Seven Network (Operations) Limited v Amber Harrison

Supreme Court of NSW|2017-02-21|Before: McDougall J

Seven Network obtained court orders to stop its former employee, Amber Harrison, from speaking publicly about her affair with Seven's CEO and her dismissal. Harrison had signed a confidentiality agreement in 2014 when she left the company, receiving over $400,000 in exchange for her silence. When Seven stopped paying her after she refused to hand over her electronic devices for checking, Harrison went public in December 2016. The court ruled that Harrison had clearly broken her contract and would likely continue doing so unless stopped. While the judge acknowledged there were legitimate public interest questions about Seven's corporate governance, he said Harrison had already told her side of the story in court documents, and the media could report on that. The court continued the gag order with one change: Harrison was now allowed to talk about the existence and terms of the deed itself, since Seven had already made that public. The judge rejected Harrison's argument that Seven's failure to pay meant she didn't have to keep quiet, finding Seven was entitled to stop payments because Harrison had broken the agreement first.

Judgment (ex tempore - revised 22 february 2017)

HIS HONOUR: The plaintiffs (Seven) seek the continuation of interlocutory orders restraining the defendant (Ms Harrison) from breaching her obligations under a deed of release (the second deed) made on 14 November 2014. Ms Harrison opposes the continuation of those orders.
At the conclusion of the hearing yesterday I ordered that the orders be continued until further order, with the exception of one paragraph relating to the second deed. I stood the matter over until today for the giving of reasons. What follows are my reasons for making the orders that I did.

Background

From 1 July 2009 to 22 October 2013, Ms Harrison was employed by Pacific Magazines Pty Ltd. Pacific Magazines is a member of the group of companies of which the plaintiffs are also members. On 23 October 2013, Ms Harrison became employed by Seven, pursuant to a written agreement made on 22 October 2013.
Ms Harrison's role in her employment by Seven was that of an executive assistant. Her employment contract included broad obligations of confidentiality (cl 9) which were expressed to survive termination (cl 14.1(d)). Ms Harrison's employment terminated with effect from 14 November 2014.
Ms Harrison formed a sexual relationship with the Chief Executive Officer of Seven, Mr Worner, in (she says) around December 2012. That relationship seems to have continued up until mid 2014.
In July 2014, Seven began an investigation into expenses incurred by Ms Harrison on her corporate credit card and on that of another employee, the then Chief Financial Officer of Seven, Mr Chan. According to Seven, Ms Harrison conceded that she had incurred about $14,000 worth of personal expenses on one or other of those cards. At the same time, Ms Harrison disclosed to senior human resources executives of Seven her relationship with Mr Worner.
Seven and Ms Harrison reached an agreement which was embodied in a deed made on 1 August 2014 (the first deed). Under that deed, Seven agreed to pay Ms Harrison $100,000, and to employ her in a new role. Ms Harrison undertook to repay the $14,000 of personal expenses to which I have referred. The first deed imposed stringent confidentiality obligations on Ms Harrison.
At the same time, Seven commissioned a more thorough investigation into Ms Harrison's transactions on her and Mr Chan's corporate credit cards. It retained Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (Deloitte) to undertake that investigation. In late September 2014, Deloitte reported. The report stated that it was likely that, over the period October 2009 to July 2014, Ms Harrison had charged about $180,000 worth of unauthorised personal expenses to those cards.
Seven sought Ms Harrison's response to the Deloitte report. Ms Harrison engaged Harmers Workplace Lawyers to act for her. After a mediation, Seven and Ms Harrison agreed to go their separate ways, on the terms of the second deed.
Relevant provisions of the second deed include cll 2.1, 3.1, 7.4, 7.5 and cll 1 to 3, 5 and 6 of schedule 1. I set out those provisions: 2 Obligations of the Employee 2.1 The Employee must: (a) not, either directly or indirectly, give any interviews to any medium or media or make, authorise or procure any public statement, publication, off the record comment, background information, publications, press releases, press conferences or participate in social media, about the Company, any of the Beneficiaries or any of the other Group Members, the Termination, the Employment, the Relationship, the Expenses or the First Deed; (b) take all reasonable steps to ensure that any persons with whom she has discussed the Relationship, the Expenses, the First Deed, the Termination or the Expenses (or any part of them) also comply with the restrictions on publicity contained in this clause; (c) not, whether by herself or otherwise, make any statement publicly or otherwise about the Termination, the Relationship, the First Dee, the Expenses, the Company, any of the Beneficiaries or any of the other Group Members: (d) not many any adverse statement about, publicly disparage or otherwise bring into disrepute the Company, any of the Beneficiaries or any of the other Group Members; (e) not, whether directly or indirectly, cause, permit, solicit, induce or encourage any other person to make any adverse statement, whether publicly or otherwise, or publicly disparage or otherwise bring into disrepute the Company, any of the Beneficiaries or any of the Group Members; (f) not make any complaint about, or volunteer to disclose any information about the Company, any of the Beneficiaries or any of the other Group Members or any of their respective officers and employees, to any trade union, trade union official or officer, government department, commission, authority agency or inspector, except strictly to the extent required by statute; (g) take all steps necessary to give effect to this Deed, including but not limited to executing all further documents required by the Company; (h) subject to clause 3.1(a)(i), bear her own costs (if any); (i) keep confidential all Confidential Information and not copy or reproduce any Confidential Information; (j) comply with the Undertakings set out in Schedule 1 to this Deed to the Company at the time of entering into this Deed; and (k) return all Company Property by the date of this Deed. 3 Obligations of the Company 3.1 Subject to the Employee complying with her obligations under this Deed and in particular clauses 2, 4 and 5, the Company will: (a) by 5pm on 18 November 2014, pay to the trust account of Harmers Workplace Lawyers account number 687551027, BSB 082-001, account name Harmers Workplace Lawyers on behalf of the Employee: (i) a gross amount of $50,000, being a payment in lieu of notice of termination and redundancy pay, taxed as a genuine redundancy payment; (ii) a gross amount of $100,000, being payment by way of compensation for alleged injury, including loss of professional standing and reputation, pain and suffering, stress and humiliation, and dislocation of life as a result of events during the Employment; (iii) a gross amount of $8,749.84 in lieu of accrued but unused annual leave, less applicable tax; and (iv) a gross amount of $7,807.54 in lieu of accrued but unused long service leave, less applicable tax; (b) pay $50,000.00, in respect of her legal costs of Harmers Workplace Lawyers incurred by the Employee, within 7 Business Days of receipt by the Company of a tax invoice for such costs; (c) pay the Employee $150,000, being a further payment by way of compensation for alleged injury, including loss of professional standing and reputation, pain and suffering, stress and humiliation, and dislocation of life as a result of events during the Employment, each month over the 12 month period commencing on or about 14 December 2014 and then on the 14th day of each month up to 14 December 2015; (d) take responsible steps to ensure that its directors, the Chief Executive Officer, the Chief Financial Officer and the Chief Operating officer of Seven West Media Limited, Ms Inthachanh, Susan Wood, Warwick Lynch and Ms Allibon do not, and do not cause, permit, induce or encourage any other person to, whether publicly or otherwise, make any adverse statement, publicly disparage or otherwise bring into disrepute the Employee; (e) pay for any legal costs associated with any services provided by Mr Kite SC, in accordance with clause 6; (f) provide the Employee with all Spendvision records regarding the Expenses, by 5pm on 17 November 2014 and such other records as are reasonably requested in writing by the Employee in respect of the Expenses and any Disputed Expenses within a reasonable time after receipt of the request; and (g) pay the Employee a sum of any general damages calculated in accordance with the process set out in clause 6 of this Deed. 7.4 Warranty and Indemnity The Employee warrants that: (a) she has not assigned or otherwise dealt with any right, Claim, liability or cause of action that she now has, or but for the execution of this Deed she may at any time have had against the Company, or any of the other Group Members, and indemnifies the Company and the other Group Members against any action, suit, cause of action, claim, liability, costs or expenses that may arise as a result of a breach of this warranty; (b) she has obtained independent legal advice concerning the nature, effect and extent of this Deed; (c) she is aware of and understands the consequences of entering into this Deed including, in particular, the consequences of providing the release and indemnity contained in clause 4; (d) she has entered into this Deed voluntarily and without any duress; (e) the background recited in this Deed is true and accurate; (f) she is aware that the Company and each of the Group Members are relying on these warranties in executing this Deed; (g) she has returned all Company Property within her possession, custody or control, including but not limited to the mobile telephone, iPad and laptop computer provided to her by the Company; (h) the Company and the other Group Members have not made any promise, representation or inducement or been a party to any conduct material to the Employee entering into this Deed other than as set out in this Deed; and (i) she has not commenced any proceedings against the Company or any other Group Member. 7.5 Acknowledgments The Employee acknowledges that: (a) the Company's agreement recorded in this Deed is not an admission of liability by the Company, any of the Beneficiaries or the other Group Members; (b) subject to receiving the payments provided for in clause 3 of this Deed, the Employee will have received all legal and statutory entitlements arising out of or in connection with Employment or the Resignation including but not limited to claims for remuneration flowing from her employment, notice of termination or a payment in lieu of notice, severance pay and any other compensation, payments and benefits whatsoever; (c) the Employee has ongoing obligations regarding Confidential Information which continue to apply; (d) the Employee has ongoing obligations under the Contract, however to the extent of any inconsistency with the Contract this Deed will prevail; (e) to the extent permitted by law this Deed may be used by the Company as a complete bar to any Claims; and (f) the Employee has entered into this Deed freely and voluntarily, understanding and accepting: (i) the consequences for the Employee of doing so; (ii) the Employee's rights and obligations under this Deed; and (iii) that the Company and the Group are relying on these acknowledgements. … 1. have deleted or left in the custody of my lawyers, Harmers Workplace Lawyers as a confidential component of my file, all Confidential Information (which includes any such information related to or giving rise to the Allegations, as defined in the Deed), and includes but is not limited to text messages, email communications, photographs, and all other forms of electronic and physical documents and communications (whether original or copied) including 'screen dumps' and whether sent to or by me, that remained in my possession or control as at the Termination Date (Information); 3. subject to 1 above and other than for the purpose of obtaining legal or professional advice and to make a complaint to the Company, have not, whether by myself or through partners, employees, agents or others acting on my behalf or on my instruction or with my encouragement or in any other way, used, reproduced or disclosed to any person, corporation or other entity; a) the whole or any part of any Information (including attachments), including any hard or soft copy of those documents; and b) the whole or any part of any document or information which I obtained as a consequence of my employment with Seven, including any hard or soft copy of those documents; 5. will comply with: a) the post-employment restrictions in the Contract other than clause 14.1 (b) of the Contract (as set out in the Deed); and b) the confidentiality obligations in the Deed, including in clauses 2 and 5 respectively; 6. allow access by an independent information technology expert, on request by the Company, to any equipment or records on which the Information has been recorded or stored for the purpose of ensuring that I comply with my obligations in 1 above.
I set out also such of the definitions as are necessary to give further content to those provisions: 1.1 Definitions … Beneficiaries means each of the Group Members and each of their current and former directors, officers, representatives, agents and employees. … Company Property includes: (a) any property of the Group (including property leased by the Group) including all machine readable material, software, computers, iPads or tables, laptops, passwords and other access codes, credit cards, keys mobile telephones, security passes and vehicles; and (b) any document (including any form of electronic record such as screen shots and photographs) which includes any Confidential Information. Confidential Information includes all confidential information, including, but not limited to: (a) any information (whether written, oral or in electronic form) concerning the Company or any of the other Beneficiaries, or any of its Related Bodies Corporate including but not limited to information of a commercial, operational, marketing and sales, technical, accounting or financial type (including client and contact lists, research results and analysis, price lists, data bases, source codes and methodologies, trade secrets, proprietary systems and know-how) of which the Employee is aware of or has generated in the course of, or in connection with the Employment (including confidential information belonging to a third party); (b) any information developed, created or otherwise arising from the information in paragraph (a) above; and (c) all copies, notes and records based on incorporating the information referred to in paragraphs (a) to (b) above, except where such information has come into the public domain other than by breach of confidentiality involving the Employee. Group means the Company and all Related Bodies Corporate of the Company from time to time, jointly or severally and Group Member means any member of the Group.
Seven made the required payments to Ms Harrison up to and including that due in February 2015. It has not made any of the ten following payments. It has stopped making those payments, it says, because Ms Harrison refused to comply with a request made pursuant to cl 6 of schedule 1 to the second deed for access to her electronic devices and records. For reasons that I shall give later, her justification for not complying with that request reflects, at least, a misunderstanding of the relevant provisions of the second deed.
Although the submissions put for Ms Harrison sought to defend her erroneous construction of the second deed on which she relied, they did not go so far as to suggest (were it relevant) that Seven's request for access to Ms Harrison's electronic devices and records was unreasonable, or against good faith, or otherwise tainted by some impropriety. In short, it was not put that Ms Harrison was discharged from compliance with the request simply by reason of its character, as opposed to the erroneous reason that was advanced.
Matters rumbled along for some time. Seven maintained its position, that its obligations under cl 3.1 of the second deed were subject to Ms Harrison's compliance with her obligations. Seven said that Ms Harrison was in breach of, at least, cl 6 of schedule 1.
On 18 December 2016, the dispute intensified when Ms Harrison adopted what might be called the nuclear option of resorting to social media, and the media more generally. She collaborated in the production of a "media statement", and either released or procured the release of that statement to the media. On any view, Ms Harrison's complicity in the preparation and release of that statement (if established at a final hearing) would amount to a breach of her obligations under cl 2.1 of the second deed.
I should note that the evidence that Ms Harrison was responsible for or procured the release of the media statement is circumstantial. However, she has never denied that she was involved one way or the other (including in her affidavit replying to Seven's evidence). And in the course of submissions, her counsel, Mr Catlin, effectively accepted that she had procured the release of the statement.
The dispute quickly attained a high degree of public notoriety. Both Ms Harrison and Seven contributed to that. She gave interviews and released information in breach of her obligations under the second deed. Seven, in particular by the Chairman of its Board, Mr Stokes, and by a non-executive director, Mr Kennett, likewise descended into the welter of accusation and counter-accusation. I do not think that the social media battle that, in particular, Mr Kennett waged was well advised.

The competing submissions

Dr Bell of Senior Counsel, who appeared with Mr Thomas of Counsel for Seven, submitted that there was a real danger that, unrestrained, Ms Harrison would continue to breach her obligations under the second deed. He submitted further that this was a case where equity, in its auxiliary jurisdiction, would grant an injunction to restrain breach of negative contractual stipulations. In the circumstances, Dr Bell submitted, there was a strong case for the continuation of the relief that had been granted originally ex parte and then continued, by consent but without admissions, to enable Ms Harrison to prepare her defence.
Mr Catlin did not address directly the proposition that, unrestrained, his client would continue to breach her obligations. He submitted that interlocutory relief should be refused for a number of reasons: 1. (1) Seven had made incomplete disclosure on its initial, ex parte, application; 2. (2) Seven was using, and would continue to use, the injunction to "vilify" Ms Harrison in circumstances where, if enjoined, she could not respond; 3. (3) Seven was itself in breach of its obligations, because of its non-payment of the instalments due from March to December 2015, and thus Seven could be said to lack clean hands; 4. (4) Seven had "cherry-picked" from the Deloitte report, and had sought to use selected extracts from it "to brand Ms Harrison as a thief"; 5. (5) much of the information was in the public domain - he referred specifically to the second deed and to the Deloitte report - and thus was no longer entitled to protection on the basis of confidentiality; 6. (6) Ms Harrison had sworn that she had no further information (as defined in the second deed) of Seven other than what she had produced pursuant to a notice to produce; and
(7) the restraints would have the effect of stifling freedom of speech and open reporting, in the media, of matters of public interest.
Mr Lewis of Counsel intervened with leave on behalf of two media organisations that sought to put submissions: Nationwide News, and Fairfax Media Publications. He submitted that the restraints should be substantially modified, to enable Ms Harrison to give her side of the story in relation to the allegations made by Messrs Stokes and Kennett.
Mr Lewis submitted that the whole dispute was a matter of legitimate public interest, and not, as Dr Bell had put it, merely a matter of public notoriety. Mr Lewis relied, in particular, on the following matters: 1. the impact of the dispute on Seven's share price and on its shareholders (Seven, or the holding company, is of course publicly listed); 2. the impact of the dispute on issues of corporate governance at Seven; and 3. (3) Mr Kennett's supposedly inconsistent stance, as Chief Executive Officer of Beyond Blue (an organisation formed to raise awareness and promote treatment of depression) and as a director of Seven aggressively pursuing Ms Harrison, who claimed to be suffering from anxiety and depression, in his Twitter posts dealing with her alleged defalcations.
Mr Lewis submitted that no journalist reporting responsibly on the dispute could do so without asking Ms Harrison to comment. However, he submitted, unless the orders were varied substantially, she could not do so.
Dr Bell submitted in reply that Ms Harrison had had a full opportunity to tell her version of events in her affidavit, and had done so. He noted, correctly, that the interlocutory hearing had been conducted in open Court, and that the media had been given access to all the affidavits and exhibits with a few and very limited (and irrelevant) exceptions of matters that were the subject of confidentiality or suppression orders.
Thus, Dr Bell submitted, the media were not gagged from reporting fully on the matter, subject to those limited and irrelevant exceptions. Dr Bell submitted that to cut down the restraints as sought would effectively destroy the contractual protection for which Seven had bargained.
More fundamentally, Dr Bell submitted, it was not legitimate for Ms Harrison to seek to rely on her own breaches of contract to support what he called the self-reinforcing circularity that, thereby, the matter had become one of public interest so as to justify lifting, or substantial modification of, the protections afforded by the interlocutory injunctions.
Dr Bell submitted that Seven was contractually entitled to withhold payment, and thus could not be said to lack clean hands.
I raised with Dr Bell the concept that the topic of "Expenses", as defined in these interlocutory injunctions, should be excepted, given the comments that had been made by Messrs Stokes and Kennett. Dr Bell submitted that it would not be proper to do this, because: 1. (1) that topic was closely allied with other topics that were the subject of the restraints, and thus any comment on "Expenses" was very likely to impinge on the protection of those other topics; and 2. (2) in any event, Ms Harrison had had her chance to say what she wanted in open Court, and had availed herself of it.

Decision

I start by observing that this is an application for the continuation of interlocutory injunctions. The questions to be considered are, therefore, whether there is a prima facie breach; whether damages would be an adequate remedy for any breach; and the question of balance of convenience apart from the adequacy of damages.
Though it is conventional to deal with each question separately (and I shall do so), it is necessary to note that the assessment of each bears on the assessment of the others. Gummow and Hayne JJ made that clear in Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O'Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57 at [71], [72]. It is not necessary to set out the relevant paragraphs.

The principles to be applied

What is sought is an injunction to restrain breach of negative stipulations in a contract. The starting point is often taken to be the speech of Lord Cairns LC in Doherty v Allman (1878) 3 App Cas 709, 720: If parties, for valuable consideration, with their eyes open, contract that a particular thing shall not be done, all that a Court of Equity has to do is to say, by way of injunction, that which the parties have already said by way of covenant, that the thing shall not be done; and in such case the injunction does nothing more than give the sanction of the process of the Court to that which already is the contract between the parties. It is not then a question of the balance of convenience or inconvenience, or of the amount of damage or of injury - it is the specific performance, by the Court, of that negative bargain which the parties have made, with their eyes open, between themselves.
His Lordship may have over-emphasised matters in suggesting that an injunction would go almost as of course. Certainly, Lord Blackburn, in the same case at 728-729, seems to have thought so. Regardless, there are two things to bear in mind when reflecting on what Lord Cairns said.
The first is that the House of Lords was concerned with a decision, whether to grant a final injunction. By contrast, I am concerned with the decision, whether to grant an interlocutory injunction. The decision that I make (and the orders that I have made) will not finally settle rights, in either a legal or a practical sense (as to the latter, see the observations of McLelland J in Kolback Securities Ltd v Epoch Mining NL (1987) 8 NSWLR 533 at 535-536). Thus, in this case, discretionary considerations remain important.
Second, and as Brereton J demonstrated in Otis Elevator Co Pty Ltd v Nolan [2007] NSWSC 593 at [17] and following, there is now recognised, in this country at least, a discretion to withhold injunctive relief even where breach of a negative stipulation is proved. However, as his Honour said at [29], one would require "compelling discretionary reasons" to decline to enforce, by injunction, a negative contractual stipulation. His Honour drew on a decision in Maitland Main Collieries Pty Ltd v Hunter Valley Coal Corporation Pty Ltd [2006] NSWCA 258 at [62] in support of that proposition.
In my respectful opinion, Brereton J correctly stated the position. I adopt, further, what his Honour said at [30]: … I am of the view that the mere fact that the injury to the plaintiff is slight or non-existent is insufficient to justify declining an injunction on discretionary grounds; so also is the mere fact that enforcement of the injunction would occasion considerable hardship to the defendant. However, where the jeopardy to the plaintiff from declining an injunction is slight, and the hardship that the grant of an injunction would occasion the defendant is disproportionately great, the Court may, as a matter of discretion, decline to grant an injunction, even in the context of a breach of a negative stipulation.

Prima facie case

I turn to the first of the three questions that I identified earlier: is there a prima facie case of breach?
Neither Ms Harrison's affidavit nor Mr Catlin's submissions on her behalf sought to deny all the allegations of breach in Seven's evidence, let alone to suggest that Ms Harrison had fully and scrupulously performed all her obligations under the second deed. I am of the opinion that there is a strong prima facie case that Ms Harrison has indeed breached her obligations under cll 2.1(a), (c) to (f) and (i) to (k) of the second deed, picking up cl 6 of schedule 1. It is not necessary to go to all the detail of Seven's evidence. The case for Ms Harrison was that the effect of what she said was Seven's breach of its payment obligations under cl 3.1(c) was to dispense her from compliance, or to suspend her obligations to comply, with cl 2.1.
However, I should note that it is clear from Ms Harrison's response to the notice to produce referred to earlier that she has not complied with her obligations under cll 2.1(i) to (k), picking up cll 1 to 3 of schedule 1. It is equally clear, as I have said, that Ms Harrison, by refusing Seven access to her electronic devices and records, breached cl 6 of schedule 1.
Ms Harrison's argument as to the supposed effect of Seven's alleged breaches suffers from three fundamental flaws.
The first flaw is that Ms Harrison's obligations under cl 2.1 are not dependent or conditional upon Seven's performance of its obligations under cl 3 (and other clauses). This is not a case where the principles explained in Peter Turnbull & Co Pty Ltd v Mundus Trading Co (Australasia) Pty Ltd (1954) 90 CLR 235 have any application.
The second flaw is that even if Seven were in breach, Ms Harrison has not sought to terminate the second deed so as to bring to an end her obligations under it. She has asserted that Seven has repudiated the second deed. She has done nothing to accept that repudiation. It is trite that unaccepted repudiation (assuming, for the moment, that Seven's conduct could be characterised as repudiatory) does not operate of itself to discharge a contract.
The third flaw is that in my view Seven is not in breach. It suspended payment after Ms Harrison refused to deliver up her electronic devices and records. Her argument that she was not required to do so rests on an erroneous construction of cl 2.1(j), read in conjunction with cl 6 of schedule 1.
Clause 6 of schedule 1 applies "on request by [Seven]". There is no express limitation as to the time when such a request may be made. Given the evident purpose of the clause (which is to enable Seven to monitor Ms Harrison's compliance with the five preceding undertakings), it seems to me to be clear that the request is one that can be made at any time, and indeed from time to time, during the life of the second deed.
Clause 2.1(j) required Ms Harrison to "comply with the Undertakings set out in Schedule 1 to this Deed to [Seven] at the time of entering into this Deed" (my emphasis). The emphasised concluding words identify the time at which the schedule 1 undertakings were given. They do not mean that Seven's rights under, in particular, cl 6 of schedule 1 must be exercised, if at all, immediately and only "at the time of entry into" the second deed. The construction for which Mr Catlin contended would undermine entirely both the clear language of cl 6 and its evident purpose. As I have said, that purpose of necessity requires the right to be available at any time, upon request.
There are no doubt cases where a persistent breach of contract, based on an honest but mistaken belief as to the proper construction of the contract, would not amount to repudiation. That however is not to the point. Breach resulting from an honest but mistaken belief as to the content of a contractual obligation is, nonetheless, breach. I should add that in the present case I do not find (nor could I find, on an interlocutory application) that Ms Harrison's asserted belief did, or for that matter did not, either exist or (if it did) have the quality of an honest mistake.
I am satisfied that: 1. Ms Harrison has breached some at least of her obligations under the second deed; and 2. unless restrained, she is likely to continue to do so.
The first conclusion follows from what I have just said.
The second conclusion follows from a mass of evidence showing that Ms Harrison has threatened, in effect, to destroy Mr Worner's career and reputation, apparently as some sort of revenge for what she perceives as the wrongs done to her. That conclusion follows also from the social (and other) media campaign that Ms Harrison has waged from December 2016 until restrained, and from the very fact that, in breach of her obligations and without any lawful excuse, she has retained the electronic devices and records that she was required to deliver up. That is shown both by her Twitter campaign and by her response to Seven's notice to produce.
Put simply, I am satisfied that there is a very serious risk that Ms Harrison will not perform her contractual obligations under the second deed unless she is constrained to do so by orders of this Court.

Specific submissions

I turn to the various specific points raised by Mr Catlin and by Mr Lewis.
First, Mr Catlin submitted that Seven had made incomplete disclosure on its ex parte application. That appears to rest on a misunderstanding of both the extent of the evidence that Seven put before the Court and the submissions that Dr Bell made in respect of it. I am satisfied that there was no, let alone no relevant, incomplete disclosure.
Next, as to the submission that Ms Harrison could not respond to Seven's campaign of "vilification", it is enough to point out that she has had a full opportunity of putting her case before the Court, in an affidavit that would be read in open Court. She has done so. She has said what she wishes to say as to the matter of expenses. Her response was, if I may put it this way, a little coy. She said that, had she but world enough and time, she would be able to justify "the majority" of the suspect expenses identified in the Deloitte report. That is far from a complete disavowal of any improper use of the cards.
As to Mr Catlin's submission that Seven was itself in breach of its contractual obligations, I refer to what I have said already.
Next, Mr Catlin submitted that Seven had "cherry-picked" from the Deloitte report. I do not agree that this is a correct characterisation of what happened. Seven has disclosed the existence and some of the conclusions set out in the report, in part in statements made to the ASX in satisfaction of continuous disclosure obligations. I am far from satisfied that this amounts to "cherry-picking" so as, somehow, to make it appropriate, let alone legitimate, for Ms Harrison to seek to do the same.
As to information said to be in the public domain: I accept that the second deed is. It is in the public domain if only because Seven put it in its evidence, and did not seek any protection. Thus, I accept that the specific paragraph relating to disclosure of the second deed and its terms should not be continued (and the orders made yesterday reflect that). I do not accept that, by putting other material into the public domain (to the extent that she has) in breach of her confidentiality obligations, Ms Harrison should be held to have engineered a situation where she may continue to disregard those obligations.
As to the next submission, I accept that Ms Harrison has sworn that she has no further information of Seven other than what was produced. But she certainly has not sworn, nor has she undertaken, not to continue to use that which she has in her possession. Nor has she said that, by providing a USB drive with the relevant information of it or otherwise, she has divested herself completely of electronic or other copies so as to prevent her from using it. Her silence in that respect is telling.
Mr Catlin's final submission dealt with freedom of speech and open reporting. That overlapped with submissions that Mr Lewis put.
In this context, Mr Catlin drew on the analogy of what he called a "defamation injunction". He submitted that, just as the Court should be slow to grant injunctions to restrain the publication of allegedly defamatory material, because to do so would have a significant impact on freedom of speech and freedom of the media, so too in this case the Court should be slow to intervene.
The analogy is false. The cases of so-called defamation injunctions are exemplified by the decision in O'Neill. The plaintiff in that case sought an injunction to restrain the defendant from broadcasting material that was said to be defamatory. The High Court held that the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Tasmania had erred in allowing (by majority) the injunction to stand. In the course of their reasons, Gleeson CJ and Crennan J said at [32]: It is one thing for the law to impose consequences, civil or criminal, in the case of an abuse of the right of free speech. It is another matter for a court to interfere with the right of free speech by prior restraint. In working out the consequences of abuse of such freedom, the law strikes a balance between competing interests, which include an individual's interest in his or her reputation. When, however, a court is asked to intervene in advance of publication wider considerations are involved. This is the main reason for the "exceptional caution"1[1] with which the power to grant an interlocutory injunction in a case of defamation is approached. It is not reflected in the reasoning of Crawford J, or the majority of the Full Court. It is only in the reasoning of Slicer J that it was influential.
However, this is not a case where anyone seeks to restrain the publication of material simply on the basis that it is or may be defamatory. It may be - I do not know - that some of the material that Ms Harrison seeks to publish could be characterised as defamatory. But Seven's legal right to restrain publication depends not on the proposition that an injunction should go to prevent defamation but, rather, on the proposition that injunctive relief is necessary to protect its legitimate contractual interests under the negative stipulations, on Ms Harrison's part, in the second deed. That is a very different situation indeed.
I do of course accept that what Gleeson CJ and Crennan J said in O'Neill is a matter of great importance. But it is important to put it into context. That context, as I have sought to make clear, is very different to the present.
I am inclined to accept the submissions put by Mr Lewis, to the effect that this was more than a matter of public notoriety, and that there are legitimate questions of public interest. I accept that the dispute may involve the interests of Seven and its shareholders, both in a financial sense and in so far as the dispute may shed light on the way in which corporate governance is conducted at Seven. It does not however follow that the public interest in those matters outweighs Seven's legitimate interests under the bargain that it struck with Ms Harrison. Nor does it follow that reporting on those matters is restrained. There is ample material in the public arena already. Ms Harrison's side of the story, to the extent that she chose to tell it in her affidavit, is in the public arena. The media may make of that what they wish.
I am not so sure that what Mr Lewis put as to Mr Kennett's supposedly inconsistent stances is a matter that really comes into play in this dispute. But it is not necessary to express a concluded view, because even if it did, it could not take the public interest point any further.
I do accept of course that responsible reporting (something to be encouraged) should seek to take account of Ms Harrison's side of the story. At the risk of repetition, I point out that she has told her story to the extent that she wished to do so.

Balance of convenience otherwise; adequacy of damages as a remedy

What I have said to date deals very largely with relevant considerations bearing on the balance of convenience. It is plain however that damages would not be an adequate remedy for any further breach. Mr Catlin did not submit otherwise.
The second deed protects not only Seven itself but also all the described "beneficiaries". Ms Harrison has made it clear, both in her social media campaign and in her affidavit, that she is reckless or indifferent to any collateral damage to the reputations of others. To the extent that those others are protected by her negative covenants in the second deed, the protection should be continued.
As I have noted already, the trend of authority in this country favours the proposition that an injunction should be withheld only on the basis of compelling discretionary reasons. In this case, the evidence does not come within a country mile of establishing any such reasons. I do accept that one consequence of a continuation of the substance of the interlocutory restraints is that there will be some limitation on the ability of the media to report on the dispute. However, for the reasons I have given, that does not outweigh, or trump, Seven's legitimate interest in retaining the benefit of Ms Harrison's negative stipulations in the second deed.
Beach J dealt with a very similar argument in A V Jennings Homes Ltd v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd [1999] VSC 426 at [11]. His Honour said: Whilst one is mindful of the fact that the imposition of such a restriction on the defendants may be said to be an interference with the right of free speech and publication, in my opinion such a factor is outweighed by the fact that these documents are the property of the plaintiff, that whoever removed them from the possession of the plaintiff was unauthorised to do so and in all probability acted unlawfully in so doing, and that the plaintiff will be caused acute embarrassment and possible financial loss if the content of the documents is made public.
In my respectful opinion, his Honour's analysis was correct, and applies completely in the present case.

Modification of the interlocutory regime

As the injunctions were initially granted and extended, they prevented specifically disclosure of the second deed or its terms (para 2(f)). For the reasons I have given, that aspect of the interlocutory regime should not be continued.

Conclusion

These are my reasons for making the substantive orders that I made on 21 February 2017.
That leaves the question of costs. My present view is that costs should abide the outcome of the final hearing. Since the parties have not addressed on costs, I will do no more than reserve them.
I make the following further orders: 1. reserve costs. 2. Direct that the exhibits be handed out.

Amendments 01 March 2017 - paragraph [27], accepted to excepted. paragraph [28], case of right to breach. paragraph [30], covenant to covenant. DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 01 March 2017

Outcomeplaintiff

Disposition:

Interlocutory injunctions extended until further order, with variation to remove paragraph 2(f) restraining disclosure of the second deed and its terms. Costs reserved.

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