9 Since then, dispute has continued as to the validity of the 2005 AGM and as to the standing of the 2005 Committee and office bearers, and all attempts at resolution of those disputes have so far failed. On 24 October 2005, solicitors acting for the defendants wrote to Mr Krishna, the Treasurer on the 2005 Committee, maintaining that the 2005 Annual General Meeting was invalid, seeking undertakings - including acknowledgment of the status of the defendants as Secretary and President respectively - and again threatening to make an application to the Court for an injunction before early November if those undertakings were not forthcoming. No such undertakings were given, but no such application was brought.
10 Some time in or about December 2005 the second defendant received a letter from the Office of Fair Trading which, he says, expressed a requirement to resolve the dispute and bring the affairs of the Association into order, and to require a response by 16 December. It seems that on 15 December the second defendant lodged with the Office of Fair Trading an application for an extension of time within which to hold the Annual General Meeting for the purposes of s 26(3) of the Act. On 11 January 2006, the Office of Fair Trading sent a letter to the first defendant referring to the application for extension of time and expressing approval of the Association's request to hold the Annual General Meeting on 19 February 2006.
11 The second defendant thereupon convened at his residence a meeting of some, but not all, of the persons who had been members of the 2004 Committee. Notice was not given to those persons who, though they had been members of the 2004 Committee, were not aligned with the defendants. This "meeting" resolved to convene an AGM on 19 February 2006, with the consequence that nominations for any election at such AGM would close on 12 February. The first defendant, purporting to be the Secretary of the Association, issued notices of that proposed meeting on or about 26 January 2006.
12 On 8 February 2006, the plaintiff obtained leave to file a summons and Notice of Motion claiming interlocutory and final relief, including declarations as to the validity of the 2005 AGM and to the effect that the office bearers and Committee declared elected at the 2005 AGM were duly and validly elected and held office as such, as well as interlocutory relief restraining the proposed meeting for 19 February and other interlocutory relief. The Notice of Motion returned before the Court this morning. Some of the supporting evidence, including, in particular, the bundle of exhibits referred to in the affidavits, without which the affidavits would make very little sense to a reader, were not served within the time for which service was abridged and Mr Prakash, who appeared today for the defendants, sought an adjournment of the present application until next week. Mr Smallbone, of counsel, who appeared for plaintiff, pressed today only so much of the application for interlocutory relief as would restrain the holding of the meeting on 19 February. I declined Mr Prakash's application for an adjournment because, on the limited understanding I then had of the case at that stage, from reading the affidavit material, it seemed to me that the fate of the proposed meeting on 19 February would not likely be affected by further evidence and that, in any event, it was necessary to make some determination, even if only a preliminary one before nominations closed on 12 February. The benefit of further argument and further consideration has reinforced my view that it is appropriate to deal today with the question of restraining the holding of the proposed Annual General Meeting on 19 February.
13 I am satisfied there is at least a seriously arguable case that the 2005 AGM was duly convened and that the 2005 office bearers and Committee members were validly elected - and, therefore, that the proposed meeting would not be validly convened. It may well be, in due course, that some defect in the process of calling the 2005 AGM can be identified, but in this respect it is relevant that when there was an opportunity to move for an injunction to restrain that meeting being held, it was not availed of, nor was an injunction sought in October or November of last year when again the prospect of restraining the 2005 Committee from acting as such arose. At first sight, the argument that the Notice of Meeting was given by the Assistant Secretary rather than the Secretary it not an impressive one. The requirement that it be given by the Secretary is, I think, not a precondition of the validity of the meeting, more so where it is given by the person who is, in effect, the Secretary's deputy.
14 Moreover, upon the assumption that the 2005 AGM on 3 July 2005 was not duly convened, and that the 2005 Committee was not validity elected and, therefore, that the 2004 Committee would remain in office, there is, nonetheless, a seriously arguable case that the recent purported committee meeting cannot validly have convened an AGM for 19 February. The power of convening an AGM is given to the Committee, and not to selected members of the Committee. The meeting which the second defendant described was only of selected members of the 2004 Committee, no notice having been given to other members of that Committee. Accordingly, the meeting could not have been a meeting of the 2004 Committee, even if it remains in office, and could not have convened an AGM for 19 February 2006. So much is, I think, at least seriously arguable.
15 On the question of the validity of the process by which the meeting which has been convened for 19 February has been called, the extension of time apparently granted by the Office of Fair Trading is irrelevant. The mere fact that a regulatory authority has approved a request to hold an AGM out of time does not give validity to a committee's resolution to convene a meeting, let alone to a resolution to that effect by a body which was not the 2004 Committee.
16 It follows that there is a seriously arguable case that the meeting proposed to be held on 19 February 2006 has not been duly and validly convened. Mr Prakash, responsibly and realistically, did not argue to the contrary. Whether an injunction should be granted, therefore, turns on considerations of the balance of convenience.
17 The prejudice said by Mr Smallbone to arise from declining to grant an injunction is that the members of the 2005 Committee would, in order to protect their position, effectively be compelled to lend legitimacy to a process which they dispute, by lodging their nominations by this Sunday 12 February, as if they did not do so, they run the risk of exclusion if ultimately the meeting proves to be validly convened. The prejudice said to be suffered by the defendants from the granting of an injunction was their potential exposure to penalties under s 26(7) of the Act, for failing to convene an Annual General Meeting within time if they were restrained from doing so.
18 The consideration identified by Mr Smallbone is germane to whether it is necessary to grant an injunction today, as distinct from waiting until some time next week when the defendants can have an opportunity to adduce further evidence before deciding whether the Annual General Meeting should be restrained. But deferral of the matter until next week would only require revisiting the balance of convenience, which I think can be sufficiently addressed now.
19 On the face of the correspondence before me, and the submissions which I have heard, it is, I think, improbable that further evidence would affect whether or not there is a serious question to be tried. In other words, I do not think that that position is going to be changed between now and next week by the adducing of further evidence. The correspondence on both sides is before me, and that correspondence sets out the positions of both factions to the dispute. Given the oral evidence of the first plaintiff as to who was and who was not notified of the recent purported meeting of the 2004 Committee, it is highly improbable that further evidence would result in the Court concluding that there was no serious question to be tried as to the validity of the proposed meeting. If that be right, then the Court is simply going to have to consider next week rather than today whether the balance of the convenience favours restraining the meeting.
20 On that question, in addition to the prejudice identified by Mr Smallbone as being relevant to whether an injunction should be granted before nominations close, are the increased confusion in the affairs of the Association which will arise, if the meeting is allowed to proceed; the potential jeopardy to the assets of the Association which may arise from having two competing committees claiming authority; and the difficulties in the conduct of an election, for example compliance with the requirement that nominations be sent to the "Secretary", when there is dispute as to who is the Secretary. These are but some illustrations of the potential prejudice to the Association which may arise from allowing a disputed meeting and election to proceed before resolving whether or not it has been duly called.