Shellharbour City Council v Minister for Local Government

Adequacy of public notice

1. The Council pleaded a number of alleged defects in the notice of the inquiry given by the Delegate. Those alleged defects where the complaints were on general grounds that the notice that was given did not satisfy the requirement of s 263(2B) for the giving of reasonable notice were dealt with in Hunter's Hill and other councils at [152] to [175] as the alleged defects (although the wording in the pleadings may have varied) were to the same effect as in those other proceedings. The discussion and conclusions there set out are equally applicable in these proceedings.
2. These complaints are without foundation.
3. This Council also raised specific, individual matters concerning the notice. Those matters are dealt with in the later section of this judgment dealing with the range of complaints specific to this Council.

Conduct of the inquiry

1. The Council pleads a number of alleged defects in the conduct of the inquiry by the Delegate. Those alleged defects where the complaints were on general grounds were dealt with in Hunter's Hill and other councils at [176] to [188] as the alleged defects (although the wording in the pleadings may have varied) were to the same effect as in those other proceedings. The discussion and conclusions there set out are equally applicable in these proceedings.
2. These complaints are without foundation.

The KPMG issues

1. As in Hunter's Hill and other councils, the Council pleads that KPMG was not independent, that the Delegate relied on the assertion that it was; and that the basis for the KPMG economic assertions was not disclosed. These defects are said to have denied the Council procedural fairness and to have caused the Delegate's discharging of his functions to have miscarried in a material respect - thus vitiating his reporting process.
2. These alleged defects were dealt with in Hunter's Hill and other councils at [196] to [258] as the alleged defects (although the wording in the pleadings may have varied) were to the same effect as in those other proceedings. The discussion and conclusions there set out are equally applicable in these proceedings.
3. These complaints are without foundation.

Introduction

1. Fulfilling the requirements set by the statute for the Delegate is a central matter for consideration in these proceedings. The role of the Delegate is clear and confined. The role is set by the mandate given by s 263(2A) of the Local Government Act - hold an inquiry for the purpose of exercising its functions in relation to a proposal for the amalgamation of two or more areas that has been referred to it in accordance with section 218F. Although this provision speaks of the role of the Boundaries Commission, it applies to the Delegate by virtue of s 218F(2).
2. In order to fulfil this role, the Delegate must ensure that reasonable public notice is to be given of the Delegate's holding of his inquiry (s 263(2B)). The inquiry must be one at which members of the public are able to attend (s 263(5)).

The Delegate's reporting role

1. During the course of the Delegate's inquiry, there are 11 matters specifically set out in the Local Government Act to which the Delegate is to have regard for his examination and report in the context of the proposal that has been referred to him. These 11 matters are set out in s 263(3) and were set out in the earlier extract from Woollahra.
2. Having conducted his inquiry, the Delegate is then required to furnish a report that addresses these mandatory matters. As can be seen from the final point in the list set by the section, there is also a general sweep-up provision that enables the Delegate to report on such other matters as the Delegate considers may be appropriate under the circumstances.

Consideration of the Delegate's report

1. In Botany Bay City Council v Premier Customs Services Pty Ltd (2009) 172 LGERA 338; [2009] NSWCA 226, Macfarlan JA (with whom Ipp JA and Hoeben J agreed) said, at [32]: I appreciate that it is not appropriate to approach reasons of a Commissioner with a "fine-tooth comb", but the Court must nonetheless attempt to ascertain as best it can what were the essential reasons for a decision.
2. I consider it is appropriate to apply that comment in the context of considering a report, pursuant to s 263(1), of a delegate to whom an amalgamation proposal has been referred. Such reports should not be subject to the same degree of forensic dissection as would be the case of a decision made by a judge.

The Council's complaints concerning the Delegate's report

1. In these proceedings, the Council points to what it says are a number of significant inadequacies in the discharge by the Delegate of his statutory responsibilities - deficiencies that the Council says are so fundamental that it is appropriate to conclude that the failures by the Delegate, either individually or in combination, caused the inquiry process to have miscarried and it should be set aside.

Introduction

1. In addition to the issues common to the various council proceedings that have been determined, to date, in this Court, the Council has raised separate, more detailed issues requiring consideration in these proceedings. That which follows deals with those separate issues.

Refusal to make the full KPMG documents available

1. Ku-ring-gai Council's complaints that the full KPMG documents were not made available were dealt with by me when I upheld a claim for public interest immunity - see Ku-ring-gai Council v Mr Garry West in his capacity as delegate of the Acting Director-General of the Office of Local Government [2016] NSWLEC 62. The Chief Judge also dealt with and upheld a similar claim for public interest immunity in Woollahra Municipal Council v Minister for Local Government [2016] NSWLEC 44.
2. Although this Council did not take part in either of those preliminary proceedings, the outcomes are applicable to the Council's claims in these proceedings that the full KPMG documents should have been made available to it.
3. As a consequence of these determinations and what was dealt with in the section of this judgment dealing with KPMG (and its involvement and its documents), this complaint is without foundation.
4. However, the Council also complains (Grounds 1 and 2) that the refusal to provide the full KPMG documents was a denial of procedural fairness by the Department of Premier and Cabinet and that these documents should have been taken into account by the Delegate. To the extent that these grounds merely constitute a re-pleading of what is dealt with at [44], it was dealt with as there discussed.
5. To the extent that there is embodied in these grounds, a complaint concerning the availability of the full KPMG documents to the Delegate, this is dealt with in Hunter's Hill and other councils at [218] to [254]. The reasoning there set out is equally applicable in these proceedings.

Denial of procedural fairness - undisclosed information

1. The Council complains (Ground 3) of what it says is a specific denial of procedural fairness caused by the nondisclosure to the Council of material which had been provided (whether in writing or orally) to the delegate thus denying the Council the opportunity to respond to it. This ground was pleaded in the following terms: The Delegate further denied the applicant (and any other affected member of the community) procedural fairness in taking into account material provided to him without disclosing the substance of the information before him, or providing access to the information or an opportunity to comment on the information. Particulars The Delegate received briefings from the Second Respondent and KPMG staff. The applicant was not aware of the substance of the briefings, nor was the fact that the briefings had occurred disclosed to the applicant. The applicant did not have an opportunity to make submissions on any material or information provided to the Delegate during the said briefings.
2. The starting point for dealing with this complaint is what was said by Preston CJ in Woollahra at [111] to [113] ([111] being included for context). These paragraphs read: It follows from this conclusion that s 263 did not mandate that the person holding the inquiry (in this case the Delegate of the Departmental Chief Executive) actively question persons speaking at the inquiry or answer questions asked of the Delegate at the inquiry. Where the section is silent as to the procedure to be followed at the inquiry, that procedure within such limits as are necessarily imposed by its qualifying for the description "inquiry", is left to the discretion of the person holding the inquiry: Bushell v Secretary of State for the Environment at 94-95. The Delegate did not fail to hold an inquiry under the section by stating that he was "here only to listen". Fourth, it also follows from the previous point that s 263 does not require that all key material relied upon by the Boundaries Commission or Departmental Chief Executive in examining and reporting on a proposal referred to it by the Minister under s 218F must be publicly accessible in advance of the holding of the inquiry. This argument of Woollahra Council is predicated on its mistaken contention that the entire process of examination and report must be carried out in public at the inquiry. The citation of Bread Manufacturers of New South Wales v Evans (at 413) is misplaced. The inquiry required to be conducted in the circumstances and under the legislation considered in that case was quite different to the inquiry required to be held under s 263 of the Act. There, the High Court held that, because legislation in that case conferred investigative powers on the Prices Commission for the purposes of a public inquiry, where an inquiry was held, the Prices Commission was precluded either from using information obtained privately for the purposes of the inquiry without disclosing it to the parties (per Gibbs CJ and Aickin J) or from obtaining information for the purposes of the inquiry except in public and on oath (per Wilson and Mason JJ). Here, s 263 does not so require that information obtained by the Boundaries Commission or Departmental Chief Executive must be publicly disclosed and publicly adduced at an inquiry held under the section. So too, the inquiries held under the legislation considered in Bushell v Secretary of State for the Environment and B Johnson & Co (Builders) Ltd v Minister of Health were quite different to the inquiry required to be held under s 263 of the Act.
3. Although, in [112], His Honour was dealing with accessibility of material in advance of the holding of the enquiry, an examination of Bread Manufacturers of New South Wales v Evans (1981) 180 CLR 404; [1981] HCA 69 shows that this position is equally applicable at any stage during a Delegate's examination and reporting process. The joint judgement of Mason and Wilson JJ set out, at [11] the relevant provisions applicable at that time in the Prices Regulation Act 1948. Their Honours noted, at [13], the powers of the Prices Commission: The investigative powers of the Commission are contained within a group of sections numbered from 9-17. They include the power to summon witnesses and take evidence on oath (s. 9), require information to be given and questions answered (s. 13), require the production of balance sheets and other accounts (s. 14), enter upon and search any premises and inspect any documents or goods taking copies or samples thereof as the case may be (s. 15), and require a return to be furnished by any person or class of persons containing particulars of the quantity and cost of any goods in possession and of prices charged or proposed to be charged in respect of them (s. 17).
4. It is clear that the functions being undertaken by the Prices Commission were, subject to a power of intervention by the Minister, of a determinative nature but, most relevantly applicable, of deriving a conclusion from an enquiry conducted in a fashion significantly akin to that conducted by a court. The position here, mandated by ss 218F and 263 is quite radically different. The conclusion of His Honour in [113] that "s 263 does not so require that information obtained by the Boundaries Commission or Departmental Chief Executive must be publicly disclosed and publicly adduced at enquiry under the section" is clearly applicable to this complaint in these proceedings.
5. This complaint fails.

Introduction

1. The Council makes a number of complaints about the notice of the inquiry given by the Delegate. These complaints are that the notice that was given did not satisfy the requirement of s 263(2B), a provision which requires that reasonable public notice must be given of the holding of an inquiry under this section. The Council says that the notice actually given by the Delegate could not be regarded as reasonable as it was inadequate in a number of material respects and that these errors were jurisdictional.
2. The deficiencies that the Council identifies and proposes should lead to this conclusion were pleaded in the following terms: 7. The Delegate erred at law, and the error was jurisdictional, in failing to provide reasonable public notice of the holding of an inquiry as required under section 236(2B) [sic] of the LG Act. Particulars (a) The Delegate gave notice of a public inquiry on 20 January 2016. (b) The notice was defective as to location in that it failed to provide the address of where the inquiry was being held. (c) The notice was defective in that it did not give sufficient details of the merger proposal subject of the public inquiry including, but not limited to, insufficient information is as to whether the proposal was for amalgamation or an alteration of the boundaries with respect to Shellharbour City Council and Wollongong City Council local government areas. (d) Further the notice did not constitute reasonable notice in accordance with section 236(2B) [sic] of the LG Act in the circumstances of this case, namely: (i) The time of the year; (ii) The lack of postal notification to residents of affected areas; (iii) The contents of the Proposal and, in particular, the information that was required to be comprehended in order for an interested resident or ratepayer to meaningfully participate in the inquiry; and (iv) The process of registration which the notice implied was required (but which in fact was not required under the LG Act) in order for a person to be heard at the inquiry.

Alleged deficiencies (c), (d)(iii) and (d)(iv)

1. These complaints are in common with those pleaded in Hunter's Hill and other councils and are dealt with at [28] to [30] above.

Alleged deficiency (b) - location of the inquiry

1. The Council complains that the locations of the Delegate's inquiry to which interested people or organisations were invited is insufficient. This complaint can be dealt with comparatively briefly.
2. As earlier observed, the notice given by the Delegate of the holding of his inquiry was published in both metropolitan and local newspapers. The two locations were described in those notices in the following terms: The Shellharbour Club and Sage Hotel Wollongong
3. The Council makes the same complaint about the description of each venue. The complaint is that each does not provide sufficient specificity - in that the street address of each venue (Corner Wattle and Shellharbour Roads, Shellharbour and 60-62 Harbour Street, Wollongong respectively) was not provided.
4. I am satisfied that this complaint is without foundation. I have so concluded for the following reasons. First, the identifiers contained in the Delegate's notice were capitalised. Each was clearly the title of a specific place rather than some generic descriptor. For those who might, of their own knowledge, know where The Shellharbour Club or the Sage Hotel Wollongong was located, such a descriptor would be sufficient, in itself. For those who did not know where that institution was located, it would be necessary to make some further enquiry as to where it was and, if the person seeking the information proposed to attend the Delegate's inquiry, obtain information on how to reach either venue.
5. Even if the notice had said: The Shellharbour Club, Corner Wattle and Shellharbour Roads, Shellharbour and Sage Hotel Wollongong, 60-62 Harbour Street, Wollongong it is also reasonable to assume that, for a very significant element (if not the vast majority) of those resident in these two local government areas (or anybody else who might be interested in attending this inquiry who was resident outside those areas), those persons would not have precise knowledge of how to reach either of the above set out addresses and would need to make some subsequent enquiry of how to get the venue.
6. The notice, itself, provides two sources for further information: they being a website, and a local-call-cost telephone number. There is no suggestion that visiting the website would not have provided sufficient information on how to access the venue, or that any person making a telephone enquiry seeking such information would not so have been given information in sufficient detail to permit them to find either venue.
7. In any event, it is likely that anybody with other than an immediate and sufficient knowledge of how to get to either of the above set out addresses would need to resort to some other way of obtaining directions for this purpose.
8. Whether that information would be, in this ubiquitous electronic information age, by consulting Google maps or some form of GPS system or by old-fashioned paper street directory or, even more primitively, by taking handwritten notes during a telephone enquiry (whether to the advertised number or to either nominated venue), I am satisfied that the identification given in the notice was of sufficient particularity so as to provide an adequate description of the venues in a fashion that would enable anybody wishing to attend the inquiry to be able to inform themselves sufficiently to get to the venue.
9. I am also satisfied that the pool of potential participants whose knowledge would have been such that further enquiry would have been unnecessary (had the street addresses been given) would not have been so significantly large as to obviate any reasonable likelihood of further information needing to be sought to enable a potential participant to get to either of the venues.
10. The suggestion that capitalised identifiers used in the fashion included in this notification could only be regarded as sufficient if that which was identified was iconic (for example the Opera House) cannot succeed for the reasons earlier described.
11. The capitalisation of the venue names is of sufficient specificity under the circumstances to permit a person desiring to attend the inquiry to be held by the Delegate to be able to find either venue without there being any realistic risk of not being able to do so or going to the wrong place.
12. This ground fails.

Alleged deficiency (d)(i) - the time of the year of the inquiry

1. Notice of the two sets of public inquiry sessions was given in the Sydney Morning Herald and the Daily Telegraph on 13 January 2016. Notice was also given in the Illawarra Mercury on 18 and 25 January 2016 and in The Advertiser (a publication also incorporating The Lakes Times). Notice was given in The Advertiser on 20 and 27 January 2016.
2. New South Wales' public school holidays, it was agreed, finished with pupils returning to school on 28 January 2016.
3. The public inquiry sessions were scheduled to be held on Tuesday 2 February 2016 at 9.00 am to noon at The Shellharbour Club, whilst those to be held at the Sage Hotel Wollongong were scheduled to be held in two sessions on the same day between 3.00 pm to 5.00 pm and 7.00 pm to 10.00 pm.
4. There is no dispute that, in summary form, this notice can be described as being in two newspapers of statewide circulation and two newspapers of local circulation. With respect to the latter point, I have evidence of the distribution areas of the Illawarra Mercury and The Advertiser, with these showing that the local newspaper distribution appears to cover the totality of the Wollongong City and Shellharbour City local government areas.
5. There is not, as I understand the position, any dispute as to the geographic reasonableness of the notice concerning this proposal; the complaint is as to the temporal reasonableness of the notice, given its juxtaposition with the school holidays and the comparative shortness of the period of time between the second phase of the local notices and the public inquiry sessions themselves.
6. Whilst prudence might well have suggested that the public inquiry sessions might have potentially benefited from greater participation had they been held later and had further local notice been given after the end of the school holidays, this is mere speculation.
7. Although, in this instance, a matter of finer balance than arises in other matters requiring consideration in these proceedings, I am satisfied that the notice actually given should be regarded as reasonable as required by s 263(2B) of the Local Government Act.
8. I have reached this conclusion for two reasons.
9. First, the period between the various statewide-circulating advertisements and the date of the public inquiry sessions, and the period of time between the first of the local-circulating advertisements and the public inquiry sessions, was quite generous and it would be appropriate to regard the later local-circulating advertisements as reasonable reminders.
10. Second, the statewide-circulating advertisements would have been available to all potentially interested residents and ratepayers who may have been holidaying elsewhere within New South Wales at the time of those statewide notices, as well as had they been remaining at home in either local government areas at those advertisement dates. I do not understand there to be any complaint that there was the need, for the purposes of the statutory requirement of reasonable notice, to give notice outside the boundaries of the state of New South Wales.
11. In Woollahra, Preston CJ said, at [72], on a similarly argued point: Fifth, the fact the public notice was given progressively throughout January, when people might be on vacation, did not cause the public notice that was given to be unreasonable. The earliest that public notice was given was on 12 January 2016. This was after the Christmas/New Year period and the first week of January, being the periods when the greatest number of people are on vacation. The last two weeks of January and the first week of February do not fall into the same category. The evidence of a few people that they did not become aware of and did not attend the inquiry does not establish that the public notice that was given was ineffective in alerting people to the holding of the inquiry. Indeed, the sizeable number of people who did make submissions (449) and attended the two sessions of the inquiry that was held on 4 February 2016 points to the contrary.
12. The same approach is to be taken here.
13. In addition, as his Honour noted at [56]: Public notice by newspaper advertisement in newspapers circulating in the local government areas affected by the proposal is fair and reasonable notice to the public: Waitemata County v Local Government Commission [1964] NZLR 689 at 699.
14. As a consequence, the mere giving of these notices, in circumstances where a sufficiently long period of notice was given, does not in these circumstances cause a notice given to be regarded as not being reasonable. It is not as if the complaint made is that the public inquiry sessions, themselves, were held during the school holiday period.
15. The test of the reasonableness of the notice is an objective one, having regard to how and when the notice was given, rather than a subjective one in the mind of any person to whom such notice was required to be given.
16. This complaint fails.

Alleged deficiency (d)(ii) - failure to give postal notification to residents

1. As earlier observed, the requirement for notice is contained in s 263(2B) of the Local Government Act. This reads: (2B) Reasonable public notice must be given of the holding of an inquiry under this section.
2. Preston CJ in Woollahra explained, at [22] to [24] why s 705 of the Local Government Act was unlikely to apply. He also observed, at [25]: There is no express guidance given in the Act or the regulations made under the Act of what constitutes "[r]easonable public notice … of the holding of an inquiry".
3. As noted at [81], "Public notice by newspaper advertisement in newspapers circulating in the local government areas affected by the proposal is fair and reasonable notice".
4. Preston CJ concluded on this point, at [73], that: Public notice by newspaper advertisements of the holding of the inquiry was fair and reasonable notice to the public, which was the audience to whom notice was intended to be given
5. The same position applies in these proceedings. I am satisfied that reasonable public notice was given. This complaint fails.

Conclusion on the notice of the inquiry

1. For the reasons set out above, there is no validity in any of these complaints.

Introduction

1. The Council makes one substantive complaint concerning the Delegate's report. Although not specifically particularised in the Council's pleadings in its Further Amended Summons, Mr Kennett SC, in his oral submissions, specifically raised issues put by the Council, in its written submission to the Delegate, concerning what it considered would be the inequitable redistribution of development benefits being (and, in the future, to be) reaped from a development known as Shell Cove, a development being undertaken by the Council as a public-private partnership venture. The Council also complained that the significant capital expenditure on the new Shellharbour Civic Centre would not provide the anticipated benefits to residents of the Shellharbour City local government area.

The requirements of s 263(3)

1. As part of the Delegate examining and reporting on the proposal that has been referred to him, the Delegate is required to have regard to the 10 specified matters set out in s 263(3) and may, additionally, have regard to other matters that the Delegate considers are warranted under the circumstances (s 263(3)(e5) contains this catch-all provision).
2. In this context, it is appropriate to note two aspects of what is required of the Delegate by this section.
3. The first is that each of the matters that are set out in it is coequal. That is, the provision itself provides no ranking to which the Delegate is obliged to have regard. The consequence of this is that, as part of the reporting function to be undertaken by the Delegate after his examination of these matters (and after holding the mandated public inquiry), the Delegate is required to have examined and reported upon each of these mandated topics. In doing so, the Delegate is required to engage with and consider, in a sufficient and relevant fashion, each of these mandated topics.
4. Failure by the Delegate to do so with respect to any of the topics will mean that the Delegate has not discharged his statutory obligations and, as a consequence, the Delegate's function will have miscarried. However, what consequences might flow from such an outcome requires consideration of such factors (if any) requiring consideration in the circumstances.
5. Second, the Delegate is required to have regard to each of those mandatory factors as part of the examination and reporting process. There is no requirement in the statute for the Delegate to be satisfied in some fashion with respect to any of these matters. What is required of the Delegate, after engaging with and examining each of these factors, is to report upon them, individually and collectively. It is clear from the terms of s 263(7)(b) that it is envisaged that the Delegate will contemplate whether or not to make recommendations of a detailed nature in addition to expressing conclusions with respect to the overall proposal.

The Delegate's s 263(3)(a) analysis of financial issues

1. The Delegate set out his analysis of general matters falling within the scope of s 263(3)(a) on pages 16 to 22 of his report. The Delegate observed, at page 19 of his report, that: Shellharbour City Council commented at great length in their submission in regard to their concerns under this factor and engaged Morrison Low and Professor Brian Dollery to undertake additional financial analysis.
2. The Delegate set out the Council's overview (from Table 8) of the financial advantages or disadvantages of the merger. The eight points so submitted included: The merger proposal creates significant and disproportional disadvantage for the Shellharbour community including through loss of investment returns, liability for infrastructure funding shortfalls in Wollongong, and "sunk cost" of recent financial investments made in the Shellharbour Civic Centre and IT upgrades
3. The first and third of the matters noted in the extract above reflect the two concerns noted earlier in [84].
4. The Delegate also set out extracts from the Morrison Low study commissioned by Shellharbour City Council and from that prepared on the Council's behalf by Professor Brian Dollery. The material submitted by the Council (including the Morrison Low and Dollery material) comprised over 120 pages.
5. The Delegate's overall conclusion on the general financial matters under s 263(3)(a) was in the following terms: There are differences between time periods, the methodological approaches, assumptions, and therefore financial estimates undertaken in the various analyses carried out by KPMG, Morrison Low, and Professor Dollery. It is very difficult in this context away up and appropriately balance out all differing expert and professional views, arguments and counterarguments. Professor Dollery is the most strident in his criticism of the KPMG report and was quite emotive and some of the language he used. KPMG are the most optimistic in their projections, although they do use a reasonably conservative discount rate and if a lower discount rate were to be used, then the model benefits would be greater. In their analysis Morrison Low took a very cautious approach and modelled both potential positive financial benefits as well is the negative financial outcomes and risks if the claimed deficiencies were not achieved. Further to this Wollongong City Council said in its submission "while stating overall some concerns the KPMG assumptions and resulting savings estimates do not withstand rigourous scrutiny at a detailed level, it would appear that there was the potential for financial benefits to be achieved over the longer term as a result of the merger". The key questions here are does the proposed merger have sufficient potential to generate financial efficiencies and/or beneficial economies and are these achievable across both of the councils in the long term? On balance and overall, in the view of the Delegate, the creation of the new council under this proposal does have the potential to bring about a number of long-term benefits and opportunities. The formation of a single merged council will generate economies of scale and financial efficiencies that if effectively managed will allow the establishment of a more financially robust entity that will have a stronger balance sheet and a greater capacity to deliver more efficient management, infrastructure, and services across a range of critical local government functions into the long term. Therefore this factor is not considered to be an impediment to the merger proposal proceeding.
6. On 8 April, the Delegate forwarded his report to the Chairperson of the Boundaries Commission. The Boundaries Commission considered the Delegate's report (the next section of this judgment deals with the Council's complaint about the role of the Boundaries Commission). The Boundaries Commission's general conclusions concerning the Delegate's report were: Overall, the Commission's view is that the Report shows the Delegate adequately considered all the factors.
7. With respect to the aspect of the Delegate's report dealing with s 263(3)(a), the Boundaries Commission said: The Commission's view is that the Delegate adequately considered this factor.
8. Mr Kennett's oral submissions (Transcript 9 June 2016, page 8, line 1 to 22) on this point were: …I wanted to note the council makes a couple of other points under the general heading of financial advantages and disadvantages. On p 268, it argues that the merger proposal imposes and inequitable disadvantage on the Shellharbour community and it refers to an investment that the council had made - or it says, "Shellharbour community," but it really means the council - in a development known as Shell Cove. It says "Council and its...the merger proposal," I'm not at about point 6 "the merger proposal...of the income." Then there's a table to illustrate that. Over the next page, again in bold, there's suggestion that infrastructure funding shortfalls in Wollongong would create a liability for Shellharbour rate payers that doesn't currently exist. There's reference to some other financial returns on investments of Shellharbour. Further down on p 269, then at p 270, a new point, "Shellharbour rate payers...councils are merged." And it talks about funding that has been committed to the Shellharbour civic centre. So submission went a bit beyond a direct response to KPMG and financial pluses or minuses for the merged council. The submission also went into issues of financial equity for want of a better word or fairness as between Shellharbour and its residents and Wollongong and its residents.
9. It is unnecessary to set out the Respondents' submissions on this point.
10. As Preston CJ observed in Woollahra, at [167]: At the outset, it should be noted that the financial factors in s 263(3)(a) are expressed at a high level of generality. Woollahra Council's argument is that the Delegate failed to make some inquiry about facts at the level of particularity set out in its submissions. But in order for that argument to succeed, s 263 must expressly or impliedly oblige the Delegate to inquire into and consider the financial factors in s 263(3)(a) at that level of particularity: see Walsh v Parramatta City Council [2007] NSWLEC 255; (2007) 161 LGERA 118 at [60], adopted in Notaras v Waverley Council [2007] NSWCA 333; (2007) 161 LGERA 230 at [120].
11. In effect, the Council's complaint is that, for these two matters, of specific concern to it, the Delegate has not given "proper, genuine and realistic consideration" to their merits (see decision of Gummow J in Khan v The Minister of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1987] FCA 457 at [25]).
12. However, in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko -Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24; [1986] HCA 40, Mason J said, at [15(d)]: … in the absence of any statutory indication of the weight to be given to various considerations, it is generally for the decision-maker and not the court to determine the appropriate weight to be given to the matters which are required to be taken into account in exercising the statutory power [citations omitted]. I say "generally" because both principle and authority indicate that in some circumstances a court may set aside an administrative decision which has failed to give adequate weight to a relevant factor of great importance, or has given excessive weight to a relevant factor of no great importance. The preferred ground on which this is done, however, is not the failure to take into account relevant considerations or the taking into account of irrelevant considerations, but that the decision is "manifestly unreasonable".
13. In this instance, there is no weighting requirement or any relevant specificity mandated by s 263(3)(a). As earlier noted, the Delegate addressed the matters raised by this provision over more than six pages of his report. It is clear from the above extracted material that he was well aware of the matters raised by the Council. That he did not feel the need to address them at the level of specificity that the Council felt was necessary does not mean that he did not consider the matters raised.
14. There is no manifest unreasonableness in the Delegates' consideration of the s 263(3)(a) material submitted to him by the Council. This complaint fails.

The role of the Boundaries Commission

1. When the Minister elects to adopt the option of referring a proposal to the Chief Executive of the Office of Local Government and, thence, by delegation by the Chief Executive to a person specifically tasked to consider the proposal as described above, the role of the Boundaries Commission is a much more constrained one than that which would have arisen had the Minister elected to refer the matter directly to the Boundaries Commission. This constrained role set by the Boundaries Commission in these circumstances is set out in s 218F(6)(b) of the Local Government Act. The role of the Boundaries Commission is confined to reviewing and commenting upon the report of the Delegate.
2. In these proceedings, the Council submits that this role is a broad one, mandating the Boundaries Commission to comment on the merits of matters contained in the Delegate's report rather than confining itself, as is here the case, to an assessment of whether the Delegate met the statutory inquiring and reporting responsibilities mandated for him by the Local Government Act.
3. In this respect, the Council says that the process undertaken by the Boundaries Commission, as shown from its report to the Minister, did not fulfil the statutory tasks set for it. As a consequence, the Council submits that this is a fundamental failure and that this failure caused this element to miscarry and to do so in such a fashion as to vitiate the process.
4. The Delegate provided, as required by s 218F(6)(a), his report to the Boundaries Commission. Following the provision of his report to the Boundaries Commission, the Boundaries Commission undertook a review of his report and provided its own report to the Minister, commenting on that which had been provided to it by the Delegate. The Council submits that the Boundaries Commission process miscarried. A copy of the Boundaries Commission's report is in evidence.
5. The Council pleaded its concerns about the role of the Boundaries Commission in Ground 11 of its Further Amended Summons in the following terms: The Boundaries Commission, in making its Comments, misunderstood its statutory task, improperly fettered its discretion and thus failed to complete its jurisdictional task. Particulars (a) On 26 April 2016, the Boundaries Commission prepared Comments on the Report, in purported compliance with s 218F(6) of the Act. (b) The Comments were directed to whether the Delegate adequately considered the factors required by section 263(3) of the Act. (c) The Comments expressly stated that the Boundaries Commission's role does not involve re-examining the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed mergers, accepting submissions or holding public inquiries. (d) Contrary to the Boundaries Commission's finding, as part of its function of review and comment, the Boundaries Commission: i. May re-examine the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed merger, accept submissions or conduct a further inquiry; and ii. Was implicitly required to review the merits of the Report as opposed to merely whether the Report complied with the requirements of the Act.
6. A broadly similar complaint had been heard and determined by Garling J in Botany Bay City Council v State of New South Wales [2016] NSWSC 583. Garling J had rejected that complaint concerning the role of the Boundaries Commission. Garling J's decision was appealed.
7. On 2 September 2016, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against Garling J's decision (see Botany Bay City Council v The State of New South Wales [2016] NSWCA 243). The judgment in those proceedings was written by Sackville AJA (with whom Bathurst CJ and Ward JA concurred). His Honour dealt with the complaint raised by Botany Bay City Council concerning the role of the Boundaries Commission at [91]-[101], saying: 91. In addressing Botany's submissions, it is convenient to start with the construction of s 263(1) of the LG Act. It will be recalled that s 263(1) requires the Commission (or, in the present case, the Chief Executive) to "examine and report on any matter with respect to the boundaries of areas…which may be referred to it by the Minister". 92. This language appears to be very broad. However, in Botany Bay City Council v Minister for Local Government, this Court held that the Chief Executive's role, where the Minister refers a proposal for examination pursuant to s 218F(1), is constrained by the proposal that is the subject of the referral. The role of the Chief Executive in such a case is to examine and report on the proposal that has been referred by the Minister. Accordingly, the Court upheld the trial Judge's conclusion that Botany's separate proposal for the alteration of its boundaries was irrelevant to the Chief Executive's examination of the Minister's Proposal. 93. It follows from the reasoning of the Court in Botany Council, that the functions of the Chief Executive on the referral of a proposal by the Minister are not at large, but are constrained by the purpose of the referral. The stark contrast between the language of ss 218F(1) and 263(1) on the one hand, and s 218F(6) on the other, demonstrates that the functions of the Commission in conducting a review of a report of the Chief Executive are substantially more confined than the functions of the Chief Executive in preparing a report on a proposal by the Minister. Under s 218F(6) the Commission is not to examine and report on the Minister's proposal. Instead, the Commission is directed to review the Chief Executive's report and send its comments to the Minister. 94. It is no doubt true, as Mr Robinson submitted, that the word "review", considered in isolation, is capable of describing a reconsideration of the merits of the decision or a proposal. But s 218F(6) must be construed in context. The provision applies to an amalgamation proposal or a proposal that is not supported by at least one of the councils affected. It is the Chief Executive's report on the proposal, not the proposal itself,that is to be furnished to the Commission for "review and comment". The Commission is then required to "review the report and send its comments to the Minister". The "comments" are clearly intended to be the views of the Commission arising from its review of the Chief Executive's report. 95. Mr Robinson emphasised that, as pointed out by Spigelman CJ in South Sydney, the Commission has expertise in local government issues and enjoys a degree of independence from the Minister. However, these characteristics do not compel the conclusion that the Commission's role under ss 218F(1) and 263(1) extends to re-examining the merits of a Minister's proposal that has already been examined by the Chief Executive. The contrast in statutory language to which I have referred demonstrates that the Commission's expertise and independence are to be utilised for a different purpose. The Commission's primary function is to review the report already prepared by the Chief Executive and comment whether the Chief Executive has performed his or her functions in accordance with the legislation. If not, the Commission is to make such comments as it considers appropriate in order to assist the Minister in determining whether or not that the Governor implement the proposal, with or without modifications. 96. It is implicit in the language of s 218F(6) that the Commission's role is not necessarily limited to commenting whether the Chief Executive's report complies with the statutory requirements. Section 218F(7) contemplates that the Minister may recommend that the Governor implement the relevant proposal with such modifications as arise, inter alia, out of the Commission's comments on the Chief Executive's report. This language implies that the Commission, on the basis of its review of the Chief Executive's report, may draw the Minister's attention to matters that may warrant modification of the proposal. However, the statutory language does not imply that the Commission must go beyond a review of the Chief Executive's report and undertake its own independent evaluation of whether the proposal should be recommended for implementation. 97. If Botany's construction of s 218F(6) of the LG Act were to be accepted, the Commission would be entitled and perhaps bound to re-examine afresh the merits of the Minister's proposal. Yet, in doing so, it would not be required to observe the statutory procedures that govern the Chief Executive's examination of the merits of the proposal. For example, the Commission would be free to re-examine the merits of an amalgamation proposal without conducting an inquiry of the kind that the Chief Executive must undertake when examining the proposal on a referral under s 218F (see s 263(2A)). Not only would this set the Chief Executive's examination of the proposal at nought, it would effectively negate the right of the public to participate in the decision-making process, contrary to the evident intention of the legislation. 98. Mr Robinson submitted that the Commission's error was revealed in its statement that: "the Commission's role does not involve re-examining the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed merger, accepting submissions and holding inquiries." Putting aside the reference to "accepting submissions", as to which no issue arises in the present case, this statement is unobjectionable. For the reasons I have given, the Commission's role did not involve re-examining the merits of the Minister's Proposal. Nor was the Commission empowered by the legislation to conduct inquiries when discharging its function of reviewing the Delegate's Report. 99. Mr Robinson did not suggest that the Commission lacked power to make the comments on the Delegate's Report summarised in Section 1 of the Commission Review. His complaint was that the Commission did not go further. It is, however, one thing to recognise the Commission as having the power to make additional comments on the Delegate's Report; it is quite another to contend that by choosing not to make additional comments the Commission committed an error of law, let alone a jurisdictional error that might invalidate its report. 100. It follows from the foregoing that the Commission did not commit any legal error by observing that the name of the new council and the Delegate's suggestion of a boundary realignment were matters for the Minister. There is nothing in the legislation that obliged the Commission to go any further than to draw these matters to the Minister's attention with a view to considering whether the merger proposal should be modified. 101. For these reasons I reject Botany's challenge to the validity of the Commission Review. It is not necessary to consider whether, if the challenge had been made good, any relief could be granted in respect of the Minister's public announcement on 12 May 2016.
8. That which Sackville AJA wrote is equally applicable to the complaint by the Council in these proceedings. As a consequence, this ground fails.

Conclusion

1. I have concluded that there was no defect in the process for this proposed amalgamation in either that which was required of the Delegate or that which was required of the Boundaries Commission. It therefore follows that the proceedings are to be dismissed. The Council is to pay the Respondents' costs.

Orders

1. Therefore, the orders of the Court are: 1. The proceedings are dismissed; and 2. The Applicant is to pay the Respondents' costs as agreed or assessed.

Amendments 21 September 2016 - Amendment to appearances for the Respondent on the cover sheet. DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 21 September 2016