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[2014] FCA 841
Federal Court of Australia
2014-07-24
Adam P, Rangiah J
Original judgment source is linked above.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY GENERAL DIVISION QUD 294 of 2014
BETWEEN: SANDHURST TRUSTEES LIMITED ABN 16 004 030 737
JUDGE: RANGIAH J DATE: 24 JULY 2014 PLACE: BRISBANE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT 1 This is an application made pursuant to s 25(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) for leave to appeal against the judgment of a single judge of this Court. 2 His Honour ordered that the applicant for leave to appeal ("the applicant") give preliminary discovery pursuant to r 7.23 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). The parties agree that the judgment in question is interlocutory and that leave to appeal is required: Malouf v Malouf (1999) 86 FCR 134 at [36]. 3 The Court has a wide discretion as to whether to grant leave to appeal but such leave will not usually be granted unless the judgment is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant the grant of leave and substantial injustice would result from the refusal of leave to appeal: DÉcor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398-399; Minogue v Williams [2009] FCA 125 at [19]. Leave will be more readily granted where the interlocutory decision affects substantive rights: DÉcor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc at 400; Minogue v Williams at [19]. In such a case, leave will generally be granted if there is any doubt about the decision at first instance: Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Ltd (2000) 104 FCR 564 at [43]. 4 The parties differ, however, on the question of whether the judgment is one that affects the applicant's substantive rights. The applicant submits that although orders made under r 7.23 are interlocutory, they, in effect, provide final relief. The applicant relies, in particular, on Echo Tasmania Pty Ltd v Imperial Chemical Industries PLC [2008] FCAFC 58 where Black CJ and Sackville J said, in relation to the predecessor of r 7.23, at [40]: Moreover, while the orders made by his Honour were technically interlocutory, they effectively required Echo to produce documents for inspection that otherwise it was entitled to keep to itself. 5 The applicant then relies on authority to the effect that if an order is final in substance then the threshold for a grant of leave to appeal is not high: Wills v Australian Broadcasting Commission (2009) 173 FCR 284 at [14] per Emmett J, at [31], per Rares J; Zoia v Commonwealth Ombudsman Department (2007) 240 ALR 624 at [26] per French J; Petroulias v Commissioner of Taxation [2011] FCA 795 at [43]-[44] per Reeves J. 6 On the other hand, the respondents rely on Optiver Australia Pty Ltd v Tibra Trading Pty Ltd (2007) 163 FCR 554 at [20], where Tamberlin J decided in relation to the predecessor of r 7.23 that: [N]o substantive rights are finally determined until a decision is made in the contemplated substantive application. 7 The respondents submit that the passage taken from Echo Tasmania does not squarely address the issue. They argue that as the orders are not final in substance, the approach taken in cases such as Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Inc (1981) 148 CLR 170 should be applied and that the Court should be reluctant to grant leave to appeal concerning a matter of practice or procedure. 8 I consider that the applicant has demonstrated an arguable case on issues including: whether the scope of an order for preliminary discovery is required to be limited to documents directly relevant to the question of whether the prospective applicant has a right to obtain the relief; and whether the prospective applicant is required to depose as to the grounds on which he or she believes that he or she has a right to obtain relief. 9 However, I consider that the question of whether the orders affect substantive rights is one that should be decided by the Full Court in view of what appear to be conflicting authorities. That question has relevance to the degree to which the applicant is required to demonstrate that it has an arguable case. I think that the Full Court is in the best position to consider the question of whether leave to appeal should be granted. 10 Accordingly, I will direct, pursuant to s 25(2)(e) of the Federal Court of Australia Act, that the application for leave to appeal is to be heard and determined by a Full Court. I certify that the preceding ten (10) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Rangiah.
Sandhurst Trustees Limited
Clarke
(1981) 148 CLR 170
(1991) 33 FCR 397
(2000) 104 FCR 564
(1999) 86 FCR 134
(2007) 163 FCR 554
(2009) 173 FCR 284
(2007) 240 ALR 624