The class issue in the present case
40 Kingsway is the holder of 588,830 in-the-money options. They are some of a series of 777,700 options which expire on 8 August 2012. Their exercise price was originally C$5.63 but, as a result of a consensual amendment, was reduced by 16c to C$5.47. Assif SA holds options in the same series. For all I know, it may hold the remaining 188,870 options in the series.
41 In correspondence, Kingsway and Assif SA contended that in-the-money options should be valued, not according to the intrinsic value methodology, but according to the Black-Scholes methodology so that their holders would enjoy the benefit of the prospect of an increase in the value of Sino Gold shares down to the expiry date of the options, 8 August 2012.
42 Pursuant to the leave that I granted (see [8] above), Kingsway read an affidavit of Andrew Mark Williams sworn 27 October 2009 and made submissions elaborating on the contentions it had made in correspondence. In an exhibit to Mr Williams's affidavit, the various options issued by Sino Gold are purportedly particularised in a table, into 26 series of which eight are "vested" and eighteen are "unvested" (as noted at [33] above, the proposed Scheme Booklet and the Grant Samuel report each lists 27 series). The latter are all held by directors or employees. In the ordinary course they will vest only if and when the director or employee has held that position for a certain period. However, it is a term of each option that the option also vests upon a change in control of Sino Gold. It follows that if the Schemes are implemented, there will be no unvested options.
43 The eight classes of vested options particularised by Mr Williams are held, not only by directors and employees, but also by "others".
44 There are two series of vested options issued to "others", 250,000 issued on 16 September 2005 and expiring on 16 September 2010, and the 777,700 previously mentioned issued on 7 August 2007 expiring on 8 August 2012. Both series are in-the-money since the exercise price for the first series mentioned is $2.53 and the exercise price for the second series mentioned is $5.47.
45 Kingsway makes its point in relation to the second series by suggesting, according to the table in the exhibit to Mr Williams's affidavit, that according to the intrinsic value method, Kingsway and Assif SA will be entitled to C$777,427.81, whereas if the Black-Scholes methodology were applied to in-the-money options, they would be entitled to C$1,222,553.84 - a difference of C$445,126.04.
46 Kingsway does not object to a classification into in-the-money and out-of-the-money, but submits that those classes are inadequate unless they are further divided into "vested" and "unvested". In other words, there should be four classes.
47 It emerged that according to the table in the exhibit to Mr Williams's affidavit, one of the series shown as unvested/out-of-the-money was in fact vested/out-of-the-money, and as such would have only one member - Douglas Betts, the President and CEO of Kingsway. Senior counsel for Sino Gold protested that this would give Mr Betts a power of veto over the Option Scheme and, because of the interdependence of the two Schemes, over the Share Scheme as well.
48 Mr Williams's table also grouped as "unvested" two other series that were in fact vested. It is difficult to have confidence in the table.
49 According to the particulars of options in the Scheme Booklet and the Grant Samuel Report, Mr Betts would not in fact be the sole member of a "vested/out-of-the-money" class, but the total number of options in that class would be 174,908 of which Mr Betts would hold 109,730. This would still enable him to prevent that class from resolving to agree to the Option Scheme.
50 It is unprincipled to decide the question of the appropriate classes by reference to how the voting is likely to turn out or even, necessarily, whether someone will have a power of veto.
51 The leading English case of the composition of classes is Sovereign Life Assurance Company v Dodd [1892] 2 QB 573 (Sovereign Life). In that case Bowen LJ said (at 583) that classes must be defined so as to prevent confiscation and injustice and that a class must be "confined to those persons whose rights are not so dissimilar as to make it impossible for them to consult together with a view to their common interest". This approach has often been cited with approval.
52 In UDL Argos Engineering & Heavy Industries Co Ltd v Li Oi Lin [2001] 3 HKLRD 634 Lord Millett (at [27]) emphasised that the test was based on similarity or dissimilarity of legal rights against the company, not on similarity or dissimilarity of interest derived otherwise than from such legal rights. His Lordship stated:
The question is whether the rights which are to be released or varied under the Scheme or the new rights which the Scheme gives in their place are so different that the Scheme must be treated as a compromise or arrangement with more than one class.
53 In In the matter of Opes Prime Stockbroking Limited (2009) 73 ACSR 385, Finkelstein J said (at [66]):
The application of the relevant test involves a comparison of the rights creditors have in the absence of the scheme and any new rights that are established under the scheme: Re T & N Ltd (No 3) [2007] 1 All ER at 882. Once those differences are identified the question whether they form separate classes must be assessed with the following factors in mind. First, when creditors are broken up into classes, each class is given power to veto the scheme and that is a process that undermines the basic approach of decision by majority: Nordic Bank Plc v International Harvester Australia Ltd [1983] 2 VR 298, 301. Second, there is a built-in safeguard against majority oppression in that the court is not bound by the decision of the meeting. Thus, it is necessary to ensure that there is no oppression by the minority. Third, practical considerations are relevant. If a judge is too assiduous in identifying classes, it is possible to end up with any number of classes. In the end, schemes of arrangement are propounded in a business context. The judge should adopt a practical business-like approach to the issue, as would the creditors if they were to decide the matter.
54 Finally, in Re MIA Group Ltd, above, Barrett J stated (at [14]):
In the present case, consistent and indiscriminate application of the same pricing or valuation methodology to options having different characteristics in terms of exercise price and expiry, being a methodology that has regard to value criteria in one market at one time, should lay to rest any argument that those different characteristics so destroy community of interest as to indicate different classes. The matter is, to my mind, sufficiently clear to make it appropriate that a single meeting of all optionholders be convened on the basis that separate classes do not exist. Any contrary view can be agitated in due course should anyone see fit to raise it.
55 Barrett J's reference to "consistent and indiscriminate application of the same pricing or valuation methodology" is reflected in the classes that have been adopted in the present Option Scheme: the intrinsic value methodology has been applied to all in-the-money options, while the Black-Scholes methodology has been applied to all out-of-the-money options. Accordingly, it is appropriate to describe the proposed in-the-money class as the intrinsic value methodology class, and the proposed out-of-the-money class as the Black-Scholes methodology class.
56 I do not see why it is "impossible" for Kingsway and Assif SA "to consult" with all other holders of in-the-money options with a view to persuading them to vote against the Option Scheme on the ground that the consideration being offered for their options is inadequate because it is not calculated according to the Black-Scholes methodology (cf Sovereign Life, above). According to their contention, all holders of in-the-money options will be underpaid for the same reason: that they are denied the benefit of receiving any consideration for loss of the prospect of an increase in the value of the underlying shares and the corresponding prospective increase in the value of their options. All holders of in-the-money options have a "common interest" or "community of interest" in considering the merits of this contention.
57 For the above reasons I was not persuaded that the two classes of option holders proposed were inappropriate.
58 It will remain open to Kingsway and Assif SA (and others) to contend on the second court hearing that the Option Scheme should not be approved because it is unfair or oppressive to them.