St George Wholesale Distributors Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue

Judgment (8 paragraphs)

[1]

reasons for decision 1This interlocutory application by the applicant, St George Wholesale Distributors Pty Ltd, is for an adjournment of the proceeding pending a decision of the Supreme Court relevant to an issue arising in the substantive proceeding. The respondent does not oppose the application for an adjournment. For reasons given below, the application for adjournment is granted. 2Paul's Retail Pty Ltd as trustee for Paul's Warehouse Discretionary Trust incurred payroll tax liabilities under assessments raised for the periods 1 July 2007 to 23 January 2008 and 1 July 2010 to 31 January 2012. That taxpayer and the applicant are "grouped' under Part 5 of the Payroll Tax Act 2007 (NSW). 3Pursuant to s 81(1) of the Act, if a member of a group fails to pay an amount that the member is required to pay under the Act, every member of the group is liable jointly and severally to pay that amount to the Chief Commissioner. In such a case the Chief Commissioner, pursuant to Taxation Administration Act 1996 (NSW), s 45(2A) may- issue a notice of assessment of the liability of a person to pay any tax and related charges for which the person is jointly and severally liable with another person under a taxation law, even if a notice of assessment has already been issued to the other person. 4In respect to the Paul's Retail tax liabilities, the Chief Commissioner issued to the applicant as a group member, a s 45(2A) notice of assessment with issue date 16 February 2012. 5Section 45(2A) was inserted into the Taxation Administration Act by the State Revenue Legislation Amendment Act 2010 (NSW), Schedule 11[2]. That amendment commenced on the date of assent of the Amendment Act, 28 June 2010. 6The substantive proceeding is an application for review of payroll tax assessment decisions relating to the periods 1 July 2007 to 23 January 2008, the 2010 year and each of the months from July 2011 to January 2012. 7One of the issues arising in the substantive proceeding is whether s 45(2A) operates in respect to any period ended prior to 28 June 2010. The assessment for the period 1 July 2007 to 23 January 2008 is the only assessment subject to the applicant's challenge on the s 45(2A) issue. The liability under that assessment is $267,443.61 and represents a substantial portion of the total liability under all assessments in issue. 8The application for adjournment is supported by an affidavit affirmed 14 July 2014 by Ajit Wijesinghe. The annexures to the affidavit include a copy of the Summons filed in Supreme Court proceeding Secom Australia Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue, Case number 2014/148214. The Supreme Court proceeding is a review pursuant to the Taxation Administration Act, s 97. Details of the review, orders sought and review grounds are set out in the plaintiff's summons filed 16 May 2014. 9In the Secom proceedings the s 45(2A) issue is one of the review grounds recited in the summons. The respondent is party to the Secom proceeding as defendant.

The power to adjourn 10Pursuant to s 51 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), The Tribunal may adjourn proceedings to any time and place (including for the purpose of enabling the parties to negotiate a settlement). 11Section 51 is in the same terms as former s 73(5)(f) of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 (NSW) - the latter provision was repealed at the time the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act came into force: see Civil and Administrative Tribunal Amendment Act 2013 (NSW) No 94, Sch 2.2 [31]. Section 73(5)(f) was considered by the Administrative Decisions Tribunal, R L Seiden, Deputy President, in Complete Wardrobes & Showerscreens Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2013] NSWADT 67 and in Betta Industries Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (NSW) [2013] NSWADT 68. 12On its terms the s 51 discretion to adjourn is unconfined save with respect to the subject matter, scope and purpose of the statutory regime: Water Conservation and Irrigation Commission (NSW) v Browning (1947) 74 CLR 492 at 505.2 per Dixon J; Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd (1992) 110 ALR 449; (1992) 67 ALJR 170; [1992] HCA 66. 13Other relevant statutory provisions of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act include the following: (1) Section 3(c) provides that the objects of the Act include to ensure that the Tribunal is accessible and responsive to the needs of all of its users. (2) Section 3(d) provides that another object is to enable the Tribunal to resolve the real issues in proceedings justly, quickly, cheaply and with as little formality as possible. (3) Section 3(e) provides that the Tribunal is to ensure that the decisions of the Tribunal are timely, fair, .... 14Competing interests to be weighed would include- (1) The interest of the parties to have the issues in the case determined in a way that will be consistent with any future decision of the court in the Secom case: City of Sydney Council v Satara [2007] NSWCA 148 (8 June 2007) at [32]. (2) The interest of the applicant to have its claims heard and determined as quickly as possible - although in this instance the adjournment is sought by the applicant and is not opposed by the Chief Commissioner. (3) A general public interest in the administration of justice: Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australia National University (2009) 239 CLR 175 at 211. 15Whilst a court (or Tribunal) deals with the law as it is, rather than speculates about changes in the law, there may be circumstances where it is appropriate to adjourn the proceeding pending the outcome of an appeal in an unrelated case: City of Sydney Council v Satara at [19], [20] and [32].

Interests of Justice 20In addition to the interests of the parties there is a public interest in the efficiency of the legal system. On this matter the Tribunal in Complete Wardrobes (and Betta Industries at [39]-[46]) said- [40] In Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175 (Aon), the court was considering an application, made on day three of a four week trial, to adjourn and make amendments to the statement of claim. Prejudice to the defendant was plain and the High Court noted that costs orders were no longer considered a panacea. Prejudice to the other party was not however the court's only concern. As French CJ noted at [5]: ... the time of the court is a publicly funded resource. Inefficiencies in the use of that resource, arising from the vacation or adjournment of trials, are to be taken into account. So too is the need to maintain public confidence in the judicial system. [41] At [23]-[24] the Chief Justice further noted: In this respect, however, the adversarial system has been qualified by changing practices in the courts directed to the reduction of costs and delay and the realisation that the courts are concerned not only with justice between the parties, which remains their priority, but also with the public interest in the proper and efficient use of public resources ... ... Undue delay can undermine confidence in the rule of law. To that extent its avoidance, based upon a proper regard for the interests of the parties, transcends those interests. Another factor which relates to the interests of the parties but transcends them is the waste of public resources and the inefficiency occasioned by the need to revisit interlocutory processes, vacate trial dates, or adjourn trials either because of non-compliance with court timetables or, as in this case, because of a late and deliberate tactical change by one party in the direction of its conduct of the litigation. [42] No question of deliberate tactical change or tardy behaviour by a litigant arises in this case. However, the interests of justice are plainly served by the timely disposition of maters in the Tribunal. As stated by the Chief Justice in Aon, at [27]: However, the mischief engendered by unwarranted adjournments and consequent delays in the resolution of civil proceedings goes beyond their particular effects on the court in which those delays occur ... the public interest in the efficient use of court resources is a relevant consideration in the exercise of discretions to amend or adjourn. [43] Unnecessary delay risks eroding the public confidence in the legal system. As stated by the Chief Justice in Aon, at [30]: Also to be considered is the potential for loss of public confidence in the legal system which arises where a court is seen to accede to applications made without adequate explanation or justification, whether they be for adjournment, for amendments giving rise to adjournment, or for vacation of fixed trial dates resulting in the resetting of interlocutory processes. [44] As the Plurality in Aon, (Gummow, Hayne , Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ) noted (at [98]): a "just resolution" is to be understood in light of the purposes and objectives stated. Speed and efficiency, in the sense of minimum delay and expense, are seen as essential to a just resolution of proceedings. [45] Rules of court (and of the Tribunal) minimising delay recognise the "ill-effects" of delay not only on the parties, but to litigants generally (Aon at [101]). [46] These concepts are given application in the Tribunal's [statutory] objects .... As Heydon J noted in Aon (at [156]). The court (and by analogy a Tribunal) has a duty to achieve its objects. [47] To grant an adjournment at this stage because there is a mere suggestion that the Tribunal will deliver a decision that turns out to be inconsistent with a subsequent court of Appeal decision would not pay due regard to the important concepts the High Court emphasised in Aon and before that decision, in Sali v SPC Ltd (1993) 67 ALJR 841 at 843-844 (Brennan, Deane, McHugh JJ) and at 849 (Toohey, Gaudron JJ). .... 21The parties do not say they are prejudiced by the adjournment - they support it. Even so, "It does not further the interests of justice to delay proceedings in the absence of clear grounds." (Complete Wardrobes at [47].) 22I am satisfied that: the s 45(2A) issue is an issue in the Tribunal; it is likely that that issue will be determined by the Supreme Court; the inconvenience to the Tribunal is minimal. I am satisfied that the interests of justice favour granting the adjournment.

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Judgment (8 paragraphs)

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Legislation Cited (7)

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