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[2014] FCAFC 103
Federal Court of Australia (Full Court)
2014-08-20
Perry JJ
Original judgment source is linked above.
3.1 Obligation to have a maritime security plan (MSP) 132 First, the port operator, together with other maritime industry participants, is required to have a MSP in place and to comply with it under ss 42 and 44 respectively. A contravention of either of these provisions constitutes an offence. Furthermore, a failure to comply with the Act can lead to the making of an enforcement order against the maritime industry participant by the Secretary under s 189 of the Act and an injunction under s 197. The Secretary must approve each MSP, together with any variations or revisions which the responsible participant may request or the Secretary direct, and may cancel such plans (Div 5, Part 3 of the Act). 133 The matters with which a MSP must deal with are specified by ss 47 and 48 of the Act and the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Regulations 2003 (Cth) (the Regulations). These include a security assessment for the participant's operation, the security activities or measures to be implemented by the participant for the various maritime security levels, designated security officers responsible for implementing and maintaining the plan, and provision for declarations of security. As to the second of these matters, "level 1" is the default maritime security level for a security regulated port, regulated Australian ship and maritime industry participant, but the level may increase to level 2 or 3 if the risk escalates (ss 21 and 22). Changes in the maritime security level must be notified by the Secretary to the relevant maritime industry participant and, if that person is not the port operator, the port operator (ss 29 and 30). 134 The MSP must also demonstrate that its implementation will make an appropriate contribution towards the achievement of the "maritime security outcomes" specified in s 3(4) of the Act which include: a) reduction in the vulnerability of ships and ports to terrorist attack without undue disruption to trade; b) reduction in the risk that maritime transport facilities are used to facilitate terrorist or other unlawful activities; and c) effective communication of security information among maritime industry participants and relevant government agencies.
3.2 Obligations to ensure compliance by other actors 135 Secondly, the Act imposes obligations to ensure compliance with maritime security plans by other relevant actors. Specifically, s 45 provides that a maritime industry participant (the first participant) must not engage in conduct that hinders or obstructs compliance with the MSP of another such participant (the second participant) (s 45(1)). Furthermore, where the first participant's activities are covered by the MSP of the second participant (the covering plan), the first participant is relieved of the requirement to have a MSP but must take all reasonable steps to comply with the covering plan (s 45(2)). It is apparent from the scheme of the Act that the detail of how responsibilities are to be allocated between maritime security participants is a matter to be worked out in each case through the approval process for the MSPs for each regulated port and through on-going mechanisms for variation, revision and cancellation of the MSPs. 136 In addition, s 46 provides that the operations of a regulated Australian ship must not hinder or obstruct compliance with an MSP. That obligation is enforceable by a ship enforcement order made under s 195 by the Secretary directing the ship operator or master of a ship to act or refrain from acting, or by an injunction under s 197.
3.3 Port security zones 137 Thirdly, s 102 of the Act provides that the Secretary may, by written notice given to the port operator, establish one or more port security zones within the port of a type prescribed by the Regulations in accordance with s 103, including for the purpose of controlling the movement of people and ships within security regulated ports and restricting access to areas within such ports. In considering whether to establish a port security zone, the Secretary is required to have regard, among other things, to the views of the port operator, each person who controls an area of land to be included within the boundaries of the zone, and the relevant offshore facility operator (s 104). Ship security zones may also be established under s 106 of the Act by the giving of written notice to the ship operator of a security regulated ship and the relevant port operator to protect ships within those zones from unlawful interference. Power is conferred to make regulations regarding (among other things) access to such zones, for the management of people and goods within them, and for the movement, management or operation of vessels and vehicles within them, and penalties may be prescribed for offences against those regulations: see ss 105 and 109. The Act provides for monitoring and control through the conferral of limited powers on maritime security guards who may physically restrain a person, request identification and information, and remove a person, vehicle or vessel from a maritime security zone: Division 5, Part 8 of the Act.
3.4 Additional security measures 138 Finally, the Secretary may direct that additional security measures be implemented or complied with where an unlawful interference with maritime transport or offshore facilities is probable or imminent (s 33). Such a direction may be given to a maritime industry participant or an employee, passengers or other persons within the boundaries of the security regulated port (35(1)). Where the Secretary requires a port operator to communicate a security direction to specified maritime industry participants operating within the port, the port operator must as soon as practicable communicate the direction to those participants (s 35(3) and (4)). Where the direction is given to the participant by a port operator, by subs (7), "the direction is taken to have been given to the participant by the Secretary." Section 39 of the Act makes it an offence for a person to fail to comply with a security direction to whom the direction has been given or communicated.
5.1 Construction of s 14(2)(c) 148 The primary judge held at [85] that the Citic parties were not persons responsible for managing the operations of the Declared Port for the purposes of s 14(2)(c) whose views must therefore be taken into account. Rather, his Honour consider that the Citic parties were: …persons responsible for managing some operations in certain areas of the Port. They were not able to point to any agreement or source of rights that gave them power to manage the operations of the Port. Such rights as they had derived from their agreements with Mineralogy and nothing in those, to which they referred in argument, conferred such a right. The agreement between Citic and CPPC was a private arrangement between those two corporations, amongst the Citic parties themselves, that could not, and did not, confer any status as to the public role of managing the operations of the Port. That agreement did not affect Mineralogy's position as the Citic parties' effective landlord. The Citic parties would be the first users of the Port, would have a role as a, or the only, port facility operator and would conduct the transhipping and export operations. However those were private activities that did not amount to a responsibility for managing the operations of the Port. That was the role of the harbourmaster and the State, to whose views the delegate did have regard. 149 I would respectfully take a different view. 150 I agree with Buchanan J that the reference to a "person responsible for managing the operations of the port" for the purposes of s 14(2)(c) of the Act is not limited to those who may be charged with a public role of managing port operations but includes those who, by reason of private arrangements, may be described as having such responsibility. 151 First, the Act does not differentiate between ports operated by a State port authority on the one hand, and those, such as the Declared Port, that are operated by resource companies or otherwise by persons engaged in private enterprise on the other hand. The anterior question posed by s 14(2)(c) which the decision-maker must decide (ie, who is the "person [or persons] responsible for managing the operations of the port"), must be considered in that context and is not framed so as to exclude the possibility that persons in private enterprise might have that responsibility. 152 Secondly, the narrow construction of s 14(2)(c) adopted by the primary judge would not, in my view, further the objects of that provision. Read in context, s 14(2)(c) imposes an obligation to obtain the views of the person (or persons) responsible for managing operations of the port in question in order to assist the Secretary to make an informed decision about who to designate as port operator. Given that, in making that decision, the Secretary must also have regard among other things to the physical and operational features of the port by s 14(2)(b), it makes sense to require the Secretary to have regard to that person's views, as such a person is likely to be well placed to provide that and other potentially relevant information. Limiting, therefore, those whose views must be sought to those persons vested with a public role of managing port operations would not, in my view, promote this purpose, and therefore is not to be preferred: Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Association (1998) 194 CLR 355 at 382 [70]; Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s 15AA. 153 In this regard, the primary judge appeared to consider that the purpose of s 14(2)(c) was to afford those persons whose views must be sought an opportunity to be heard. In other words, in his view the provision imposed a statutory requirement to accord procedural fairness to such a person. It may be that this comprises part of its object although I consider that unlikely. No equivalent opportunity is afforded in relation to the designation of other maritime security participants under the Act. Nor is the designation of a particular person to assume particular statutory functions a decision of such a nature as would ordinarily attract a right of procedural fairness to third parties. It is difficult to see how the rights and interests of others would be affected so as to attract any such procedural right at common law in line with the principles recently affirmed by the High Court in Plaintiff S10/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 246 CLR 636 at 658-9. Nonetheless, even if that is part of the purpose, that does not mean that the provision is not also intended to achieve the object of ensuring that an informed decision is made on a matter of intense public importance. 154 Thirdly, I do not consider that s 14(2)(c) necessarily assumes that only one person will be responsible for managing the operations of a security regulated port. In this regard, no party contended that the views of Mineralogy should not have been taken into account under s 14(2)(c), as the Secretary found. Nor in any event does anything in s 14 of the Act suggest that the views of other persons, such as those of the harbourmaster, might not also be taken into account.
5.2 Failure to have regard to CPPC's views contrary to s 14(2)(c) 155 I agree with Buchanan J that CPPC was a person whose views should have been taken into account by reason of its responsibilities for managing the operations of the Declared Port under private arrangements. I gratefully adopt his Honour's detailed reasons at [57]-[73] for that finding. 156 It is apparent from the Secretary's reasons and, in particular, from the list of "evidence or other material" which he identified as the basis of his findings, that the Secretary did not take the views of CPPC into account in making his decision. No submission was made to the contrary. Nor, rightly in my view, was it disputed that the requirement in s 14(2)(c) to take into account the views of the person(s) responsible for managing the operations of the port is a relevant consideration which the Secretary was bound to take into account in the sense used in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 39 (Mason J); see also Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 179; and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 at 339-340 [41]. It follows that the decision falls within the potentially overlapping grounds of review under s 5(1) of the ADJR Act including, as the appellants contend, that the decision was an improper exercise of the power (s 5(1)(e), ADJR Act).
5.3 Discretion to grant relief 157 The appellants seek orders to quash or set aside the Secretary's decision. The question of whether relief should be granted, as well as the form of the relief, is discretionary: see s 16 of the ADJR Act, exercisable by this Court on appeal under Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 28(1). Thus, for example, the Court may decline to grant relief under s 16 of the ADJR Act where it would be futile or where the failure to have regard to a relevant consideration could have had no material effect on the decision under review: see, eg, Martincevic v Commonwealth (2007) 164 FCR 45 at 64 [67] (the Court); Kamha v Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (2005) 147 FCR 516 at 536 [87] (the Court). In my opinion, no such considerations apply here; nor did Mineralogy contend otherwise. It is not possible in my view to exclude the possibility that the port operator's views might have affected the Secretary's decision to designate Mineralogy as port operator under s 14(1). Furthermore, to exclude that possibility would, in my view, potentially undermine the object of s 14(2)(c) in ensuring that a decision is made which is properly informed.
Sino Iron Pty Ltd
Secretary of the Department of Infrastructure and Transport
nts Pty Ltd (1979) 180 CLR 322 Sino Iron Pty Ltd v Secretary of the Department of Infrastructure and Transport [2014] FCA 28; 308 ALR 496 TCL Air Conditioner (Zhongshan) Co Ltd v Castel Electronics Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 83 Telstra Corporation Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2008) 176 FCR 153 Telstra Corporation Ltd v Australian Competition Tribunal (2009) 175 FCR 201 Tickner v Chapman (1995) 57 FCR 451
Should relief be granted 74 There are some competing considerations to be taken into account, bearing in mind that, ultimately, relief of the nature sought in the present proceedings is discretionary. 75 First, although the delegate made no reference to the views of the Citic parties, and did not say that Mr Rankin's emails were matters he took into account, nevertheless at a level of basic practicality the delegate knew (because he had been informed by Mr Rankin) that the Citic parties no longer accepted Mineralogy as port operator. On one view it should not be supposed that he simply ignored that practical circumstance. 76 Furthermore, there was no suggestion at the hearing of the appeal that any Citic party should have the role of port operator instead of Mineralogy. At the hearing of the appeal the Citic parties made it clear that their position was that, instead of Mineralogy, it was the State of Western Australia, or the harbourmaster appointed by it, which should be designated as port operator under MTOFSA. 77 Before the primary judge there was unchallenged evidence that at no time before the delegate's decision was it suggested that the State or the harbourmaster should be the designated port operator under MTOFSA. In any event, the delegate understood and recorded that the position of the State, as conveyed by the current harbourmaster, was that Mineralogy was the appropriate port operator. 78 A Full Court of this Court recently observed: 87 The importance of fair procedure, of the fair exercise of power, of not exercising power in a manner that is practically unjust explains why it can be said that there is nothing technical about the rules of natural justice: Salemi at 419 (Gibbs J). … (TCL Air Conditioner (Zhongshan) Co Ltd v Castel Electronics Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 83). 79 That observation was preceded by the following passage: 86 The required content of fairness in any particular case will depend on context: constitutional, statutory and human, on all the circumstances of the case: Salemi v MacKellar (No 2) [1977] HCA 26; 137 CLR 396 at 419. The fairness required relates principally to the procedure employed in dealing with the party in question. That may involve the exercise of state or governmental power over the individual, who may be vulnerable and powerless, or a great corporation. The terms of any statute will be critical. The common element is that, generally speaking, the exercise of power should be fair. That exercise will always have a human context. That is why, as Gleeson CJ said in Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam [2003] HCA 6; 214 CLR 1 at 14, fairness is not an abstract concept, but essentially practical. The concern of the law is to avoid practical injustice. Fairness is normative, evaluative, context-specific and relative. 80 In the circumstances of the present case, there may have been no practical unfairness in not seeking some developed statement of the views of the Citic parties. Those views were apparent. They were also of questionable significance in circumstances where it was not at any time suggested (and is not now) that Cape Preston Port Company should be designated port operator and where the position of the State, as conveyed through the harbourmaster, was that Mineralogy was an appropriate designate. 81 To that doubt may be added the fact that, in my view, none of the matters upon which the Citic parties relied at first instance or on the appeal to suggest a lack of ability on the part of Mineralogy to be port operator should be accepted. Once those matters are put aside there may be little practical force in any suggestion that the mere opposition of the Citic parties to Mineralogy as a commercial opponent (no matter how forcefully opposed) could have influenced the decision. 82 Nevertheless, it appears to me to be clear from the delegate's own reasons that the delegate did not take into account the views of Cape Preston Port Company as required by s 14(2)(c) of MTOFSA, or any of the Citic Parties. 83 In his decision the delegate identified the "evidence or other material" on which his findings were based as follows: EVIDENCE OR OTHER MATERIAL ON WHICH MY FINDINGS WERE BASED 8. In reaching my decision, I had regard to the following material: 8.1 A draft MSP submitted by Mineralogy, email dated 17 January 2013. 8.2 Minutes of the Cape Preston Marine Safety Meetings (13 February 2012 - October 2012). These meetings were chaired by WA Department of Transport and comprised senior representatives of Mineralogy and Citic-Pacific. The Department was invited to attend to provide advice on the process for obtaining regulatory approvals under the Act for Cape Preston. Brian Rankin, Compliance Manager, Maritime, Department of Infrastructure and Transport represented the Department at these meetings. 84 When the delegate addressed the specific requirements of s 14(2)(c) he referred, in the passages I have set out above, to the stated position of Mineralogy (as a person responsible for managing the operations of the port) and the views of WA DoT officials expressed at meetings with Mineralogy and the Citic parties (as representative of the views of the owner of the port) but he made no reference to the draft MSP submitted by Cape Preston Port Company (which disclosed a lack of acknowledgement of Mineralogy as port operator) or the information given to him by Mr Rankin about the views of the Citic parties. He did not seek the views of any of the Citic parties directly. 85 The better view is, therefore, that the delegate did not take into account the views of the Citic parties, probably because he thought it was not relevant to do so. 86 On the construction of s 14(2)(c) which I prefer, that approach was based on a misunderstanding of the statutory requirements and resulted in a failure by the delegate to carry out the task assigned to him under s 14 of MTOFSA. 87 As a result, I accept that the appeal should be upheld and the decision of the delegate should be set aside.
[1977] HCA 26
(2013) 201 LGERA 334
(1995) 184 CLR 163
(2013) 87 ALJR 588
(2005) 147 FCR 516
(2007) 164 FCR 45
(1986) 162 CLR 24
(2001) 206 CLR 323
(2012) 246 CLR 636
(1998) 194 CLR 355
(1979) 180 CLR 322
(2008) 176 FCR 153
(2009) 175 FCR 201
(1995) 57 FCR 451
(1966) 185 CLR 259
(2001) 206 CLR 57
(1985) 159 CLR 550
(2012) 87 ALJR 98
(2012) 87 ALJR 131
(1981) 147 CLR 297
(1955) 92 CLR 390
[2003] HCA 6