SRG has complied with the orders and other procedural requirements
10 Having reviewed the evidence, I am satisfied that the procedural requirements have been met, other than as to an aspect of despatch of the scheme materials, that I address further below.
11 The orders and scheme booklet were lodged with ASIC.
12 The relevant procedures as to the receipt and collection of proxies and preparation of proxy reports were complied with.
13 The scheme meeting was advertised, convened and held in accordance with the orders.
14 According to the poll report prepared by Ms Ahwan, the scheme was agreed to by the requisite majorities for the purposes of s 411(4)(a)(ii) of the Corporations Act as follows:
(a) 99.63% of the votes cast on the resolution at the scheme meeting were cast in
favour of the scheme; and
(b) 94.58% of scheme shareholders present and voting (either in person or by proxy) voted in favour of the scheme.
15 The shares voted were 55,029,121 of the 82,173,611 shares on issue. Therefore, approximately 66.97% of shares on issue were voted. Further, 240 of 1530 eligible shareholders in SRG voted (that is, about 15.69% voted).
16 The issue of low voter turnout was addressed by Farrell J in TriAusMin Limited, in the matter of TriAusMin Limited (No 2) [2014] FCA 833 at [9]-[12] as follows:
The number of TRO shareholders who were eligible to vote at the Scheme Meeting was 1,463 holding 251,389,050 shares. Only 160 or 10.94% of TRO shareholders who were eligible to do so voted at the Scheme Meeting. Those shareholders who exercised votes held 52.9% of the shares. The Supporting Shareholders, Dr Gill and Tri Origin Exploration Limited, accounted for 26.4% of the votes.
Although the statutory requirement under s 411(4)(a)(ii) has been satisfied, it is the usual practice of the Court at the second court hearing to consider the number of shareholders who attended the Scheme Meeting in person or by proxy. Low shareholder turnout may be an indication that some procedural irregularity occurred. It is inappropriate to assume (in the absence of complaint) that shareholders who did not vote either did not have notice of the meeting or were silent in protest of the scheme: Re Professional Investment Holdings Ltd (No 2) [2010] FCA 1336 at [7] and Re Seven Network Limited (No 3) (2010) 267 ALR 583 (Re Seven Network Ltd) at [61] per Jacobson J; apathy should not be presumed to be antagonism: Re Matine Limited (1998) 28 ACSR 268 at 295 per Santow J.
Nonetheless it does call for consideration to ensure that the vote not unrepresentative, since the court retains the discretion to withhold its approval in that case: see Re Seven Network Ltd at [61] and Re BTR plc [2000] 1 BCLC 740 at 747. It is relevant to consider whether members have been deterred from attending or voting at the meeting: Re Cape plc [2006] EWHC 1446 at [20] per David Richards J.
Relatively low shareholder turnout did not prevent orders being made in Re Avoca Resources Limited [2011] FCA 208 (11.49% of shareholders holding 72.38% of shares) or Re Cortona Resources Limited (No 2) [2013] FCA 302 (17.5% of shareholders holding 45.2% of shares); see also Re Redcape Property Fund Limited and The Trust Company (RE Services) Limited [2012] NSWSC 486 per Black J at [6]. In Re Auzex Resources Limited (No 2) [2012] QSC 101 at [18] Applegarth J noted that a turnout of 9.75% of shareholders representing 42.3% of votes was substantially higher than at annual general meetings of the company. In Re Osiris Insurance Ltd [1999] 1 BCLC 182 only 35 of 971, scheme creditors with claims worth approximately 41% of the total value attended the meeting and Re British Aviation Insurance Co Ltd [2006] 1 BCLC 665, creditor turnout was 15% representing approximately 50% of claims. See Damian T and Rich A, Schemes, Takeovers and Himalayan Peaks (3rd edition, 2013, University of Sydney) at 4.4.2 for a full discussion of this issue.
17 I do not consider that the relatively low voter turnout prevents me from making orders under s 411(4)(b), taking into account that those shareholders who voted did so overwhelmingly in favour of the scheme and there is no evidence of any failure to comply with the despatch and procedural requirements such as would have deterred shareholders from voting.