Official Trustee in Bankruptcy v Gargan

1. Pursuant to r 2.27(e) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), it is directed that the registry shall not accept for filing the documents lodged by the applicant on 16 November 2020. Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

SNADEN J: 1 On 27 July 2011, this court made an order (amongst others) prohibiting the applicant, Mr Mohinder Singh, from commencing any proceeding herein without leave: Singh v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (2011) 282 ALR 56 (Bromberg J). 2 Mr Singh did not institute an appeal against that order within the time limited by the rules for doing so. After the expiry of that period, he instead made an application for an extension of time within which to appeal against Bromberg's J orders. That application came before Jessup J, who, in 2012, dismissed it. Since then, Mr Singh has made more than 30 similar applications for extensions of time and leave to appeal from Bromberg's J orders, all of which have been rejected. 3 On 16 November 2020, Mr Singh sought to file yet another such application, in support of which he sought to file an affidavit affirmed on that same day. These reasons pertain to those documents (hereafter, the "Relevant Documents"). A draft notice of appeal was annexed to Mr Singh's affidavit, to which reference is made below. 4 Although the order that Bromberg J made in 2011 was made pursuant to rules since repealed, there is no issue about its ongoing validity and force: Re Singh, in the application of Mohinder Singh [2020] FCA 213 (hereafter, "Singh"), [4] (Wheelahan J). 5 Rule 2.27(e) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (hereafter, the "FCRs") provides that the court's registry will not accept a document for filing if the court has given a direction to that effect. I intend to issue such a direction in respect of the Relevant Documents, much as Jessup, Gordon, North, Tracey, Middleton, Kenny, Davies, Marshall, Mortimer, Moshinsky, Pagone, Beach, Steward and Wheelahan JJ have done before me (in some cases, on more than one occasion) in respect of Mr Singh's earlier attempts. These reasons briefly explain why. 6 The present application and the appeal that Mr Singh hopes to institute if it succeeds both relate to a decision made by a Centrelink delegate in 1999. In Singh, Wheelahan J summarised the nature of Mr Singh's complaint as follows (at [7]): The present application, like many before it, is focussed on the applicant's complaint about a decision made by a Centrelink delegate on 4 November 1999, now more than 20 years ago, in relation to the applicant's social security entitlements. On 4 November 1999, the Centrelink delegate decided that the applicant and his wife were members of a couple, and consequently, Centrelink sought to recover a debt of $88,633.34 from the applicant. The applicant has already exhaustively sought to review that decision through various avenues, including on two occasions seeking special leave to appeal to the High Court in relation to it: see, Singh v Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations [2009] HCASL 194, [5]. 7 It is unnecessary that I should recite the grounds upon which Mr Singh proposes to prosecute his appeal in the event that he were granted an extension of time and leave to file it. It suffices to note that, although not identical, it is apparent that those grounds bear more than a passing resemblance to those that Wheelahan J considered in Singh (which, as his Honour noted (Singh, [8]), were themselves facsimiles of equivalent grounds that were the subject of earlier consideration by other judges of this court). To borrow from his Honour (Singh, [15]), the present application "…is the applicant's latest attempt at re-litigation, which is a feature often associated with vexatious proceedings: see, Official Trustee in Bankruptcy v Gargan (No 2) [2009] FCA 398 at [7] (Perram J)." 8 Mr Singh's current application for an extension of time and leave to appeal has no reasonable prospect of succeeding. That is so not simply because it is an attempt to re-litigate that which has already been determined (although that, in and of itself, is reason enough to conclude as I have). It is also so because Mr Singh offers no acceptable explanation for why it was that he failed to institute an appeal against Bromberg's J orders within the timeframe stipulated for doing so, and because, in any event (and for reasons equivalent to those identified in Singh), the appeal that he now proposes to institute itself has insufficient prospects of success. Those matters would assume prominence in the court's consideration of the current application, were it to be accepted for filing: Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 195, [20] (Perram, Farrell and Perry JJ). They would almost certainly oblige the court to dismiss Mr Singh's application. 9 Those realities acknowledged, the present application very likely is (or would be) a textbook example of an abuse of process. So as to avoid such an abuse, I have no hesitation in directing (assuming, momentarily, that such a direction is necessary to prevent their acceptance - see, in that vein, FCRs, r 2.27(f)) that the court's registry not accept the Relevant Documents for filing. I certify that the preceding nine (9) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Snaden.