Spyer v Cuddles 'N' Mum
[2002] FCA 1563
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Federal Court of Australia
Decision date
2002-12-20
Before
Lindgren J
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Judgment (12 paragraphs)
introduction 1 The applicants ("Mr and Mrs Spyer") complain about the adequacy of discovery. As is well known, discovery is the most burdensome, costly and time consuming of all the interlocutory procedures. These problems are exacerbated where, as in the present case, there is protracted disputation over the adequacy of discovery.
The motion and the Federal Court Rules 2 Mr and Mrs Spyer move for the following orders (incorporating an amendment from "December" to "August" made on the hearing): "2. The Third and Fourth Respondents give discovery ... in respect of all documents held by either of them in respect of Armarchi Pty Limited trading as Cuddles 'N Mum Wollongong which fall into Categories 8 or 9 of the Notice for Discovery filed 20 March 2002 and, in particular, without limiting the generality of this Order, such documents to include: (i) customer notes; (ii) financial statements; (iii) internal memoranda; (iv) customer interview records; (v) file notes; (vi) watch lists; (vii) correspondence to and from the Wollongong franchisee; (viii) profitability assessments; (ix) compliance reports. All between the dates of 1 January and 31 August 1998. 3. In the alternative, order that each of the Third and Fourth Respondents file and serve on the Applicants ... an affidavit which states whether or not any document of the class referred to in [2, above] is or has ever been in its/his possession, custody or power and if it has been but is not now in its/his possession, custody or power when it/he parted with it and what has become of it." 3 Mr and Mrs Spyer rely on O 15 r 8 of the Federal Court Rules ("the Rules") which is as follows: "Where, at any stage of the proceeding, it appears to the Court from evidence or from the nature or circumstances of the case or from any document filed in the proceeding that there are grounds for a belief that some document or class of document relating to any matter in question in the proceeding may be or may have been in the possession, custody or power of a party, the Court may order that party - (a) to file any affidavit stating whether that document or any document of that class is or has been in his possession, custody or power and, if it has been but is not then in his possession, custody or power, when he parted with it and what has become of it; and (b) to serve the affidavit on any other party." (my emphasis) 4 The expression "relating to any matter in question" is a familiar one in rules of court defining the ambit of the discovery required by the familiar simple and unqualified form of notice for discovery. Order XXXI r 12 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1875 (UK), which was in issue in the leading case on the test of discoverability, Compagnie Financiere et Commerciale du Pacifique v The Peruvian Guano Company (1882) 11 QBD 55 ("Peruvian Guano"), used that expression. It was also used in O 15 r 2 of the Rules until 3 December 1999, but amendments then made (SR 295 of 1999) provide a different test. Order 15 subr 2(3) now provides that where a party is required to give discovery pursuant to a notice for discovery, what must be discovered are: "... any of the following documents of which the party giving discovery is, after a reasonable search, aware at the time discovery is given: (a) documents on which the party relies; and (b) documents that adversely affect the party's own case; and (c) documents that adversely affect another party's case; and (d) documents that support another party's case; and (e) documents that the party is required by a relevant practice direction to disclose." This more restricted ambit of discoverability is based on the "Standard Disclosure" of the United Kingdom Rules of Civil Procedure 1999, and, in particular, on Rule 31.6 of those Rules. The Peruvian Guano "relating to" test of discoverability, however, continues to find expression as the ordinary measure of the documents to be discovered by a party in the Rules of Court of the High Court of Australia (O 32 r 9) and of the Supreme Courts of Victoria (O 29 subr 29.02(1)), Western Australia (O 26 subr 1(1)), South Australia (Rule 58.01(1)), the Australian Capital Territory (O 34 subr 13(1)) and the Northern Territory (sects 29.02(1), 29.08(1)). The Supreme Courts of New South Wales (Pt 23 r 3) and Queensland (Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999,subr 211(1)), like this Court, have departed from the Peruvian Guano test, though the departures differ as between those three Courts. 5 Order 15 subr 2(4) of the Rules qualifies the discovery obligation defined in O 15 subr 2(3) in a manner not presently relevant, and subrule 2(5) provides that, for the purposes of the "reasonableness" of the search called for by subrule 2(3), a party may take into account the matters referred to in subrule 2(5) (subrule 2(5) is based on the United Kingdom's Rule 31.7). Practice Note 14, also made on 3 December 1999, gives guidance as to the approach which the Court can be expected to take when making orders in relation to discovery. 6 The expression "relating to any matter in question in the proceeding" of O 15 r 8 of the Rules uses "the Peruvian Guano test" of discoverability. In Peruvian Guano, the expression "relating to any matter in question" was given a broad construction. The expression was held to refer to documents containing information which "may - not which must - either directly or indirectly enable the party requiring the affidavit [of discovery] either to advance his own case or to damage the case of his adversary" (at 63 per Brett LJ). In particular, a document which "may fairly lead ... to a chain of inquiry" was to be included (above, per Brett LJ). 7 It follows from the retention of the expression "relating to any matter in question in the proceeding" in O 15 r 8, that there is a disconformity between the narrower and less demanding test of discoverability pursuant to notice of O 15 subr 2(3), and the Peruvian Guano test which provides the basis for the making of an order under O 15 r 8. In other words, where discovery is given in response to the simple form of notice for discovery found in Form 21, (referred to in O 15 r 1), it can no longer be said that the basis for the making of an order under O 15 r 8 is that there has been a failure to give full discovery as required by such a notice. 8 Not only is a much broader test relevant to the present motion than to the giving of discovery in response to the prescribed form of notice for discovery (Form 21); the words "may be or may have been" in O 15 r 8 do not pose a high threshold. But the second "may" in that rule gives the Court an overriding discretion not to make an order even if the power given by the rule to make one is enlivened.