Substantive issue
36 The primary facts referable to the adjustment issues were not in dispute in this Court.
37 After the respondent had fallen pregnant in March 1978, the parties commenced their de facto relationship in October that year when the respondent moved into the appellant's property at Five Dock.
38 The parties inspected a property at Mittagong. It was purchased by the appellant for $55,000 in October 1980 using the proceeds of sale of his two properties and his savings. Before she fell pregnant, the respondent had worked in a secretarial position and she had no substantial savings. Her assets at the start of the relationship were in the vicinity of $8,000-$13,000 including a car.
39 The couple initially lived in a shearing shed at Mittagong. It was renovated at the appellant's expense. They tried their hand at a holiday camp venture. In 1982 they purchased a flock of sheep. Despite extensive work on the property, much but not all of it done by the appellant (cf Blue 7), the venture was terminated due to the impact of drought. In 1983 the couple decided to subdivide and sell, a process that took the next two years.
40 The Master found that both parties contributed in a substantial way to the increase in value of the Mittagong property (J79), a conclusion that was not challenged on appeal.
41 The proceeds of sale were deposited partly into a jointly operated trust account for the benefit of the daughter and partly into a joint account in the names of the parties (in which the respondent was described as Mrs Christine Anne Selmore). Subsequent drawings were made to help fund the purchase of a property at Hornsby and $70,000 of the balance was kept secretly by the appellant.
42 Like all of the purchases, the Hornsby property was acquired in the appellant's name. The Hornsby property was itself sold in January 1986 with the proceeds being used to fund acquisition of the subject property at Mt Colah. The purchase price was $80,000, the property being worth about $90,000 at the date of separation.
43 The parties were unemployed and the family was dependent on social security in the mid 1980s. In May 1986 the appellant commenced a picture-framing business. At some later stage he started part-time teaching at a TAFE College. The respondent was not engaged in paid employment during Jennifer's early years. However, she embarked upon a part-time real estate course in 1985. The respondent commenced employment when the appellant left the relationship and the Mt Colah home in September 1986. With some gaps, she held various part and later full-time positions, using her wages to support herself and Jennifer. As indicated, the appellant provided $40 per week child maintenance as well as permitting the respondent and Jennifer to continue living at the Mt Colah home.
44 At the close of the de facto relationship, in September 1986, the appellant was the owner of Mt Colah, a property acquired in large part from the sale of Mittagong. The respondent's uncertain interest in those sale proceeds could (if necessary) have been enforced through proceedings under the Act. The respondent also had the benefit of the admission implicit in the proceeds having been invested in the two bank accounts (one of them a trustee account) in the parties' joint names.
45 In addition to his interest in Mt Colah, the appellant had a half-share of the property at Hornsby that he purchased in June 1986 (the source of funding being unknown) as well as the $70,000 that he kept, unknown to the respondent, from the various term deposits and savings at the date of separation. The Master correctly recognized that the appellant has had the benefit of this latter sum since 1986 (J78).
46 At the end of the relationship the respondent had $6,000 in assets (J43) and her entitlements over Mt Colah, whatever they were.
47 In 1989-1990 the appellant installed a pool at the property. In May 1992 he built and moved into the shed to which reference has already been made. In 1995 he performed renovation and landscaping work that doubtless contributed to the value of the property at date of trial ($450,000).
48 The parties accept that the Master was entitled, as he did, to have regard to the direct and indirect financial contributions made to the property and the welfare of the family after the cessation of the de facto relationship (see Foster v Evans ((1997) DFC 95-193, Jones v Grech [2001] NSWCA 208, (2001) 27 Fam LR 711). Most, but not all, of the expenses relating to the property were paid by the appellant (J73). On the other hand there were the substantial financial and non-financial contributions made by the respondent as the primary caregiver of the couple's daughter (J72). These were required to be taken into account in the respondent's favour in light of s20(1)(b).
49 It was also recognised as relevant in the appellant's favour that the respondent had many years rent-free accommodation at the Mt Colah property. The appellant contended, before the Master and in this Court, that the rental value of the property had to be directly offset against whatever provision called to be made in the respondent's favour.
50 The rental value of the property as a whole between 1986 and the date of trial was computed at $194,300. Contrary to the appellant's submission, the Master did not err in his refusal to deduct this sum from the respondent's putative entitlement. First, the appellant himself had partial occupation of the premises after 1992. Secondly, Mt Colah was in part the home of the parties' daughter, Jennifer, with the consequence that permitting the respondent to live there as Jennifer's primary carer was a partial fulfilment of the appellant's duty to Jennifer, not to mention a situation that enabled him to enjoy ready access to his daughter. Thirdly, the respondent's contributions as homemaker and parent to the welfare of the family during this period were required to be taken into account. These included financial contributions towards Jennifer's needs, given that the $40 pw maintenance hardly covered more than her food and minor items of clothing (Blue 14, J75). Fourthly, the respondent had indirectly contributed to the acquisition of Mt Colah through the contributions she made with respect to Mittagong. In these circumstances, her occupation of Mt Colah rent-free was something less than total bounty on the appellant's part.
51 In the previous paragraph I have addressed the greater part of the appellant's attack on the Master's decision to award the respondent 40% of the sale proceeds of the property. Beyond his complaint about the failure to deduct $194,300 or any finite sum before proceeding to the evaluative exercise of adjusting the parties interest in the property, the appellant's complaints are tantamount to a plea to exercise the discretion afresh without pointing to material error.