the federal circuit court
10 On 27 October 2015, the primary judge in the Federal Circuit Court dismissed Mr Sims' application for review of the Registrar's decision (Douglas Arthur Sims v Suda Ltd [2015] FCCA 2934).
11 The primary judge found that the grounds of review, as formulated by Mr Sims, who was self-represented, were, save in one respect, irrelevant or misconceived.
12 However, the primary judge identified one complaint which merited full consideration. This was Mr Sims' contention that cl 14, being the indemnity clause in his contract of employment, operated in such a way as to require Suda Ltd to indemnify him in respect of the order that Suda Ltd had obtained in WAD 255 of 2014, that Mr Sims pay Suda Ltd's costs on an indemnity basis.
13 The indemnity is contained in cll 14.1 to 14.4 of the contract of employment which provide as follows:
14.1 Indemnity
To the maximum extent permitted by law, the Company will indemnify the Executive and keep the Executive indemnified against any Legal Proceedings and any claims of any kind made against, suffered, paid or incurred by the Executive pursuant to, arising from or in any way connected with the Executive being an officer of the Company, the employment of the Executive by the Company and any act or omission by the Executive, directly or indirectly, connected therewith, or a breach by the Company of its obligations under this Deed.
14.2 Continuing Indemnity
(a) The indemnity contained in this Deed in a continuing indemnity and is not voided or affected by the Executive resigning or otherwise ceasing to be or to act as an officer of the Company for any reason, or by the occurrence of any other event.
(b) The indemnity given by the Company under this Agreement is irrevocable and will continue for the entire Access Period (which includes that period after the Executive ceases, for any reason, to be an officer of the Company) and is not affected by:
(i) any intermediate payments, settlement of accounts or payments;
(ii) delay on the part of the Executive;
(iii) the death, bankruptcy, insolvency or liquidation of any person; or
(iv) any other thing or matter which might otherwise affect the indemnity, whether in law or equity.
14.3 Payment on Demand
(a) Any substantiated moneys payable by the Company under this Agreement and the indemnity are due and payable by the Company to the Executive on demand.
(b) Any obligations under this Agreement must be performed and fulfilled immediately.
14.4 Notice of Claim
The Executive must give the Company notice of any possible claim the Executive may have under Clause 16.1 as soon as reasonably practicable after becoming aware of an actual or threatened claim, proceeding or other circumstance which could give rise to such an indemnity claim.
14 The term "Legal Proceedings" is defined as follows:
Legal Proceedings means proceedings of any kind including any enquiry by any authority or other person and includes also any claim, action, suit or demand, whether civil or criminal, which relate to or arise from or are in any way connected directly or indirectly with the Officer being an officer of the Company or the employment of the Officer with the Company or any subsidiary and any act or omission by the Officer and includes legal costs.
15 The primary judge considered whether Mr Sims' claim for an indemnity under cl 14.1 of the contract of employment might arguably constitute a "counter-claim, set-off or cross demand" under s 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).
16 Section 40(1)(g) relevantly reads as follows:
(1) A debtor commits an act of bankruptcy in each of the following cases:
…
(g) if a creditor who has obtained against the debtor a final judgment or final order, being a judgment or order the execution of which has not been stayed, has served on the debtor in Australia or, by leave of the Court, elsewhere, a bankruptcy notice under this Act and the debtor does not:
(i) where the notice was served in Australia--within the time specified in the notice; or
(ii) where the notice was served elsewhere--within the time fixed for the purpose by the order giving leave to effect the service;
comply with the requirements of the notice or satisfy the Court that he or she has a counter-claim, set-off or cross demand equal to or exceeding the amount of the judgment debt or sum payable under the final order, as the case may be, being a counter-claim, set-off or cross demand that he or she could not have set up in the action or proceeding in which the judgment or order was obtained;
…
17 The primary judge held that cl 14.1 did not arguably provide Mr Sims with a right to be indemnified by Suda Ltd in respect of the indemnity costs order made against him in WAD 255 of 2014. This was because, said the primary judge, on its plain reading, the indemnity clause operated only in relation to claims against Mr Sims in Legal Proceedings (which is a defined term) and "claims of any kind made against, suffered, paid or incurred" by him.
18 The primary judge went on to say that there was a further qualification, namely, that the indemnity would operate in relation to any claim made against Mr Sims "pursuant to, arising from or in any way connected with" Mr Sims being an officer of Suda Ltd, or Mr Sims being employed by Suda Ltd or any act or omission by Mr Sims directly or indirectly connected therewith; or a breach by Suda Ltd of its obligations under the contract of employment. The indemnity, said the primary judge, did not operate in respect of claims which Mr Sims made against Suda Ltd.
19 The primary judge also considered the prospect that the concluding words of cl 14.1 might give rise to an argument that there was an obligation on Suda Ltd to indemnify Mr Sims in respect of costs orders made against him in proceedings wherein Mr Sims claimed a breach by Suda Ltd of its obligations under the contract of employment with Mr Sims. The primary judge said that such an argument would lead to an "odd result" and, in light thereof, that construction of cl 14.1 was not sufficiently arguable to warrant setting aside the bankruptcy notice.
20 The primary judge went on to find that, in any event, even if he was wrong on the construction of the indemnity clause, the claim Mr Sims now made was a claim that it was "at least open" to Mr Sims to have made before Gilmour J in WAD 255 of 2014 on the question of costs. Accordingly, the primary judge found that Mr Sims' indemnity claim did not, in any event, fall within the ambit of s 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act.