State of New South Wales v Jason Leslie Stevenson

Judgment 1The plaintiff, the State of New South Wales, has brought proceedings against the defendant, Jason Stevenson, seeking an extended supervision order under s 9(1)(a) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 ("the Act"). Last week I conducted a preliminary hearing under s 7 of the Act, and on Friday, 17 May 2013, I made an order requiring the defendant to attend examinations by two qualified psychiatrists, who are to prepare reports for the final hearing of this matter, and I also made an interim supervision order under s 10A. These are my reasons for that decision. 2On 19 August 2011 the defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for 20 months, with a non-parole period of 13 months, for five offences of sexual intercourse with a person between the ages of 14 and 16 years (s 66C(3) of the Crimes Act 1900). That offence is a "serious sex offence" by virtue of s 5 of the Act, and the defendant is a "sex offender" as defined in s 4. 3By s 7(4), the court must order the psychiatric examination of the defendant if it is satisfied that the matters alleged in the State's supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of an extended supervision order. By s 10A, the court may make an interim supervision order if it appears that the defendant's current custody would expire before the proceedings are finally determined, and that the matters in the supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of a "high risk sex offender extended supervision order." That expression refers to an extended supervision order under s 5C, and the defendant would be classified as a "high risk sex offender" if the court were satisfied to a high degree of probability that he poses an unacceptable risk of committing a serious sex offence if not kept under supervision: s 5B(2). 4Interim supervision was sought because the balance of the offender's sentence, after his parole had been revoked, was to expire on Monday, 20 May. He is represented by Mr Styles, solicitor of the Aboriginal Legal Service. The orders sought by the State were not opposed, subject to a dispute as to some of the proposed conditions of the interim supervision order. However, it remained necessary for me to satisfy myself that the orders were appropriate, applying the statutory test. Given the manner in which the application was conducted, these reasons can be brief. 5The five offences of sexual intercourse of which the defendant was convicted were committed in February 2010. The victim was a 15 year old girl, with whom he had made contact through the internet. His criminal history includes two convictions for common assault, committed on separate occasions in February 2005. On each occasion he grabbed a young girl from behind, placed his hand over her mouth and dragged her backwards. Both girls were able to escape before anything further happened but, plainly enough, his motive was sexual. On the second occasion the girl was 13 years old, and on the first occasion she was only 7. 6On 4 August 2011 he was convicted of using a carriage service "to menace/harass/offend." This arose from his contact with a mature homosexual man through an on-line chat and dating site. Contact was made in April 2010, but in June of that year the defendant sent messages to the man which disturbed him and which he reported to police. The effect of those messages was that the defendant played with his children, and that he would let the man do so, including having anal intercourse with his 10 year old son, if he would keep it a secret. 7The defendant was released on parole in respect of the sentence for the sexual intercourse offences in October 2012, but his parole was revoked and he was returned to custody in February of this year. His response to supervision while on parole was poor. He was frequently in breach of the conditions of parole, as well as the rules of a Community Offender Support Program (COSP) facility where he was residing. Among other things, he contacted two teenage girls though Facebook and his conversations with them quickly became of a sexual nature. He accessed internet sites to meet women, and he had pornographic images of teenage girls on his phone. He associated with women under the age of 18, in and out of the COSP facility. Among other things, he had sexual intercourse with a 16 year old homeless girl in his COSP room over a number of weeks. 8In a breach report a Community Compliance and Monitoring officer, Ms Carol Quilter, said of him, "From the outset of his Parole supervision Mr Stevenson's behaviour has been cause for concern to this Service, particularly in regard to his high risk and predatory sexual behaviour towards young women." A sex offender program completed while in custody and some limited treatment while at liberty had not modified his behaviour. In recommending the revocation of his parole, Ms Quilter wrote that his "selective and flagrant disregard for the conditions of his Parole lend credence to the assessment that his risk of sexual deviance is elevated." She added that "his behaviour demonstrates that re-offending appears inevitable ... ." 9A comprehensive report has been supplied by Mr Patrick Sheehan, senior forensic psychologist at the Department of Corrective Services, and Ms Danielle Matsuo, A/Director Sex and Violent Offender Therapeutic Program, both of whom are experienced in matters of this kind. There is no need to summarise that report for present purposes. It confirms the assessment of him as a high risk sexual offender, concluding that "all the available evidence supports the hypothesis that he would continue to present an elevated risk of sexually re-offending when released to the community." It proposes a framework for the conditions of an extended supervision order, the goal being "to encourage the development and maintenance of a stable and sustainable lifestyle, so that new habits can be formed that might endure beyond supervision." 10The State proposed a number of conditions of the interim supervision order, pursuant to s 11 of the Act. I am satisfied that those which are not in dispute are appropriate in the circumstances. I shall refer only to those about which there was argument. 11Condition 4 requires the defendant to wear electronic monitoring equipment "as may from time to time be directed by the departmental supervising officer ... ." Mr Styles questioned the need for such a condition, as the defendant's history did not demonstrate a pattern of offending whereby he approached areas frequented by children or young people, such as schools or playgrounds. However, I am persuaded by the argument of Ms Mahony, counsel for the State, that electronic monitoring should be available as a tool to ensure his compliance with other conditions. She noted his history of non-compliance with conditions while on parole, in particular, an occasion when he rented a motel room in which he spent some hours with two teenage girls. 12I note that the requirement to wear electronic monitoring equipment is at the discretion of the defendant's supervising officer. I trust that that discretion would be exercised responsibly, the requirement being imposed only if, and for as long as, it is seen to be necessary. 13Condition 13 empowers the defendant's supervising officer to impose a curfew upon him at his approved address between 9pm and 6am, but also confers a discretion upon the officer to vary those hours or to approve his being at some other place during the relevant hours. Mr Styles submitted that there was not a sufficient connection between this requirement and the minimisation of the risk of re-offending, but his primary concern was that it could impede the defendant's prospects of employment or training. It is not apparent to me how the specified hours could have that effect and, in any event, the condition is sufficiently flexible to cater for employment or training at odd hours. Here also, I can see the benefit of the power to impose a curfew in the interest of ensuring compliance with other conditions, and I trust that that power and the discretion accompanying it would be exercised responsibly. 14Condition 21 requires the defendant to notify his supervising officer if he should enter into a relationship with another person involving sexual or intimate contact. Mr Styles accepted that the supervising officer should know of any such relationship but was concerned that, given that the notion of a sexual or intimate relationship lacks precision, the defendant might by an unintended omission find himself in breach of the condition. He suggested an alternative condition requiring the defendant to respond accurately, to the best of his knowledge and ability, to any enquiry by his supervising officer about his relationship with another person. However, I think it appropriate that the onus should be upon him to disclose any such relationship, and it would not be difficult for him to understand the type of relationship to which the condition is directed. Provided this matter is approached in a common sense way by him and by his supervising officer, the condition appears to me to be meaningful and practicable. 15Finally, paragraphs 53 and 54, as originally drawn, required the defendant to consent to disclosure of confidential medical information by any treating or consigned clinician to his supervising officer. Mr Styles was rightly concerned at the breadth of that condition, emphasising the need for confidentiality in the doctor/patient relationship. In the course of discussion it was resolved that the conditions should be redrawn to make it clear that the consent required would relate only to information which, in the belief of the clinician, conveyed that the defendant was at risk of committing a further serious sex offence. Those conditions were recast accordingly.