State of New South Wales v Thomas

LEGISLATION CITED : Crimes Act 1900 Crimes (Serious Sex Offenders) Act 2006

Attorney General for the State of New South Wales v Brookes [2008] NSWSC 150 Attorney General for the State of New South Wales v Tillman [2007] NSWCA 119 CASES CITED : Attorney General for New South Wales v Tillman [2007] NSWSC 605 Cornwall v Attorney General for New South Wales [2007] NSWCA 374 Tillman v Attorney General for the State of New South Wales [2007] NSWCA 327; (2007) 70 NSWLR 448

PARTIES : State of New South Wales (Plaintiff) Edward Reginald Thomas (Defendant)

COUNSEL : Ms CE Adamson SC with Ms A Mitchelmore, counsel (Plaintiff) Mr D Thiering, counsel (Defendant)

SOLICITORS : IV Knight, Crown Solicitor (Plaintiff) Legal Aid Commission (Defendant

• 19 - IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES COMMON LAW DIVISION SCHMIDT J

2010/85162 THE STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES v EDWARD REGINALD THOMAS

JUDGMENT 1 HER HONOUR: By summons of 7 April 2010 the plaintiff commenced these proceedings, seeking an order under s 9(1)(a) of the Crimes (Serious Sex Offenders) Act 2006 ('the Act'), that the defendant be subject to an extended supervision order for a period of 5 years. The defendant is in custody, serving the balance of a 5 year sentence handed down in May 1999, for attempted aggravated sexual assault of a child under 16 years and aggravated sexual assault, the circumstance of aggravation being the child's age. The defendant was extradited from Queensland in April 2008 to serve the balance of this sentence, having breached the terms of the parole order pursuant to which he was released from custody in September 2001, on the day after his release. The defendant's sentence expires on 27 April 2010. 2 Earlier today I made an order under s 7 of the Act for the appointment of two psychiatrists to examine and report on the defendant and directing the defendant to attend those examinations, as well as an order under s 8(1) of the Act, that the defendant be subject to an interim supervision order, with effect from 27 April, pending the hearing of the application for final extended supervision orders. These are the reasons for the making of those orders.

Section 7 Order 3 Section 7 of the Act provides: 7 Pre-trial procedures (1) An application for an extended supervision order must be served on the sex offender concerned within 2 business days after the application is filed in the Supreme Court or within such further time as the Supreme Court may allow. (2) The State of New South Wales must disclose to the offender such documents, reports and other information as are relevant to the proceedings on the application (whether or not intended to be tendered in evidence): (a) in the case of anything that is available when the application is made, as soon as practicable after the application is made, and (b) in the case of anything that subsequently becomes available, as soon as practicable after it becomes available. (3) A preliminary hearing into the application is to be conducted by the Supreme Court within 28 days after the application is filed in the Supreme Court or within such further time as the Supreme Court may allow. (4) If, following the preliminary hearing, it is satisfied that the matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of an extended supervision order, the Supreme Court must make orders: (a) appointing:

(i) 2 qualified psychiatrists, or (ii) 2 registered psychologists, or (iii) 1 qualified psychiatrist and 1 registered psychologist, or (iv) 2 qualified psychiatrists and 2 registered psychologists, to conduct separate psychiatric or psychological examinations (as the case requires) of the offender and to furnish reports to the Supreme Court on the results of those examinations, and

(b) directing the offender to attend those examinations. (5) If, following the preliminary hearing, it is not satisfied that the matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of an extended supervision order, the Supreme Court must dismiss the application. 4 There was no issue between the parties that the defendant was a serious sex offender as defined in s 4 of the Act and that the offences in respect of which he is presently serving his sentence fall within the definition of a serious sex offence, appearing in that section. The defendant is serving a sentence for offences under s 61J, s 344A and s 61M of the Crimes Act 1900. The s 61J and 61M offences respectively carried maximum penalties of 20 and 7 years. There was also no issue that the plaintiff's application was made in accordance with the requirements of s 6 of the Act. 5 The defendant did not object to an examination by Court appointed psychiatrists and/or psychologists and indicated that he would submit to orders that he attend for that purpose. The parties agreed that Drs Robert Lewin and Sampson Roberts should be appointed to undertake those examinations.

Onus 6 The onus to make out a case for orders under the Act falls on the plaintiff. Given what was observed in Attorney General for the State of New South Wales v Tillman [2007] NSWCA 119 at [98] it is apparent that the questions here before the Court depend on a consideration of the material on which the plaintiff relies, without considering what evidence the defendant might call at a final hearing, although any evidence on which the defendant relies at this stage, is of course relevant to be considered. Such evidence goes to discretionary matters, but not to the matters on which the plaintiff relies. It is also not necessary to predict what weight that material will finally be given, or whether final orders will be made. (See Attorney General for the State of New South Wales v Brookes [2008] NSWSC 150 at [12] - [14]). 7 It must also be considered that what must be established by the plaintiff under s 9(2) of the Act, must be established to a 'high degree of probability'. This is proof to a higher standard than the civil standard, but lower than the criminal (see Attorney General for New South Wales v Tillman [2007] NSWSC 605 at [27] per Bell J). It must be shown that the defendant is 'likely' to commit a further serious sex offence. That is to 'a degree of probability at the upper end of the scale, but not necessarily exceeding 50 per cent' (see Tillman v Attorney General for the State of New South Wales [2007] NSWCA 327; (2007) 70 NSWLR 448 at [89]). In Cornwall v Attorney General for New South Wales [2007] NSWCA 374 this was explained at [21] as: "The expression "a high degree of probability" indicates something "beyond more probably than not"; so that the existence of the risk, that is the likelihood of the offender committing a further serious sex offence, does have to be proved to a higher degree than the normal civil standard of proof, though not to the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt. On the other hand, the risk or likelihood itself does not have to be a probability to the civil standard of proof, but rather a sufficiently substantial probability to satisfy the criterion "likely" as explained in TSL ." 8 Section 9 of the Act specifies what must be established to justify the making of an extended supervision order. It provides: 9 Determination of application for extended supervision order (1) The Supreme Court may determine an application for an extended supervision order: (a) by making an extended supervision order, or (b) by dismissing the application. (2) An extended supervision order may be made if and only if the Supreme Court is satisfied to a high degree of probability that the offender is likely to commit a further serious sex offence if he or she is not kept under supervision. (3) In determining whether or not to make an extended supervision order, the Supreme Court must have regard to the following matters in addition to any other matter it considers relevant: (a) the safety of the community, (b) the reports received from the persons appointed under section 7 (4) to conduct examinations of the offender, and the level of the offender's participation in any such examination, (c) the results of any other assessment prepared by a qualified psychiatrist, registered psychologist or registered medical practitioner as to the likelihood of the offender committing a further serious sex offence, the willingness of the offender to participate in any such assessment, and the level of the offender's participation in any such assessment, (d) the results of any statistical or other assessment as to the likelihood of persons with histories and characteristics similar to those of the offender committing a further serious sex offence, (e) any treatment or rehabilitation programs in which the offender has had an opportunity to participate, the willingness of the offender to participate in any such programs, and the level of the offender's participation in any such programs, (f) the level of the offender's compliance with any obligations to which he or she is or has been subject while on release on parole or while subject to an earlier extended supervision order, (g) the level of the offender's compliance with any obligations to which he or she is or has been subject under the Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000 or the Child Protection (Offenders Prohibition Orders) Act 2004, (h) the offender's criminal history (including prior convictions and findings of guilt in respect of offences committed in New South Wales or elsewhere), and any pattern of offending behaviour disclosed by that history, (i) any other information that is available as to the likelihood that the offender will in future commit offences of a sexual nature. 9 It followed from s 7(4), that if the orders sought by the plaintiff were to be made, it was necessary to come to the view that the matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of an extended supervision order. That depended upon the matters specified in ss 9(2) and 9(3) being established by the plaintiff. If those requirements were not met by the plaintiff, then this application had to be refused. Having considered the material on which the plaintiff relied, which was not the subject of any challenge by the defendant, in the light of the twin purposes of the Act, namely the safety and protection of the community and the encouragement of serious sex offenders to undertake rehabilitation (s 3), I was satisfied that the plaintiff had met the onus which fell upon it at this stage of these proceedings. That conclusion rested on the evidence to which I now turn.

The evidence 10 In support of its application the plaintiff relied on various supporting documents, directed to the matters specified in s 6 of the Act. In evidence was a schedule of the defendant's convictions, as well as the records relating to those convictions. This material disclosed sixteen convictions for offences committed in New South Wales, Western Australia and Queensland. The defendant is now aged 55 years. The first offence was a 1968 conviction for neglect and exposure to moral danger, for which the defendant was admonished and discharged. In 1974 there were convictions for two counts of malicious injury, one of stealing and one of stealing a motor vehicle. In 1976 a conviction for aggravated assault of a female. In 1977 convictions for assault and rape. In 1981 convictions for possession of concealable firearm; 2 counts of stealing; and 2 counts of stealing with actual violence whilst armed with a dangerous weapon. In 1982 a conviction for rape. In 1987 a conviction for produce dangerous drug. In 1988 a conviction for break enter and steal. In 1990 convictions for break, enter and steal; 2 counts of larceny (motor vehicle); and 2 counts of assault and carry firearms in a manner likely to endanger safety. In 1999 convictions for attempted aggravated sexual assault - child under 16 and aggravated sex assault - victim under 16 years. In 2003 convictions for sexual assault, possessing dangerous drug and escape in lawful custody. In 2005 fraud convictions for dishonestly obtain property from another and two counts of entering or remaining in a dwelling or yard. In 2007 a conviction of entering or remaining in a dwelling or yard. Other documents disclosed many convictions for various driving offences, including disqualified driving; negligent driving; failing to stop after an accident; and prescribed concentration of alcohol offences. The history also revealed recognisances forfeited when the defendant did not appear to answer charges. 11 A risk assessment report of the defendant dated 4 March 2010, was also in evidence. It had been prepared by the Senior Specialist Psychologist of the Department of Justice & Attorney General, Mr Sheehan, which was also signed by the Director Sex and Violent Offender Programme, Mr Ware. The report notes that the defendant consented to participating in a clinical interview for this assessment. In preparing the report regard was also paid to Departmental files, which included the sentencing remarks of Ducker J, given on 5 May 1999; Western Australian and Queensland Police and Departmental files; the defendant's CUBIT treatment file; his probation and report file; Justice Health file; and numerous other documents, including other earlier assessments of the defendant, created for various purposes. 12 The report outlined the defendant's history of sexual offending in 1977, 1983, 1998 and 2002 against adults and children, including male and female victims who have generally been known to him, with the 1998 offence being understood to constitute a serious sex offence as defined by the Act. Victim ages ranged from 12 years to adults. The offences ranged from sexual fondling to penile-vaginal sexual intercourse. An entrenched pattern of general criminality throughout the defendant's life was also noted. A number of further charges for sexual offences which did not result in conviction were also noted. 13 It was noted that parole in 2001 was then dependent on the defendant completing a sex offender treatment programme and residing in approved accommodation in Sydney and continuing treatment maintenance under a Departmental Forensic Psychology Services programme (FPS) in Surry Hills. The defendant failed to attend his initial appointment with the Parole Service, did not reside in the approved accommodation, or contact the FPS. Parole was revoked in October 2001, but the defendant had travelled to Queensland, from where he was later extradited in 2008, in order to serve the balance of his sentence. In the meantime the defendant had been convicted in Queensland of sexual and other offences and charged, but not convicted of other sexual offences. 14 The defendant's primary diagnosis was found to be Antisocial Personality Disorder. He is medicated with antidepressant medication, having been medicated with such medicines for over 10 years. The diagnostic criteria for Paedophilia were found not to be satisfied. His victims were found to be more a function of vulnerability and opportunity, than a fixated deviant interest in sexually immature children or sexual violence. There was a very long history of drug and alcohol abuse, as well as drug use in custody. A 12 session Alcohol and other Drug programme had been completed by the defendant, but management of substance use through a community supervision order was suggested. 15 The defendant had participated in the CUBIT programme in 1999, a programme offered to moderate and high risk/needs offenders while in custody. His relapse prevention plan was then noted to be deficient. He had initially declined to participate further in this programme, after his later extradition to NSW, which was regarded as reflecting a failure to appreciate his actual behaviour after release. There was a subsequent participation, but on examination, still ongoing ambivalence about his understanding of his offences. 16 The defendant had also participated in the Custodial Maintenance programme in 2000-01 for offenders who had already completed a formal structured sex offender program. He was then still found to struggle with completion of a relapse prevention programme and his insight into his own behaviour was noted as waning at times. His risk assessment was then found to be moderate, with increased risk if he engaged in illegal drugs, alcohol and other identified risk factors. His earlier behaviour after release was noted as indicating that he had been unsuccessful in transferring treatment gains in custody, into daily life. 17 The defendant further participated in maintenance programmes in 2008, but he then declined to further participate in the CUBIT programme. Following an unfavourable State Parole Authority hearing in 2009, the defendant did participate again in the CUBIT programme. There was little found to have been achieved by the defendant in that programme before the end of 2009, when observable improvements in behaviour began to be noted. The defendant had planned to relocate to rural Victoria on release, in order to reside with family until he finds his own accommodation. He has, however, been approved to reside at the Campbelltown Community Offender Support Programme, if required to reside in NSW after release. 18 After consideration of the defendant's history, the outcome of his participation in treatment programmes and his stated intentions, it was concluded in the report that the defendant was in the high risk category relative to other men who have sexually offended. He was regarded as requiring significant further assistance to enable him to overcome a lifetime of poor habits in community living. To expect him to independently adapt and maintain a positive, risk free lifestyle after release was to expect him to do what he had never before done in his lifetime. While possible, this was regarded as yet unlikely to be achieved, given the defendant's prolonged history of sexual offending behaviour and general pattern of antisocial conduct. 19 Other earlier psychological reports were considered. They were noted as revealing that the defendant has been a long term drug and alcohol abuser. That conclusion was confirmed by sentencing remarks made on conviction for the earliest of the defendant's sexual offences and other remarks made on later sentencing. In 1990 the defendant claimed that he had attended a one week drug rehabilitation programme in Canberra, and then to have recovered under his own efforts. On the evidence there had been no such recovery. A report prepared for the NSW Parole Board in 1990 recommended support and supervision for numerous identified problems, including drug and alcohol use. 20 In a 1999 report as to his state on the day of the offences for which he is presently in custody, the defendant's self report was a state of extreme inebriation, as well as having taking between 20 and 25 vallium tablets and smoked approximately six joints of marijuana. He was then diagnosed as requiring considerable psychotherapy. The report noted that the defendant's files include multiple references to ongoing alcohol, cannabis, opiate, including heroin and methadone and amphetamine abuse. 21 The defendant's suitability for anti libidinal medications was referred to, but the outcome of assessments of the defendant's suitability for such medication was not known. 22 The defendant's risk assessment was that while it was not scientifically possible to accurately predict whether or not the defendant would re-offend, actuarial risk assessments suggested that there was a high relative risk of the defendant re-offending, by comparison to other sex offenders. This reflected the defendant's intimacy defects, that is the incapacity to make friends and feel close to others, the defendant having a long history of transient living, and inhibited development of intimate and stable relationships with others and little past contact with family members, although evidence of a developing familial connection with his brother was noted. The defendant also had a long history of social networks with antisocial peers and failure to develop social connections with non-criminal persons. He had supported an antisocial belief system for many years, with some improvement in cognitive distortions noted during the recent CUBIT programme, although an ability to characterise antisocial behaviour as benign, was noted as still continuing, perhaps as a means of minimising the defendant's sense of wrongdoing. There had also been life long problems with self regulation. Current improvements were noted as possibly reflecting attempts at performance management in the period leading up to release. The defendant's history of sexual offences revealed ongoing problems with sexual self regulation, with offences reflecting sexual preoccupation, blurred sexual boundaries, a sense of sexual entitlement and a poverty of empathic connection with the distress of victims. Recent improvements in the CUBIT programme of behaviour reflecting impaired physical boundaries, were however noted. 23 It was observed that the risk factors identified in 2010 were similar to those identified in 2001. The conclusion reached in the 2010 report was that without further intervention, release into community life was likely to result in the defendant falling back into established patterns. The defendant had positive intentions, but his history suggested caution when predicting his future behaviour. Despite his stated intentions, he remained in the high risk category and required further support.

The plaintiff made out its case 24 The defendant conceded, for the purpose of this interim application, that the material relied on by the plaintiff was capable of satisfying the Court, to the required standard, of the criteria specified in s 9(3) of the Act and that consequently the orders sought could be made. 25 On the evidence, I too was satisfied that the matters in the material before the Court on which the plaintiff relied would, if proven, justify the making of an extended supervision order, pursuant to s 9 of the Act. Those matters, if proven, would permit the Court to be satisfied, to a high degree of probability, that the offender is likely to commit a further serious sex offence if he is not kept under supervision. 26 The material did not permit any conclusion other than that the safety of the community required that an order under s 7 of the Act be made in respect of the defendant and that this would assist the defendant in undertaking rehabilitation. This flowed from a consideration of the defendant's extraordinarily long and extensive past history of sexual and other offending in New South Wales, Queensland and Western Australia, from as early as 1976 to as recently as 2007 (s 9(h)). The defendant's sexual offences involve a range of victims and types and circumstances of offending, including four convictions for sexual assaults, including two of a 12 year old female child and two rapes. The sexual assault of the child occurred in 2002, even after the defendant had claimed self realisation of homosexuality as early as 1992 (s 9(2)). The conclusion reached was supported by consideration of the defendant's failed past participation in treatment programmes (s 9(e)); his past repeated non-compliance with obligations to which he was subject while released on parole, including further offending while on parole, as well as an escape from custody and absconding while on bail (s 9(3)(f); the current assessment of the likelihood of the defendant committing a further serious sex offence without ongoing participation in a treatment or rehabilitation program in a supervised setting, where he can be provided with necessary support (s 9(c); and the statistical assessment of the high likelihood that the defendant will commit a further serious sex offence (s 9(d)).

The section 8 order 27 Section 8 of the Act provides: 8 Interim supervision orders (1) If, in proceedings on an application for an extended supervision order, it appears to the Supreme Court: (a) that the offender's current custody or supervision will expire before the proceedings are determined, and (b) that the matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of an extended supervision order, the Supreme Court may make an order for the interim supervision of the offender. (2) An order under this section commences on the day fixed in the order in that regard (or, if no such day is fixed, as soon as it is made) and expires at the end of such period (not exceeding 28 days from the day on which it commences) as is specified in the order. (3) An order under this section may be renewed from time to time, but not so as to provide for the supervision of the offender under such an order for periods totalling more than 3 months.

28 In this case there was no question that the defendant's current custody will expire before these proceedings are determined and for the reasons explained, that the matters alleged in the supporting material, would, if proved, justify the making of an extended supervision order. It followed that an order for the interim supervision of the defendant had to be made. 29 That order was not opposed, but it was submitted for the defendant that under s 8(2) of the Act the interim supervision order could not exceed 28 days and that it should commence on 27 April, on the expiry of the defendant's current parole period. There was no issue between the parties over the term of the order. It was also submitted for the defendant that the order can be extended upon application, but cannot exceed 3 months in total (s 8(3)). It followed that the order would have to be renewed by application on or before 25 May, or it would expire by effluxion of time. 30 These are matters which it is unnecessary to consider at this stage of the proceedings, as is the defendant's submission that while he does not object to participation in the examinations which the Court is asked to order, that he reserves his position in relation to the conditions of any final supervision order which might be sought, until after the reports of the Court appointed specialists are received. 31 The parties agreed that the Court's order should require that reports be provided to the Court by 19 May and that the matter should be listed for further directions on 21 May. It is anticipated that by that time the defendant will be in a position to inform the Court as to whether the final orders sought will be opposed. In that event it is anticipated that there will be a need for an application for the extension of the interim order to be made by the plaintiff. 32 The conditions sought by the plaintiff in respect of the interim supervision order under s 11 of the Act were also consented to by the defendant. I was satisfied that they were appropriate conditions in the circumstances here before the Court. 33 The matter is listed for directions before me at 9.30 am on 21 May 2010.

Orders 34 For these reasons, pursuant to s 7 and s 8 of the Crimes (Serious Sex Offenders) Act 2006, I ordered that:

1. Two qualified psychiatrists, Dr Robert Lewin and Dr Sampson Roberts are appointed to conduct separate psychiatric examinations of the defendant and that they each furnish a report to the Supreme Court on the results of those examinations by 19 May 2010.

3. The defendant be subject to a period of interim supervision, commencing on 27 April 2010 and expiring 28 days later, on 25 May 2010, on the following conditions: Oversight For the purpose of these conditions, the Departmental supervising officer is the person authorised from time to time by the Commissioner of Corrective Services to manage and supervise the defendant pursuant to the extended supervision order. The Department is the Department of Justice and Attorney General ("the Department"). Corrective Services NSW is a division of the Department. The Community Compliance Group ("the CCG") and Probation and Parole are each part of Corrective Services NSW. The conditions referred to in orders 2 and 3 of the Summons in these proceedings are as follows: Reporting and monitoring 1. For the duration of the supervision order, the defendant must accept the supervision of the CCG for so long as the CCG is involved in the supervision of the defendant and, for any period that the supervision of the defendant is transferred from the CCG to Probation and Parole, the defendant must accept the supervision of Probation and Parole. 2 The defendant must report personally once a week to the Departmental supervising officer and as otherwise directed by that officer. 3 The defendant must comply with any reasonable direction given by the Departmental supervising officer or any other Departmental officer who may from time to time be allocated to the defendant's case. 4 The defendant must wear such electronic monitoring equipment as may from time to time be directed by the Departmental supervising officer and comply with all instructions given by a CCG officer in relation to the operation of such equipment, and must not tamper with or remove such equipment. 5 If directed by the Departmental supervising officer, the defendant must inform the Departmental supervising officer of his movements 48 hours in advance by providing a schedule in writing (or as otherwise directed by the Departmental supervising officer) and must obtain prior approval from the Departmental supervising officer for any proposed change. 6 Condition 5 does not apply if the defendant requires urgent medical attention and he is either unable to inform the Departmental supervising officer of his proposed movements in advance or is unable to obtain prior approval from the Departmental supervising officer for any proposed change 24 hours in advance. Accommodation 7 For the duration of the extended supervising order the defendant must reside at such accommodation as is approved in advance by the Departmental supervising officer. 8 The defendant must accept visits at his approved accommodation, including visits without prior notice, by the Departmental supervising officer or any other Departmental officer who may from time to time be allocated to the defendant's case. 9 If directed by his Departmental supervising officer, the defendant must be at his approved address between 9pm and 6am (or such other hours as may be specified) unless his presence at another place during those hours has been approved by his Departmental supervising officer. 10 The defendant must not leave New South Wales without the prior written permission of the Commissioner or his delegate. Restrictions on employment and other activities Employment 11 The defendant may only enter into employment arranged or approved by the Departmental supervising officer and must not enter into or undertake employment unless it has been so arranged or approved. 12 If deemed necessary by the Departmental supervising officer, the defendant must make his employer aware of his offending history and that he is subject to an extended supervision order and of the terms of this order. Alcohol and other drugs 13 The defendant must not possess or consume any alcohol or illicit drugs or abuse prescription medication (including any alcohol-based products such as methylated spirits). 14 The defendant must submit to drug and alcohol testing as directed by the Departmental supervising officer. 15 The defendant must attend community based drug and alcohol programs as directed by the Departmental supervising officer. 16 The defendant must not attend licensed premises, including but not limited to hotels, bars, licensed clubs and racecourses without the prior approval of the Departmental supervising officer. Associations 17 The defendant must not associate with persons who are specified by the Departmental supervising officer as persons with whom he must not associate. 18 Except with the permission of his Departmental supervising officer, the defendant must not approach or have any unsupervised contact with any persons under the age of 16 years. 19 Without limiting the generality of the previous condition, the defendant must not approach or have any contact with children under 16 years of age at any sporting facility, sporting venue or public swimming pool. 20 Should the defendant propose to enter into a sexual relationship with another person, he must notify the Departmental supervising officer at the earliest opportunity. The defendant must disclose his offence history to that other person if the Departmental supervising officer is satisfied that it is necessary or desirable in the interests of the safety of the other person, or persons in their custody, that they be aware of the defendant's offence history, and directs the defendant to do so. Access to the internet 21 The defendant must comply with any direction made by the Departmental Supervising Officer regarding access to or use of the World Wide Web and the internet by him and without limitation the Departmental Supervising Officer may direct the defendant to use on any computer a parental lock or other device or software that may restrict access to or permit access only to certain websites. Personal details and appearance 22 The defendant must not change his name from Edward Reginald Thomas, use or be known by any other name without prior approval of the Departmental supervising officer. 23 The defendant must not, without the approval of the Departmental supervising officer, change his facial appearance, including facial hair or the colour of his hair and must not alter the length of his hair to the extent that he cannot be reasonably recognised. 24 If the defendant's proposed change of appearance is approved, he must allow himself to be photographed by or on behalf of the Departmental supervising officer. Medical intervention and treatment 25 If directed by his Departmental supervising officer, the defendant must accept such psychological intervention by psychologists employed by the Department as may be offered to him, including the maintenance program provided by the Forensic Psychology Services and must participate in all such rehabilitation treatment and programs as may be directed by the Departmental supervising officer. 26 The defendant must accept a comprehensive assessment (and further assessments from time to time) including medical examinations, pathological investigations, psychometric testing and radiological imaging to be conducted by the Community Forensic Mental Health Service (CFMHS) or the Area Mental Health Service (AMHS) (or Justice Health), to determine whether he is suitable to receive anti-libidinal treatment and, in addition, to determine what other treatment is required, in light of the defendant's potential for sexual reoffending. 27 The defendant must accept psychological and psychiatric assessment and treatment as may be arranged by an AMHS in consultation with or by the CFMHS, including counselling and psychological therapy. 28 The defendant must engage a general practitioner as soon as reasonably practicable and must notify the Departmental supervising officer of the identity and address of the general practitioner. 29 The defendant must disclose to his Departmental supervising officer the identity of any other medical or mental health practitioner, including psychologists, whom he consults. Disclosure of information 30 The defendant must waive his right to the confidentiality of all information disclosed by him during treatment to his doctors, including any psychiatrist or other specialist and any psychologist. 31 The defendant must consent to his general practitioner, any other medical practitioner, his treating psychologists or psychiatrists, the AMHS and CFMHS sharing information about him, including reports on his progress and information he has disclosed during treatment with each other and with the Departmental supervising officer and other departmental officers involved in his supervision. 32 The defendant agrees to all sharing of information between the Departmental supervising officer, the Department, the defendant's employer (if any), CFMHS, any treating AMHS, the defendant's general practitioner and any treating psychologist or psychiatrist. 33 The defendant must attend a six monthly meeting with all agencies or parties in attendance if required by the Departmental supervising officer at which point the defendant's management plan may be reviewed and adjusted if considered appropriate.

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