Salient Facts
16 In 2011, Martin met Peiliang and his wife, Weiping. Peiliang and Weiping engaged Martin to perform migration work for them. Between about July 2014 and the beginning of 2016, Martin introduced Peiliang to a number of investments. Peiliang provided the investment capital, Martin managed the investments and they shared the profits. Peiliang accepted in cross-examination that as at January and February 2016, no investment that Martin had proposed had made a loss, and some had been quite profitable: T358.16, 343.44, 344.1, 345.18.
17 In 2016, Peiliang was the Chairman of Conglin China, the holding company of a large corporate group operating in PRC. Peiliang was an 80% shareholder in Conglin China, with effective control of Conglin China and its related entities, and oversaw the group's investments. Conglin Australia was one of the companies through which Peiliang conducted some of his business: T342.5-6 (Peiliang XX).
18 In January or February 2016, Martin and Peiliang met at Conglin China's offices in PRC, and discussed a proposal made by Martin for an education business in Australia. At that time, Martin understood that Conglin China had approval for a foreign exchange quota: T100.5-9; 102.14-15; 104.35. At the time, it was Martin's understanding that it was very difficult to get Chinese RMB out of PRC: T100.6-7; 104.13-15. Martin's proposal was that parents in PRC would pay money to Conglin China for their child to study and Conglin China would use its foreign exchange quota to transfer money to its Australian subsidiary, Conglin Australia, which would pass it on to the Australian business. The money would be put in a fund and used for investments. There would be a gap between when the money entered the fund and when it was invested, and during that period Conglin China could borrow money from the fund at a cheaper rate than market rates: T100.5-25; 103.42-46; 104.37-41; 105.9-16 (Martin X). Conglin China would guarantee repayment of the funds to parents: T101.40-45; 102.7-10 (Martin X).
19 The imprecision and vagueness with which the proposal was discussed are reflected in the following passages of transcript. At T104.37, Martin was asked in chief what he recalled Peiliang saying, if anything, about the use of the foreign exchange quota, as Martin had proposed. Martin answered:
I mentioned this opportunity we only refund going to a parent company. This opportunity for - before we allocate a fund to realise some projects, and Conglin can access the fund, can borrow from the fund at a relatively cheaper rate.
At T105.8, Martin was asked in chief what was said at the meeting on the topic of Conglin China accessing cheaper finance through the fund. Martin replied:
I just explained the investment structure. The money moved from parents go into the parent company. The parent company inject into Australian wholly owned subsidiary, and a wholly owned subsidiary then inject into the investment project. There is a - a gap of time before we transfer funds over to allocate into the project. The fund now sitting in - the money now sitting in the fund. And because we give a guarantee and Conglin can borrow from the fund as well at a cheaper rate is compared to - because at the time it was difficult to get the finance, and that's much easier for them to - to utilise the benefit of the fund.
20 Martin explained at the meeting that the SEP proposal was a new idea and it was a start-up: T381.1-5 (Peiliang XX). Peiliang conceded that it was obvious to him that its success depended on recruiting students from wealthy families, and there was no reliable way of predicting how many students would sign up: T381.15-20. However, he trusted Martin's business judgment, and because of that he decided to invest: T381.25-37. Peiliang agreed to proceed with the business proposal at the end of the meeting in January or February 2016, including Conglin China's provision of guarantees and Conglin China and Conglin Australia using the foreign exchange quota to transfer funds between China and Australia: T381.42-382.5 (Peiliang XX); T100.1-34 (Martin X).
21 Further, Peiliang gave unchallenged evidence that Martin said to him:
Besides, I was your lawyer. So I will do anything in your benefit.
This evidence was given through a translator. The defendants submit, and I accept, that Peiliang did not intend in that evidence, as translated, to say "was", but "am", given that the Chinese language does not have past, present or future tenses. I will return to the topic of the solicitor-client relationship later in the judgment.
22 Peiliang and Martin subsequently had a number of telephone discussions, in which they discussed Martin investing money in the business and Martin sourcing an office and personnel: T107.34-41; T108.9-31 (Martin X).
23 The parties have agreed upon a statement of agreed facts (SAF), which records that the following matters were discussed between Martin and Peiliang in early 2016, that is between around January and May 2016:
(a) SEP would conduct the education business and be owned by Martin and Peiliang or their nominees: SAF 12.1, 12.2;
(b) SEP would provide education and training in Australia to the children of Chinese nationals and their parents would pay in RMB the equivalent of A$500,000 (Investment) to either:
(i) SEP; or
(ii) Conglin China, which would then pay the Investment to SEP via Conglin Australia (using, if necessary, its rights under the law of PRC to convert RMB into AUD and transfer AUD out of China): SAF 12.3, 12.5.
(c) SEP would have the use of the Investment, which it would invest in a fund together with payments received in respect of other students. At the conclusion of the education or training, the parent would be able to elect between having the balance of the Investment repaid to him or her, or converting it into equity in SEP: SAF 12.4, 12.6.
(d) If the parent elected to have the balance of the Investment repaid to him or her, then SEP would pay that amount in AUD to Conglin Australia and Conglin Australia would transfer that money to Conglin China, so that Conglin China could pay in RMB the equivalent of that amount to the parent (using, if necessary, its rights under the law of PRC to convert AUD into RMB): SAF 12.7.
(e) Conglin China would have the right to borrow from the fund at a discount to market rates: SAF 12.8.
(f) Conglin China would provide guarantees to the parents in respect of the repayment of the investment: SAF 12.9.
(g) Peiliang agreed to the use of Conglin China's foreign exchange quota for the purpose of exchanging currencies and transferring funds between the PRC and Australia for the purpose of the business: SAF 13.
24 In February 2016, SEP was incorporated. Martin was its sole director and beneficially held 50% of the issued shares: CB7/2332-2340. Peiliang beneficially held 40% of its issued shares, contributing capital between March and June 2016: CB3/841. The other 10% was held by someone called Xue Qin: CB7/2334.
25 SEPAM was also incorporated. Both Martin and Peiliang were directors, and Martin beneficially owned all of its issued shares: CB7/2338-2340.
26 On about 29 March 2016, Conglin China obtained a foreign exchange authority that permitted it to transfer US$80 million to Conglin Australia as its "final destination" for the purposes of investing in Conglin Australia: CB3/955-956 (the Quota). The Quota is entitled "Enterprise Certificate of Overseas Investment" and was issued by the Department of Commerce of Shangdong Provence and dated 29 March 2016. It refers to the "Overseas enterprise (final destination)" as Conglin Australia. It contains repeated references to "investment", including a description of Conglin China as the "Investment body". The notes at the end of the Quota record that Conglin China was applying to increase its investment capital in Conglin Australia in the following terms:
Changes of circumstances: Conglin Group Co., Ltd applies to increase invest in CLGC Australia Co., Ltd. Changes are: The total investment amount is increased from $1,740 to $8,000, $6,260 is added. The total investment amount from the China side is increased from $1,740 to $8,000, 6,260 is added (unit: USD10,000).
The plaintiffs submit, and I accept, that the Quota unambiguously recorded that it could only be used to increase investment capital in Conglin Australia. Peiliang accepted in cross-examination that that stated purpose was not a true reflection of Conglin China's actual purpose: T383.34-36.
27 Between March and September 2016, Martin took steps to establish the education business he had discussed with Peiliang, including by investing approximately A$1 million in SEP and SEPAM, and causing those entities to enter into various agreements, such as a lease and a bank guarantee: affidavit of Martin dated 27 September 2017 at [19]. On 16 March 2016, Peiliang invested A$23,000 of capital in SEP, and between 15 and 27 June 2016, Peiliang invested about A$777,000 of further capital in SEP: CB3/841. Martin and Peiliang continued to discuss the education business, guarantees and foreign exchange transfers: affidavit of Martin dated 27 February 2018 at [22]-[29]. Those discussions took place over the telephone, with Martin being in Australia and Peiliang being in PRC.
28 In April 2016, Peiliang accompanied Martin to a final inspection in Sydney for offices Martin was considering leasing for the business. Peiliang was supportive of Martin leasing the premises: T112.45-113.2; 113.5-6 (Martin X).
29 The business reached the stage of enrolling three students in SEP's education courses, as follows:
(a) In April 2016, Yaojia Zhang: CB8/2570-2572. The contract in relation to Yaojia Zhang differed from the others, in that W&H Lawyers was a party and guaranteed the return of the investment (cl 3). That feature was attributed by Martin to the personal relationship which the student's family had with Martin: Martin's affidavit of 27 February 2018 at [36]. The contract permitted payment in AUD to W&H Lawyers or in RMB to Conglin China (cl 2.3). Return of the investment was also guaranteed by Conglin China (cl 3).
(b) In September 2016, Dehang Kong: CB6/1778-1787. SEP, Conglin China and Dehang Kong were parties and signed the agreement: CB6/1787. The agreement included terms that payment could be made in RMB to Conglin China, and a company referred to as Shandong Conglin Group Co. Ltd guaranteed repayment of the investment (cll 2.2(c), 3). I assume that that company is the same company as Conglin China, consistently with the plaintiffs' submission, which does not appear to have been controverted by the defendants. The contract annexed a certificate of guarantee from Conglin China: CB6/1797.
(c) In January 2017, Qingyun Dai: CB6/1764-1777. The letter of offer to Qingyun Dai incorporated standard terms (which included the term that payment could be made in RMB to Conglin China (cl 2.2(c)): CB6/1773. The contract included a guarantee from Conglin China (cl 6 at CB6/1766 and cl 3 at CB6/1774). The contract was signed by Conglin China: CB6/1769.
30 On about 14 September 2016, Conglin China executed a certificate confirming that it fully guaranteed student funds for the purposes of the SEP project: CB6/1652BJ.
31 Between May 2016 and January 2017, Conglin China:
(a) received payments in RMB with respect to the enrolment of two of those students: affidavit of Peiliang dated 11 May 2018 at [65]; SAF 26.2; and
(b) converted those amounts to Australian dollars and transferred them to Conglin Australia, using the Quota: Peiliang's affidavit dated 11 May 2018 at [65]; Conglin Australia bank statements at CB4/1159A-1159F; Conglin China applications for foreign transfers at CB4/1163A, 5/1551A, 6/1682C, SAF 26.2.
32 Conglin Australia, in turn, transferred those funds to SEP: CB4/1159A-1159F; Peiliang affidavit dated 11 May 2018 at [65], SAF 26.2.
33 In 2017, Conglin China was in financial difficulty. On 10 March 2017, a judgment was entered against it for the equivalent of about A$3 million: CB6/1965. In mid-2017, PRC changed its lending policies, such that its banks called on existing loans and refused to refinance them through new loans. Conglin China had guaranteed the borrowing of a number of its subsidiaries and associated companies: Peiliang's affidavit dated 12 September 2018 at [42]-[43]; affidavit of Xuewei Liu dated 12 December 2018 at [14]-[15]; T356.15-23 (Peiliang XX). In the first half of 2017, Conglin China was forced to seek millions of RMB of short-term borrowing, some of that borrowing at "extortionate" interest rates: T354.12-16 (Peiliang XX). Sometimes, it could not raise funds without Peiliang giving a personal guarantee: T354.21-26 (Peiliang XX). It still failed to pay those loans on time. Creditors took legal action and froze assets in the group: CB9/2882AQ-2882AU.
34 Within a few months of May 2017, Conglin China had debts well in excess of 1 billion RMB that needed to be repaid or refinanced, causing a sudden and unexpected shortfall in cash: T355.12-20 (Peiliang XX). In that passage, I read Peiliang's response "I think so" at T355.15 as accepting that proposition. Conglin China did not have enough money to repay what the banks were demanding. It had to resort to strategies such as selling assets at a discount, offering discounts in return for early payment of debts and on-selling unpaid debts at a discount: T355.27-42 (Peiliang XX).
35 In June 2017, Conglin China provided financial statements to Bohai International Trust Co Ltd (Bohai Trust). The case was opened by the plaintiffs on the basis that Bohai Trust was contemplated as operating the proposed fund for SEP: T6.25-28. I return to that topic in further detail below.
36 In July 2017, Martin flew to China to discuss Conglin China's financial position with Peiliang: T114.6-20 (Martin X). On the way to PRC, Martin was told that significant amounts in Conglin China's bank accounts were frozen and that Conglin China was 7 billion RMB in debt: T114.35-115.16 (Martin X). The defendants criticised that evidence in their submissions as being hearsay and as not having been included in Martin's affidavit evidence, but despite objection having been taken, the trial judge posed the question herself and objection was not taken to the answer. The plaintiffs also referred, by way of background to Martin's trip to PRC, to the fact that Peiliang had not attended his only son's wedding in Sydney. However, that non-attendance needs to be placed in context. Peiliang had already attended the traditional wedding ceremony for his son in PRC which all elderly relatives had attended, but did not attend the Australian wedding for his son's young English-speaking friends: Peiliang's affidavit dated 12 September 2018 at [50].
37 On 16 July 2017, Peiliang and Martin met at Conglin China's offices in PRC. Martin asked Peiliang about Conglin China's frozen bank account. Peiliang told him that Conglin China was "collapsing" because the Chinese banking system was not supporting manufacturers: T117.1-6 (Martin X). Peiliang told Martin that the position was "hopeless", the company was "finished" and "going under", and he could not hold it for longer than three months: T114.26-31, 115.37-46, 116.2-11, 120.21 (Martin X). The defendants dispute Martin's version of the conversation, but in my view that evidence should be accepted as being consistent with the objective facts at the time. The fact that Conglin China did not enter reorganisation until almost a year later, and continued to trade under administration, does not undermine the dire predictions which Peiliang made at the time. The following day, Conglin China was required to repay a short term loan of RMB30 million, personally guaranteed by Peiliang, but did not make that repayment: CB9/2882AQ, T352.3-12 (Peiliang XX).
38 As the education business relied upon the ability to receive payments from PRC and give guarantees to parents in the PRC, following his conversation with Peiliang, Martin decided to close the SEP business down, and began taking steps to do so (including by sending termination letters to students): Martin's affidavit of 27 February 2018 at [47], CB7/2189-2197.
39 The plaintiffs sought to prove through Martin's oral evidence in chief that on 28 July 2017, Conglin China published a notice to its creditors on its website and advised that it was suffering from a financial deficit, which had resulted in overdue payments to them, and proposed a payment plan that involved deferring payment for six months and said that it would "try its best" to make that happen: T117.8-118.2 and CB7/2199. Peiliang denied that such a letter was published or issued at all: Peiliang's affidavit of 11 May 2018 at [93] (responding to [54] of Martin's affidavit of 27 February 2018, which was not read). It is not possible for me to resolve satisfactorily that issue of contested credibility without having seen and heard the evidence being given. Accordingly, I do not place any reliance upon that document, in light of the abundance of other evidence as to Conglin China's financial position in mid-2017.
40 Between January and July 2017, Conglin China made losses equivalent to about A$19 million: CB3/844BD.
41 On 16 August 2017, Peiliang offered to pay Martin for the business's losses. Although there is a dispute about why the offer was made, there is no dispute that the offer was made, as it was recorded in writing on WeChat: CB6/1707; SAF 29; T123.31-32 (Martin X). I do not regard that offer as constituting any form of admission of legal liability or moral responsibility.
42 Conglin China's financial position continued to deteriorate. It lost the equivalent of about A$40 million that calendar year: CB3/844BI. In October 2017, judgment was entered against it and Peiliang in PRC for the equivalent of about A$9 million: CB8/2503.
43 In March 2018, Conglin China's shareholders, including Peiliang, resolved to apply to a court in the PRC for bankruptcy reorganisation, on the basis that it was unable to pay its debts due: CB9/2882B, 2805B.
44 In April 2018, Conglin China produced a feasibility analysis report, recording that the company "has been trapped in a financial crisis since 2017. … Up to now, Conglin Group has found it hard to pay the loan principal and interest. Many creditors have filed law suits against Conglin Group …". The report stated that Conglin Group had a net asset deficiency of 7 billion yuan: CB9/2805C.
45 In May 2018, a court in PRC made an order approving an application made by Conglin China and 23 related companies to enter into bankruptcy reorganisation. The order recorded that the Conglin Group was "seriously insolvent": CB9/2828.
46 Conglin China prepared a draft proposal dated 21 April 2020 for its reorganisation, proposing that ordinary creditors should receive the equivalent of 12.64% of their debts: CB10/3205, 3211, 3212.
47 I indicated above that I would return to the topic of the financial statements sent to Bohai Trust. In about September 2016, Martin approached Bohai Trust to see if it might operate a trust fund licensed in PRC to raise capital for SEP's education business. Martin gave evidence that he considered that such a fund was needed to comply with the law of PRC: affidavit of Martin dated 27 February 2018 at [43]; affidavit of Martin dated 27 September 2017 at [24]. That proposition was disputed as a proposition of the law of PRC, but whether Martin thought that that was the legal position is not a matter of any real significance.
48 On about 16 June 2017, an employee of Conglin China, Mr Li Wei, emailed Conglin China's financial statements for calendar years 2015 and 2016 to an employee or representative of Bohai Trust, Mr Ai Pingping: SAF 27. The attachments to that email, being the financial statements, were not discovered. However, it is an admitted fact (SAF 28) that the financial statements provided to Bohai Trust purported to record Conglin China's financial position as follows:
(a) in calendar year 2015, the net assets were RMB9,783,421,061.69 and the net profit was RMB1,319,155,406.25; and
(b) in calendar year 2016, the net assets were RMB10,806,155,208.23 and the net profit was RMB1,391,704,830.80.
The defendants sought to withdraw the admission in SAF 28 in the course of their final address on the very last day of the hearing (T566.18-20), on the basis that they wished to submit that the financial statements referred to in SAF 28 were those pertaining to the Conglin Group as a whole rather than to Conglin China. Unsurprisingly, after hearing argument from both sides, the trial judge refused leave to withdraw the admission (T573.32-38).
49 Three days later, on Monday, 19 June 2017, Mr Ai Pingping provided Conglin China's 2015 and 2016 financial statements to a lawyer at W&H Lawyers, referring to them as the "Audit reports": CB7/2098. Those financial statements are expressed to be for Conglin China. In the calendar year to 31 December 2015, they show total assets in the amount of RMB18,202,036,041.93 and total liabilities of 8,418,615,340.24 (CB7/2111 and 2110 respectively). The difference between those figures (namely RMB9,783,420,701.69) is very close to the amount of RMB9,783,421,061.69, given for the net assets for the 2015 year referred to in SAF 28 as having been provided to Bohai Trust. In relation to the calendar year ended 31 December 2016, those financial statements show total assets of RMB18,904,083,072.38 and total liabilities of 8,097,927,864.15 (CB7/2116 and 2115 respectively). The difference is the figure of 10,806,155,208.23 shown in SAF 28 as having been the net assets in the financial statements provided to Bohai Trust. Accordingly, it is an obvious inference that the audited financial statements sent on 19 June 2017 for calendar year 2016 at CB7/2113 are the same as the financial statements which were sent to Bohai Trust on 16 June 2017. The audited financial statements sent on 19 June 2017 for calendar year 2015 at CB7/2018 are very close to, but not exactly the same as, the financial statements sent to Bohai Trust on 16 June 2017.
50 The plaintiffs contrast what was provided to Bohai Trust by Conglin China in June 2017 with a different set of financial statements provided by Conglin China in discovery in these proceedings. The discovered financial statements show the following (CB3/844BZ):
(a) in the calendar year ended 31 December 2015, the total assets of Conglin China were RMB3,875,598,408.41 and the total liabilities were RMB3,709,581,238.18, a surplus of less than RMB 200 million (or approximately A$35m); and
(b) in the calendar year ended 31 December 2016, the total assets of Conglin China were shown as RMB3,777,137,653.60 and the total liabilities were RMB3,608,461,576.30, again a difference of less than RMB 200 million (or approximately A$35m).
The plaintiffs submit that the financial statements produced on discovery are a more reliable indication of Conglin China's financial position than those provided to Bohai Trust.
51 The defendants submit that the documents produced to Bohai Trust related to the Conglin Group as a whole, rather than Conglin China in particular, thus accounting for the very large disparity in the net asset positions. However, that submission depended upon the defendants being granted leave to withdraw their admission in SAF 28 (corresponding to an admission in [43] of the defence by Peiliang and Conglin China), and as I have indicated that application was rightly refused. The defendants also draw attention to various media articles in PRC and drafts of the reorganisation proposal for Conglin China, but I do not place any weight on those documents, being either hearsay or drafts, and which (as the defendants acknowledge) related to Conglin China plus 23 related entities. The defendants also drew attention to statements in Conglin China's application for bankruptcy reorganisation as to the asset and liability position as at February and March of 2018, but that does not appear to me to have any relevance to the financial position in 2015 and 2016.
52 Accordingly, in my view the plaintiffs are correct to say that there is a very large and unexplained disparity between the two sets of financial statements. I will return to that topic when I consider the question of reasonable grounds for making certain representations when I deal with the case concerning statutory misleading conduct.
53 Before dealing with the particular causes of action alleged by the plaintiffs, I should also deal with the evidence concerning the role of Peiliang with respect to Conglin Australia.
54 The sole appointed director of Conglin Australia was Weiping, Peiliang's wife. As I have indicated above, the sole shareholder of Conglin Australia was Conglin China. Peiliang was the 80% shareholder in Conglin China, thereby giving Peiliang effective control of the group, and Conglin Australia was one of the companies through which Peiliang conducted business: T340.47-341.23; 342.5-6 (Peiliang XX). Peiliang described himself as overseeing the Conglin Group and its subsidiaries: Peiliang's affidavit of 11 May 2018 at [29]. However, Peiliang said in that paragraph that he did not generally get involved in the management of the investments and projects undertaken in Australia with Martin. At [6] of that affidavit, Peiliang acknowledged that he was the Chairman and a major shareholder of Conglin China, which was the sole shareholder of Conglin Australia, but said that he did not have control of the operations of Conglin Australia, as Weiping was the director of that company. That evidence does not appear to have been the subject of any direct challenge. Although Peiliang acknowledged that he was involved in discussions about decisions to sell properties owned by Conglin Australia (T393.39-394.6; 399.16-400.36; 403.3-23 (Peiliang XX)), that evidence falls short of establishing any actual decision-making by Peiliang. In my view, the plaintiffs have failed to establish that Weiping was accustomed to act in accordance with Peiliang's instructions or wishes, or that Peiliang effectively made decisions for Conglin Australia himself: see Buzzle Operations Pty Ltd (in liq) v Apple Computer Australia Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 109; (2011) 82 ACSR 703 at [196]-[197] and [205]-[232] (Young JA, with whom Hodgson and Whealy JJA agreed). Accordingly, I reject the submission that Peiliang was a shadow director of Conglin Australia.