Settlers Estate Pty Ltd v Penrith City Council
[2021] NSWCA 13
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Court of Appeal (NSW)
Decision date
2021-02-12
Before
Gleeson JA, Payne JA, Preston CJ, Pepper J, Mr P
Catchwords
- [2017] NSWCA 263 Burwood Council v Ralan Burwood Ltd (2014) 206 LGERA 40 Gattellaro v Westpac Banking Corporation (2004) 204 ALR 258
- [2004] HCA 6 Norrie v NSW Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages (2013) 84 NSWLR 697
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Catchwords
Judgment (15 paragraphs)
[Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.]
HEADNOTE [This headnote is not to be read as part of the judgment] Development consents had been granted for the subdivision of land and associated works in three stages. The Stage 3 development consent approved construction of a drainage line ("Drainage Line A") to convey stormwater flows from the future development into a riparian corridor. A construction certificate for the drainage works was later issued. The relevant approved plans issued with respect to the construction certificate specified the height (or depth below surface), length, grade and direction of Drainage Line A. These differed in some respects from those specified in the approved development consent plans. The main point of difference, however, was that the construction certificate plan identified the location of the discharge point of Drainage Line A as abutting to the east the existing channel (watercourse), while the development consent plan showed Drainage Line A in an area marked as "Riparian Corridor". Penrith City Council brought proceedings in the Land and Environment Court contending that the applicants had constructed Drainage Line A not in accordance with the development consent and in breach of s 4.2 of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 because the drainage line did not discharge at a location abutting to the east the existing channel but instead crossed the existing channel and discharged into a newly formed drainage line to the west of the existing channel that flowed into the existing channel a little downstream of the discharge point. The primary judge ordered and determined a separate question of whether the drainage line had been constructed in accordance with the development consent. The primary judge found that the location of the discharge point abutting to the east the existing channel, shown on the construction certificate plan, was a legal requirement of the development consent, which the applicants had breached by constructing the drainage line in a different location. The applicants sought leave to appeal against the primary judge's finding that the drainage line was constructed not in accordance with the development consent, and in breach of s 4.2 of the EPA Act. The applicants also challenged an interlocutory decision of the primary judge refusing the applicants leave to reopen their case in order to tender additional evidence from a surveyor to establish that the drainage line was constructed in the same direction as the direction shown on the construction certificate plan. The questions for the Court included: (i) Whether the primary judge erred in finding that the drainage line was not constructed in the location depicted in the construction certificate; (ii) Whether the primary judge erred in finding that Drainage Line A could be lawfully constructed in accordance with the construction certificate plan and yet still end on the eastern side of the watercourse; (iii) Whether the primary judge erred in refusing to determine for herself, by either a comparison of different plans or by use of a protractor, that Drainage Line A had been constructed in the same direction as that shown on the construction certificate plan; (iv) Whether the primary judge had misunderstood the relevance of certain construction plans and the applicants' argument concerning these plans; (v) Whether the primary judge's interlocutory decision refusing the applicants leave to reopen their case to tender evidence from a surveyor denied the applicants procedural fairness or was based on incorrect factual and legal assumptions. The Court dismissed the applications for leave to appeal and held: In relation to (i): (1)The primary judge did not err in finding that Drainage Line A was not constructed in accordance with the construction certificate plans: (a) the construction certificate and its approved plans and specifications are taken to form part of the development consent. The construction certificate did more than merely authorise the proposed development; the construction certificate also described and defined the development authorised to be carried out. The specification in the construction certificate plan that Drainage Line A should discharge into the existing channel from the east described and defined an aspect of the development the subject of the development consent: [42]-[43]. (b) the fixing of the location of the discharge point at the existing channel served the functional purpose of discharging stormwater directly into the existing channel. This functional utility supported the conclusion that the location of the discharge point, shown on the construction certificate plan, is a fundamental aspect of the development the subject of the development consent and one in accordance with which the development had to be carried out: [44]. (c) it was irrelevant to the issue of breach of s 4.2 of the EPA Act that it might be impossible to comply with all of the parameters for construction of Drainage Line A shown on the construction certificate plans: [45]. In relation to (ii): (1) The primary judge's statement that "there was no evidence to suggest that the pipe structure could not be constructed in accordance with the plans as approved" meant only that there was "no evidence" of this fact. The statement, read in context, was made in the course of explaining why the primary judge rejected the first of four arguments: [47]-[51]. In relation to (iii): (1) The primary judge did not err in refusing to determine for herself, by either a comparison of different plans or by use of a protractor, that Drainage Line A had been constructed in the same direction as that shown on the construction certificate plan. The angle of the drainage line shown on the plans was not a fact of which the primary judge could take judicial notice under s 144 of the Evidence Act 1995. Evidence was needed to establish the foundational facts upon which the angle was to be measured and to otherwise compare the two plans: [52]-[63]. (2) In addition, the issue of direction was not a principal contested issue. The primary judge did not therefore need to deal with the applicants' submissions about the direction of the drainage line. But insofar as she did, even if she were to have been in error, that error would not be material or vitiating: [64]. In relation to (iv): (1) Irrespective of whether the primary judge misunderstood the applicants' argument about certain construction plans, the primary judge did not err in rejecting the applicants' argument. The submission by the applicants of plans to the Council for review prior to the issue of the construction certificate pursuant to condition 67 of the development consent did not amount to an approval to construct Drainage Line A in a location contrary to the construction certificate and its approved plans and specifications: [71]. The construction certificate that was subsequently issued, and the approved plans and specifications issued with respect to that construction certificate, described and defined the location of the discharge point as abutting to the east the existing channel: [72]. In relation to (v): (1) There was no denial of natural justice. None of the primary judge's reasoning to refuse leave to reopen involved any material error of fact or law of the kind required for an appeal against a matter of practice and procedure: [79]. (2) Even if the primary judge's decision were found to be erroneous, no substantial injustice would result if leave to appeal against the decision were to be refused. The applicants did not have to meet any changed case of the Council concerning the direction in which the drainage line was constructed: [81]-[88].