Simone Starr-Diamond v Talus Diamond
[2013] NSWSC 351
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Supreme Court of NSW
Decision date
2013-04-05
Before
Slattery J, Hoeben JA
Catchwords
- Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW)
- Partition Act 1869 (Tas)
- Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth) Cases Cited: Simone Starr-Diamond v Talus Diamond [2012] NSWSC 675
- Starr-Diamond v Diamond [2013] NSWCA 7, Starr-Diamond v Talus Diamond (No 2) [2013] NSWSC 1650
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Catchwords
Judgment (6 paragraphs)
Judgment 1This is my third judgment in these proceedings. My principal judgment in the matter was given on 19 June 2012: Simone Starr-Diamond v Talus Diamond [2012] NSWSC 675. My second judgment was given on 20 July 2012: Starr-Diamond v Talus Diamond (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 1650. The second judgment dealt with the form of final orders and costs issues. But the second judgment did not appoint trustees for sale of the Baker's Beach and Ambleside properties in Tasmania. This third judgment now deals with that issue, on the defendant's motion. Persons, matters and things are referred to in this judgment in the same way as they are in my principal judgment and the second judgment. All three judgments should be read together. 2Since the second judgment the plaintiff has commenced proceedings in the Court of Appeal seeking an extension of the stay upon the orders made in my second judgment. Hoeben JA (as his Honour then was) determined the plaintiff/appellant's stay application adversely to her on 12 February 2013: Starr-Diamond v Diamond [2013] NSWCA 7. The defendant now moves the Court for the appointment of trustees for sale of the Tasmanian Properties. The present motion was contemplated by Order 2 of the Court's orders of 20 July 2012. That order provided for a mechanism by which the President of the Law Society of Tasmania would nominate persons suitable to act as trustees for the sale of the Tasmanian Properties. It then provided for relisting of the proceedings for the appointment of trustees for sale, unless there were objections to the trustees so nominated. 3The evidence on this motion makes clear that the Law Society of Tasmania through its President and through its executive director Mr Martyn Hagen made considerable efforts to find suitable trustees to act as trustees for sale in the present circumstances. The Court now formally thanks them for their assistance in this task. That assistance has enabled neutral trustees to be appointed to sell these two properties. 4The defendant also seeks in her motion to have herself appointed to sell the properties. This is not acceptable. Although it might save expense, such a course is unlikely to engender the confidence of both parties and it is likely to risk further conflict between them. The law is clear that the trustees appointed for sale must be impartial as between the co-owners, so much so that it is even regarded as inadvisable for the trustees to engage the same solicitor to act for them as may act for one of the co-owners: Dixon v Roy (1991) 5 BPR 11,655. I will therefore not appoint the defendant to sell the Tasmanian properties. 5Three questions arise for consideration in this judgment: (1) what is this Court's power to order the appointment of trustees for sale in Tasmania; (2) has the defendant established on the motion the requisite elements for the appointment of the trustees for sale; (3) should any special terms be included in the orders that the Court makes.