(3) The trial judge erred in ordering the respondents to pay the costs of the interveners."
Cross-Appeal
160 VCCL and Vadarlis each filed a cross-appeal in relation to the trial judge's finding on the question of standing. Each sought a declaration that it had standing to seek the relief claimed (other than habeas corpus). Vadarlis sought an order remitting the matter to the trial judge for determination of the question whether he was entitled to the other relief he claimed, apart from the habeas corpus orders.
161 In the event, each of VCCL and Vadarlis made what were described in the written outline of their arguments as "formal submissions" on the question, albeit they did not concede that the position was concluded against them at this level of appeal by the Australian Conservation Foundation and Bateman Bay decisions in the High Court. The directions given for the conduct of the appeal in this Court were given on the basis, expressed at a directions hearing before his Honour the Chief Justice, that these would remain formal submissions in the sense that they would not be developed and would preserve a position for argument if the matter were to reach the High Court. For these reasons the Court declined to allow counsel for Vadarlis to pursue the standing question as a substantive submission on this appeal - that course being objected to by the Solicitor-General.
Issues on the Appeal
162 The key issues on this appeal are:
1. Whether the executive power of the Commonwealth authorised and supported the expulsion of the rescuees and their detention for that purpose.
2. If there was no such executive power, whether the rescuees were subject to a restraint attributable to the Commonwealth and amenable to habeas corpus.
Before considering these issues it is desirable to set out the relevant statutory frameworks.
Statutory Framework - Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976
163 The Judiciary Act confers jurisdiction on the Federal Court in relation to matters arising under the Constitution and the laws of the Commonwealth thus:
"39B(1) Subject to subsections (1B) and (1C), the original jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Australia includes jurisdiction with respect to any matter in which a writ of mandamus or prohibition or an injunction is sought against an officer or officers of the Commonwealth.
39B(1A) The original jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Australia also includes jurisdiction in any matter:
(a) in which the Commonwealth is seeking an injunction or a declaration; or
(b) arising under the Constitution, or involving its interpretation; or
(c) arising under any laws made by the Parliament, other than a matter in respect of which a criminal prosecution is instituted or any other criminal matter. "
164 The powers of the Federal Court in aid of the exercise of its jurisdiction include those conferred by s 23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act:
"The Court has power, in relation to matters in which it has jurisdiction, to make orders of such kinds, including interlocutory orders, and to issue, or direct the issue of, writs of such kinds, as the Court thinks appropriate."
There was no suggestion that the Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the application for the writ of habeas corpus, it being directed to the lawfulness of action taken purportedly in reliance upon the executive power of the Commonwealth under s 61 of the Constitution.
Statutory Framework - Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
165 It is sufficient for present purposes to refer to those provisions of the Act relied upon by VCCL and Vadarlis as evidencing a legislative intention to exclude the operation of the executive power of the Commonwealth or the prerogative in relation to the expulsion of aliens from Australia and incidental powers.
166 The long title of the Migration Act is:
"An Act relating to the entry into, and presence in, Australia of aliens, and the departure or deportation from Australia of aliens and certain other persons."
The objects of the Act are set out in s 4:
"4(1) The object of this Act is to regulate, in the national interest, the coming into, and presence in, Australia of non-citizens.
(2) To advance its object, this Act provides for visas permitting non-citizens to enter or remain in Australia and the Parliament intends that this Act be the only source of the right of non-citizens to so enter or remain.
(3) To advance its object, this Act requires persons, whether citizens or non-citizens, entering Australia to identify themselves so that the Commonwealth government can know who are the non-citizens so entering.
(4) To advance its object, this Act provides for the removal or deportation from Australia of non-citizens whose presence in Australia is not permitted by this Act."
Among terms defined in s 5 of the Act are the following:
"detain means:
(a) take into immigration detention; or
(b) keep, or cause to be kept, in immigration detention; and includes taking such action and using such force as are reasonably necessary to do so;"
"enter Australia, in relation to a person, means enter the migration zone;"
"immigration detention means:
(a) being in the company of, and restrained by:
(i) an officer; or
(ii) in relation to a particular detainee - another person directed by the Secretary to accompany and restrain the detainee; or
(b) being held by, or on behalf of, an officer:
(i) in a detention centre established under this Act; or
(ii) in a prison or remand centre of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory; or
(iii) in a police station or watch house; or
(iv) in relation to a non-citizen who is prevented, under section 249, from leaving a vessel - on that vessel; or
(v) in another place approved by the Minister in writing;"
"migration zone means the area consisting of the States, the Territories, Australian resource installations and Australian sea installations and, to avoid doubt, includes:
(a) land that is part of a State or Territory at mean low water; and
(b) sea within the limits of both a State or a Territory and a port; and
(c) piers, or similar structures, any part of which is connected to such land or to ground under such sea;
but does not include sea within the limits of a State or a Territory but not in a port;"
"non-citizen means a person who is not an Australian citizen;"
"officer means:
(a) an officer of the Department, other than an officer specified by the Minister in writing for the purposes of this paragraph; or
(b) a person who is an officer for the purposes of the Customs Act 1901, other than such an officer specified by the Minister in writing for the purposes of this paragraph; or
(c) a person who is a protective service officer for the purposes of the Australian Protective Service Act 1987, other than such a person specified by the Minister in writing for the purposes of this paragraph; or
(d) a member of the Australian Federal Police or of the police force of a State or an internal Territory; or
(e) a member of the police force of an external Territory; or
(f) a person who is authorised in writing by the Minister to be an officer for the purposes of this Act; or
(g) any person who is included in a class of persons authorised in writing by the Minister to be officers for the purposes of this Act, including a person who becomes a member of the class after the authorisation is given."
"port means:
(a) a proclaimed port; or
(b) a proclaimed airport;"
"unlawful non-citizen has the meaning given by section 14;"
167 Section 6, as a matter of abundant caution, preserves the operation of the Act in parts of Australia outside the migration zone thus:
"6. To avoid doubt, although subsection 5(1) limits, for the purposes of this Act, the meanings of "enter Australia", "leave Australia" and "remain in Australia" and as well, because of section 18A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901, the meaning of parts of speech and grammatical forms of those phrases, this does not mean:
(a) that, for those purposes, the meaning of "in Australia", "to Australia" or any other phrase is limited; or
(b) that this Act does not extend to parts of Australia outside the migration zone; or
(c) that this Act does not apply to persons in those parts."
The Act is extended to the territory of Christmas Island which is deemed to be part of Australia for the purposes of the Act and not a place outside Australia (s 7).
168 The term "unlawful non-citizen" is defined in s 14:
"14(1) A non-citizen in the migration zone who is not a lawful non-citizen is an unlawful non-citizen.
(2) To avoid doubt, a non-citizen in the migration zone who, immediately before 1 September 1994, was an illegal entrant within the meaning of the Migration Act as in force then became, on that date, an unlawful non-citizen."
A "lawful non-citizen" is one who is in the migration zone and holds a visa that is in effect (s13).
169 Provision is made for non-citizens to enter Australia by way of the grant of a visa (s 29). General provisions relating to visas are found in Part 2, Division 3 of the Act. These include protection visas (s 36). A criterion, ie a necessary condition for the grant of a protection visa is that the applicant is:
"…a non-citizen in Australia to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol."
170 Division 6 of Part 2 of the Act provides for certain non-citizens to be kept in immigration detention until such persons leave Australia or are given visas (s 176). It applies to people arriving in the migration zone by boat in the territorial sea of Australia between 19 November 1989 and 1 September 1994 (s 177).
171 Division 7 provides for the detention of unlawful non-citizens. In particular, s 189 provides:
"189(1) If an officer knows or reasonably suspects that a person in the migration zone is an unlawful non-citizen, the officer must detain the person.
(2) If an officer reasonably suspects that a person in Australia but outside the migration zone:
(a) is seeking to enter the migration zone; and
(b) would, if in the migration zone, be an unlawful non-citizen;
the officer must detain the person."
172 There are procedural rights in ss 194 and 195 whereby detainees must be told of the consequences of detention (s 194) and, in particular, that they may apply for visas (s 195) and that the detention is continued until they are removed or deported from Australia or granted a visa. These procedural rights however do not apply to persons detained under s 189(2) (s 193(1)(c)).
173 Unlawful non-citizens are to be removed from Australia under provisions contained in Division 8 of Part 2 of the Act (ss 198 and 199). Division 9 relates to deportation of non-citizens. Division 12 creates offences in relation to the carriage of non-citizens to Australia without documentation (s 229) and the concealed carriage of unlawful non-citizens (s 230). Section 232A relates to the bringing into Australia of a group of five or more people.
174 Division 12A contains provisions relating to the pursuit and boarding of ships which are applicable to Australian territorial waters beyond the migration zone (s 245B to s 245F). Section 249 of the Act provides:
"249(1) An officer may:
(a) prevent a person whom the officer reasonably suspects to be an unlawful non-citizen from leaving a vessel on which the person arrived in Australia; or
(b) prevent a remove or deportee from leaving a vessel on which he or she has been placed;
and may take such action and use such force as are necessary for that purpose.
(1AA) An officer may prevent a person from leaving a vessel on which the person arrived in Australia if the officer reasonably suspects that the person:
(a) is seeking to enter the migration zone; and
(b) would, if in the migration zone, be an unlawful non-citizen.
(1A) To avoid doubt, and without limiting the generality of subsections (1) and (1AA), if a person of a kind referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or subsection (1AA) is on board a vessel (other than an aircraft), the actions that may be taken by an officer under subsections (1) and (1AA) include:
(a) requiring the vessel to travel to a port; and
(b) requiring the person to remain on the vessel until it arrives at the port.
(2) The master of a vessel may, in relation to persons on board the vessel, do all things which an officer is, under subsections (1) and (1AA), authorized to do."
175 The power to enter and search a vessel extends to the case in which an officer reasonably suspects that there is on board the vessel "a person seeking to enter the migration zone who would, if in the migration zone, be an unlawful non-citizen" (s 251(1)(b)(ii)).
The Executive Power of the Commonwealth - Source and General Character
176 The Commonwealth of Australia is constituted by the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (s 4). The legislative executive and judicial powers of the Commonwealth are conferred by the Constitution and not otherwise. The executive power is provided for in s 61:
"The executive power of the Commonwealth is vested in the Queen and is exercisable by the Governor-General as the Queen's representative, and extends to the execution and maintenance of this Constitution and of the laws of the Commonwealth."
Section 61 is the primary source of executive power. Its content extends to the execution and maintenance of the Constitution and the laws of the Commonwealth. It is also limited by those terms in so far as it will not authorise the Commonwealth to act inconsistently with the distribution of powers and the limits on power for which the Constitution provides. Nor will it authorise the Commonwealth to act otherwise than according to the laws of the Commonwealth. Other provisions of the Constitution vesting powers in the Governor-General may be seen as distinct sources of executive power on their specific topics and as giving content to the power conferred by s 61.
177 At the time of federation and the early years of the Commonwealth it seems to have been assumed that a number of the common law prerogatives of the Crown such as the power to declare war, enter treaties or acquire territories, were not subsumed in s 61 but remained with the Crown to be exercised upon the advice of Imperial Ministers - Zines, The High Court and the Constitution 4th Edition (1997) at 251. Even so, there was apparent a broad view of the content of s 61 in the observation of Isaacs J in Farey v Burvett (1916) 21 CLR 433 at 452 that:
"These provisions carry with them the royal war prerogative, and all that the common law of England includes in that prerogative so far as it is applicable to Australia."
178 The modern relationship of the power to the prerogatives of the Crown was stated by Mason J in Barton v The Commonwealth (1974) 131 CLR 477 at 498:
"The Constitution established the Commonwealth of Australia as a political entity and brought it into existence as a member of the community of nations. The Constitution conferred upon the Commonwealth power with respect to external affairs and, subject perhaps to the Statute of Westminster 1931 and the Balfour Declaration, entrusted to it the responsibility for the conduct of the relationships between Australia and other members of the community of nations, including the conduct of diplomatic negotiations between Australia and other countries. By s 61 the executive power of the Commonwealth was vested in the Crown. It extends to the execution and maintenance of the Constitution and of the laws of the Commonwealth. It enables the Crown to undertake all executive action which is appropriate to the position of the Commonwealth under the Constitution and to the spheres of responsibility vested in it by the Constitution. It includes the prerogative powers of the Crown, that is, the powers accorded to the Crown by the common law."
179 The use of the "prerogative" to describe such a power may properly acknowledge its historical antecedents but not adequately illuminate its origins in s 61 of the Constitution. For it is s 61 that "…confers on the Commonwealth all the prerogative powers of the Crown except those that are necessarily exercisable by the States under the allocation of responsibilities made by the Constitution and those denied by the Constitution itself." - Davis v The Commonwealth (1988) 166 CLR 79 at 93 (Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron JJ) citing The Commonwealth v Colonial Combing, Spinning and Weaving Co Ltd ("the Wooltops case") (1922) 31 CLR 421 at 437-439. As Gummow J said in Re Ditfort; Ex parte Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 19 FCR 347 at 369:
"In Australia, … one looks not to the content of the prerogative in Britain, but rather to s 61 of the Constitution, by which the executive power of the Commonwealth was vested in the Crown."
180 The "spheres of responsibility vested in the Crown by the Constitution" and referred to by Mason J in Barton were described in Davis as "…derived from the distribution of legislative powers effected by the Constitution itself and from the character and status of the Commonwealth as a national polity" (at 93). In like vein Brennan J agreed generally with the observation of Jacobs J in Victoria v The Commonwealth and Hayden ("the AAP case") (1975) 134 CLR 338 at 406 that the phrase "maintenance of the Constitution" imports the idea of Australia as a nation. Jacobs J said in the AAP case:
"Within the words "maintenance of this Constitution" appearing in s 61 lies the idea of Australia as a nation within itself and in its relationship with the external world, a nation governed by a system of law in which the powers of government are divided between a government representative of all the people of Australia and a number of governments each representative of the people of the various States."
Brennan J saw the phrase as assigning to the Executive government functions relating "not only to the institutions of government but more generally to the protection and advancement of the Australian nation" - referring to Burns v Ransley (1949) 79 CLR 101 at 109-110 and Australian Communist Party v The Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 187-188.
The Executive Power of the Commonwealth - Subject to Parliamentary Control
181 The executive power can be abrogated, modified or regulated by laws of the Commonwealth. Its common law ancestor, the Royal Prerogative, was similarly subject to abrogation, modification or regulation by statute. As Lord Denning observed in Laker Airways Ltd v Department of Trade [1977] 1 QB 643 at 705, it was described by Blackstone, drawing on Locke's True End of Civil Government, as:
"…the discretionary power of acting in the public good where the positive laws are silent."
Lord Denning himself described it as "… a discretionary power exercisable by the executive government for the public good, in certain spheres of governmental activity for which the law has made no provision…."
182 The conceptual bases upon which it is said that statute law may abrogate or regulate the prerogative were variously proposed in Attorney-General v De Keyser's Royal Hotel, Limited [1920] AC 508. Implied assent by the Crown (526), the futility of concurrent powers, one regulated and the other not (539), a presumption that the Crown resorts to statute rather than its unqualified power (554) and simple parliamentary sovereignty (576) encapsulate the approaches taken by the Law Lords in that case. In the end, however, there was nothing in their approaches which permitted avoidance of the need to construe the relevant statute to determine whether, by express words or necessary implication, it has any, and if so what, operation upon the prerogative power. For it may be as Lord Sumner seemed to allow that a statute dealing with the same matter as the prerogative power could have as its object "…to provide an additional mode of attaining the same object" (561). It has been broadly stated that the royal prerogative ceases to apply to a matter once it has been made the subject of legislation - Walker v The Queen [1994] 2 AC 36 at 41. That is not to say that any statute, however confined its effect upon a matter covered by the prerogative is to be taken as displacing it.
183 The executive power of the Commonwealth under s 61 cannot be treated as a species of the royal prerogative, "The residue of discretionary or arbitrary authority which at any given time is legally left in the hands of the Crown." - De Keyser at 526. While the executive power may derive some of its content by reference to the royal prerogative, it is a power conferred as part of a negotiated federal compact expressed in a written Constitution distributing powers between the three arms of government reflected in Chapters I, II and III of the Constitution and, as to legislative powers, between the polities that comprise the federation. The power is subject, not only to the limitations as to subject matter that flow directly from the Constitution but also to the laws of the Commonwealth made under it. There is no place then for any doctrine that a law made on a particular subject matter is presumed to displace or regulate the operation of the executive power in respect of that subject matter. The operation of the law upon the power is a matter of construction.
184 That construction, while governed ultimately by the terms of the statute under consideration, is informed by a requirement for a clear intention to displace the power. In Barton, Barwick CJ used the term "extremely strong", to describe "the rule that the prerogative of the Crown is not displaced except by a clear and unambiguous provision" - (488). Mason J referred to the "well accepted" requirement "that a statute will not be held to abrogate a prerogative of the Crown unless it does so by express words or by implication, that is, necessary implication" - (at 501 citing De Keyser). McTiernan and Menzies JJ adopted the same approach (at 491). Jacobs J said that "…an intention to withdraw or curtail a prerogative power must be clearly shown" - (508). He referred also in that context to the importance of the right to communicate freely with a foreign state which was the power there in issue, the case being one about an extra statutory request by Australia for extradition of a person from Brazil. In Ling v Commonwealth (1994) 51 FCR 88, the Full Court (Gummow, Lee and Hill JJ) considered the effect of legislation upon the power of the Crown to take an assignment of a chose in action. They referred to the passages cited above from Barton and, with approval, to the statement of Street J in Booth v Williams (1909) 9 SR (NSW) 421 at 440 that "it is presumed that the Legislature does not intend to deprive the Crown of any prerogative right or property unless it expresses its intention to do so in explicit terms or makes the inference irresistible " (at 92). In Oates v Attorney-General (Cth) (2000) 181 ALR 559, Lindgren J referred to what Barwick J had said in Barton about the requirement for a clear and unambiguous provision to "displace" the prerogative of the Crown and added:
"…I regard the word "displaced" in this sentence as including the notion of partial displacement, that is, confinement, restriction or limitation." (569)
185 The executive power of the Commonwealth covers a wide range of matters, some of greater importance than others. Some are intimately connected to Australia's status as an independent, sovereign nation State. The relevance of the importance of the particular power to the question whether it has been displaced by a statute, appears to have been accepted by Jacobs J in Barton. The greater the significance of a particular executive power to national sovereignty, the less likely it is that, absent clear words or inescapable implication, the parliament would have intended to extinguish the power. In such a case close scrutiny will be required of any contention that a statute, without express words to that effect, has displaced the operation of the executive power by virtue of "covering the field" of the subject matter. Even in De Keyser the possibility was allowed by Lord Sumner that a statute dealing with a subject matter covered by the prerogative might have as its object the creation of another way of dealing with the subject which does not displace the prerogative.
The Executive Power - The Gatekeeping Function
186 English courts have long recognised the general proposition of international law that:
"…the supreme power of every state has a right to make laws for the exclusion or expulsion of a foreigner…" - In Re Adam [1837] 1 Moo PC; 12 ER 889
In that case the court recognised a power in the Governor in Council of the Colony of Mauritius "as the depositaries of the executive authority of the Crown, to remove at pleasure all aliens not protected by any special privilege" (470). The power of a State under international law to remove aliens was recognised indirectly by the Privy Council in its approval of the judgment of Kerferd J in the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria in Toy v Musgrove (1888) 14 VLR 349 where it was said:
"…it seems beyond question that every nation may exercise the right of excluding aliens without giving offence to the country to which those aliens belong."
See Musgrove v Toy [1891] AC 272. The principle was explicitly recognised by the Privy Council in Attorney-General for Canada v Cain [1906] AC 542:
"One of the rights possessed by the supreme power in every State is the right to refuse to permit an alien to enter that State, to annex what conditions it pleases to the permission to enter it, and to expel or deport from the State, at pleasure, even a friendly alien, especially if it considers his presence in the State opposed to its peace, order, and good government, or to its social or material interests." (546)
A State could also do all those things which must be done for the effective exercise of the power to expel. It is true that the Privy Council was addressing the exercise of legislative power, being concerned with the question whether the Alien Labour Act of Canada was invalid for territorial overreach. Their observations however were directed to the incidents of statehood at international law. The way in which the right to expel or to refuse entry is exercised, and whether by legislative or executive means, may vary according to the constitutional mechanisms of particular States.
187 There is a statement in Forsyth's Cases and Opinions on Constitutional Law, Steven and Haynes (1869) p 181 that:
"…the Crown has no power by its prerogative alone, to send anyone, whether he be a subject or an alien compulsorily out of the realm."
In the same passage in which this was stated the learned author said that Lord Ellenborough CJ had contended in debate in the House of Lords in 1816 on the Aliens Bill that at common law the Crown had the right by the royal prerogative to send all aliens out of the kingdom. But this, according to the writer, was "certainly not the law of England". No authority was referred to by Forsyth in support of the argument beyond the fact that alien acts had been passed from time to time in order to give analogous statutory power to the Executive.
188 A contention that the Governor of the Colony of New South Wales had power independent of statute to exclude foreigners from the colony was rejected by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in Ex parte Lo Pak (1888) 9 NSWR 221. There a Chinese subject with a statutory right of residence in New South Wales returned to the colony after a nine month visit to China. He returned on the British steamship "Afghan" but was prevented by police, under direction of the Governor, from disembarking at Sydney harbour. He applied for and was granted habeas corpus. All three of the judges rejected, albeit obiter, the submission that the Governor of the Colony possessed a prerogative power to exclude foreigners (at 237 per the Chief Justice, 244 per Windeyer J, 248 per Foster J). The Chief Justice doubted whether the British Crown had such power but:
"…even supposing the King or Queen of England have power by proclamation to prevent aliens from entering the kingdom, and a statute to be unnecessary, yet that power so vested is a power personal to the Sovereign, and cannot be delegated either to the Governor, or to the Government of this colony." (238)
Windeyer J accepted that the Executive Government would have power "to exclude foreigners from landing if they come infected with disease, or in such vast and overwhelming numbers as really to threaten danger to our liberties, though they should come in peaceful guise". It was enough to say however, that there were "not half a million of Chinese waiting to be landed, and no impending danger to the country [was] shewn upon the affidavits." (243)
189 A similar application for habeas corpus was made and succeeded in Ex parte Leong Kum (1888) 9 NSWR 254. The Chief Justice in that case expressed more fully his view that the colony lacked the power of a sovereign State to exclude foreigners (255-256). See also Windeyer J at 261-262 and 265.
190 It is to be noted that in relation to each of these cases the executive order appeared to have been made contrary to a statute under which there was at least an implied permission to Chinese immigrants to enter the colony - see the discussion by Innes J in Ex parte Leong Kum at 267-268. These cases, although, like Forsyth, adverting to the absence of any relevant exercise of exclusionary prerogative power by the British Crown, turned upon the existence of a statutory permission to enter the colony and, albeit obiter, the fact that the colony was not a sovereign nation.
191 The scope of the executive power conferred by s 61 of the Constitution is to be measured by reference to Australia's status as a sovereign nation and by reference to the terms of the Constitution itself. The effect of the statute law, in this case the Migration Act, will be considered separately.
192 It is not necessary for present purposes to consider the full content of executive power and the extent to which it may operate upon the subject matter of the heads of Commonwealth legislative power. Given that the legislative powers conferred by s 51 are concurrent with those of the States, subject to the paramountcy of Commonwealth statutes, (covering cl 5 and s 109) it could not be said that, absent statutory authority, executive power may be exercised in relation to all those matters. There are legislative powers however which may be seen as central to the expression of Australia's status and sovereignty as a nation. They include the powers to make laws with respect to naturalisation and aliens (s 51(xix)), immigration and emigration (s 51(xxvii)) and the influx of criminals (s 51(xxviii)). Australia's status as a sovereign nation is reflected in its power to determine who may come into its territory and who may not and who shall be admitted into the Australian community and who shall not. That power may also be linked to the foundation of the Constitution in popular sovereignty implied in the agreement of the "people" of the pre-federation colonies "to unite in one indissoluble federal Commonwealth". It may be said that the people, through the structures of representative democracy for which the Constitution provides, including an Executive responsible to the Parliament, may determine who will or will not enter Australia. These powers may be exercised for good reasons or bad. That debate, however, is not one for this Court to enter.
193 In my opinion, the executive power of the Commonwealth, absent statutory extinguishment or abridgement, would extend to a power to prevent the entry of non-citizens and to do such things as are necessary to effect such exclusion. This does not involve any conclusion about whether the Executive would, in the absence of statutory authority, have a power to expel non-citizens other than as an incident of the power to exclude. The power to determine who may come into Australia is so central to its sovereignty that it is not to be supposed that the Government of the nation would lack under the power conferred upon it directly by the Constitution, the ability to prevent people not part of the Australia community, from entering.
194 The Australian case law does not resolve the question before this Court. Robtelmes v Brenan (1906) 4 CLR 395 was concerned with the validity of a Commonwealth Act, the Pacific Islands Labourers Act 1901, providing for the deportation of unemployed Pacific Islanders, albeit they may have been brought into Australia under the Pacific Island Immigration Act (Qd). The general propositions in Attorney-General for Canada v Cain were adopted (400 Griffith CJ; 413-414 Barton J; 419 O'Connor J). It was accepted that the power to exclude aliens includes the power to deport them. It was not necessary for the Court to consider whether the Executive would have such a power absent statutory authority. Griffiths CJ doubted "…whether the Executive authority of Australia, or of any State, could deport an alien except under conditions authorized by some Statute…" but found it "not necessary to discuss that question now" (403). Barton J observed that:
"Whether expulsion in Great Britain or in one of her self-governing Colonies or States, requires statutory authority has, no doubt, been the subject of some hesitation on the part of eminent lawyers, but it is not necessary for us to decide that question. It does not arise." (414)
He did refer, however, to the comment in the Encyclopaedia of the Laws of England, vol 5 p 268 which mentioned dicta of Blackstone (1 Com 366) and Chitty (Pleas of Crown ed 1820 p 49) to the effect that the Crown by its prerogative could expel even alien friends but that there did not seem to have been any attempt since the Revolution to exercise such prerogative. The "extrusion of alien friends has since then always been effected by statutory authority."
195 It has been said that the common law of Australia knows no lettre de cachet or executive warrant pursuant to which either citizen or alien can be deprived of his freedom by mere administrative decision or action - Re Bolton; Ex Parte Beane (1987) 162 CLR 514 at 528 (Deane J) and Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs at 19 (Brennan, Dawson and Deane JJ). Those observations were made in the context of cases about the surrender of a resident of Australia to another country (Bolton; Ex Parte Beane) and the validity of statutory provisions for the detention of unlawful non-citizens who arrived in Australia as boat people between November 1989 and December 1992 (Chu Kheng Lim).
196 Reliance was placed upon the observation by Davies J in Mayer v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs at 316 that whatever may have been the common law prerogative of the Crown "…at the present time the law with respect to the entry of persons to Australia and with respect to their expulsion is regulated by statute".
197 The reference to the common law of Australia in Beane and Lim and to the common law prerogative of the Crown in Mayer do not deal with the question whether, absent statutory authorisation, s 61 of the Constitution confers upon the Executive a power to exclude or prevent the entry of a non-citizen to Australia and powers incidental thereto. In my opinion, absent statutory authority, there is such a power at least to prevent entry to Australia. It is not necessary, for present purposes, to consider its full extent. It may be that, like the power to make laws with respect to defence, it will vary according to circumstances. Absent statutory abrogation it would be sufficient to authorise the barring of entry by preventing a vessel from docking at an Australian port and adopting the means necessary to achieve that result. Absent statutory authority, it would extend to a power to restrain a person or boat from proceeding into Australia or compelling it to leave.
198 The question for determination now is whether, if such power exists absent statute, it has been abrogated by the Migration Act.
Whether the Executive Power to Exclude Aliens is Abrogated by the Migration Act
199 The long title of the Migration Act marks it as a control mechanism for regulating the entry into Australia of aliens, or non-citizens, as they are now termed. This is apparent from its sole object set out in s 4(1) "to regulate, in the national interest, the coming into and presence in, Australia of non-citizens". The other subsections of s 4 relate to what the Act provides in order "to advance its object". The Act is not therefore concerned to create rights of entry except in particular circumstances where it establishes machinery for the discharge of Australia's protection obligations under the Refugee Convention 1951 as amended by the 1967 Protocol. There is no doubt however that the Act provides a comprehensive regime for preventing unlawful non-citizens from entering into Australia and for their removal from Australia if they do so enter. It confers substantial powers on the Executive in aid of its object. These include the powers under Division 12A of Part 2 which relate to the pursuit and boarding of foreign ships in Australian waters - s 245B(2), s 245C and s 245F.
200 It was submitted for VCCL and Vadarlis that the Act covers the field of unlawful entry into Australia in a way that manifests an intention to displace any executive power in relation to the same subject matter. Reliance was placed, in particular, upon ss 198 and 199 providing for the removal of unlawful non-citizens from Australia, ss 200-206, providing for their deportation and the pursuit and boarding provisions of Division 12A. Reference was also made to s 189 of the Act. That section authorises officers to "detain" persons who are within Australia, for example in the territorial waters, but not in the migration zone as defined where they would be unlawful non-citizens if they were to enter the migration zone. It is a specific control mechanism and a significant element of it is imported by the use of the word "detain". That is defined in terms of "immigration detention". That term is itself defined by reference to "being in the company of, and restrained by" an officer or other authorised person or being held by, or on behalf of, an officer in one or other of the places referred to in par (b) of the definition. This may include being held by, or on behalf of, an officer on a vessel when the non-citizen is prevented under s 249 from leaving the vessel.
201 The question is whether the Act operates to abrogate the executive power under s 61 to prevent aliens from entering into Australia. There are no express words to that effect. It is necessary then to look to whether by implication it has that effect. It is not necessary for this purpose either to determine the full extent of the executive power or the full effect of the Act upon it. It is sufficient to ask whether the Act evinces a clear and unambiguous intention to deprive the Executive of the power to prevent entry into Australian territorial waters of a vessel carrying non-citizens apparently intending to land on Australian territory and the power to prevent such a vessel from proceeding further towards Australian territory and to prevent non-citizens on it from landing upon Australian territory.
202 In considering what is the implied intention of the Act and in particular the provisions referred to earlier, it is necessary to have regard not only to the general approach, supported by authority, to the question whether executive power is taken to be abrogated by statute, but also the importance to national sovereignty of the particular power in question. In my opinion the Act, by its creation of facultative provisions, which may yield a like result to the exercise of executive power, in this particular application of it cannot be taken as intending to deprive the Executive of the power necessary to do what it has done in this case. The Act confers power. It does not in the specific area evidence an intention to take it away. The term "intention" of course is a fiction. What must be asked is whether the Act operates in a way that is necessarily inconsistent with the subsistence of the executive power described. It is facultative. Its object is control of entry. Subject to certain specific provisions, such as those relating to the grant of protection visas, its object is not to confer rights upon non-citizens seeking to enter Australia. There are of course process rights at various stages of the visa granting system including those arising under the provisions of Part 8 relating to judicial review but they do not operate in the circumstances to which the executive power posited for the purposes of this case applies.
203 Australia has obligations under international law by virtue of treaties to which it is a party, including the Refugee Convention of 1951 and the 1967 Protocol. Treaties are entered into by the Executive on behalf of the nation. They do not, except to the extent provided by statute, become part of the domestic law of Australia. The primary obligation which Australia has to refugees to whom the Convention applies is the obligation under Article 33 not to expel or return them to the frontiers of territories where their lives or freedoms would be threatened on account of their race, religion, nationality, or membership of a particular social group or their political opinions. The question whether all or any of the rescuees are refugees has not been determined. It is questionable whether entry by the Executive into a convention thereby fetters the executive power under the Constitution, albeit there may be consequences in relation to the processes to be applied in the exercise of that power or relevant statutory powers - Minister of State for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273. In this case, in my opinion, the question is moot because nothing done by the Executive on the face of it amounts to a breach of Australia's obligations in respect of non-refoulement under the Refugee Convention.
204 The steps taken in relation to the MV Tampa which had the purpose and effect of preventing the rescuees from entering the migration zone and arranging for their departure from Australian territorial waters were within the scope of executive power. The finding does not involve a judgment about any policy informing the exercise of that power. That is a matter which has been and continues to be debated in public and indeed international forums. Through that debate and the parliamentary process the Ministers involved can be held accountable for their actions. If Parliament is concerned about the existence of an executive power in this area, deriving from s 61 of the Constitution, it can legislate to exclude it by clear words. The task of the Court is to decide whether the power exists and whether what was done was within that power, not whether it was exercised wisely and well.
205 It should be added that the closure of the Christmas Island port itself was done under statutory authority which was not challenged. The other steps taken by the Commonwealth, having been taken within the executive power, there is no basis, assuming there was a relevant restraint on liberty, for the award of the remedy which was granted.
Whether the Rescuees were Subject to a Restraint Attributable to the Commonwealth and Amenable to Habeas Corpus
206 It was submitted for the Commonwealth that habeas corpus did not lie as the rescuees were not detained. For a detention to take place the detainer must subject the detainee to a total restraint of movement. Partial restraint was to be distinguished from detention. To obstruct a person from going in a particular direction, it was argued, does not constitute detention. The rescuees were only prevented from going to their preferred destination. That limited restriction, it was submitted, did not constitute detention given that they were free to proceed to any other destination. It was contended for VCCL and Vadarlis that "close custody" is not necessary to attract the remedy of habeas corpus. In the alternative it was submitted that North J was correct to conclude, as a matter of fact, that the restraint upon the rescuees was total. I do not accept the argument for the Commonwealth insofar as it may be taken to suggest that a "total restraint of movement" is necessary to constitute detention amenable to habeas corpus.
207 There seems to be a variety of views across and within jurisdictions about the level of restraint on liberty necessary to attract the remedy - see Clark and McCoy, The Most Fundamental Legal Right - Habeas Corpus in the Commonwealth, Clarendon Press, Oxford (2000) p 183 et ff. Authorities including Bird v Jones [1845] 7 QB 742; [1845] 115 ER 668 and Syed Mahamad Yusuf-ud-din v Secretary of State for India (1903) 10 TLR 496 were cited by the Commonwealth. In the first case no action for the tort of false imprisonment would lie where the plaintiff was prevented from proceeding along a section of public footway closed off for the spectators of a boat race. But in that case Patterson J (with whom Coleridge and Williams JJ also agreed albeit publishing separate judgments) allowed that if a person compels another to stay in any given place against his will he imprisons that other just as much as if he locked him up in a room. Compelling a person to go in a given direction against his will could amount to imprisonment. The Privy Council in the second case took the view that from the time at which a person was released on bail he was not imprisoned for the purposes of the tort. Burns v Johnston (1916) 2 IR 444 involved a factory worker refused egress from the workplace under terms and conditions of his employment which provided that the gate to the workplace would not be unlocked before 6.30pm. He had submitted to those terms. While the factory owner could not actively prevent him from leaving, he was not bound to open the gate early to allow him to do so.
208 The false imprisonment cases are of some but limited assistance in considering the circumstances in which habeas corpus will issue and themselves allow for the possibility of something less than a complete restraint on liberty as a prerequisite to the tort. Habeas corpus is concerned with restraints on liberty imposed by a public officer or authority.
209 There are many forms of restraint on liberty that may be imposed under colour of lawful authority. While "close custody" may have been a condition of the remedy in the past, it is not a condition that should fetter artificially the function of habeas corpus as a remedy for unauthorised restraint be it total or partial. There have been cases analogous to the present in which intending entrants onto a territory, being barred from entry, have been treated as detained. In Ex parte Lo Pak, Windeyer J said at 247-248:
"It is idle to urge that, because this ship can go anywhere the captain likes to take it, and because the applicant is free to go wherever the ship goes, that he is not imprisoned. What answer is that to this application? Compelling him to stay on board the ship is exactly what the applicant complains of as an illegal restraint upon his liberty."
See also Ex parte Leong Kum at 256-257. In those cases however the applicants were restrained from going where they were entitled to go and the restraint was held to be sufficient for the purposes of the writ.
210 United States' cases favour the view that even a partial restraint will attract the writ albeit they must be read in their constitutional context. Jones v Cunningham concerned a prisoner on parole held to be "in custody" for the purposes of habeas corpus. The statute conferring the relevant jurisdiction conditioned it on the applicant being "in custody" - 28 USC 224. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the chief use of habeas corpus had been to seek the release of a person held in close physical custody. Yet there were cases to which it referred in England where "the writ was recognised as a proper remedy even though the restraint was something less than close physical confinement" (238). The court said of the writ:
"It is not now and never has been a static narrow formalistic remedy; its scope has grown to achieve its grand purpose - the protection of individuals against erosion of their right to be free from wrongful restraints upon their liberty." (243)
In the end it is necessary to consider whether on the facts of the case there is a restraint on liberty which is not authorised by law. The relevant liberty is freedom of movement.
211 A public authority may do something in respect of a person which, in combination with other factors, results in that person's freedom of movement being curtailed. Whether the authority is thereby to be regarded as imposing the resulting restraint on that person's freedom of movement for the purposes of the writ may involve a cause and effect analysis. If the authority's action contributes to the restraint there may then be a policy choice as to whether the outcome is attributable to the authority for the purposes of habeas corpus.
212 To the extent that the Commonwealth prevented the rescuees from landing on Australian soil it closed a possible avenue out of a situation in which they had been placed by other factors. There is nothing to be gained by the use of such perjorative terms as "self-inflicted". There is a number of circumstances which led the rescuees to find themselves on board the MV Tampa with, initially at least, no where to go. Unlike the plaintiffs in the Lo Pak and Leong Kum cases, they had no right to land. The closure of the port itself and the orders made by the Harbour Master were done under statutory authority and their validity was not challenged. The act of the Commonwealth in barring the landing of the rescuees in any event could not, in my opinion, constitute a restraint upon their liberty which was amenable to habeas corpus.
213 The learned primary judge however has constructed a total restraint upon their freedom by virtue of the Commonwealth's commitment to retaining control of their fate. He referred to a constellation of factors which had the result, as he saw it, that the Commonwealth took "…the complete control over the bodies and destinies of the rescuees." As to one of those factors the evidence did not appear to support the conclusion that his Honour reached that the Commonwealth did not allow communication with the rescuees. It may be accepted that it did not facilitate communications and did not permit third parties to approach the vessel. Attempts to communicate with the rescuees through the vessel's owners were unsuccessful because of the attitude of the vessel's owners. The ultimate judgment made by his Honour was evaluative and weight should be given to his view of the case. In my opinion, however, the actions of the Commonwealth were properly incidental to preventing the rescuees from landing in Australian territory where they had no right to go. Their inability to go elsewhere derived from circumstances which did not come from any action on the part of the Commonwealth. The presence of SAS troops on board the MV Tampa did not itself or in combination with other factors constitute a detention. It was incidental to the objective of preventing a landing and maintaining as well the security of the ship. It also served the humanitarian purpose of providing medicine and food to the rescuees. The Nauru/NZ arrangements of themselves provided the only practical exit from the situation. Those arrangements did not constitute a restraint upon freedom attributable to the Commonwealth given the fact that the Captain of the Tampa would not sail out of Australia while the rescuees were on board. In my opinion, taken as a whole, there was no restraint on their liberty which could be attributed to the Commonwealth.
214 The conceptual difficulty of constructing such a constraint is well illustrated by the nature of the relief granted by his Honour which could only be made effective by a direction that the rescuees be brought on to the mainland. His Honour's principal order had two elements, release of the rescuees and their transportation to mainland Australia. The second element was ancillary to the primary remedy which was "release". It begs the question release from what? That in turn raises the question what freedom did the rescuees have which the Commonwealth, without authority, constrained? It points to the reality that nothing done by the Commonwealth amounted to a restraint upon their freedom, they having neither right nor freedom to travel to Australia.
215 In my opinion there was no detention, what was done was within power, the appeals should be allowed, the orders made by his Honour set aside and the applications before him, dismissed. The question of costs should be the subject of written submission, particularly having regard to the public interest which the respondents have sought to advance in bringing these proceedings.
Postscript
216 The counsel and solicitors acting in the interests of the rescuees in this case have evidently done so pro bono. They have acted according to the highest ideals of the law. They have sought to give voices to those who are perforce voiceless and, on their behalf, to hold the Executive accountable for the lawfulness of its actions. In so doing, even if ultimately unsuccessful in the litigation they have served the rule of law and so the whole community.
I certify that the preceding ninety (90) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice French .