That statement was explored in cross-examination, in the manner set out at [73] above. In other words, Senior Constable Evans' contribution was not a major contributor to her distress at the time of the incident and probably made a minor contribution overall. His Honour was incorrect in summarising the psychiatric evidence in identifying Dr Parmegiani's views with those of Dr Robertson: they were significantly different in a critical respect.
105 As already noted, Professor Bryant was of the opinion that the conduct of Senior Constable Evans in leaving the surgery was simply one aspect of the exposure to trauma, which could not be separated in causal terms: Tcpt, 23 February 2005, p 44. He treated the absence of another officer as part of the demands placed on the plaintiff in the surgery, but declined to agree that this made it "more difficult for her to cope with what was required of her": p 42. He saw the subsequent conduct of senior officers as no more than a "minor contribution".
106 So far as the events on the evening of 25 August were concerned, none of the experts was prepared to ascribe more than a "minor contribution" to the conduct of Inspector Whitten, after she had left the surgery. The high point for her case was the view expressed by Dr Robertson: however, once pressed on the question of probabilities, he was not prepared to say that the departure of Senior Constable Evans had, more probably than not, given rise to the disorder.
107 The third area of conduct relied upon by the plaintiff was the failure of senior officers either to make further inquiries as to her need for counselling in the period following the incident, or to make sure that counselling was available to her.
108 The findings made by the trial judge in this respect are unclear. Thus, at p 62, in summarising his findings, his Honour stated, in relation to the period between 25 August and early September when the plaintiff went on leave:
"During the latter time the defendant knew, or ought to have known, that the plaintiff was expressing an adverse reaction to her experiences on the evening of 25 August 1999 … . The defendant, through its officers, was negligent in failing to observe and/or act upon the observations, such observations as were made and/or failed to inform her of forms of help available to her in the circumstances."
109 This passage is, with respect, vague as to whether any relevant officer was aware of an adverse reaction, and failed to act upon it, or whether particular officers should have been so aware, but were not.
110 Evidence of actual awareness came from two sources. First, there was evidence from the plaintiff that an officer from Fairfield Police Station, who had heard her on the radio during the incident, had commented later that she sounded distressed. Indeed, so far as the night in question was concerned, it would be reasonable to infer that several of the officers at the incident, including Senior Constable Evans and Inspector Whitten would have been aware of the assistance she gave in the medical room, the state of the victim and the likelihood that she would have been distressed. It was common ground between the parties that the plaintiff had attended a number of serious accidents over the previous three years, was a caring and responsible person, and had no doubt been distressed on each of those occasions. The question was rather whether a normal and expected human reaction failed to diminish over the coming days and became, or was threatening to become, a psychological condition.
111 The other officer who might have been made aware expressly of her distress was Sergeant McEvoy, an education officer, from whom she obtained the name of a chaplain about 10 days later. She did not reveal to him the reason for her request, nor did he ask. However, in a letter dated 13 January 2000, written some four and a half months after the incident, to the Local Area Commander, whilst expressing deep disappointment with the support she had had from other police stated:
"The only officer to keep in contact with me throughout this ordeal has been Sgt McEvoy. He has truly been fantastic. I believe that he should be thanked in some way by the Service."
112 The plaintiff's own evidence, that in the two weeks after the incident she was manifesting significant symptoms, not sleeping and spending much time at home sitting on the floor crying, was complemented by the clear impression that she was maintaining a "brave face" at work. His Honour, however, noted that no other police officers were called by the defendant. At p 25, he stated:
"Whilst the plaintiff may not have been keen to display those symptoms, she had certainly communicated to [the education officers] information indicating that there might be something observable about her upon closer inspection. The absence of those officers from the witness box, which remains unexplained, is, for that reason, one such that … the court would draw the inference that, if called, they would not have assisted the defendant's case.
In addition, of course, there are the named officers who were partners on car duties on the three days before she went on leave and, indeed, presumably, a number of officers who had worked with her on station duties on the two days when she performed those duties before going on leave."
113 The difficulty, from the point of view of the plaintiff, is that she called no evidence to suggest that she had expressed her distress to anyone at Green Valley Police Station, nor that she had behaved in a way which might reasonably have been expected to suggest that she was distressed in a pathological sense. In these circumstances, to criticise the State for not calling witnesses, in 2004, to describe how she had appeared in September 1999, is beside the point. It would seem that the plaintiff's case was, in any event, run on the basis that she should have been actively monitored, given the nature of the incident, and routinely provided with some level of informal counselling or the names of peer support officers, to whom she could turn if she wished. There was, perhaps understandably, a tension in the plaintiff's case between acknowledgement that she had survived a number of traumatic incidents without apparent ill-effects, that over-intrusive inquiries might be neither medically beneficial, nor an appropriate response by an employer operating a disciplined force and, on the other hand, the asserted obligation to "monitor" and offer services routinely, albeit in the knowledge that officers might not readily reveal, or wish to reveal, perceived weakness. These tensions needed to be resolved in order for the plaintiff to demonstrate treatment involving a breach of the duty of care owed by the Police Service to her as an individual officer.
114 In addition, the plaintiff needed to establish that a relevant breach of duty, occurring between 26 August and 6 September, materially contributed, in a legal sense, to her undoubted psychiatric condition. For example, she needed to establish, to the satisfaction of the trial judge, that had she been approached by a peer support officer and offered the opportunity for counselling, she would have done more than she did in relation to the chaplain, prior to going on leave on 6 September. There was no finding to that effect and this Court was not directed to evidence which would have supported such a finding. Further, she needed to establish that such an approach would have materially affected her psychological condition.
115 In this context, it is necessary to bear in mind the evidence of Dr Parmegiani that psychological treatment would be indicated in a case where symptoms continued for longer than three to four weeks. Within four weeks of the incident, the plaintiff had attended the police psychologist and been referred to Ms Blows, whom she first met on 29 September. There was no finding of fact that an earlier referral would have led to a different outcome: nor did the medical evidence expressly support such a finding.
116 This Court did not, of course, have the benefit of hearing the plaintiff's evidence: nevertheless, a reading of the transcript, particularly of her evidence in chief, suggests a level of embitterment with the Police Service, which may have been triggered by the conduct of Senior Constable Evans and Inspector Whitten, on 25 August 1999, but which was overtaken by other events. In his report of 1 December 2003, Dr Parmegiani noted, in relation to a report prepared by a Mr Terry O'Connell, a former police officer who provided services as a consultant in areas of police complaints, discipline and grievances:
"The incidents raised by Mr O'Connell identify the causes of Ms Fahy's PTSD. The incident per se could not be considered unusual in the course of police work. Her experiences following the incident however were a source of significant distress to Ms Fahy. Her PTSD became a conduit for expressing her dissatisfaction with management practices within the NSW Police Service.
Under the circumstances described by her, intervention by the NSW Police Service by way of debriefing, counselling or other psychological treatment would have been of little use. A medical approach would not have addressed the systemic problems that Ms Fahy and Mr O'Connell identified within the NSW Police Service. I would consider these issues to be industrial matters, not medical ones."
117 An example of this concern may be found in the letter of 13 January 2000, written by the plaintiff to the Local Area Commander, Superintendent Hofer, apparently in response to a call made by him to the plaintiff's mother, about a month earlier. The letter, which covered six handwritten pages, provided a moving account of her experience of abandonment and lack of support from colleagues in the Service generally (with the exception of one or two named officers). On 21 January, Superintendent Hofer replied by way of a letter which was entirely sympathetic in tone, although it did not seek to deal with the specific complaints she had raised. Later, however, whilst working in the exhibits room at Green Valley, she discovered the victim's clothing from the 25 August incident and broke down at work. Some weeks later, she had an interview with the Local Area Commander, at which she said she "felt really intimidated" as he and two other officers "were into me about unexplained periods of absence of more than five minutes". In her words, she "stormed out" at the end of the meeting, refusing an offer of a ride home.
118 When she gave evidence in June 2004, she said of the letter which she had received from the Commander that she did not believe a word of it, it had not been an adequate response to her letter and she asserted, perhaps with some hyperbole, that she had expected him to come round to her house: Tcpt, 1 June 2004, pp 73-74.