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KENNY J 1 The application before the Court is in terms an application by Mr Sarabjeet Singh for an extension of time in which to seek leave to appeal, and leave to appeal, from a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia delivered on 29 July 2019. By this judgment, the Federal Circuit Court dismissed Mr Singh's application in a case, which had been filed earlier that month. Mr Singh's proceeding had been started by an application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal ('Tribunal'), which had affirmed a decision of a Ministerial delegate not to grant Mr Singh the student visa for which he had applied. 2 Mr Singh, who is a citizen of India, arrived in Australia on 2 April 2013. At that time, he held a student visa to permit him to study a Bachelor of Information Technology in Australia. Mr Singh has been enrolled in various courses in Australia since then but, from time to time, these enrolments have been subject to cancellation. 3 On 30 August 2016, Mr Singh made the application for the student visa, which forms the basis of the present proceeding. The delegate refused this application on 21 February 2017 on the basis that Mr Singh did not satisfy the requirements of cl 500.212 of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) ('the Regulations'). 4 Mr Singh unsuccessfully applied to the Tribunal for a review of this decision. The Tribunal held that: The criteria for a Subclass 500 (Student) visa are set out in Part 500 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations. The primary criteria in cl.500.211 to cl.500.218 must be satisfied by at least one applicant. Other members of the family unit, if any, who are applicants for the visa need only satisfy the secondary criteria. The issue in the present case is whether the applicant is enrolled in an approved course of study as required to meet the criteria for the grant of a student visa. Clause 500.211 relevantly requires that at the time of this decision the applicant is enrolled in a course of study: cl.500.211(a). The applicant does not claim to meet any of the alternative criteria in cl.500.211. … The applicant confirmed he had intended to study a Bachelor's degree when he came to Australia in 2013 but said his father's business collapsed and there was no money available for his studies. Instead the applicant said he undertook full-time work. The applicant said he still wants to study and claimed he had commenced a course in Hospitality six months prior to the hearing. He declared he was enrolled and attending George Brown College on Tuesdays and Wednesdays and also works part-time. The Tribunal then put information to the applicant in accordance with s. 359AA of the Migration Act that indicated his latest enrolment had been cancelled. The applicant was given a copy of the PRISM record that showed he was not enrolled and was asked to comment or respond. The applicant said the PRISM record was correct but claimed the cancellation related to his enrolment at Australian Academy of Management and Science. He said he was due to commence a Hospitality course next month and had been attending 'trial' classes. The applicant said he had not yet paid the course fees but expected to receive a COE in the next few weeks. The applicant had submitted in evidence a Statement of Attainment from George Brown College that demonstrates he has attained competency in one subject that forms part of an Advanced Diploma of Management. 5 Since Mr Singh did not provide any evidence of current enrolment, the Tribunal was not satisfied that at the time of making its decision Mr Singh was enrolled in an approved course of study in Australia. It concluded that Mr Singh did not meet the applicable criteria for the grant of a student visa set out in cl 500.211 of Schedule 2 of the Regulations. Accordingly, it affirmed the delegate's decision. 6 On 3 May 2018, Mr Singh started his proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court by filing a judicial review application, the grounds for which are discussed below. The Circuit Court fixed a directions hearing for 12 June 2019. Mr Singh failed to attend this hearing and a Registrar dismissed the judicial review application for non-appearance under r 13.03C of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth). 7 On 10 July 2019 Mr Singh filed an application in a case seeking two orders: 1. The decision of the Federal Circuit in Melbourne be set aside as per my affidavit. 2. The Tribunal decision of 5 April 2018 be set aside. Mr Singh's supporting affidavit accompanied this application. 8 The hearing of Mr Singh's 10 July 2019 application was fixed for the morning of 29 July 2019. When first called on for hearing that morning, Mr Singh was not in attendance. In consequence, the primary judge made an order dismissing this application for non-appearance pursuant to r 13.03C of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth). Sometime later that morning, Mr Singh attended the Court, with the result that the primary judge set aside his previous order and conducted a hearing in which the Minister and Mr Singh both participated. 9 At the conclusion of the hearing, the primary judge delivered judgment with ex tempore reasons. In his reasons (made available in writing on 25 September 2019), his Honour not only assessed Mr Singh's explanation for his failure to attend before the Registrar on 12 June 2019 but also assessed Mr Singh's judicial review application. After examining the grounds set forth in this last-mentioned application, his Honour concluded: [14] In the circumstances, it appears clear that the applicant has no prospects of succeeding in this [judicial review] application in that he did not meet the visa criteria at the time of the decision and still does not meet those visa criteria. The applicant was not able to show an arguable case that there was jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal in refusing to direct that he be granted a visa. [15] In the circumstances, there is no purpose to be served in setting aside the Registrar's order dismissing the application. I therefore dismiss the application in a case filed by the applicant on 10 July 2017. See: Singh v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor [2019] FCCA 2718 ('PJ'). That is, the primary judge declined to set aside the Registrar's 12 June 2019 order dismissing Mr Singh's judicial review application under r 13.03C of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth). This meant that Mr Singh's judicial review application remained dismissed. 10 On 14 August 2019, the primary judge amended the order first made in the proceeding on 29 July 2019 in order to reflect the order he had intended be made after hearing the Minister and Mr Singh on 29 July 2019. Neither the Minister nor Mr Singh made any submission in the present proceeding that it was not open to the primary judge to amend his order in this way: see further Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), r 16.05. The primary judge's orders as amended were as follows: 1. The application be dismissed. 2. The Applicant shall pay the First Respondent's costs fixed in the sum of $500.00. 11 On 23 August 2019, Mr Singh filed his application for an extension of time and leave to appeal in this Court. Under the heading 'Grounds of application', Mr Singh stated: 1. The Federal Circuit Court in Victoria issued the wrong Order dated 29 July 2019 and I believe after speaking with the Court that the new Order was to be issued to me on 13 August 2019 and yet I have not received it. 2. I do not agree with the Order issued by His Honour Judge Riethmuller because I already explained in my Application in a Case accompanied by an Affidavit that my circumstances are different and I was cheated by my migration agent who lodged my application in Victoria and I have never been informed of a directions hearing. 3. Until now I have not received the corrected Order. 12 Mr Singh's affidavit of 23 August 2019 accompanied this application. In this application, Mr Singh deposed that he had not received the "updated Order to replace the one issued on 29 July 2019". At the same time, Mr Singh also filed a Draft Notice of appeal from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. 13 Only the Minister filed written submissions and appeared at the hearing of the application that Mr Singh had filed in this Court on 23 August 2019. After Mr Singh did not appear when his application was called on for hearing, the Minister sought an order that the application be dismissed for non-appearance under s 25(2B)(bb)(ii) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ('the Act'). The Court may dismiss an appeal for failure to attend a hearing relating to the hearing of the appeal under s 25(2B)(bb)(ii) of the Act. Further, although s 25(2B)(bb)(ii) refers in terms only to the dismissal of an appeal, s 25(2BA) of the Act provides that in s 25(2B) a reference to an appeal includes a reference to an application of the kind mentioned in s 25(2). Amongst other things, s 25(2) refers to applications for an extension of time and for leave to appeal. There is also provision in the Federal Court Rules 2011 Cth) ('Rules') to dismiss an appeal for non-appearance: see r 36.75(1)(a)(i). 14 I accept that Mr Singh would require leave to appeal if the judgment he wished to challenge was interlocutory: see s 24(1A) of the Act. An application for leave must be filed within 14 days of the judgment sought to be appealed: Rules, r 35.13. By the time Mr Singh filed his application in this Court, more than 25 days had passed since the primary judge had delivered judgment on 29 July 2019. On the assumption that the judgment under appeal was interlocutory in nature, Mr Singh therefore required an extension of time in which to seek leave to appeal. 15 Of course, an appeal lies as of right from a final judgment of the Federal Circuit Court to this Court: see s 24(1)(d) of the Act. Until recently, the Rules required that a notice of appeal be filed within 21 days after the judgment or order under appeal was made. Since 2 May 2019, the Rules allow a period of 28 days. As it happened, Mr Singh filed his application in this Court (seeking an extension of time in which to seek leave to appeal and leave to appeal) and draft notice of appeal within the time allowed for filing a notice of appeal. 16 Whether a judgment is interlocutory or final is to be determined according to the established principles. A judgment is final if it "finally determines the rights of the parties in a principal cause pending between them": Kowalski v MMAL Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd [2009] FCAFC 117; 178 FCR 401 (Kowalski) at [33]. As the Full Court said in Kowalski at [33], "[i]f the legal effect of the judgment is final, it is a final order; otherwise it is an interlocutory order" (emphasis added). Thus, if it would be open to a party to bring a second application, even if that application were doomed to fail, the judgment in question is interlocutory: see, e.g., Plaintiff S164/2018 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] HCA 51; 361 ALR 8 at [11] (Edelman J). 17 Notwithstanding the principles stated above are well accepted, the character of a judgment is not always as clear as one would wish. As I observed at the hearing on 19 April 2022, some features of the judgment of the primary judge in this particular case were indicative of finality. As we have seen, on 29 July 2019 the primary judge heard both the Minister and Mr Singh on an application. Besides seeking an order that the "decision of the Federal Circuit in Melbourne" [sic] be set aside, in this application Mr Singh also sought an order that the "Tribunal decision ... be set aside". The reasons of the primary judge showed that his Honour addressed both aspects of the application. His Honour held that Mr Singh had in fact "shown sufficient evidence to establish a reasonable explanation for his failure to appear on the first Court date" (PJ [3]), a conclusion that, as his Honour acknowledged, militated in favour of setting aside the Registrar's order of 12 June 2019: compare PJ [15]. His Honour also carefully considered the substantive grounds of Mr Singh's judicial review application and concluded that Mr Singh had "no prospects of succeeding in this application" (PJ [14]). 18 The primary judge set out Mr Singh's 10 grounds of review in his reasons, noting (correctly) that grounds 4 to 7 were the "substantive grounds" (PJ [8]-[9]). By ground 4, Mr Singh contended that the Tribunal did not consider his "reasons fairly and affirm[ed] the decision". The primary judge noted that the basis for this ground was unclear. His Honour held that the Tribunal had clearly considered whether Mr Singh satisfied cl 500.211 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations and that there could be no error in its finding that, without evidence of a certificate of enrolment, the applicant was unable to satisfy the relevant criterion (PJ [9]). By ground 5, Mr Singh contended that the Tribunal and the delegate had failed to consider the "facts, reasons and evidence" that he provided. The primary judge rejected this ground on the basis that Mr Singh was unable to identify what precisely had not been considered (PJ [10]). By ground 6, Mr Singh contended that the decisions of the Tribunal and the delegate were "unfair" and that they would have a detrimental impact on him and his family's life. The primary judge rejected this ground, observing that Mr Singh was found not to satisfy the requirements of cl 500.211 and this finding did not disclose unfairness (PJ [11]). By ground 7, Mr Singh alleged that the Tribunal's decision was affected by jurisdictional error. The primary judge rejected this ground, on the basis that Mr Singh had not identified any particular error (PJ [12]). Hence the primary judge concluded that Mr Singh had no prospects of succeeding in his application for judicial review, as he was unable to satisfy cl 500.211 of Schedule 2 of the Regulations (PJ [14]). In the result, his Honour decided that since Mr Singh's judicial review application could not succeed, then setting aside the Registrar's order was inutile, and the better course was to dismiss the application in a case (filed on 10 July 2019, not 10 July 2017 as mistakenly appeared at PJ [15]). 19 In sum, the primary judge dismissed Mr Singh's application (seeking to set aside both the Registrar's order of 12 June 2019 and the Tribunal's decision) following a hearing at which the parties appeared; and after this hearing his Honour assessed Mr Singh's judicial review application (directed to setting aside the Tribunal's decision) as having no prospects of success. Having regard to these features, it seemed to me at the hearing on 19 April 2022 that the judgment was final, rather than interlocutory and, if so, Mr Singh did not require leave to appeal or an extension of time. In these circumstances, the fact that his Honour declined to set aside the Registrar's order did not alter the character of the decision as final: compare Singh v Secretary, Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations [2011] FCA 799 at [25] (Gordon J). As already noted, Mr Singh filed his application for an extension of time and for leave to appeal, with his draft notice of appeal, within the time allowed to file a notice of appeal. It therefore appeared to me appropriate at that time to order that the document headed "Draft Notice of appeal from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia" and stamped as received by the Court on 23 August 2019 stand as the notice of appeal filed in the proceeding. 20 There are, however, a number of decisions in this Court to the effect that a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court on a reinstatement application is interlocutory in nature. See, for example, Pannu v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 1282 at [1]; Perera v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCA 1417 at [4]-[6]; BZDA v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 1062 at [3]; and Bechara v Bates [2018] FCA 460 at [15]. Since the hearing on 19 April 2022, I have had an opportunity to read these decisions. As a matter of judicial comity, a judge of this Court should follow a decision of another judge (let alone decisions of a number of judges) of the same court unless the judge is of the view that it is plainly wrong. None of these decisions is plainly wrong. Further, I do not consider that the features mentioned in [19] are sufficient to distinguish the present case from the previous decisions. I must, therefore, conclude that the judgment of the primary judge is properly characterised as interlocutory in character, notwithstanding I had previously considered that it was final. To the extent that this misapprehension was reflected in the orders I made on 19 April 2022, those orders should be set aside under r 39.04 of the Rules. I would made new orders instead, reflecting the interlocutory nature of the judgment of the primary judge. 21 Irrespective of whether the judgment was final or interlocutory, the Minister's application was, however, essentially the same: the Minister sought dismissal for non-appearance under s 25(2B)(bb)(ii) of the Act. As indicated at the hearing on 19 April 2022, I would accede to the Minister's application, having regard to the fact that Mr Singh did not appear at the hearing on 19 April 2022 and the following facts. 22 First, Mr Singh was given adequate notice that there was to be a hearing at 10:15 am on 19 April 2022. The court file shows that Mr Singh was notified of this by email dated 10 February 2022, and by letter sent by tracked post to his address for service the same day. Omitting formal parts, the letter read as follows: I write to advise you that the above matter has been listed for hearing before Justice Kenny on Tuesday 19 April 2022 at 10:15 am at the Commonwealth Law Courts Building at 305 William Street, Melbourne VIC 3000. It is important that you attend the hearing. If you do not attend, the Court may proceed in your absence. Prior to sending the letter, Chambers had attempted to contact Mr Singh at various times about the hearing. Chambers emailed the Minister and Mr Singh on 24 December 2022, notifying them that the Court proposed to schedule Mr Singh's application for hearing on 19 April 2022. The Minister's representative replied; Mr Singh did not. Chambers used the email addresses that each of these parties had given to the Court and, as regards Mr Singh, this was the email address provided in the application that he had filed in this Court on 23 August 2019. 23 The Court made orders on 9 February 2022 fixing the hearing of Mr Singh's matter for 19 April 2022. A copy of these orders was sent to the parties, also by email to the parties' notified email addresses. On the same day, Chambers telephoned Mr Singh on the mobile number that he had provided to the Court in his 23 August 2019 application. When this was unsuccessful, Chambers sought further contact information from the Minister's representative, who provided a second mobile number for Mr Singh. Mr Singh did not answer the telephone calls from Chambers on either number. As already stated, a letter and email were sent to Mr Singh's notified addresses the following day notifying him of the 19 April 2022 hearing date. Earlier this month, on 13 April 2022, Chambers again sought to remind the parties by email of the hearing date, reiterating that the Court could proceed in Mr Singh's absence if he did not attend. 24 The Court has not received any communication from Mr Singh for some time now, and he did not appear when his matter was called on for hearing on the morning of 19 April 2022. In the circumstances outlined, I would dismiss the proceeding as the Minister has sought. The evident lack of merits in Mr Singh's proposed appeal confirms my view that this course is appropriate. This lack of merits is relevant not only to the appeal itself but also to the application for an extension of time in which to seek leave to appeal, as well as for leave to appeal. The absence of merits would militate against an exercise of discretion in either respect that was favourable to Mr Singh. 25 The draft notice of appeal provided by Mr Singh contains the following two grounds: 1. I appeared in Melbourne before Judge Riethmuller and I received an Order but not a judgment yet. I explained to His Honour that I submitted Application in a Case with an Affidavit filed on 28 June 2019 in support of my Application in a Case. 2. The Judge failed to consider that it was beyond my own control not to attend the first directions as I was not aware of the date and I did explain in my Affidavit the reasons for not attending the directions. 26 These grounds must fail. The primary judge delivered his ex tempore reasons after hearing the parties' submissions, by speaking these reasons in court at the conclusion of the hearing. His Honour pronounced orders in court in conformity with these reasons, although the orders as entered were amended in August 2019 to reflect his Honour's intention. 27 It is usually desirable to provide written reasons as soon as practicable after giving oral reasons. No appellable error arises, however, simply because the primary judge did not provide written reasons until after the time in which to appeal had expired. This is evident from Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v AAM17 [2021] HCA 6; 388 ALR 257 (AAM17) at [22]. Further, as the Minister observed, Mr Singh has been in receipt of the primary judge's written reasons for over two years, during which time he has not sought to amend his draft notice of appeal to identify anything in his Honour's reasons that might support a conclusion of error on the appeal. One may conclude from this that Mr Singh has not suffered any injustice simply because reasons in written form were not available until 25 September 2019: see: AAM17 at [37] and [38]. 28 By ground 2, it is said that the primary judge failed to consider that Mr Singh's non-attendance at the 12 June 2019 Directions Hearing was beyond his control as he was not aware of the date. The reasons for judgment of the primary judge disclose that this was not the case. His Honour essentially accepted Mr Singh's claim that he was not aware of the date of the Directions Hearing and that Mr Singh had in fact "shown sufficient evidence to establish a reasonable explanation for his failure to appear on the first Court date" (PJ [3]). His Honour concluded, however, that since Mr Singh's judicial review application could not succeed, then merely setting aside the Registrar's order was inutile, and the better course was to dismiss the application before him ([PJ 15]).