Singh v Minister for Home Affairs
[2018] FCA 1909
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Federal Court of Australia
Decision date
2018-11-23
Before
Gleeson J
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Judgment (13 paragraphs)
- The application for an extension of time and leave to appeal be dismissed.
- The applicant pay the first respondent's costs of the application. Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
GLEESON J: 1 This is an application for an extension of time and leave to appeal from a decision of a judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia ("FCCA"), dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the second respondent ("Tribunal"): Singh v Minister for Immigration [2018] FCCA 1306. The Tribunal had, by decision dated 21 November 2017, affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent ("Minister") to refuse to grant the applicant Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) visa. 2 In order to obtain the visa, the applicant was required to demonstrate that he was in a spousal relationship with his sponsor. 3 As he was not the holder of a substantive visa at the time of the visa application, cl 810.211(2)(d) of Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) ("Regulations") also required the applicant to satisfy, relevantly, certain criteria in Sch 3 to the Regulations unless the Minister was satisfied that there were compelling reasons for not applying those criteria. 4 Mr Singh's application to the FCCA was dismissed because the FCCA judge was not satisfied that Mr Singh had raised an arguable case for the relief he claimed. 5 The decision to dismiss the application was made pursuant to r 44.12(1)(a) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2011 ("FCCA Rules") and was therefore interlocutory in nature: see r 44.12(2) of the FCCA Rules. Accordingly, leave to appeal from the decision is required: see s 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). 6 Pursuant to r 35.13 of the Federal Court Rules 2011, an application for leave to appeal must be filed within 14 days after the date on which the judgment was pronounced or the order was made. The judgment and orders of the FCCA were made on 22 May 2018, and consequently the application for leave to appeal was required to be filed by 3 June 2018. The application was filed on 15 June 2018 (about 10 days out of time). Mr Singh therefore requires an extension of time to bring the application for leave to appeal. 7 The applicant's draft notice of appeal sets out the following proposed grounds: (1) The FCCA judge "failed to hold" that the Tribunal committed a jurisdictional error by failing to take into account matters occurring after the date of application when determining whether the Sch 3 criteria should apply. (2) "The Tribunal [misconstrued] and mistook the facts related to the Sponsor's medical and mental condition and it concluded that the appellant is not a credible witness because of the sponsor did not attend the hearing. The appellant attended the hearing and he presented oral evidence as a [truthful] witness. In assessing the genuine spousal relationship the Tribunal's assessment is biased." (3) The Tribunal made a jurisdictional error when it "did not apply a flexible attitude ([Waensila v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 32; (2016) 241 FCR 121]) in using his [discretionary] power". (4) The Tribunal made a jurisdictional error when it "accounted many irrelevant considerations and discredited oral and written evidence of the appellant in support of the compelling circumstances to waive the Schedule 3 Conditions". 8 At the outset, I note (as set out below) that the Tribunal did not address the Sch 3 criteria because it was not satisfied that the appellant and his sponsor were in a spousal relationship. 9 Accordingly, proposed grounds (3) and (4) are hopeless because they are based on the incorrect premise that the Tribunal did address the Sch 3 criteria. 10 It also follows that the FCCA judge could not have made a jurisdictional error of the kind identified in proposed ground (1), because that ground is also based on the incorrect premise that the Tribunal addressed the Sch 3 criteria. Proposed ground (1) is therefore also hopeless. 11 Accordingly, the only ground in respect of which there is any prospect of an appeal is proposed ground (2).