How should the Tribunal evaluate the evidence and, in particular, what weight should be given to so-called 'risk-factor'?
- As well as evidence of whether granting the licence would increase alcohol related harm, the Authority identified various 'risk factors' for alcohol related harm which it submitted the Tribunal should take into account. My understanding is that those so called 'risk factors' include crime statistics such as hotspots, the level of socio-economic disadvantage of residents, the proportion of indigenous residents and health data. The Authority suggested that the Tribunal's role was not to just to make findings of fact on disputed evidence but to attach weight these and other risk factors.
- The Tribunal "is not bound by the rules of evidence and may inquire into and inform itself on any matter in such manner as it thinks fit, subject to the rules of natural justice": Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) (NCAT Act), s 38(2). Although the Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence, it must "act judicially", that is "rationally and reasonably": Australian Broadcasting Commission v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 at 367 per Deane J.
- The Tribunal's task in this case is essentially to make findings of fact. I must make a finding as to the overall social impact of granting the licence and then ask whether that impact will be detrimental to the well-being of the local or broader community. In Macedon Ranges Shire Council v Romsey Hotel Pty Ltd [2008] VSCA 45, the Court stated at [44] that "the weight to be given to the evidence is, of course, a matter for the decision maker, and will depend on the nature, extent and cogency of the evidence". Evidence will have little or no probative value if it is based on dubious assumptions or mere speculation.
- The Tribunal will give weight to so-called 'risk factors' if there is probative evidence that granting the licence will have a particular social impact. The issue for the Tribunal is not whether the local or broader community is currently experiencing higher than average levels of alcohol related harm. The Tribunal's task is to assess the overall social impact of the licence being granted and determine whether that overall impact will not be detrimental to the well-being of the local or broader community.
- There is no provision in the ADR Act dealing with the issue of onus of proof to establish facts. Neither party has a legal onus to prove that the decision is correct or incorrect. Any findings of fact relevant to the Tribunal's decision must be made "on the balance of probabilities". In this case, one question of fact is "the overall social impact of (granting) the licence". Only social impacts of granting the licence are relevant. In Coastwide Fabrication & Erection Pty Ltd v Honeysett [2009] NSWCA 134 the Court of Appeal (Ipp JA, Young JA and McDougall J) at [61]-[64] made the following observations about the difference between inference and conjecture when the question of causation arises:
61 In dealing with the question of causation, it is necessary to bear in mind the distinction between inference and conjecture. As Spigelman CJ said in Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness (2000) 49 NSWLR 262 at 275 [84], "[c]haracterisation of a reasoning process as one or the other occurs on a continuum in which there is no bright line division. Nevertheless, the distinction exists".
62 On the same topic, Lord Macmillan said, in Jones v Great Western Railway Co (1930) 144 LT 194 at 202, that although it was often difficult to find the dividing line between conjecture and inference, there was a clear distinction between them. His Lordship said that a conjecture, even though plausible, is no more than a guess, whereas an inference is a deduction from the evidence. Thus, his Lordship said, if the deduction were reasonable, the inference "may have the validity of legal proof". His Lordship concluded by saying that "[t]he attribution of an occurrence to a cause is… always a matter of inference".
63 Lord Wright put the matter somewhat differently in Caswell v Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd [1940] AC 152 at 169 - 170. His Lordship said, in substance, that there could be no inference unless there were objective facts from which the inference could be drawn; and if there were no such objective facts then inference fails "and what is left is mere speculation or conjecture".
64 Finally, before I return to the facts, I note that the process of inference may involve an intuitive element that is not susceptible to detailed explication: see Hayne J in Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232 at 290 [148]; and Spigelman CJ in Seltsam at 268 [30].
The question of causation (of granting the licence and any particular social impact) is not a question that can be reached intuitively. Common sense and experience are not sufficient to conclude that granting an extra packaged liquor licence in Kurri Kurri will increase the rates of assault in the area or have any other negative social impact. There must be some objective facts from which the inference that there will be a particular social impact can be drawn.