Are there "exceptional circumstances necessitating disclosure"?
29The Court has considered the requirements of the Practice Note on a number of occasions including in Armstrong Strategic Management and Marketing Pty Ltd v Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 393 at [65] - [66] per Bergin CJ in Eq; Leighton International v Hodges; Thiess v Reinforced Earth [2012] NSWSC 458 at [14] per McDougall J, SkyMesh Pty Ltd v Ipstar Australia Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 696 at [7] - [9] per Sackar J and by me in RSA (Moorvale Station) Pty Ltd v VDM CCE Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 534.
30In Leda Manorstead Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue; Leda Manorstead Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2012] NSWSC 913 at [17] Gzell J said:
"[T]o be exceptional the circumstance need not be unique or unprecedented or very rare. What is needed is an appraisal of all the circumstances and the context in which the expression must be satisfied. Are there circumstances necessitating disclosure before evidence in the sense that the party's case cannot be put without the disclosure? Are those circumstances exceptional?"
31Each case must be examined in its own context.
32This case is similar to that which I considered in RSA (Moorvale Station) Pty Ltd in that a basis upon which it is said that "exceptional circumstances" exist is to provide an expert witness with all relevant documents now, and before the expert's report is finalised. Mr Dicker submitted that it was desirable to take this course, rather than having Ms Francis prepare her expert report upon the basis of the materials already available from Villawood, and then, perhaps, be obliged to produce a revised or supplementary report if Schofields ultimately disclosed further documents.
33I accept that the desirability of avoiding a revised or supplementary expert report (which might involve the production of concomitant responsive reports from that expert's opposite number) is a factor to be taken into account when considering whether there are "exceptional circumstances" to justify disclosure prior to the service of all evidence.
34However, in this case, I do not see that factor as weighing heavily in the balance for a number of reasons.
35First, Ms Francis has been asked to opine on the role of Villawood, as project manager, in relation to the obtaining of planning approval. Ms Fracis has not been asked to express any opinion about Schofields' conduct. Ms Francis will now have available all material that Villawood has in relation to that topic.
36It is possible that Schofields also has some documents relevant to that topic. However, it seems unlikely Schofields has any critical documents over and above those that Villawood has already disclosed. Villawood, and not Schofields, was the project manager. And the documentary shortcomings identified by Ms Francis, albeit in very general terms, are directed to documents likely to be in the possession of Villawood, rather than Schofields.
37Furthermore, were Schofields ordered to give disclosure as sought by the Cross Claimants, it will be put to the trouble and expense of giving disclosure twice; both before and after the delivery of evidence.
38Having taken into account all of these matters, the conclusion to which I have come is that the Cross Claimants have not established "exceptional circumstances" within the meaning of the Practice Note.
39Accordingly, the Cross Claimants' notice of motion of 9 December 2013 should be dismissed.
40I will hear the parties as to costs of the motion. However, my tentative view is that the costs of the motion should be the Cross-Defendants' costs in the cause.