Applications of the State and the GWY Applicant
19 The State seeks orders to the effect that the Yirrganydji No 1 and Yirrganydji No 2 proceedings be summarily dismissed pursuant to s 31A(2) of the FCA Act insofar as they relate to areas of land and waters delineated as "Part B" in the bundles of maps and descriptions marked MFI-Y2 and MFI-Y1 respectively. Consequential orders are sought for the filing of amended originating processes retracting the claim areas in accordance with the order.
20 Section 31A of the FCA Act provides that the Court may give judgment against a party in whole or in part if the Court is satisfied that the party has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or that part of the proceeding. Section 31A(3) provides that a proceeding or part thereof need not be "hopeless" or "bound to fail" for it to have no reasonable prospect of success. A reasonable prospect of success is one which is real, not fanciful or merely arguable: Rogers v Asset Loan Co Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 1305; 250 ALR 82, Logan J (at [41]). As the State correctly submits, if a prima facie case in support of summary judgment is established, the onus shifts to the opposing party to point to some factual or evidentiary issues making a trial necessary: Jefferson Ford Pty Ltd v Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd (2008) 167 FCR 372, Gordon J (at [127]), cited in Buurabalayji Thalanyji Aboriginal Corporation v Onslow Salt Pty Ltd (No 2) [2018] FCA 978, McKerracher J (at [3]).
21 The State's submission is that the claims in respect of the Part B areas are factually untenable as a consequence of the Court's order adopting the Report. I accept that submission. In that respect, I observe that the Yirrganydji Applicant has not made an application (previously foreshadowed) that the adoption of the Report did not preclude an amended claim alleging native title rights and interests in the Part B area acquired by a process of succession: see Singleton at [108] - [109]. Counsel for the Yirrganydji Applicant has confirmed that no such application is to be made. Counsel has informed the Court that the Yirrganydji Applicant disagrees with the factual conclusions expressed in the Report, but nonetheless acknowledges the legal consequences that follow from the Court's adoption of it.
22 The interlocutory application filed on behalf of the applicant in the GWY Claim also seeks orders dismissing the Yirrganydji No 1 and Yirrganydji No 2 proceedings insofar as the claims include the Part B areas. However, it was submitted that the appropriate source of power is that conferred under r 28.67(1) of the Rules. It provides:
(1) After a report has been given to the Court, a party may, on application, ask the Court to do any of the following:
(a) adopt, vary or reject the report, in the whole or in part;
(b) require an explanation by way of a further report by the referee;
(c) remit on any ground, for further consideration by the referee, the whole or any part of the matter that was referred to the referee for inquiry and report;
(d) decide any matter on the evidence taken before the referee, with or without additional evidence;
(e) give judgment or make an order in relation to the proceeding or question.
23 In Singleton, I exercised the power in r 28.67(1)(a). That order was justified in part because the parties to the Protocol Deed had agreed not only to submit to the referral procedures (conducted by the referees of their choosing), but also because they had agreed that in their capacities as applicants in the Cairns proceedings, they would amend their originating applications in a manner consistent with the conclusions of the referees' Report: Singleton at [14] and [49].
24 It appears to the Court that if the Protocol Deed had operated in accordance with its terms, the overlaps would have resolved in the performance of the parties' contractual obligations, without the need for judicial intervention either under r 28.67(1)(a) of the Rules.
25 Whatever be the terms of the Protocol Deed, an order under r 28.67(1)(e) is now justified on the basis that the Court's adoption of the Report has the legal effect that the claims in Yirrganydji No 1 and Yirrganydji No 2 cannot succeed in respect of the Part B areas in any event.
26 I am satisfied that it is appropriate to exercise the power under r 28.67(1)(e) as that is the mechanism that best reflects the procedural history and the choices made by the parties in the litigation. An order under that rule reflects the circumstance that the claims are dismissed in part on their substantive merits because a critical question has been resolved against the Yirrganydji Applicant as a consequence of the referral procedures to which it submitted.
27 In the course of submissions, Counsel for the State acknowledged that orders could be made under r 28.67(1)(e). That submission may be received as an unopposed application to vary the relief sought on the State's interlocutory applications, so as to rely on the rule as an alternative source of power. I will make orders under the rule on the State's applications so as to avoid any unnecessary argument that might conceivably arise as to the standing of any other person to move the Court for the same relief in the within proceedings.