hearing, after reflection - are appropriate, and should be imposed by me. Those of them that do not directly relate to his prior offending do nevertheless relate to preventing its recurrence indirectly, in my opinion. As I say, I am relying upon his DSO to exercise his or her discretion with regards to them in a practical and common sense way.
Finally, the parties were in agreement that proposed order 4 in the summons should be made, not only in accordance with the applicable Practice Note, but also in order to facilitate the rehabilitation of the defendant. I agree with that joint position, and it is reflected by my order 3.
[6]
Orders
I make the following orders:
1. Pursuant to ss 5B and 9(1)(a) and 10(1A)(a) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), an extended supervision order is imposed upon the defendant, commencing on 17 June 2018 for a period of 3 years.
2. The defendant must comply with the conditions annexed to this judgment for the period of the extended supervision order.
3. Access to the Court's file in this proceeding is restricted. Access is only permitted to a non-party with the leave of a judge of the Court, and with prior notice to the parties so as to allow them an opportunity to be heard in respect of the application for access.
[7]
KEITH FARRINGDON
Departmental Supervising Officer (DSO)
Corrective Services NSW (CSNSW)
Part A: Reporting and Monitoring Obligations
Monitoring and Reporting
The defendant must accept the supervision of Corrective Services NSW (CSNSW) until the end of the Order.
The defendant must report to the Department Supervising Officer (DSO) or any other person supervising him as directed by his DSO.
The defendant must follow all reasonable directions by his DSO or any other person supervising him.
The defendant must attend the police station nearest to his approved accommodation within 3 days of the date of this order and provide a copy of this order.
Electronic Monitoring
The defendant must wear electronic monitoring equipment as directed by his DSO or any other person supervising him.
Schedule of Movements
If directed, the defendant must provide a weekly plan (called a schedule of movements) and this is to be provided 3 days before it is due to start.
If the defendant wants to change anything in his schedule of movements once it is approved by his DSO, he must tell his DSO about the change 24 hours in advance, unless the DSO approves a shorter period.
The defendant must not deviate from his approved schedule of movements except in an emergency.
The defendant must truthfully answer questions from his DSO, or any other person supervising him, about where he is, where he is going and what he is doing.
Part B: Accommodation
The defendant must live at an address approved by his DSO.
The defendant must be at his approved address between 12am (Midnight) and 6am unless other arrangements are approved by his DSO.
The defendant must allow his DSO or any other person supervising him to visit him at his approved address at any time and, for that purpose, to enter the premises at that address.
The defendant must not spend the night anywhere other than his approved address without the approval of his DSO.
The defendant must not permit any person to enter and remain, or to stay overnight, at his approved address, without the prior approval of his DSO.
Part C: Place and travel restrictions
The defendant must not leave New South Wales without the approval of CSNSW.
The defendant must surrender any passports held by the defendant to the Commissioner.
The defendant must not go to a place if his DSO tells him he cannot go there.
Without limiting condition [17] above, the defendant must not, without the prior approval of his DSO, go to any:
a. Day-care centres, pre-schools and schools;
b. Amusement parlours, amusement parks and theme parks
c. Cinemas;
d. Libraries and museums;
e. Camping grounds and caravan parks;
f. Children's playgrounds, parks, and areas with play equipment provided for the use of children;
g. Pools, playing fields and sporting facilities;
h. Concerts, theatre shows, movies, events and activities intended for the entertainment of children; or
i. Residences where the defendant knows that persons under 18 ordinarily reside;
j. Internet cafes or other businesses which provide public access to the internet either for payment or for no charge (other than employment agencies).
The defendant must not attend any place used solely or mainly for the sale or display of sexually explicit material, or for providing sexual services or sexually explicit entertainment without prior approval of his DSO.
Part D: Employment, finance and education
If the defendant is unemployed, the defendant must make himself available for education, training or participation in a personal development program as directed by his DSO.
The defendant must not start any job, volunteer work or educational course without the approval of his DSO.
Part E: Drugs and alcohol
The defendant must not possess or use illegal drugs, and he must not possess or use prescription medication other than as prescribed.
22A.The defendant must not possess or use alcohol without the prior approval of his DSO.
The defendant must submit to testing for drugs and alcohol as directed by his DSO.
Part F: Non-association
Association with Children
The defendant must not approach or have contact with anyone who he knows is under 18 unless his DSO tells him he may do so, and he is with someone who has been approved in writing by his DSO.
Associations with Others (not children)
The defendant must not associate with people that his DSO tells him not to.
The defendant must not knowingly associate with any people who are consuming, administering, or under the influence of illegal drugs.
If the defendant starts a relationship with someone, he must tell his DSO who may tell the person about the defendant's criminal history.
The defendant must obtain written permission from his DSO prior to joining or affiliating with any club or organisation, including any internet or mobile based social networking service.
Part G: Access to the internet and other electronic communication
The defendant must give his DSO a list of all devices, services and applications he uses to communicate with or to access the internet. This includes phones, tablet devices, data storage devices or computers. This includes the details of telephone numbers, service provider account numbers, email addresses or other user names and relevant passwords and codes, used by the defendant and the nature and details of the internet connection, as directed.
The defendant's DSO (or any other person requested by the DSO) may remotely inspect any internet account used by the defendant, including the defendant's email addresses, in monitoring compliance with this order.
The defendant must obey any reasonable directions of his DSO about the use of phones, tablet devices, data storage devices, computers and other devices, including any reasonable directions relating to his access to the internet.
The defendant must allow his telephone and/or internet service provider to share information about his accounts with his DSO.
The defendant must provide a list of communication devices and data storage devices in the defendant's possession and advise the DSO of any change to the inventory immediately.
Part H: Search and seizure
If the defendant's DSO reasonably believes that a search (of the type referred to in sub-paragraphs (d) to (f) below) is necessary:
a. for the safety and welfare of residents or staff or persons present at the defendant's approved address;
b. to monitor the defendant's compliance with this order; or
c. because the DSO reasonably suspects the defendant of behaviour or conduct associated with an increased risk of the defendant committing a serious offence;
then the DSO may direct, and the defendant must submit to:
d. search and inspection of any part of, or any thing in, the defendant's approved address;
e. search and inspection of any part of, or any thing in, any vehicle owned, hired by or under the control of the defendant;
f. search and inspection of any part of, or any thing in, any storage facility, including a garage, locker or commercial facility owned, hired by or under the control of the defendant; and/or
g. search and examination of his person.
For the purposes of the above condition:
a. a search of the defendant means a garment search or a pat-down search.
b. to the extent practicable a pat-down search will be conducted by a DSO of the same sex as the defendant, or by an Officer of CSNSW of the same sex as the defendant under the direction of the DSO.
NOTE:
"Garment search" means a search of any article of clothing worn by the defendant or in the defendant's possession, where the article of clothing is touched or removed from the person's body.
"Pat-down search" means a search of a person where the person's clothed body is touched.
During a search carried out pursuant to condition [34] above, the defendant must allow the DSO (or any other person requested by the DSO) to seize anything found, whether in the defendant's possession or not, which the DSO reasonably suspects will compromise:
a. the safety of residents or of staff at the defendant's approved address;
b. the welfare or safety of any member of the public or any other person; or
c. the defendant's compliance with this order;
or which the DSO reasonably suspects relates to behaviour or conduct associated with an increased risk of the defendant committing a serious offence.
The defendant must allow CSNSW to search any phone, tablet device, data storage device or computer that he may use.
The defendant must not attempt to destroy or interfere with any object that is the subject of a search or seizure, carried out pursuant to conditions [34] to [37] above.
Part I: Access to pornographic, violent and classified material
The defendant must not purchase, possess, access, obtain, view, participate in or listen to any photographs, audio and/or visual material depicting children or childlike images without the prior approval of his DSO.
Subject to condition [39] above, the defendant must not purchase, possess, access, obtain, view, participate in or listen to pornographic material classified or pornographic material that would be classified as Refused Classification, X18+, Restricted Category 2 and Restricted Category 1 without the prior approval of his DSO.
Part J: Personal details and appearance
The defendant must not change his name from "Keith Farringdon" or use any other name without the approval of his DSO.
The defendant must not use any alias, log-in name, or a name other than "Keith Farringdon" or use any email address other than those provided to the DSO in accordance with condition [29] above, on any internet site (including social networking sites), any online communication applications or any third party sites or applications that requires the user to have a user identification name or log-in email.
The defendant must not change his appearance without the approval of his DSO.
The defendant must let CSNSW photograph him.
If the defendant changes the details of any current form of identification or obtains further forms of identification, he must provide his DSO with such details.
Part K: Medical intervention and treatment
The defendant must notify his DSO of the identity and address of any healthcare practitioner that he consults.
The defendant must attend all psychological, psychiatric or other assessments, therapy, support and treatment that his DSO tells him to attend.
The defendant must take all medications that are prescribed to him by his healthcare practitioners.
If the defendant knowingly ceases to take medication that has been prescribed, either on a temporary or permanent basis, the defendant is to notify his DSO within 24 hours of ceasing to take the medication.
The defendant must agree to his healthcare practitioners sharing information including reports on his progress and information he has told them with each other and with his DSO.
The defendant must agree to any information being shared between those agencies that are involved in his supervision including, but not limited to, his DSO and CSNSW.
DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated.
Decision last updated: 13 June 2018