PUBLIC INTEREST IMMUNITY
23 Apart from the documents themselves, the State relied on two affidavits in support of its claim for public interest immunity. The first affidavit was affirmed by Carol Mills who is the Director-General of Communities NSW, a Department of the NSW government. The OLGR is an office within this Department. Ms Mills also gave evidence in Betfair (No 7). The general description of her evidence which I provided in Betfair (No 7) (at [8]-[11]) is also sufficient for the present case. That description was as follows:
[8] …The OLGR advises the NSW Government on racing and wagering policy and policy implementation. In that capacity, the OLGR regularly consults with Racing NSW. Racing NSW also regularly makes unsolicited submissions to OLGR about the legislative regime governing horse racing.
[9] One process of consultation related to amendments to the Racing Administration Act (1998) NSW and the promulgation of the Racing Administration Amendment (Publication of Race Fields) Regulation 2008 (NSW). These amendments authorised Racing NSW to grant an approval to the use of race field information subject to conditions including a condition for the payment of a fee that does not exceed 1.5% of the approval holder's wagering turnover. ….
[10] The process of consultation in question involved the establishment of a working group. The working group included officers of the OLGR and representatives of each of the racing bodies in NSW, being Racing NSW, Harness Racing NSW, Greyhound Racing NSW and the Greyhound and Harness Racing Regulatory Authority. The purpose of the working group was to assist OLGR in developing legislative drafting instructions to be provided to Parliamentary Counsel. Parliamentary Counsel's Office is a separate office within the NSW Department of Premier and Cabinet responsible, amongst other things, for drafting NSW legislation.
[11] The initial email communication establishing the working group (forwarded by the OLGR to the relevant agencies but not to all attendees at the working group) said that "(t)he meeting is confidential in accordance with the protocol that applies to developing legislation generally". The working group met on at least six occasions. Whenever a new participant joined Frank Marzic, the Manager, Racing Policy within the OLGR, according to Ms Mills, "would make a statement to the effect that the meeting was confidential and the that the discussions that took place were to stay within the room" to which participants indicated their agreement. Attendance varied but included officers of the OLGR, various representatives of Racing NSW, Harness Racing NSW, Greyhound Racing NSW and, for the initial meeting, the Greyhound and Harness Racing Regulatory Authority, subsequently abolished. The Working Group discussed drafting instructions to be provided to Parliamentary Counsel. The OLGR was ultimately responsible for deciding what instructions should be provided to Parliamentary Counsel.
24 In the present case, however, the State claims public interest immunity over seven categories of documents whereas in Betfair (No 7) only three categories were involved. This is a consequence of the fact that the State is a party to the present proceeding and presumably holds additional documents to those discovered by Racing NSW in the Betfair proceeding. Further, Sportsbet, unlike Betfair Pty Limited (Betfair), challenges the validity of the legislation and not merely the conditions requiring the payment of the turnover fee. Hence, I infer that documents concerning the legislation have also been discovered.
25 As both parties made submissions using Betfair (No 7) as a base I identify the exhibits with a cross-reference to those in Betfair (No 7). The State's documents are contained in six folders marked as Exhibits CM1 (vols 1, 2, 3, and 4), CM2 and CM3. The four volumes of Exhibit CM1 are all new documents. But for a few extra documents, Exhibits CM2 and CM3 in the present case are the same as Exhibits CM1 and CM3 in Betfair (No 7). The seven categories of documents (and their listing in an annexure to Ms Mills' affidavit) are:
(1) Cabinet and related documents (Annexure A).
(2) Documents concerned with briefing the Premier, Ministers and public servants on important matters of policy (Annexure B).
(3) Documents concerned with meetings involving and correspondence with Ministers and officials from other jurisdictions (Annexure C).
(4) Documents concerned with the working group (Annexure D).
(5) Other documents concerning consultation with the controlling bodies in relation to the control and regulation of the racing codes (Annexure E).
(6) Documents concerned with the provision of instructions to and receipt of advice from Parliamentary Counsel regarding the drafting of legislation (Annexure F).
(7) Other documents revealing high-level deliberations, consultation and advice between various government departments and bodies (Annexure G).
26 Apart from the working group documents it is difficult to align these categories with those considered in Betfair (No 7) (see at [12]).
27 Sportsbet did not press for production of the Cabinet and related documents (Annexure A) and certain other documents identified as "Not Challenged" in the annexures to Ms Mills' affidavits. I therefore exclude those documents from consideration.
28 Sportsbet made a formal submission to the same effect as that of Betfair in Betfair (No 7) that Australian law did not recognise any public interest immunity over a class of documents but for Cabinet documents. I considered and rejected this submission in Betfair (No 7) at [13]-[20]. I remain of the view that this submission fails to recognise the substance of the State's submission which I accepted at [18] in Betfair (No 7) as follows:
…the classes of documents attracting the immunity at least on a prima facie basis involve a spectrum from those at the highest level (Cabinet documents) to those at lower levels (such as reports of junior Departmental officials). The strength or weakness of the public interest protected (or the harm that might result from disclosure) does not affect the existence of the immunity. It affects the balancing exercise between that public interest and the interest of the party seeking access in order to litigate its claim. In any event, it is well-recognised that the classes of immunity are not closed (Australian National Airlines Commission v The Commonwealth (1975) 132 CLR 582 at 591 and D v National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children [1978] AC 171 at 230). The …application of the doctrine involve[s] three considerations: - (i) the harm that might flow from disclosure, (ii) the material assistance that disclosure might provide to the party seeking access, and (iii) weighing those conflicting interests.
29 For the same reasons as set out in Betfair (No 7) at [21]-[27] I also accept that there is a public interest served by protecting the documents from disclosure. The public interest may vary in strength having regard to the different classes of the documents but, nevertheless, exists in respect of all. It is the public interest in enabling those involved in the formulation of government policy to be uninhibited in their task in the sense of both being free from concerns about future disclosure and of disclosure at a time when to do so might risk premature, distracting, ill informed or misdirected public comment. As to the latter aspect, however, I note that the legislative process in the present case is complete. The balancing exercise in this case, accordingly, is to be carried out having regard to that fact. In another case, where the legislative process was continuing, the risk of premature, distracting, ill informed or misdirected public comment by reason of disclosure may have far greater weight than a case such as the present.
30 Again, and consistent with Betfair (No 7) at [28]-[32] I accept that there is a public interest served by requiring disclosure of the documents. Sportsbet's claims are broader than those of Betfair. Nevertheless, the essence of the two cases is the same. Sportsbet claims that the State has enacted legislation and State agencies have exercised governmental powers so as to protect traders within New South Wales (including the TAB interests) and to discriminate against a trader outside New South Wales (Sportsbet) in a manner that infringes a Commonwealth guarantee of free trade (s 49 of the Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act).
31 The State attempted to negate the relevance of the documents by observing that discerning Parliamentary intention is an objective process. This proposition is valid. But, as Sportsbet submitted, the State has discovered the documents presumably because they are potentially relevant to the facts in issue. The documents may not be admissible at the hearing to prove the truth of some asserted fact about legislative purpose. They may, however, be relevant for other purposes which, at present, can be the subject of speculation only (such as cross-examination or exposing a further chain on inquiry). The documents in dispute concern the formulation of the policy embodied in the impugned legislative scheme and its preparation. They are centrally relevant to Sportsbet's claims. The question of their disclosure is not necessarily determined by their admissibility either at all or so as to prove any particular fact.
32 Before moving to the balancing exercise I should also record some other aspects of the submissions and the evidence. As to the submissions, I do not accept Sportsbet's submission that I should give little or no weight to Ms Mills' evidence. Sportsbet relied on the observations in Zarro v Australian Securities Commission (1992) 36 FCR 40 at 50-51 that:
In these days with large government instrumentalities and agencies involved in time consuming and extensive investigations into possible irregularities and offences, great care is required by the bodies themselves in ensuring both that the correct person within the structure of the organisation (that is, a person who knows the facts, has seen the documents and who is preferably at a high level within the organisation) swears the appropriate affidavit claiming public interest immunity and that the claim is not made too widely so as to sweep within its net documents that are not legitimately an essential integer in the investigative process. This also calls for vigilance by the courts lest documents are shielded from public scrutiny or inspection by parties to litigation under an unduly broad umbrella of public interest immunity.
33 Sportsbet noted that Ms Mills was not employed by the Department at the time of the events in question. Her evidence about the events is based on information and belief from her discussions with Mr Marzic. Mr Marzic was available to give evidence about the events but did not do so other than in respect of a single document. Sportsbet submitted that Ms Mills' affidavit showed a lack of care in its preparation and a propensity for vague assertions. Ms Mills had not read all of the discovered documents to place the claims for privilege in context.
34 Ms Mills did not have first-hand knowledge of the facts but had acquainted herself with the details of the process as her affidavit disclosed. Her affidavit is lengthy and relates to a large number of documents. The errors it contained are matters of form not substance. As the State submitted, Ms Mills is the Director-General of the Department. She has seen the documents over which the State claims privilege. Ms Mills, as the Department Director-General, is the proper officer to identify which documents are thought to engage the public interest such as to justify the claim for privilege and which do not. Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1 is replete with references to the need for a head of a government Department or "high" official to deal with questions of public interest immunity. Further, the idea that Ms Mills should also have read the documents discovered by the State not subject to any privilege claim is not supported by authority. Ms Mills was entitled to rely on legal advice and assistance to found her undoubted inference that the documents with which she was concerned had not otherwise been disclosed. I give Ms Mills' evidence weight.
35 I also have the benefit of evidence from Don Colagiuri SC, Parliamentary Counsel. Mr Colagiuri is the head of the New South Wales Parliamentary Counsel's Office. He is a senior counsel. His evidence is relevant to the claims for public interest immunity and legal professional privilege. Mr Colagiuri explains in his affidavit that, by long-standing convention, the Crown takes the advice of the Solicitor-General and Crown Solicitor on existing legislation and Parliamentary Counsel on the form of legislation required to reach a policy objective. Practice as Parliamentary Counsel is recognised as legal work under the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW). Parliamentary Counsel hold practising certificates from the NSW Bar Association (in a special class). According to Mr Colagiuri at para 10 of his affidavit:
Although briefs to and written advice by Parliamentary Counsel do not take the usual form used at the private bar, the corresponding form of instructions to, and the provision of draft instruments by, Parliamentary Counsel are the same in substance.
36 Mr Colagiuri also objected to the production of instructions to Parliamentary Counsel, draft legislation and related communications on public interest immunity grounds similar to those discussed by Ms Mills, namely, the need for the free expression of views in a confidential context.
37 With these matters in mind, I turn to the balancing exercise recognising (as stated by the High Court in Northern Land Council at 618) that:
The process of determining whether an order for disclosure of documents in that class should be made remains one of weighing the public interest in the maintenance of confidentiality against the public interest in the due administration of justice, but the degree of protection against disclosure which is called for by the nature of that class will dictate the paramountcy of the claim for immunity in all but quite exceptional situations.
38 In carrying out the balancing exercise, regard should also be had to the factors identified in Commonwealth v Northern Land Council (1991) 30 FCR 1 at 38 (reversed by the High Court in the result but not by reference to principle) relevant to the competing public interests as follows:
(1) where the contents of the documents are relied upon, the interests affected by their disclosure, e.g. national security, relationships with foreign governments and unfair prejudice to other parties by disclosure of confidential information; where the impact of disclosure on the public interest is peculiarly within the knowledge of the executive, its contentions will be given particular weight;
(2) where the class of documents is invoked, the public interest which immunity for the class is said to protect, e.g. political conventions and governmental processes; in this connection the importance of the convention of collective responsibility and the confidentiality required to support it, particularly in areas of current political debate, will be accorded a high degree of respect;
(3) the extent to which the interests referred to have become attenuated by the passage of time or the occurrence of intervening events since the matters contained in the documents or the documents themselves came into existence;
(4) the seriousness of the issues in relation to which production is sought, e.g. innocence of a criminal charge or governmental misconduct bearing upon the case;
(5) the likelihood that production of the documents will affect the outcome of the case;
(6) the likelihood of injustice if the documents are not produced.
39 The documents concern wagering on horse racing. This is not an issue at the core of traditional government functions. Insofar as the New South Wales government is concerned, wagering on horse racing is presumably a commercial activity relating to a form of recreation from which the State derives revenue. It cannot be compared to national security, relations with foreign governments or a raft of other traditional government activities of general importance. As I said in Betfair (No 7) at [36]:
It is one thing to accept that legislation is an expression of government policy. It is another to accept that all legislation embodies public policy at a high level. Statute law has grown by many multiples over the past decades regulating a great many matters that could hardly be described as involving high level public policy. Accordingly, the analysis should not stop at the mere recognition of the fact that the documents involve a proposal to amend legislation.
40 At the most general level, while I accept that wagering on horse racing might be an important source of government revenue and of employment, I do not accept that documents about legislative amendment to the control of wagering on horse racing in New South Wales so as to control the publication of race field information might disclose anything about "high" government policy. Ms Mills' evidence does not persuade me to the contrary. The interest affected by the disclosure, as in Betfair (No 7), is the protection of the general capacity for candour and the giving of frank and fearless advice to government in the future. I say general capacity because, as noted, the legislative process in question is complete. This is not a case where disclosure is sought while the process of governmental consideration continues. Hence, the interest in protecting against ill informed, distracting and premature comment is not engaged.
41 I am unable to accept any general assertion that disclosure of the documents might risk a lack of candour or inhibition in the future by the horse racing industry. The controlling bodies, which include Racing NSW, have independent obligations under their enabling legislation (see Betfair (No 7) at [37]). It is apparent that Racing NSW (at least in part) is a lobbyist of government for the interests it represents. It is also apparent that the interests it represents are not aligned with those of Sportsbet. Yet the OLGR, which managed the process of the legislative amendments, involved Racing NSW in virtually all steps of the process. It did so, moreover, knowing that the controlling bodies would obtain their own advice from lawyers and consultants about the legislative proposals and consult with other interested persons such as stewards, bookmakers and the TAB interests. It did so while the process was continuing. In this context, generalised concerns about the risk of a future lack of candour by those advising government about horse racing lack substance. Moreover, because the proceedings concern a legislative amendment to the regulation of horse racing which is now complete, I also have difficulty in accepting that disclosure of these documents would cause any real concern to those involved in advising government about other issues in the future.
42 Ms Mills' evidence also addressed documents concerned with meetings involving and correspondence with Ministers and officials from other jurisdictions (Annexure C). These documents essentially relate to the Australian Racing Minister's Conference (the ARMC) and the related meetings of racing and gaming officials. The purpose of the ARMC is to foster and co-ordinate inter-governmental relations for the development and implementation of harmonious laws regulating racing and wagering. According to Ms Mills the business of the ARMC is confidential. Ms Mills was concerned that disclosure of documents relating to these meetings would prejudice candour and thus undermine the utility of the meetings and perhaps the role of NSW in them. Ms Mills saw this as contrary to good inter-governmental relations.
43 Weighing against these considerations, the documents are of potential central relevance to Sportsbet's claims that the legislation and action taken under that legislation are rendered invalid by operation of s 109 of the Constitution.
44 I consider it necessary to inspect the documents in each class identified to determine where the balance of the public interest lies.