27 In Macarthur District Motorcycle Sportsman Inc v Ardizzone [2004] NSWCA 145 Hodgson JA observed that, at least theoretically, there may be some tension between the requirements of s 13(1) and the statements of principle in Malec v JC Hutton Pty Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 638 at 634. Basten JA in Jopling at [3] commented on the significant difficulties that would attend the assessment of damages for children who suffered serious injury if s 13 is held to require a different approach. In Jopling the primary judge's assessment of a buffer in accordance with the principles explained by Heydon JA in State of New South Wales v Moss (2000) 54 NSWLR 536 at 559 and in Malec was approved. Counsel for the claimant submitted that a proper application of these principles dictates that some allowance be made for future economic loss since, among the possible future outcomes is the chance that the claimant's impairment of a vocational skill may be productive of financial loss. Reliance was placed on Heydon JA's observations in Moss at [87]:
In short, where earning capacity has unquestionably been reduced but its extent is difficult to assess, even though no precise evidence of relevant earning rates is tendered, it is not open to the court to abandon the task and the want of evidence does not necessarily result in non-recovery of damages. … The task of the trier of fact is to form a discretionary judgment by reference to not wholly determinate criteria within fairly wide parameters. Though the trier of fact in arriving at the discretionary judgment must achieve satisfaction that a fair award is being made, since what is involved is not the finding of historical facts on a balance of probabilities, but the assessment of the value of a chance, it is appropriate to take into account a range of possible outcomes even though the likelihood of any particular outcome being achieved may be no more than a real possibility.
28 As I have noted, the Judge approached the assessment on an understanding that a claimant who may suffer disadvantage by reason of the injury is not precluded from an award under s 13. A fair reading of the judgment conveys that her Honour was not satisfied that the claimant had established that her reduced capacity to use a keyboard for extended periods without a break impaired her capacity to earn income in a way that was, or may be, productive of financial loss. To my mind to come to such a conclusion was not unreasonable; because unlike the facts in Moss this is not a case in which it is apt to speak of an "unquestionable reduction in earning capacity". In the event that it was an error not to make some allowance for the chance of financial loss arising from the claimant's injury I consider that any buffer would involve a sum well below the revised range posed by her counsel on the hearing of the application. Taking into account the principles set out by Kirby P (as he then was) in Carolan v AMF Bowling Pty Ltd t/a Bennetts Green Bowl (unreported) Court of Appeal, 16 November 1995, I would refuse leave to appeal.
29 The orders that I propose are:
1. Dismiss the application for leave to appeal;
2. The claimant is to pay the opponent's costs of the application.
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