The claim that the Approval is void
54 The SSOC contends by paras 43 and 44 that the Approval was for an improper purpose and in making the Approval the Minister failed to take into account relevant considerations. The State describes these as being the 'judicial review pleas'. The SSOC seeks a declaration that the Approval is void and of no effect at law.
55 The State notes that an administrative decision is merely voidable until declared void by a court: New South Wales v Kable (2013) 252 CLR 118 per French CJ and Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ (at [22]), where their Honours said:
The difficulties associated with using words like "void" and "voidable" in connection with administrative actions have long been recognised. Writing in 1967, H W R Wade said that:
"[T]here is no such thing as voidness in an absolute sense, for the whole question is, void against whom? It makes no sense to speak of an act being void unless there is some person to whom the law gives a remedy. If and when that remedy is taken away, what was void must be treated as valid, being now by law unchallengeable. It is fallacious to suppose that an act can be effective in law only if it has always had some element of validity from the beginning. However destitute of legitimacy at its birth, it is legitimated when the law refuses to assist anyone who wants to bastardise it. What cannot be disputed has to be accepted."
Although directed to administrative actions, these statements may find some reflection in connection with the acts of courts and judges. If a curial decision cannot be disputed, it must be accepted. To the extent to which the orders of a superior court are valid until set aside, there seems little point in attempting to classify those orders as void or voidable. But it is not necessary to pursue those analogies to their conclusion. It is enough to notice that the legal system provides (and must provide) the rules which govern what legal effect is to be given to the decisions of, and the orders made by, courts. And, as later explained, those rules are more complex than the central proposition which underpinned Mr Kable's arguments: that want of jurisdiction for constitutional reasons necessarily entails the complete invalidity for all purposes of whatever is done in purported exercise of that jurisdiction.
(Emphasis added, citations omitted.)
56 The State makes the point that the Additional Proposal was submitted by Onslow Salt pursuant to cl 7(1) of the State Agreement and the Approval given in accordance with cl 6(1)(a) of the State Agreement under a contractual obligation and power (cl 6 and cl 7), not pursuant to any statutory obligation or power. The Minister's contractual power to make the Approval was contained within the State Agreement which was ratified by Parliament. It does not have the force of law and does not create statutory powers, duties or obligations. The terms, including cl 6 and cl 7 of the State Agreement, operate contractually, binding only the parties to the State Agreement: Kidd v Western Australia [2014] WASC 99 per Beech J (at [112]-[113]) where his Honour said:
112 These provisions operate to ensure the effective operation of the contractually agreed provisions. The agreement does not have the force of law and does not create statutory duties and obligations. The purpose of these provisions is to ensure that the general body of law in the State does not 'stand in the way' of implementation of the agreements.
113 The terms of the Casino Agreement operate contractually, binding only the parties to it.
(Citations omitted.)
In Re Michael; Ex parte WMC Resources Ltd (2003) 27 WAR 574, Parker J (Templeman and Miller JJ agreeing) said (at [26] and [30]):
26 I am not able to see that s 4, in particular s 4(3), of the Agreement Act has the effect that the provisions of the State Agreement have the force of law or that they create statutory duties and obligations. Although the State Agreement is scheduled to the Agreement Act its terms are not thereby given statutory force. While the Agreement has been ratified, and its implementation is authorised, and it operates and takes effect despite any other Act or law, the terms of the State Agreement remain contractual terms with force and effect as a contract. As such it is binding on the parties to the contract and not on others.
…
30 Thus, in my view, the effect of s 4(3) of the Agreement Act and s 3 of the GA Act, separately and in combination, is not to give to the provisions of the State Agreement the force of law. They are contractual provisions, binding, insofar as their terms create binding legal obligations, as such on the parties to the State Agreement by the force of the common law, and having no binding legal force on those who are not parties.
(Emphasis added.)
57 The State contends that s 3(4) of the State Agreement has the effect that the State Agreement operates and takes effect notwithstanding any other act or law. Similarly, pursuant to s 3(a) of the Government Agreements Act 1979 (WA), which also applies to the State Agreement, each provision of the State Agreement operates and takes effect according to its terms, notwithstanding any other act or law. The purpose of these provisions is to eliminate sovereign risk, namely, the risk that domestic politics or law can disturb commercial enterprise after large investments are made. The underlying policy is that the State Agreement, including the Minister's powers and obligations are first subject to Parliamentary scrutiny. Judicial review does not lie in respect of government performance under a government contract, where the contract is protected by statute from challenge under any law.
58 BTAC points to the fact that at the time of the Approval, administration of the State Agreement was under the administration of the Minister for State Development. That Minister was nominated as the decision-maker in his capacity as 'the Minister of the Government of the State for the time being responsible for the administration of the Act to ratify this Agreement … and includes the successors in office of the Minister'. BTAC points out that the Minister's decision-making power depends on his holding of the office of the Minister of State and is exercised in that capacity on behalf of the State. The power to decide is delegated to the Minister.
59 BTAC says it is arguable that an exercise of power by a minister pursuant to a state agreement, annexed to an act of Parliament is a public power in the relevant sense amenable to judicial review. More specifically, an exercise of power by a Minister pursuant to a state agreement annexed to an act of Parliament to grant a mining title, otherwise granted pursuant to legislation, is a public power in the relevant sense and amenable to judicial power. Further, BTAC argues that the relief sought is a declaration in the nature of equitable relief 'to restrain apprehended breaches of the law and to declare rights and obligations in respect thereto' in the sense discussed in City of Enfield v Development Assessment Commission (2000) 199 CLR 135 (at [17]-[21]), where the High Court (Gleeson, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ) said:
17 Significant questions of public law, including those respecting ultra vires activities of public officers and authorities, are determined in litigation which does not answer the description of judicial review of administrative action by the medium of the prerogative writs or statutory regimes such as that provided by the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 [sic] (Cth). Examples of other vehicles are the actions for recovery of moneys exacted colore officii or paid by mistake, and those for trespass, detinue and conversion where the plaintiff challenges the validity of the authority relied upon by the defendant as an answer to the allegedly tortious act.
18 No such common law action was in issue in this litigation. Nor was the proceeding instituted by Enfield one to which r 98 of the Rules applied. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court which Enfield invoked was its jurisdiction as a court of equity to grant equitable relief to restrain apprehended breaches of the law and to declare rights and obligations in respect thereto.
19 The nature of this jurisdiction was explained by Bray CJ in Attorney-General (SA) v Huber. In Bateman's Bay Local Aboriginal Land Council v Aboriginal Community Benefit Fund Pty Ltd, Gaudron, Gummow and Kirby JJ referred to the part played by the declaration and the injunction in the shaping of modern administrative law and continued:
"In this field, equity has proceeded on the footing of the inadequacy (in particular the technicalities hedging the prerogative remedies) of the legal remedies otherwise available to vindicate the public interest in the maintenance of due administration."
20 The authorities supporting the use of equitable remedies to restrain breaches of prohibitions imposed by or pursuant to planning laws were discussed by Menzies J in Cooney v Ku-ring-gai Corporation. That case and Morris v Woollahra Corporation show that it is open to the defendant in such a proceeding to contend that the application for equitable relief should be dismissed on the ground that the ordinance or proclamation is invalid and so ineffective to impose the prohibition the defendant is said to contravene. The term "invalid" tends to be the preferred expression in these authorities. In Baxter v New South Wales Clickers' Association, Isaacs J said:
"Now, 'validity' is a well known technical expression, and is equivalent to legality or not being ultra vires. If without jurisdiction, a decision is certainly invalid."
21 That is the sense in which "invalid" is used in the present litigation. The substance of the matter is that Enfield asserts apprehended breach by Collex of the statutory provisions which forbid the proposed development without the approval of the relevant authority (the Commission) together with the concurrence of Enfield. Enfield seeks a declaration as to the invalidity of the approval upon which Collex relies as establishing the legality of its development. The cast of the litigation thus resembles that in authorities such as Thompson v Randwick Municipal Corporation, Marsh v Shire of Serpentine-Jarrahdale, City of Port Melbourne v Hamer, Electronic Industries Ltd v City of Oakleigh and Wingecarribee Shire Council v Minister for Local Government. In his oral submissions in this Court counsel for Collex did not dissent from this understanding of the nature of the proceedings. However, he rightly pointed out that Enfield itself had tended to confuse matters in its notice of appeal by categorising the Full Court as having dealt with the litigation as an application for "judicial review".
(Emphasis added, citations omitted.)
I consider that by determining the claim for declaratory relief, the jurisdiction of the Court is invoked via its accrued jurisdiction as a court of equity: see City of Enfield (at [18] above).
60 The State is correct, in my view, in submitting that the exercise of a right or power under a contract is not generally a decision made under an enactment. However, exceptions to this may arise under statutory agreements. The yardstick appears to be the source of the power. So in Australian National University v Burns (1982) 64 FLR 166, it was held that exercising a contractual power to dismiss was not amendable to judicial review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth). It was said that the decision to terminate a contract for breach or any other contractual right is referrable purely to private law and therefore, the source of the power was found in the contract and not in the Act, which arguably enabled the contract to be made in the first place. Insofar as I understand it, BTAC does not challenge that well established principle.
61 Generally speaking, if a decision made under a contract is not amenable to review through public law remedies, then it will be open to the complaining party to use ordinary private law remedies according to Aronson et el, Judicial Review of Administrative Action and Government Liability (6th ed, 2017) (at [3.180]) where the authors say:
English judicial review's general abstention from government's 'private' (usually commercial) functions preceded Datafin, but that decision's distinction between public and private functions has provided a convenient rationale. The principal alternative rationale is that the power which judicial review supervises must be non-consensual, or 'coercive' if that is different.
Just as in England, Australia's judicial review has also shown a marked aversion to supervising government's decisions as to whether (and with whom) it will contract, and an even greater aversion to decisions made under contracts. However, that aversion has not become judicial abstention.
Two issues were at stake in Victoria v Master Builders' Association of Victoria [[1995] 2 VR 121]. A shadowy government taskforce had not observed the dictates of procedural fairness when it drew up a blacklist of builders who may have cheated the government in the past. The Court of Appeal granted a declaration as to the breach of natural justice. However, it said that it could not grant relief regarding the government's decision not to contract with any of those builders in the future unless they confessed and repaid the money dishonestly obtained.
Griffith University v Tang [(2005) 221 CLR 99 at 128-129] contains strong dicta seeking to resolve a long-running debate as to the scope of AD(JR) coverage of government's contracting decisions. As explained in [2.560], Tang said that AD(JR) has no coverage of decisions on whether to award a contract, nor on decisions under a contract. In saying that, Tang endorsed the main thrust of the Federal Court's decision in General Newspapers Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation [(1993) 45 FCR 164]. However, Tang failed to address some dicta in General Newspapers to the effect that AD(JR) might yet apply if the contract was awarded for an improper purpose in violation of a relevant statutory restriction. If General Newspapers was wrong in this last regard and AD(JR) has no coverage in the situation it supposed, one would then have to ask whether there might be a remedy under the general law. And even if the common law's judicial review procedures and remedies would not be available, one would surely expect a court to be able to grant declaratory or injunctive relief as appropriate.
(Footnotes omitted.)
62 In respect of this, the authors cite, amongst others, Finn J in Hughes Aircraft Systems International v Airservices Australia (No 3) (1997) 76 FCR 151 (at 180, 195-196, 261 and 264). In MBA Land Holdings Pty Ltd v Gungahlin Development Authority (2000) 206 FLR 120 per Higgins J (at [212]-[220]), in allowing a challenge to a statutory authority's decision to lease land after a deeply flawed tender process, the Court stressed that the authority had chosen to act on public interest grounds; it said the review would have been unavailable if the lease had been awarded on purely commercial grounds.
63 In CECA Institute Pty Ltd v Australian Council for Private Education and Training (2010) 30 VR 555, Kyrou J held (at [100]) that the 'Datafin principle' (referring to R v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers; Ex parte Datafin plc [1987] QB 815), that a decision of a private body which was not made in the exercise of a statutory power may be amenable to judicial review if the decision is, in a practical sense, made in performance of a 'public duty' or in the exercise of a power which has a 'public element', was applicable in the State of Victoria. His Honour decided it was not applicable to the case under consideration, but his endorsement of Datafin was based on the constitutional principle of 'protecting citizens from abuses in exercises of powers which are governmental in nature' (at [99]).
64 Having regard to the factors to which BTAC points, particularly the governmental functions, the governmental letterhead, a statutory authority, the power contained under the Mining Act and having regard to the fact that declaratory relief is sought, while the State's submission may ultimately succeed at trial, there is considerably more unpacking required of the facts and circumstances in this developing area of the law. It is not appropriate for summary judgment.