Singh v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs

1. Pursuant to r 2.27(e) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) it is directed that the Registry shall not accept for filing the documents lodged by the applicant on 22 March 2021, including the draft notice of appeal lodged by the applicant that day. Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

MURPHY J: 1 On 22 March 2021, the applicant, who is self-represented, sought to file an application for an extension of time and leave to appeal the decision of the Court made on 27 July 2011 in Singh v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2011] FCA 833; (2011) 282 ALR 56. In that decision Bromberg J dismissed the applicant's application under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 to set aside a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) in Singh v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2009] AATA 850; (2009) 114 ALD 178. His Honour also found that the applicant had engaged in a long history of vexatious litigation (see [26]-[68]) and ordered that the applicant may not institute any proceeding in the Federal Court of Australia without leave of the Court. 2 Since that time the applicant has made numerous application for an extension of time and leave to appeal from the 27 July 2011 decision. His applications have been rejected on more than 30 occasions by judges of the Court, on a number of the judge provided written reasons for doing so, including in Re Singh [2012] FCA 322 (North J); Singh, in the application of Mohinder Singh [2014] FCA 76 (Mortimer J); Singh, in the application of Mohinder Singh [2020] FCA 213 (Wheelahan J); and Singh, in the application of Mohinder Singh [2021] FCA 82 (Snaden J). 3 Rule 2.27(e) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) provides that a document will not be accepted for filing if the Court has given a direction that it not be accepted. For the following reasons, I have directed the Registry not to accept the application and associated documents for filing. 4 The orders of Bromberg J made in 2011 remain valid and in force, unless and until set aside: State of New South Wales v Kable [2013] HCA 26; (2013) 252 CLR 118 at [32] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel (as her Honour then was), Bell and Keane JJ) and the authorities cited therein. The orders were made in a context that included the applicant's long history of vexatious litigation, which Bromberg J reviewed in detail. In my view the applicant's burden in seeking leave to file the present application is to show that it has reasonable prospects of success and that it is not an abuse of process. The applicant failed to satisfy me in those regards. 5 In Singh at [7], in which decision Wheelahan J dismissed one of the applicant's previous attempts to file an application for an extension of time and leave to appeal the decision of Bromberg J, his Honour summarised the nature of that application as follows: The present application, like many before it, is focussed on the applicant's complaint about a decision made by a Centrelink delegate on 4 November 1999, now more than 20 years ago, in relation to the applicant's social security entitlements. On 4 November 1999, the Centrelink delegate decided that the applicant and his wife were members of a couple, and consequently, Centrelink sought to recover a debt of $88,633.34 from the applicant. The applicant has already exhaustively sought to review that decision through various avenues, including on two occasions seeking special leave to appeal to the High Court in relation to it: see, Singh v Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations [2009] HCASL 194, [5]. 6 It is unnecessary to set out in detail the grounds upon which the applicant now seeks to prosecute the appeal if his application for leave were granted. In part, the grounds of the draft notice of appeal are the same or very similar to those that Wheelahan J considered in Singh (which, as his Honour noted (Singh at [8]) which were themselves similar to grounds that were the subject of earlier consideration by other judges of this Court). Mr Singh's underlying complaint continues to concern the determination by the AAT that he and his then wife were living as members of a couple, for the purposes of eligibility for social security entitlements. To borrow from his Honour, the present application "…is the applicant's latest attempt at re-litigation, which is a feature often associated with vexatious proceedings (Singh at [15]). That is sufficient to refuse leave to file the application. 7 Another part of the draft notice of appeal advances the contention that Bromberg J erred because the applicant had no legal right: (a) to make application VID 234/2010; or (b) to appeal the judgment of Bromberg J within time; because he was a bankrupt during the relevant period. This ground is not new. The 2009 AAT decision that precipitated the apparently endless applications by Mr Singh was in part based in the fact that he was bankrupt. As Bromberg J observed (at [86]): At the hearing before the AAT, it was learnt that Mr Singh had a sequestration order made against him by a Registrar of the Federal Magistrates Court on 28 February 2008. The Senior Member refused to grant leave to make the applications because, firstly and as a result of his bankruptcy, Mr Singh was found to be incompetent to bring proceedings and secondly because he was attempting to relitigate matters already previously determined and thus his applications would be obviously untenable and utterly hopeless. The Senior Member stated at [25]-[27] of his decision: [25] Even if the applicant was permitted to bring these applications and even if he was discharged from bankruptcy and therefore having a legal standing to prosecute these appeals, I would, in any event, would [sic] not permit him to make the applications having regard to the decision made by me on 3 July 2006 and the Reasons for that Decision. [26] The applicant is, again, seeking to re-litigate matters which have relevantly been before the Tribunal on three occasions, a Federal Magistrate, five single Federal Court Judges, two Full Federal Courts and the High Court on two occasions. The above summary does not include the appearances before a single Judge, a Full Federal Court and the High Court in relation to the attempt to be relieved from bankruptcy. [27] I explained at some length in my decision of 3 July 2006 why I regarded that application to be frivolous and vexatious and why leave should not be granted to bring proceedings with respect to the recovery of Sickness Allowance, Disability Support Pension or Wife Pension paid between 20 October 1991 and 26 October 1999. The compensation charge which was imposed by the respondent arose between these dates and by reason of a previous finding that the applicant was a member of a couple. Any further application challenging the compensation charge would remain obviously untenable and utterly hopeless as I previously found (refer Attorney-General v Wentworth (1988) 14 NSWLR 481 at 491) and the applicant is again attempting to use the court's processes to circumvent its decisions (refer Reid v Cameron (1966) QCA 37). 8 Bromberg J dismissed the application for review of the AAT decision. There is nothing in the materials before me to indicate any error in his Honour's decision in that regard. 9 The applicant has not satisfied me that the proposed grounds of appeal have reasonable prospects of success nor that his application is not an abuse of process. Pursuant to r 2.27(e) of the Federal Court Rules, I have directed the Registry not to accept the application and associated documents for filing. I certify that the preceding nine (9) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Murphy.