Smale v R

22 It was submitted that the judge did not achieve his stated purpose of properly taking into account "the extent to which this sentence will be accumulated" by virtue of the fact that the parole period was only 2 years and 6 months in a total sentence of 18 years 6 months. Such a parole period, it was submitted, was relatively short and inadequate for supervision on parole and assistance with reintegration into the community, particularly where the judge was of the opinion that "a significant period of time (would be) required for the supervision of this offender."

23 Reference was made to a number of cases in which a parole period was held to be inadequate in the context of the overall sentence imposed. In Salvaggio v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 136 the total effective sentence was one of 4 years with the non-parole component being 3 years 6 months. The sentencing judge provided no explanation as to why the parole period was so relatively short. Smart AJ remarked that a period of supervision longer than 6 months would have been beneficial in assisting the applicant to re-establish himself in the community. The appeal, however, was dismissed.

24 In Morris, Morris and Snelson v R [2008] NSWCCA 182 the total effective sentence for one of the applicants was also one of 4 years with a non-parole component of 3 years 6 months. The sentencing judge had stated an intention to find special circumstances. Hidden J remarked that the fact of accumulation of sentences was itself a special circumstance. The Crown conceded the point and the applicant was re-sentenced.

25 In Nguyen v R [2007] NSWCCA 14 a judge accumulated a sentence upon a pre-existing sentence so that the overall result was a total term of 12 years with a non-parole component of 10 years. Howie J said that the parole period was out of proportion to the non-parole period and that it was erroneous for the sentencing judge to have failed to consider whether the accumulation amounted to special circumstances. Nevertheless, I note, the court intervened only to the extent necessary to correct a technical error and not to change the structure of the sentence, Howie J remarking that the seriousness of the offences warranted a non-parole period of at least 10 years.

26 The Crown submitted that the judge was careful to consider the question of whether there were special circumstances, the principle of totality and the impact of the decision he was making to partially accumulate the sentence he was imposing upon the pre-existing sentence. Reference was made to other cases involving sentencing for multiple offences where the proportion of the overall sentence represented by the non-parole component exceeded seventy-five percent and in which this Court declined to intervene. Reliance was placed on authorities relating to the fixing of non-parole periods such as R v Cramp [2004] NSWCCA 264 in which Spigelman CJ stated: [34] … Perhaps more significantly, it must also always be taken into account that the non-parole period is a minimum period which the convicted person must, in fact, serve. In formulating the non-parole period questions of general deterrence and similar considerations arising from the gravity of the offence may determine that the minimum period should not fall below a stipulated amount, even despite the need for extended supervision on parole.

27 The judge was faced with something of a dilemma in formulating the appropriate sentence to impose upon the applicant and determining how it should be moulded, to use his expression, into the existing sentence. The combination of the two pre-existing sentences involved a total term of 18 years 6 months with a non-parole component of 14 years. Having first identified a sentence of imprisonment for 7 years as appropriate (as required by Pearce v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 610), his Honour was then faced with the discretionary decision as to whether to order that it be served entirely concurrently, entirely consecutively, or partially concurrent and partially consecutive with the pre-existing non-parole period: s 55 Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act. Complete concurrence would have failed to impose any effective punishment upon the applicant for a discrete and most serious offence (together with the offences taken into account) and, having regard to the totality principle, the judge was clearly of the view that complete accumulation was not warranted.

28 There is abundant authority in this Court as to how a sentencing judge should approach the making of this discretionary judgement. In Cahyadi v R [2007] NSWCCA 1; 168 A Crim R 41, Howie J summarised the relevant principles thus: [27] In any event there is no general rule that determines whether sentences ought to be imposed concurrently or consecutively. The issue is determined by the application of the principle of totality of criminality: can the sentence for one offence comprehend and reflect the criminality for the other offence? If it can, the sentences ought to be concurrent otherwise there is a risk that the combined sentences will exceed that which is warranted to reflect the total criminality of the two offences. If not, the sentences should be at least partly cumulative otherwise there is a risk that the total sentence will fail to reflect the total criminality of the two offences. This is so regardless of whether the two offences represent two discrete acts of criminality or can be regarded as part of a single episode of criminality. Of course it is more likely that, where the offences are discrete and independent criminal acts, the sentence for one offence cannot comprehend the criminality of the other. Similarly, where they are part of a single episode of criminality with common factors, it is more likely that the sentence for one of the offences will reflect the criminality of both.

29 In setting the non-parole period for the sentence the judge clearly had in mind the need for parole supervision of the applicant upon release and the effect that the partial accumulation of the sentence would have upon the potential parole period. The circumstances were such that there was limited scope to provide for what would ordinarily be desirable in this respect. It must be borne in mind as well that 2 years 6 months is not an insignificant period of time. Senior counsel for the applicant was at a loss to suggest some alternative course that could have been taken by the judge. In my view, giving greater effect to a finding of special circumstances would have resulted in setting a non-parole period that failed adequately to reflect the criminality involved in the offence. This has been described as the "ultimate constraint" in setting the length of a non-parole period: per Spigelman CJ in R v Simpson (2001) 53 NSWLR 704 at [63].

31 There is an important observation to make before departing these grounds. There was no explanation provided for why the sentencing of the applicant was delayed for as long as it was. The pleas of guilty were entered, as I have said, in July and September 2002 but finalisation of the sentence proceedings was deferred until September 2005. I can only assume that it was thought necessary or appropriate to await the outcome of the proceedings on the murder and armed robbery charges in the Supreme Court. This is something that I have encountered in the past when an offender has proceedings in two different jurisdictions and it has been sought to defer finalisation of the less serious charge(s) until he or she is sentenced for the more serious charge(s). The present case demonstrates that this can serve to constrain the court dealing with what are usually less serious charges from imposing an appropriate sentence, or, as in this case, providing for a desirable period of parole. If the court sentencing second is the Local Court, there are statutory constraints upon the scope to accumulate sentences (s 58 Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act).

32 It is convenient next to deal with ground 4 which asserts that the judge erred by sentencing the applicant upon the basis that he intentionally, rather than recklessly, inflicted grievous bodily harm during the course of his confrontation with the maintenance man at the community centre. This contention centres upon the passage of the judge's remarks in which he indicated that, albeit with his stated reluctance, he would assess the sentence upon the basis of the applicant's version of events. In that context he said: The version given by the offender is, at least, consistent with a reckless act on his part, and indeed is sufficient, in my view, to treat it as an intentional form of malice.

33 Senior counsel for the applicant drew attention to the distinction between the version of the victim, which he submitted described an "aggressive attack", and the version of the applicant, which he submitted described a "fending off" without an intention to inflict harm. It was contended that by sentencing upon the basis that the harm was inflicted intentionally the judge must have regarded the offence as more serious than if he had regarded the harm as having been inflicted recklessly and that this was not something that was open to the judge to do because of his acceptance of the version of the applicant.

34 The Crown submitted that it was not incumbent upon the judge to accept the applicant's version given in his evidence which was markedly different to the version set out in the statement of facts and the statements of the victim and the eye-witness which were each tendered without objection. The Crown contended this was so notwithstanding the absence of cross-examination on the topic by the representative of the Crown. Reliance was placed upon the following in the judgment of Howie J said in R v Falls [2004] NSWCCA 335: [34] In my opinion, the failure of the Crown to cross-examine the offender on a particular aspect of his or her evidence or to make submissions to the sentencing judge about that evidence does not mean that the sentencer is bound to accept the evidence. I do not believe that the tribunal of fact can be restricted by the conduct of the parties in that way: certainly not in sentencing proceedings which do not have the same formality or rigidity in procedure as, say, a criminal trial. It is for the tribunal of fact to weigh the evidence of the offender and determine whether to accept it to the required standard: R v O'Neill (1979) 2 NSWLR 582 at 597. That is so even where the Crown does not call witnesses but relies upon depositions or formal statements: R v Blanchard (NSWCCA, 10 September 1991, unreported). It seems to me that it must be so where there is tendered what purports to be an agreed statement of facts.

[35] The touchstone in the finding of facts by a sentencer is, of course, fairness to both parties. I see nothing unfair to an offender in the refusal of a sentencer to act upon his or her evidence, even if the evidence is undisputed by the Crown, at least where the offender has the onus of proof because it is a matter of extenuation or mitigation. Fairness may require that the sentencer indicate that he or she is not prepared to act upon the evidence in order to permit counsel to address on it or to lead further evidence to support it. Fairness may also mean that the Crown cannot seek to challenge the finding of the sentencer, for example on a Crown appeal, where that finding was not disputed at the hearing.

35 The Crown submitted that the judge, in accepting the version of the applicant, proceeded in a manner that was "unduly favourable" to him.

36 Whilst it may have been open to the judge to reject the version of the applicant, the fact of the matter is that, rightly or wrongly, he decided to assess the appropriate sentence based upon that version. The question appears to me to be whether he was correct in regarding that version as a basis to conclude that the applicant acted intentionally, as opposed to recklessly, in the infliction of harm upon the victim. I would answer that question in the affirmative. Acting upon the applicant's version of the incident the judge said: "In the course of fending him off, he struck out with the pinch bar, which happened to be in his hand". (Emphasis added).

37 The judge expressed the view that this was "at least" consistent with a reckless act but immediately proceeded to state that it was sufficient, in his view, to "treat it as an intentional form of malice". That was a finding that was open to him on the evidence. I would reject ground 4.

38 Rejection of ground 4 takes away part of the principal argument advanced on the applicant's behalf on this ground alleging manifest excess. The Court was, however, also taken to sentencing statistics maintained by the Judicial Commission, both those that were provided to the judge and more recent statistics filed with the written submissions. It was submitted that the latter statistics demonstrated that the sentence imposed upon the applicant, "although not at the top of the range, was quite severe".

39 Counsel conceded that the severity of the sentence could be partly explained by the fact that the offence was committed whilst the applicant was in the community under two forms of conditional liberty, bail and a suspended sentence bond, and also by the fact that further offences on the Form 1 documents were taken into account.

40 The Crown submitted that far from being manifestly excessive, the sentence imposed for the specially aggravated break and enter offence was "somewhat lenient". Reference was made to a mistake made by the judge as to the maximum penalty, he having said that it was imprisonment for 20 years rather than 25 years. I note, however that this was a result of being misinformed by the representative of the Crown. It was also submitted that the decision to order that all of the sentences have the one commencement date was "a particularly lenient approach" having regard to the fact that they were each for separate and serious offences. Then there was the need to impose a longer sentence because the judge was required to take into account eight further offences on the Form 1 documents involving different episodes of criminality, including two unrelated offences of break, enter and steal. Finally, reference was made to the conditional liberty status of the applicant when the offences were committed.

41 The statistics that were before the judge were based upon 36 cases in which 31% involved a longer sentence and 58% a shorter sentence. The statistics filed with the written submissions were based upon 21 cases in which there had been a plea of guilty finalised in the period January 2001 to December 2007. In 24% of those cases there was a longer sentence and 58% a shorter sentence. The use of statistics in this context is something that must be approached with caution: Regina v Bloomfield (1998) 44 NSWLR 734. Those upon which the applicant relies do not take account of the features of the present case that militated in favour of a more severe sentence - the Form 1 offences and the applicant's conditional liberty status. I do not regard the statistical material relied upon by the applicant as providing any support for the proposition that the sentence is manifestly excessive.

42 In my view, the sentence imposed by the judge was well within the range of the sound sentencing discretion. I would reject ground 3.

43 The orders I propose are: 1 Leave to appeal is granted

16/09/2009 - Correct title and spelling of counsel's name - Paragraph(s) Coversheet

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