Spalla v St George Motor Finance Ltd
[2004] FCA 470
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Federal Court of Australia
Decision date
2004-04-16
Before
Ryan J
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Judgment (18 paragraphs)
REASONS FOR RULING (No 1) 1 In this matter the first and second respondents ("St George"), have moved on a notice dated 5 April 2004 for orders, amongst others; '(2) that the proceeding be stayed as an abuse of process; and (3) further or alternatively, insofar as the amended statement of claim of the applicants filed and dated 9 December 2003 or the replies filed by the applicants refers to documents obtained by the first and second applicants or their legal advisers in the course of the criminal proceedings and, through them, the liquidator of the third applicant, it be stayed as an abuse of process.' 2 In support of that motion, St George seek to rely on an affidavit sworn 2 April 2004 by their solicitor, Peter John Sinn. Objections have been taken by Mr Hayes QC, who appears with Mr Wotherspoon of Counsel for the applicants, to the admissibility of various paragraphs of Mr Sinn's affidavit. I ruled in the course of yesterday's hearing on certain of those objections and indicated that I would exclude or disregard, for the purposes of St George's motion, certain parts or the whole of one or more of paragraphs 5, 11, 12, 20, 25, 31, 33, 36, 37 and 40 of Mr Sinn's affidavit. 3 However, other parts of that affidavit were objected to on the ground that they contain hearsay assertions. Mr Hayes accepted that, on a strict analysis, St George's motion seeks relief which is interlocutory in character and so attracts the application of s 75 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), which provides that, in an interlocutory proceeding, the hearsay rule does not apply to evidence if the party who adduces it also adduces evidence of its source. However, Mr Hayes submitted, and reiterated this morning, that the consequences to the applicants of the present proceeding being stayed as an abuse of process would be so serious that the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, should require strict proof of the matters to which the challenged paragraphs in Mr Sinn's affidavit have been directed. 4 Assuming, without deciding, that I have such a discretion, I have examined each of the contested paragraphs and concluded as follows: