Secretary, Department of Health and Aged Care v M House Pty Ltd
[2024] FCAFC 71
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Federal Court of Australia (Full Court)
Decision date
2024-06-05
Before
McElwaine JJ
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Judgment (22 paragraphs)
- The appeal is allowed.
- The orders made by the primary judge on 24 July 2023 are set aside.
- The originating application filed on 2 September 2022 is dismissed.
- The respondent is to pay the costs of the proceeding and of the appeal. Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
INTRODUCTION 1 The Secretary of the Department of Health and Aged Care (the appellant) appeals from a decision of a judge of this court upholding a contention of M House Pty Ltd (the respondent) that a decision of the appellant's delegate to release certain information under s 61(5C) of the Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (Cth) (the Act) was not authorised by that sub-section and should therefore be quashed. See M House Pty Ltd v Secretary, Department of Health and Aged Care [2023] FCA 76 (J). 2 The Therapeutic Goods Administration (the TGA), which is part of the Department of Health and Aged Care (the Department), undertook in late 2020 and early March 2021 a "post-market review" of all face masks included in the Australian Register of Therapeutic Goods, including face masks imported by the respondent. (At that time, of course, face masks were in high demand because of the spread of the Corona Virus). 3 As part of the post-market review, officers of the Department obtained two different samples of a surgical face mask product that had been supplied to the market by the respondent and subsequently acquired by the Commonwealth for the purposes of holding the product in the National Medical Stockpile. Officers of the Department then conducted testing upon masks from each sample. 4 Under s 63 of the Act, the Governor-General may make regulations prescribing matters "necessary or convenient to be prescribed for carrying out or giving effect" to the Act. Such regulations may "provide for the procedures to be followed by the Department in the sampling and testing of therapeutic goods" (see s 63(2)(d)). The Act does not define "sampling" or "testing". 5 Such regulations include those contained in Pt 5 of the Therapeutic Goods Regulations 1990 (Cth) (the Regulations). Part 5 is headed "Examination, testing and analysis of goods". 6 The testing conducted in this case was conducted for the purpose of assessing whether the masks from each sample complied with the "essential principles" set out in Sch 1 to the Therapeutic Goods (Medical Devices) Regulations 2002 (Cth) (the Medical Devices Regulations). Those essential principles concern the safety and performance characteristics of medical devices, including their quality, safety and efficacy. 7 In taking the samples and conducting the testing in this case, the officers of the Department did not exercise powers under or in accordance with Pt 5 of the Regulations, but instead acted in a non-statutory executive capacity. 8 A delegate of the Secretary of the Department then decided under s 61(5C) of the Act to release to the public, certain information relating to the testing of the masks (Information): J [32]. 9 The Information was released in accordance with that decision by way of publication on the TGA's website: J [2], [33]. 10 Section 61(5C) of the Act provides that "[t]he Secretary may release to the public therapeutic goods information of a kind specified under subsection (5D)". Subsection (5D) states that "[t]he Minister may, by legislative instrument, specify kinds of therapeutic goods information for the purpose of subsection (5C)". 11 One such legislative instrument is the Therapeutic Goods Information (Laboratory Testing) Specification 2017 (Cth) (the Specification). 12 Schedule 1 to the Specification is a table which sets out the kinds of therapeutic goods information that may be released to the public under s 61(5C) of the Act, including "description of samples of therapeutic goods", "test description" and "test results". 13 The principal question before the primary judge was whether the delegate's decision to release the Information to the public was authorised by s 61(5C) of the Act: J [3]. 14 The answer to that question turns on a question of statutory construction, namely "whether the references to 'samples' and 'tests' within Schedule 1 of the [Specification], when read in the context of s 61(5C) and (5D) of the Act, encompass sampling and testing undertaken in the exercise of the [Secretary's] alleged non-statutory capacity to determine non-compliance with the essential principles": J [111]. 15 The primary judge held that references to "samples" and "tests" in Sch 1 to the Specification do not encompass sampling and testing conducted outside of the regime for sampling and testing prescribed in Pt 5 of the Regulations (see J [73]-[74], [118]-[119]), in substance because the Regulations cover the field. 16 Accordingly, the primary judge made an order quashing the decision. He also made consequential orders requiring the appellant to publish certain statements about the outcome of the proceeding: see J [133]. 17 By a single ground of appeal, the appellant contends that the primary judge erred in so finding and making those orders because: (1) the construction of the words "sample" and "tests" that his Honour preferred is not supported by the text, context or purpose of the Specification. (2) the words "sample" and "test" are not meaningfully defined in the Regulations, and they are thus to be given their natural and ordinary meaning; (3) the natural and ordinary meaning of those words does not include any limitation that a "sample" or "test" only be conducted in accordance with Pt 5 of the Regulations; (4) Part 5 of the Regulations does not exhaust, or purport to exhaust, the ways in which samples might be obtained, or tests might be conducted, by officers of the Department; (5) the purpose of the Specification is to increase transparency; not to protect the reputations of "industry participants", and that purpose is best achieved by reading the terms "sample" and "test" as encompassing all the testing activities of the TGA, not just those conducted under Pt 5 of the Regulations. (6) if Parliament had intended the words "sample" and "test" to mean only "sample and test within the meaning of Pt 5 of the Regulations", it would have said so. 18 The respondent contended that the reasoning and decision of the primary judge was correct. 19 For the reasons set out below, the submissions of the appellant are to be accepted. Contrary to the conclusion reached by the primary judge, the question of statutory construction is to be answered in the affirmative. 20 The respondent relied on a notice of contention, contending that the orders made by the primary judge should be affirmed on grounds other than those relied on by the primary judge. Ground 1 of the notice of contention raised the same point of statutory construction raised by the appellant's ground of appeal, so it is not necessary separately to consider it under the rubric of the notice of contention. 21 Ground 2, which was only faintly pressed, was that the published information was not "therapeutic goods information" as defined in s 61(1) of the Act. 22 Ground 3 was that the decision to publish the information was legally unreasonable, in circumstances where the test results were applicable only to the samples tested; and the procedure for sampling and testing set down in regs 25-29 of the Regulations was not followed. 23 In our view, grounds 2 and 3 are without merit, for reasons set out below. 24 The appeal will thus be allowed, the orders made by the primary judge be set aside and, in lieu of those orders, it will be ordered that the originating application for judicial review be dismissed with costs.