Consideration
28 I raised with counsel for the Minister whether the fact that the FCC Judge had not, in the second hearing in the FCC, addressed the cl 573.231 criteria meant that there had been error, even though not an error identified by the Appellant in his grounds of appeal. I also raised with the parties that the present hearing was the fourth in the Appellant's pursuit of judicial review of the MRT's decision and suggested that the interests of finality in litigation made any further remittal undesirable. I then invited counsel for the Minister to consider whether the issues which had been of concern to Charlesworth J could be addressed in the course of the present hearing, subject to the Court being provided with, or otherwise being permitted to have regard to, legislative instruments bearing upon the Diploma of Website Development course conducted by Institute of Technology Australia. I adjourned the hearing to allow the parties to consider those matters.
29 At the resumed hearing, the Appellant did not refer to any legislative instruments nor seek to adduce further evidence. Counsel for the Minister did seek, pursuant to s 27 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), to adduce further evidence. Relevantly, this evidence comprised an affidavit of Qing Zahn, an Assistant Director in the Student and Graduate Visas Section of the Department of Immigration and Border Protection and two instruments made by the Assistant Minister. These were IMMI14/047 and IMMI14/015 which concerned the Diploma of Website Development course and the Institute of Technology Australia.
30 I considered it appropriate to admit this evidence in the interests of the administration of justice and, in particular, in the interests of achieving finality in the litigation. I took into account that the material could (and should) have been adduced in the FCC but considered that that consideration was outweighed by the non-contentious nature of the material, its materiality to the issues in dispute and, as indicated, the public interest in the finality of litigation: see generally, CDJ v VAJ [1998] HCA 67; (1998) 197 CLR 172 at [107]-[111]. The admission of the Ministerial instruments into evidence made it unnecessary to consider whether the Court could in any event, have had regard to them pursuant to s 143(1) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth).
31 The assessment of the Diploma of Website Development course is to be made having regard to the integrated statutory scheme for which the Migration Act and the Education Services for Overseas Students Act 2000 (Cth) (ESOS Act) provide. A stated object of the ESOS Act is to complement Australia's migration laws by ensuring that institutions providing courses of educational training to holders of student visas collect and report information relevant to the administration of the law relating to "student visas": see s 4A(c) of the ESOS Act. In Wei v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] HCA 51; (2015) 257 CLR 22, the High Court outlined the statutory scheme in some detail, at [6]-[15]. It is not necessary for present purposes to repeat the detail of that scheme.
32 A number of matters indicate that the Diploma of Website Development course cannot reasonably be understood as a course for a Diploma (Higher Education) so that the Appellant's enrolment in that course could satisfy the cl 573 criteria. First, Institute of Technology Australia was not included in the list of education providers specified by the Minister in IMMI14/047 for the purposes of cl 573. Accordingly, it could not be an "eligible education provider" for the purposes of the subcl 573.223(1A) criteria.
33 Secondly, it was the Australian Skills Quality Authority (ASQA), the entity with responsibility under the ESOS Act for Australia's vocational education and training (VET) sector, which approved the Diploma of Website Development course at the Institute of Technology Australia. ASQA could (and did) approve the Diploma of Website Development course only as a VET course. The course has not been approved as a higher education course.
34 Thirdly, the Overseas Student Confirmation of Enrolment completed by the Institute of Technology Australia on 26 May 2014 in accordance with its obligations under the ESOS Act in respect of the Appellant's enrolment identified the "course sector" of the Diploma of Website Development as "VET". It did not identify the course as a higher education course.
35 Fourthly, the Diploma (Higher Education) course specified in IMMI14/015 made by the Assistant Minister on 16 March 2014 relates to only Subclass 573 (the Higher Education Sector) and not Subclass 572 (the Vocational Education and Training Sector).
36 Fifthly, the Commonwealth Register of Institutions and Courses for Overseas Students (CRICOS) records the Diploma of Website Development as a VET course.
37 Finally, there is no evidence that the Diploma of Website Development has ever been approved as a Diploma (Higher Education) course in the Higher Education Sector.
38 In these circumstances, it is plain that grounds for cancellation of the Appellant's Subclass 573 visa existed. No error in the MRT's conclusion on that question has been shown. Further, as already noted, the Appellant had acknowledged in the MRT that he had commenced a VET course. It was because he had commenced a VET course that he had applied for a Subclass 572 visa (being the visa appropriate for those studying VET courses).
39 As noted earlier, the MRT considered separately the exercise of the discretion to cancel the visa, under s 116 of the Migration Act. The Appellant's grounds of appeal, set out earlier, indicate his dissatisfaction with the MRT's decision on that question. The question for this Court, however, is whether or not there is any error identifiable in the FCC judgment on that question. Because the FCC Judge did not consider all the matters remitted to that Court for consideration, I have reviewed afresh the MRT's exercise of the discretion. On that reconsideration, I have reached the same conclusion as did the FCC Judge. It is apparent that the MRT considered the various mitigating factors which the Appellant had put forward including his personal circumstances, the reasons for his change of course, the hardship which he perceives he will suffer by reason of the visa cancellation and the frustration of his wish to study Information Technology in Australia. I have not been able to identify any matter in the MRT's consideration of the exercise of the discretion which could constitute jurisdictional error.
40 Furthermore, it is not possible, in my opinion, for the MRT decision to be characterised as legally unreasonable. On the contrary, the decision is readily understandable in the circumstances. This is not a case in which the Appellant's non-compliance with the cl 573 criteria was of short duration only. At the time of the MRT decision, the Appellant's breach of his visa conditions was still continuing.
41 To the extent that the Appellant's grounds of appeal raise other matters, they are not within the scope of judicial review and accordingly lack merit.