South Eastern Sydney Local Health District v Lazarus

Statutory framework

1. Central to these proceedings is s 97 of the Act, which has been extracted at [3] above. Section 97 is contained in Pt 6 Div 3 of the Act, styled "Compensation awarded by court". Section 91 outlines the Object of Pt 6, being: "…to give effect to an alternative scheme under which a court may order the person it finds guilty of a crime to pay compensation to any victim of the crime."
2. Once a direction for compensation is made, it must be paid immediately by the offender (or within the time stipulated in the direction) to the Registrar of the Court, for payment to the aggrieved person: s 100 of the Act. If such compensation is not paid, a certificate issued by the Registrar may be filed and immediately entered as a judgment of the Court against the offender: s 101 of the Act.
3. For reasons that will become clear, certain provisions of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act should also be noted. Section 20 of that Act provides: "Determination of appeals (1) The District Court may determine an appeal against conviction - (a) by setting aside the conviction, or (b) by dismissing the appeal, or (c) in the case of an appeal made with leave under section 12 (1) - by setting aside the conviction and remitting the matter to the original Local Court for redetermination in accordance with any directions of the District Court. (2) The District Court may determine an appeal against sentence - (a) by setting aside the sentence, or (b) by varying the sentence, or (c) by dismissing the appeal."
4. Section 68(1) of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act provides: "An appeal court may order that a conviction or sentence confirmed or varied by it on appeal, or any part of it - (a) is to take effect (as confirmed or varied) on and from a day specified in the order, or (b) in the case of a sentence that has been served in part, is to recommence (as confirmed or varied) on and from a day specified in the order, being the day on which the order is made or an earlier day."
5. The use of the language of "confirmation" in s 68(1) of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act does not correlate, at least in terms, with the means by which s 20 of the same Act contemplates that appeals from the Local Court to the District Court will be determined, i.e. setting aside, varying or dismissing. In this context, s 20 may be contrasted with s 133A of the Justices Act 1902 (NSW), before its repeal and replacement by the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act. Section 133A of the Justices Act provided that: "(1) The District Court may, after hearing an appeal, determine the appeal by dismissing the appeal or by doing any one or more of the following: (a) confirming, quashing, setting aside or varying the conviction, order or sentence appealed against, (b) increasing or reducing the sentence appealed against, (c) making such other orders as it thinks just. (2) In determining an appeal, the District Court may exercise any function that the Magistrate who made the conviction or order might have exercised."

The proceedings at first instance

1. As outlined at [2] above, on 30 May 2019, the Applicants filed a Notice of Motion in the District Court seeking directions pursuant to s 97 of the Act that a specified sum be determined by the Court to be paid out of the property of Ms Lazarus by way of compensation for loss sustained "through and by reason of the offences the Court convicted Ms Sandra Lazarus of on 12 December 2017".
2. The primary judge noted (at [3]) that the jurisdictional question for determination was: "… whether the District Court convicted Ms Lazarus of offences. If the District Court did so convict Ms Lazarus, then s 97 gives the District Court power to make a direction for compensation for loss. However, if a court other than the District Court convicted Ms Lazarus, then the application for a direction for compensation for loss should be made to that other court and the District Court has no jurisdiction". (emphasis added).
3. At [10]-[18], under the heading "[w]hich court convicted Ms Lazarus?", the primary judge said: "[10] In Maxwell v The Queen [1996] HCA 46; (1996) 184 CLR 501 the High Court approved the following statement of the Victorian Full Court in R v Tonks [1963] VR 121 at 127-128: A conviction is a determination of guilt, and a determination of guilt must be the act of the court or the arm of the court charged with deciding the guilt of the accused. [11] It is beyond argument that Ms Lazarus was found guilty and was convicted by Magistrate Keogh in the Local Court. [12] The question then becomes whether, as a result of the outcome of the conviction appeal and/or the sentence appeal to the District Court, it can be said that the District Court has convicted Ms Lazarus of an offence, within the meaning of s 97(1) of the Act."
4. His Honour then set out the terms of s 20 of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act, which have been extracted at [21] above, and continued: "[14] The conviction appeal of Ms Lazarus was dealt with by the District Court without a hearing on the merits. The order made by Judge Conlon was an order under s 20(1)(b) dismissing the appeal. That order was not disturbed by the Court of Appeal. [15] Judge Conlon was faced with a binary choice, since s 20(1)(c) had no application. He could either set aside the convictions or dismiss the appeal. He dismissed the appeal. There was no order made affecting or disturbing the convictions entered by Magistrate Keogh in the Local Court. [16] On the severity appeal Judge Hoy was faced with three choices under s 20(2). The order he made varied the sentence imposed by the Local Court, pursuant to s 20(2)(b) of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act. [17] While Judge Hoy varied the sentence imposed by the Local Court, no order which his Honour made disturbed the convictions imposed and recorded by the Local Court. On a sentence appeal the matter of conviction is not before the District Court - Roads and Traffic Authority of NSW v Higginson [2011] NSWCA 151 at [123]. On a sentence appeal, if the sentence is varied, the sentence becomes that of the District Court and is no longer the sentence of the Local Court - Higginson at [19], [125]. [18] A District Court judge does not 'confirm' the conviction - Higginson at [17], [111]. This was the language contained in earlier legislation - the Justices Act 1902 (NSW) s 125. Section 20(2) of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act does not empower or require a judge to 'confirm' a conviction. Any use of such word in a sentencing severity appeal judgment is 'mere surplusage' - Higginson at [111]".
5. It may be observed from the extract at [16] above that Hoy DCJ, in making his order on 12 December 2017, purported to "confirm" each conviction.
6. The primary judge concluded: "[19] Section 97 of the Act gives power to make a direction for compensation for loss, not to the court which sentences an offender, but to the court which convicts a person of an offence. [20] The orders made by Judge Hoy varied the sentence imposed by the Local Court, and thus became a sentence imposed by the District Court. Even though Judge Hoy varied the sentence of the Local Court, and thus imposed a sentence of his own, the convictions in the Local Court were the unchallenged foundation for consideration of an appropriate sentence. The court which convicted Ms Lazarus of the offences remained the Local Court. [21] For those reasons, I find that there is no jurisdiction in the District Court, on the facts of this case, to make a direction for compensation for loss under s 97 of the Act. The only court which has jurisdiction to make such an order is the Local Court, being the court which convicted Ms Lazarus of the offences. [22] The application for directions for compensation for loss made in this court will be dismissed. The applicants are free to seek such relief in the Local Court, if so advised. The appropriate order for costs is for each party to pay its or her own costs of the applicants' Motion."
7. The primary judge noted that, if his Honour's conclusion that the District Court had no jurisdiction was successfully appealed, the evidence established that the First Applicant was entitled to a direction that $199,000 be paid to it out of the property of Ms Lazarus, and that the Second Applicant was entitled to a direction that $234,300 be paid to it out of the property of Ms Lazarus: at [24].
8. Whether such amounts could be awarded in the Local Court, given the monetary jurisdictional limit noted at [5] above, was not the subject of argument. There might be a nice question as to whether or not, given the number of offences, the amounts referred to by the primary judge as noted at [30] above could be disaggregated with individual amounts within the Local Court's jurisdictional monetary limits referable to specific offences directed to be paid by way of compensation. In this context, it should also be recalled that, even if this course were not available, it would be open to the Applicants to seek to recover any amounts stolen in civil proceedings against Ms Lazarus.

Consideration

1. In essence, the Applicants contended that the appeal to the District Court and, in particular, the order of Hoy DCJ confirming each conviction (see [16] above) superseded the orders of the Local Court, so that it could be said that Ms Lazarus was convicted by the District Court on 12 December 2017.
2. The Applicants' submission was that the primary judge erred in according a literal meaning to s 97 of the Act. There may, of course, be a difference between the literal and legal meaning of a statutory provision: see Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355; [1998] HCA 28. At [78] of that seminal decision, the plurality said: "However, the duty of a court is to give the words of a statutory provision the meaning that the legislature is taken to have intended them to have. Ordinarily, that meaning (the legal meaning) will correspond with the grammatical meaning of the provision. But not always. The context of the words, the consequences of a literal or grammatical construction, the purpose of the statute or the canons of construction may require the words of a legislative provision to be read in a way that does not correspond with the literal or grammatical meaning." (footnote omitted).
3. In written submissions, the Applicants drew an analogy with the now repealed Road Transport (General) Act 2005 (NSW) (Road Transport Act) s 188(2)(d)(ii), which provided that: "Disqualification if no previous major offence … (d) where the conviction is for any other offence: … (ii) if the court that convicts the person thinks fit to order a shorter period (but not shorter than 12 months) or longer period of disqualification - the person is disqualified from holding a driver licence for such period as may be specified in the order". (emphasis added).
4. Section 188(2)(d) of the Road Transport Act was considered by this Court in Roads and Traffic Authority of NSW v Higginson [2011] NSWCA 151 (Higginson), a decision upon which the Applicants placed heavy reliance. Higginson was concerned with the operation of an order which had been made by a magistrate who disqualified Mr Higginson from holding a drivers' licence for a 12 month period, pursuant to s 188(2)(d) of the Road Transport Act. The magistrate had also made a community service order which was the subject of appeal to the District Court. The District Court judge (Ellis DCJ) made the following orders: "The appeal is dismissed. The conviction is confirmed. I quash the order for community service and in lieu place him on a Section 9 bond to be of good behaviour for a period of twelve months. I confirm the minimum disqualification of twelve months. I note that the licence was handed in and therefore the suspension is to date from 8 June 2010 and to expire on 7 June 2011."
5. As Giles JA observed: "[17] There are some difficulties with this. There was no appeal against conviction, and no occasion to confirm the conviction even if it was otherwise appropriate (see Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act, s 20(1), which relevantly speaks of dismissal of the appeal). The appeal against sentence was not dismissed, because the order for community service was quashed and was replaced by a bond. Confirming the minimum disqualification of 12 months may have been part of varying the sentence, regarding the sentence as encompassing both the order that the first respondent perform 100 hours community service and the order of disqualification: his Honour may have meant that the Magistrate's sentence was not varied in relation to the period of disqualification, but the language of confirmation was inappropriate. [18] The presently relevant difficulty lies in the words 'the suspension is to date from 8 June 2010 and to expire on 7 June 2011'. Was this a statement of his Honour's understanding of the Magistrate's order, as an order which remained operative because it had not been varied? Was it a statement of his Honour's understanding of the result of his decision, but not part of his orders? Or was it an order by the District Court which replaced the Magistrate's order? [19] The better view, in my opinion, is that the judge made an order, so that the operative order became an order of the District Court that the first respondent be disqualified from holding a driver licence for a period of 12 months with a start date of 8 June 2010 and an end date of 7 June 2011..."
6. The real issue in Higginson concerned the reference to the period 8 June 2010 to 7 June 2011 in Ellis DCJ's orders, because this included a period during which the sentence was automatically stayed pending the appeal to the District Court, and was said to involve jurisdictional error because it meant that the court had in substance imposed a sentence less than the minimum period of 12 months required by s 188(2)(d) of the Road Transport Act. It was only, however, if this operative error was in an order made by the District Court that it would be amenable to judicial review for jurisdictional error. Basten JA proceeded on the basis that it was and this was the "better view" expressed by Giles JA in [19] of the passage set out at [36] above.
7. The Applicants' principal reliance in the present case was on the separate reasons for judgment of Young JA. Neither Giles nor Basten JJA expressed agreement or disagreement with those reasons. Those reasons must also be read in light of the fact, as pointed out by Young JA at [79], that some of the issues his Honour discusses were not the subject of full argument before the Court of Appeal.
8. At [114] of Higginson, Young JA noted that: "…although the literal meaning of 'the court that convicts' is the court which imposes the conviction at first instance, it seems to me that reading the relevant provisions as a whole and giving particular regard to ss 63, 68 and 71 of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001, the expression must be read as including the appeal court on an all grounds appeal and also includes the court that deals with an appeal on sentence only following that conviction".
9. At [119]-[125], his Honour expanded on this conclusion as follows: "[119] The question here really is whether the District Court judge pronounces the sentence as varied or merely varies part of the sentence and permits the magistrate's sentence to remain. If this latter view is correct then the order for disqualification made on 8 June 2010 by the magistrate stands and what the District Court judge said is surplusage. [120] Confirming the magistrate's sentence is not one of the listed powers in s 20(2) of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001. The practice of using the word 'confirm' stems from earlier legislation (see Justices Act 1902 s 125). It might be noted, however, that the word still appears in s 68 of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001, presumably as a hangover from the past. [121] 'Confirm' is a word with a number of meanings. Its usual meaning in law is to 'revive' or 'give life to'; see eg McLeod v McNab [1891] AC 471, 476, or 'approve', Re Vector Capital Ltd (1997) 23 ACSR 182 . [122] In the days when the relevant statute actually empowered the judge to 'confirm' a conviction, it was held that this operated so that the conviction was that of the District Court Judge: Wishart v Fraser [1941] HCA 8; 64 CLR 470, 491 per Williams J. As Davidson J said in Ex Parte Falstein; Re Maher [1948] NSWStRp 73; (1948) 49 SR (NSW) 133, 152, that where in the appeal court, 'the conviction is affirmed or quashed, there is nothing to prohibit as the order of the Quarter Sessions replaces the magistrate's conviction'. See also Hindmarsh v Allogia [1977] 2 NSWLR 599, 602. [123] The only reason that one might hesitate to apply this learning to a sentence only appeal is that the matter of conviction is not before the District Court. In some circumstances, it might be, such as where the District Court judge considers that the offence is sufficiently trivial or the good character of the defendant so outstanding that there should be no conviction. [124] Again, it would be strange if the powers of the District Court judge on sentence appeals were different from all grounds appeals. [125] Accordingly, although the position is not as clear as it should be, it seems to me that the District Court judge, when confirming or otherwise affirming what the magistrate did, was showing that it was his court that was making the order and he was not merely acknowledging that the magistrate's order remained in force."
10. Thus, with reference to Higginson, the Applicants submitted that the primary judge erred in effectively holding that the Local Court's orders with respect to conviction had not been superseded by the District's Court orders, as it was submitted that this was inconsistent with the well established position that the appellate court determination stands in place of that of the lower court (see, for example, Wishart v Fraser (1941) 64 CLR 470; [1941] HCA 8 (Wishart)).
11. Wishart is authority for the unremarkable proposition that where an appeal from a conviction by a magistrate has been taken to another court (in that case, the then Court of Quarter Sessions) and that conviction has been confirmed, that decision stands as a bar to any attempt to appeal from the magistrate's decision directly to the High Court. This was the context in which Williams J said (at 491) that: "As a result the order of the magistrate was confirmed on 21st March by the learned judge of Quarter Sessions. On the appellant renewing his previous application for the rule nisi on 28th March I made an order returnable before the Full Court on 2nd April. As a result of the conviction having been confirmed, the order which is now effective is that of the Court of Quarter Sessions (See sec. 125), and I agree that there is no longer any order of the magistrate in respect of which a prohibition can be granted."
12. In his judgment, Starke J had said (at 478): "If the Court of Quarter Sessions had reversed the decision of the stipendiary magistrate, its judgment would have held 'the field to the exclusion' of the conviction by the stipendiary magistrate. And when Quarter Sessions affirmed the conviction, its judgment was equally conclusive, for it operated as a judicial determination by a competent and higher authority that the conviction was right. An application was made to the Chairman of Quarter Sessions to state a case pursuant to the provisions of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (N.S.W.), sec. 5B, but he refused the application. And no appeal has been brought to this court by way of case stated or otherwise against the judgment of Quarter Sessions. That judgment therefore holds the field so long as it stands unreversed, and precludes this court making any judicial determination to the contrary."
13. I do not read Wishart as meaning, in a case where there has been a conviction in the Local Court but that the conviction has been confirmed in the District Court, that the conviction was not made in the Local Court. The position is a fortiori where all that has relevantly happened in the District Court is that an appeal from conviction has been dismissed, even though that dismissal functionally may be regarded as confirming the conviction.
14. True it is that the Local Court decision may be superseded for some purposes on such a scenario as explained in Wishart. That does not mean, however, that for the purposes of s 97 of the Act currently under consideration, Ms Lazarus was convicted on 12 December 2017 in the District Court. To the extent that Young JA's observations in Higginson may be thought to support the Applicants' submission to the contrary, I would not follow them.
15. It is not necessary to decide whether or not the District Court still has the power to "confirm" a conviction on appeal; that form of order is not contained in s 20(2) of the Crimes (Review and Appeal) Act (cf. s 133A of the former Justices Act), but it is implicit in s 68 of the same Act that such an order may be made by the District Court hearing an appeal from the Local Court in a criminal matter.
16. The District Court in the present proceedings did not make any orders which could be taken to have "superseded" the Local Court's orders with respect to conviction in the sense of altering the simple fact that it was in the Local Court in 2014 that Ms Lazarus was convicted. As Ms Lazarus' appeal as to conviction was dismissed by the District Court, the Local Court's orders as to conviction remained on foot. Nothing has occurred to alter the fact that it was the Local Court that convicted Ms Lazarus and found her guilty of the offences with which she was charged. The language of s 97 of the Act is clear and intractable.
17. As noted at [14] above, Conlon DCJ summarily dismissed Ms Lazarus' conviction appeal from the Local Court in light of her failure to appear. There was no order made which disturbed the convictions entered by the Local Court and the conviction remained that of the Local Court.
18. As noted at [16] above, on the severity appeal, Hoy DCJ allowed the appeal and varied the sentence imposed by the Local Court. Whilst it is true that Hoy DCJ purported to "confirm" the convictions in his orders of 17 December 2017, why this was necessary, even assuming there was power to do so, is not apparent. As noted by Young JA in Higginson at [123], on a sentence appeal, the matter of conviction is not before the District Court.
19. In any event, and as a matter of ordinary English, the "confirmation" of a conviction is not the same as the making of it. They are two distinct concepts and, while the original order recording the conviction may be superseded in some respects or for some purposes in accordance with Wishart, that does not mean that the identity of the Court which "convicts" a person alters.
20. Wishart was applied by this Court in Blacker v Parnell [1978] 1 NSWLR 616 (Blacker), and that decision was also relied upon by the Applicants. In Blacker at 619, Moffitt P (with whom Reynolds and Samuels JJA agreed) cited Wishart as authority for the proposition that where "the conviction is affirmed or quashed, there is nothing to prohibit as the order of the Quarter Sessions replaces the magistrate's conviction". Neither this passage not any other aspect of the then President's judgment supports the proposition stated in the headnote of the authorised report of Blacker, which is that "[w]hen the District Court judge dismissed the appeals from the magistrate, and confirmed the convictions and sentences, the convictions became those of the District Court judge and the sentences imposed were those imposed by him."
21. Other decisions which have applied Wishart to which attention was drawn in the Applicants' submissions do not assist the Applicants' case: see, for example, Garde v Dowd (2011) 80 NSWLR 620; [2011] NSWCA 115 at [12); Morgan v District Court of New South Wales (2017) 94 NSWLR 463; [2017] NSWCA 105 at [32]; Templeton (a pseudonym) v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [2018] NSWCA 335 at [4]; Stephens v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [2019] NSWSC 761 at [25]; and Jamal v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [2019] NSWCA 121. As I have indicated above, Wishart is concerned with the ongoing operative effect of orders of the Local Court where there has been an appeal from those orders, with ramifications for the availability of judicial review of the original decision.
22. The primary judge was correct in holding that the relevant court that convicted Ms Lazarus of offences in the present proceedings was the Local Court, and it was only that Court which could make directions for compensation pursuant to s 97 of the Act. The District Court could not make such directions.
23. Although the matter was argued with both skill and care by Mr Gow, no jurisdictional error has been established by the Applicants.
24. The application for judicial review must be dismissed.
25. MACFARLAN JA: I agree with Bell P.
26. WHITE JA: This application for judicial review turns upon the construction of s 97 of the Victims Rights and Support Act 2013 (NSW) ("the Victims Rights Act"). That section is set out in the reasons for judgment of the President at [3].
27. Section 98 of the Victims Rights Act provides: "98 Restrictions on court's power to give directions for compensation for loss A court may not give a direction for compensation: (a) for economic loss for which financial support is payable under this Act or compensation is payable under Division 2, or (b) for an amount in excess of the maximum amount that, in its civil jurisdiction, the court is empowered to award in proceedings for the recovery of a debt."
28. In ss 97 and 98 "court" is defined as follows: "court means the Supreme Court, the Court of Criminal Appeal, the District Court or the Local Court." (s 96)
29. The applicants submitted that the order of Conlon DCJ of 20 June 2017 summarily dismissing Ms Lazarus' appeal from conviction, and confirming that conviction, superseded the conviction made in the Local Court and became the operative order of conviction. As the President notes, the applicants rely upon Wishart v Fraser (1941) 64 CLR 470; [1941] HCA 8. The reasoning in Wishart v Fraser has been applied by this court in holding that the dismissal by the District Court of an appeal from conviction in the Local Court, whether given after a hearing on the merits or not, precludes any application for judicial review of the order of the Local Court (Jamal v Director of Public Prosecutions [2019] NSWCA 121 at [52] and cases cited; Blacker v Parnell [1978] 1 NSWLR 616 at 619).
30. The applicants relied on the judgment of Young JA in Roads and Traffic Authority of NSW v Higginson [2011] NSWCA 151 at [114] ff. I agree with the President's reasons at [38]-[45] in relation to the applicants' reliance on Higginson. The applicants also cited Blacker v Parnell. Blacker v Parnell concerned an appeal to the District Court under the then s 122 of the Justices Act 1902 (NSW) from a conviction and sentence of a magistrate. The applicants were each convicted of a drug offence and sentenced to six months' imprisonment. An application was made to the Supreme Court under s 112 of the Justices Act for a statutory prohibition. Appeals were also lodged against conviction and sentence with the consequence that execution of the convictions and sentences were stayed.
31. The application for prohibition came before a judge of the Supreme Court at 11:30am on 17 March 1978. Fifteen minutes earlier a District Court judge made orders as follows: "The appeal is withdrawn, dismissed. The magistrate's conviction findings penalties orders are confirmed in all respects." (sic)
32. The matter came before the Court of Appeal by an application for leave to appeal from the decision of the Supreme Court judge dismissing the applications for prohibition. Moffitt P, with whom Reynolds and Samuels JJA agreed, said (at 619): "In the present case, the orders of Cross D.C.J. stand in the way of the statutory prohibition sought. Their presence must lead us to uphold the preliminary objection and refuse leave. In an endeavour to escape from this conclusion counsel for the applicants argued further that we should regard the order made by Cross D.C.J. as an order permitting the withdrawal of the appeal, and that he was in error in adding the orders he did. It is clear, however, that the order made was a dismissal of the appeal and a confirmation of the conviction and sentence, and that the learned judge made and intended to make just these orders. The convictions were by the learned District Court judge and the sentences were those imposed by him." (Emphasis added.)
33. Section 122 of the Justices Act provided for an appeal to the District Court against conviction or sentence by way of imprisonment, fine, penalty or any forfeiture from a Justice of the Peace. Section 125 relevantly provided: "125. (1) The Court hearing the appeal shall determine the matter of every such appeal, and may adjourn the hearing thereof, and may by its order confirm, quash, set aside, vary, increase, or reduce, the conviction, order, sentence, or adjudication appealed against, or make such other order in the matter, and as to costs to be paid by either party, including the Crown, as to the Court seems just; and may in and by any such order, exercise any power which the Justice or Justices who made the conviction or order might have exercised, and any order so made shall have the same effect and shall be enforced in the same manner as if it had been made by such Justice or Justices."
34. In 1977, the appeal from a conviction or sentence of a Justice of the Peace to the District Court was by way of an appeal de novo (Goldfinch v R (1987) 30 A Crim R 212 at 218-219 per McHugh JA). The amendments to the appeal provisions of the Justices Act in 1998 by the Justices Legislation Amendment (Appeals) Act 1998 (NSW) are traced by McColl JA in Engelbrecht v Director of Public Prosecutions [2016] NSWCA 290 at [66]-[81].
35. Whatever the precise nature of the appeal by way of rehearing from conviction now provided for by s 18 of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW) (AG v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [2015] NSWCA 218), the change to the legislative provisions as to the nature of the appeal to the District Court from conviction is such that it cannot now be said that the order of the District Court dismissing the appeal from conviction, or confirming the conviction, is itself a conviction made by the District Court judge.
36. There are considerations that prima facie militate against anything other than a literal construction of s 97. Because these considerations were not the subject of argument (there being no appearance for the respondent and the Attorney General having declined to intervene), the following observations are necessarily tentative. They turn on the definition of "court" in s 96.
37. On the applicants' construction of s 97, it is the court that makes the order that has the operative effect of the person being convicted of an offence that can give a direction for compensation for loss. Where there is an appeal from conviction, the order that has such operative effect will be the order of the appellate court that dismisses the appeal, or, in limited cases, enters a conviction.
38. The focus of argument in the present application, perhaps naturally enough, was upon an appeal from the Local Court to the District Court. The submissions did not address alternative appeals, such as an appeal from the District Court or the Supreme Court to the Court of Criminal Appeal, or a further appeal (with special leave) to the High Court.
39. The Court of Criminal Appeal is established by s 3(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW). The Supreme Court is the Court of Criminal Appeal for the purposes of the Criminal Appeal Act. The Court of Criminal Appeal has no separate civil jurisdiction.
40. The fact that the Court of Criminal Appeal is a "court" that can give a "direction for compensation" pursuant to s 97, does not mean that the dismissal of an appeal against conviction from the District Court or the Supreme Court should mean that the Court of Criminal Appeal, and not the District Court or the Supreme Court, is the court that can give a direction for compensation. There are cases in which the only relevant conviction is that made by the Court of Criminal Appeal, rather than the District Court or the Supreme Court, such as where a conviction of a more serious offence is set aside and a conviction for a lesser offence is substituted (Criminal Appeal Act, s 7(2)).
41. Prima facie, and uninstructed by submissions, there would be good reason to conclude that in such a circumstance the Court of Criminal Appeal, being an integral part of the Supreme Court, and being the only court that convicted a person of an offence, would have unlimited authority to give a direction for compensation under s 97, just as the civil jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to give judgment in proceedings for the recovery of a debt is unlimited.
42. Otherwise, the inclusion of the Court of Criminal Appeal in the definition of "court" in s 96 would be meaningless because the Court of Criminal Appeal does not have civil jurisdiction separate from the Supreme Court.
43. I accept that this prima facie construction may be contestable. If it were intended that in the more usual case where the Court of Criminal Appeal dismisses an appeal from conviction, the court that could order compensation under s 97 of the Victims Rights Act was not the District Court or the Supreme Court who convicted the offender, but the Court of Criminal Appeal who dismissed the appeal from conviction, then one would expect explicit consideration to have been given to the issue addressed at [71]-[73] above.
44. Assuming the tentative construction I have suggested at [72] is correct, then, if the applicants' construction of s 97 is correct, it would follow that an offender convicted of a property offence by the District Court that caused victims loss of more than $750,000 would have to give careful consideration to whether a consequence of an unsuccessful appeal would be exposure to a greater level of potential liability under s 97. On the other hand, if that construction is wrong, and because the Court of Criminal Appeal, if it is treated as a court distinct from the Supreme Court, has no civil jurisdiction, then, on the applicants' construction of s 97, any such offender convicted by the District Court would have an incentive to appeal from conviction, whatever the merits of appeal, so as to avoid an order for compensation.
45. Of more significance is an appeal against conviction to the High Court. The fact that the appeal to the High Court is an appeal stricto sensu, would not affect the fact that where an appeal from conviction is dismissed by the High Court, the operative decision is that of the High Court and not the lower court. But the Victims Rights Act does not and could not confer authority on the High Court to give a direction for compensation under s 97. If the applicants' submission is correct, then an offender who pursued his or her appeal from conviction as far as the High Court, could not be subjected to a direction for compensation under s 97. Such a construction would not make sense.
46. The same consideration would arise in the more limited class of case in which an appeal from conviction may lie from the Supreme Court to the Federal Court of Australia, such as for an offence under s 132AD of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) where the appeal from conviction would lie to the Federal Court pursuant to s 131B(2)(a) of the Copyright Act.
47. For the reasons of the President, and these additional reasons, I agree with the orders proposed by the President.

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