Stanley Melbourne Gillett & Anor v Brian John Walsh

Interim orders are not granted lightly. Generally the word "urgent" connotes immediacy, that is, a situation in which it would be inappropriate for action to be delayed, or for time to intervene before a certain course is undertaken.

This request was filed in the Registry yesterday. The respondent has not been given notice of the request at this state.

I am aware of the judgments of the Supreme Court in Buzrio Pty Limited v Consumer, Trader & Tenancy Tribunal [2009] NSWSC 836 and Buzrio Pty Limited v Consumer, Trader & Tenancy Tribunal [2009] NSWSC 937. These judgments require the Tribunal to observe the rules of procedural fairness in making interim orders under s 170. In the normal course that would involve giving the affected party notice of the request prior to making any determination.

I am also aware of the earlier judgment of the court in Crawley v Cochrane (1998) NSW Title Cases ¶80-051. In that case the Court held that notice does not have to be given by the Adjudicator before making an order under s 170. The Court in that case was persuaded to this view by the fact that the person affected by the order could make an immediate application for revocation or stay of any such order. I also note that under s 168 of the Act an Adjudicator may dispense with the requirements for written submissions prior to making an interim order.

It may be that, in light of conflicting authority, the legislation needs to be amended to clarify the procedures to be followed by an Adjudicator in making orders under s 170.

In this case, for the reasons set out below, I consider that the request for an interim order should be granted on an ex parte basis. I note that Rothman j in Buzrio Pty Limited v Consumer, Trader & Tenancy Tribunal [2009] NSWSC 836 at paragraph 48 envisaged that, given the urgency of a particular situation, such orders could be made under s 170.

In this case, the Respondent is in the process of carrying out building works on his balcony. The Applicant states that the works will interfere with his view. Further, that the works are in breach of by-laws, and there has been no valid consent given to the works by the Owners Corporation. He states that if the works are allowed to continue there may be significant costs incurred in restoring common property should the Adjudicator on the substantive application order work to cease, or even as he is seeking, be removed.

In the circumstances, taking into account the substantial costs and damage that may accrue should the works continue, I am satisfied that urgent considerations justify the making of the orders.

In making this order I am mindful that those affected have not had an opportunity to put their point of view. It is, however, open to the respondent to make an application to revoke the order and that application will be considered by an Adjudicator expeditiously. 25 The orders made by the Adjudicator were as follows:

The Respondent is to cease all building works on the balcony of lot 49.

This order has effect for a period of three months from the date of this order unless revoked, renewed or the application is earlier determined in accordance with Chapter 5 of the Strata Schemes Management Act 1996.

This order may be renewed by an Adjudicator if a request for its renewal is made no later than three months after the date this order is made.

This order may be revoked by an Adjudicator on application of a person affected by the order.

Within 72 hours of receiving this order the Owners Corporation must display a copy of the order on the scheme notice board for a period of 14 days.

If there is no notice board the Owners Corporation must give a copy of the order to each person shown on the strata roll. Dealing with the matter 26 It is unnecessary to do otherwise than briefly restate the principles which inform the grant or refusal of an application for an interlocutory injunction. 27 In Appleton Papers inc v Tomasetti Paper Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 208 at 215, McLelland J pointed out the importance of recalling that the Court here deals with a discretionary power conferred on the Court in very general terms. As McLelland J made plain at page 216 citing from the judgment of Moffitt P in Stollznow v Calvert [1980] 2 NSWLR 749:

"While useful guidance is provided by the manner of exercise of the discretion in other cases, and by the factors considered in those cases to favour the exercise of the discretion in a particular way, each case must depend upon its own facts. It would be contrary to what I understand to be the accepted law in this country, to confine the exercise of a judicial discretion by judge made rigid formulae."

"The Court addresses itself to two main enquiries. The first is whether the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, in the sense that if the evidence remains as it is, there is a probability that at the trial of the action the plaintiff will be held entitled to relief...the second enquiry...is whether the inconvenience or injury which the plaintiff would be likely to suffer if an injunction were refused, outweighs or is outweighed by, the injury which the defendant would suffer if an injunction were granted." 28 Plainly enough the Court is not able in relation to the instant application to determine contested questions of fact. That process will be before a trial judge when the matter is finally heard. The jurisdictional issue 29 The defendant's counsel contended that this Court lacks jurisdiction to deal with the plaintiffs' dispute, relying on this regard upon section 22 (3) of the CTTT Act which was said to prevent any Court from dealing with any matter which is already before the Tribunal. 30 Section 66 (1) of the Supreme Court Act 1970 provides that the Court may, at any stage of proceedings, by interlocutory or other injunction, restrain any threatened or apprehended breach of contract or other injury. Subsection (4) of the same act provides that the Court may at any stage of proceedings, on terms, grant an interlocutory injunction in any case in which it appears to the Court to be just or convenient to do so. One needs to go no further to ground the jurisdiction of this Court in these proceedings. 31 Somewhat curiously it is to be observed that the defendant's very case so carefully put to the Court, contended that the subject orders were invalid for want of jurisdiction. 32 Subsection 5 of section 22 provides that subsection (3) does not prevent a Court from hearing and determining any proceedings in which it is claimed that any order, determination or ruling of the Tribunal is invalid for want of jurisdiction or from making any order as a consequence of that finding. Whilst it is unnecessary to go this distance, it could be argued that the defendants' very case, in itself, would suffice to permit this Court to determine these proceedings. The defendant's contention that nothing can be said against the proposition that the plaintiffs could never restrain works on the private lot 33 Amongst the many contentions put forward by the defendant was the contention that the plaintiffs' complaint could only relate to works on common property. 34 The problem with this argument concerns the plaintiff's contention that one of the specific items of work being carried out is to drill holes into the tiles on the surface of the deck of the terrace in order to build above that surface, a pergola with a retractable roof. This would contravene the provisions in section 65 (1) (c) earlier set out in these reasons. That section also refers to the requirement for a special resolution to have been passed at a general meeting of the Owners Corporation specifically authorising the taking of the particular action proposed where an addition to the common property or an alteration to the common property for the erection of a new structure on the common property is sought. 35 Whilst it is true that the defendant's contentions have strongly put that the plaintiffs could never restrain works on the defendant's private lot, this eschews the problems in any subsequent dispute as to what is and what is not common property: as for example whether particular bolts went into common property tiles or into some other tiles. These are the sorts of issues which require determination on a final hearing of the proceedings and not otherwise. The evidence before the Court as to the defendant's activities 36 There is evidence before the Court that the second plaintiff on or about 10 December 2009:

i. having observed the erection of a crane immediately adjacent to the subject building;

ii. having also observed road closures to Greenknowe Avenue;

iii. having also viewed various building materials positioned on the footpath immediately adjacent to the building and a number of contractors and or labourers undertaking work in the avenue within the lot 49 in relation to the building materials and operation of the crane. 37 Her further evidence is that she approached one of the landscape gardening contractors with the order from the CTTT asking that the work be stopped and pointing out that the worker was in breach of the Tribunal's orders, to be told to contact her lawyer. 38 Her further evidence was that on or about 10 December 2009 she had a telephone conversation with the defendant in which she informed him that he was in breach of the Tribunal's orders and he responded by stating that those orders had been obtained without discussion with him. 39 Her further evidence was that later on that same day she had a conversation with the contractor supervising the works on the balcony of lot 49 in the course of which he said that he was putting the roof on the awning that day. Her further evidence is that on or about 11 December she observed labourers undertaking a number of works on the balcony of lot 49, including preparation of the site and preparation and assembly of building materials including part of an awning. The need for urgency in approaching this Court 40 It is apparent that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to approach this Court for the interlocutory injunction. I reject the proposition that in a situation of an urgent need to restrain a person from breaching an order made by or under the aegis of the CTTT, this Court has no jurisdiction to intervene by granting urgent interlocutory relief. 41 Standing back from the dispute, the application before the Supreme Court does not give rise to the same issues as arose in the hearing before the Adjudicator. The issue in this Court is whether it should exercise its coercive powers to restrain the defendants from taking certain steps. Clearly enough there is no such power available to the plaintiffs in the CTTT. Conclusion 42 The plaintiffs have established a serious case for determination. The balance of convenience is very clearly in favour of the Court extending the interlocutory regime first put into place by undertakings given to the List Judge on Friday last. To permit the work to continue upon the basis that should the defendant ultimately lose, those works would and could be dismantled, only has to be stated to be dismissed. 43 Nor is there any or any satisfactory evidence that the defendant will suffer prejudice as a result of the building works being unable to proceed, including that the building contract is likely to become frustrated. 44 For those reasons the orders made on 14 December granted the interlocutory relief sought by the plaintiffs and stood the proceedings over until early February in the new term. At that time it will be appropriate for the parties to approach the list judge for further directions. 45 The principled approach is to reserve costs of and occasioned in relation to the interlocutory application.

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