14 The certificate is in error in stating that the sum was determined to be due and payable by Memocorp to the plaintiff. It should have stated that that sum was payable by Berem to the plaintiff, however nothing turns on that error on the present application.
15 On the same day, the plaintiff served notice of its claim on Memocorp pursuant to ss 6 and 8 of the Contractors Debts Act. The plaintiff contends that Memocorp owes Berem debts of $109,964 and $51,901.10 pursuant to progress certificates number 12 and 13 issued by Memocorp to Berem. It contends that those debts have been assigned to it up to the amount of $149,757.42 referred to in the debt certificate.
16 Memocorp refuses to pay the plaintiff. It says that Berem is indebted to it for liquidated damages of at least $570,000 for failure to bring the works to substantial completion by 19 December 2007. It also claims to be entitled to damages, or extinction of the price payable under the building contract arising from the cost of rectifying allegedly defective work and for the cost of providing rent abatement to tenants affected by what it says was incomplete and delayed work, indemnity in respect of damages ordered to be paid to a tenant, and costs of defending the tenant's claim.
17 It raises those matters as a defence pursuant to s 11(4) of the Contractors Debts Act that it would have against recovery of the claimed debts by Berem had there been no assignment.
18 On 27 April 2009 the plaintiff commenced new proceedings against Memocorp in the District Court claiming the amount in the debt certificate and relying on the assignment under s 8 of the Contractors Debts Act. In an interim judgment of 18 March 2010 his Honour Judge Delaney dealt with a defence that the judgment entered against Berem was not properly entered because s 471B (scil. s 500(2)) of the Corporations Act provides that the proceeding in which judgment was to be obtained should not have been continued against the company except with the leave of the court, and no such leave had been obtained.
19 His Honour Judge Delaney referred to the decision of Austin J in Re Summit Design & Construction Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 1136; (2000) 18 ACLC 125 where, in the case of a defaulting contractor that was in provisional liquidation, Austin J in substance refused leave to an unpaid subcontractor to proceed under s 471B of the Corporations Law where the subcontractor was seeking to avail itself of the remedies in the Contractors Debts Act. Austin J considered that for the contractor to proceed in that way would be to give it priority over other unsecured creditors and would interfere with the principles of rateable distribution of a company's assets between creditors in the order of priorities laid down in the Corporations Law.
20 As Judge Delaney noted, this decision was followed by Byrne J in the Supreme Court of Victoria in Belmadar Constructions Pty Ltd v Environmental Solutions International Ltd [2005] VSC 24; (2005) 23 ACLC 337. Judge Delaney stayed the District Court proceedings in order, amongst other things, to enable the plaintiff to seek leave to proceed against Berem. Hence the present application.
21 There is no dispute that leave may be granted nunc pro tunc (Emanuele v Australian Securities Commission [1997] HCA 20; (1997) 188 CLR 114; The Bell Group Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation [2000] FCA 439; (2000) 104 FCR 305 at [48]-[58]).
22 It appears from the liquidators' accounts lodged with ASIC on 22 November 2009 that the liquidators estimate that Berem has thirteen priority creditors with debts to the value of $44,445 and 303 unsecured creditors with debts totalling $11,308,794. In the accounts the liquidators stated that they did not expect any dividend to be paid to any class of creditor and did not expect to recover any further assets. It is on the cards that if the plaintiff obtains leave to proceed and is ultimately successful in its District Court proceeding against Memocorp and $50,000 is recovered by the liquidators, that money will go towards the liquidators' remuneration and expenses, although it may be that some money might be available to pay priority creditors. There is no realistic prospect of any moneys being recovered for other unsecured creditors.
23 The first question is whether leave to proceed should be refused on the ground addressed in Re Summit Design & Construction Pty Ltd. There is a significant difference between that case and the present. Here, the liquidators consent to leave being given. Mr Elkerton deposes that he consented to the plaintiff's having leave to proceed against Berem in the first District Court proceedings, because he considered it to be in the best interests of the company and its creditors. He deposes that at the present time he considers it to be in the best interests of the company and its creditors for the plaintiff to have leave to proceed.
24 Mr Elkerton does not say why he considers it to be in the best interests of the company and its creditors, except that if the plaintiff is successful, the liquidators will receive $50,000 into the liquidation.
25 The evident position taken by the liquidators is that rather than their causing Berem to seek to recover debts which may be owing pursuant to the progress certificates issued by Memocorp, they do not oppose the plaintiff's seeking to recover those debts to the plaintiff's benefit, provided that if the plaintiff is successful, $50,000 will be paid to Berem. That is a commercial judgment which must have involved the weighing of the costs of an action against Memocorp, the risk of having to meet an adverse costs order, and the likely success of such an action.
26 It is to be borne in mind on this last point that Memocorp raises as an answer to the plaintiff's claim a defence of set-off. I see no reason to doubt the liquidators' commercial judgment that it is in the interests of Berem to allow the plaintiff's claim to proceed at the plaintiff's cost and at the plaintiff's risk as to costs on the basis that if the plaintiff is successful the company will be paid $50,000. Although this disturbs the purity of the underlying principle that a company's assets will be applied rateably between creditors according to their priorities under s 556 of the Corporations Act, it does not appear to me to do so to the prejudice of creditors.
27 I think it a compelling inference that the claim to recover the debts said to be owed by Memocorp to Berem under the progress certificates would be unlikely to be brought by Berem itself through the liquidators. Such a claim would need to be funded. The liquidators' accounts reveal that as of 9 October 2009, they held only $3,074. If such proceedings were brought by Berem, presumably it would be required to provide security for costs. There would also have to be a good answer to Memocorp's off-setting claim.
28 In Re Summit Design & Construction Pty Ltd the company was in provisional liquidation only. It appears that the provisional liquidators opposed the leave there sought. There was no similar arrangement of the kind negotiated by the liquidators in the present case.
29 Counsel for Memocorp also argue that it would be unjust to grant leave because the judgment the plaintiff obtained against Berem was obtained pursuant to s 15 of the Security of Payment Act because Berem had not served a payment schedule indicating why payment was withheld. A judgment obtained pursuant to s 15 of the Security of Payment Act is an interim judgment in the sense that it does not affect the right of a party to the construction contract to bring other civil proceedings to determine the parties' rights and liabilities. In such other proceedings allowance must be made for any payments made pursuant to the Security of Payment Act, and this may involve making orders for restitution. Thus it has been said that the Security of Payment Act does no more than provide an interim, quick solution to progress payment disputes, which does not determine the parties' rights under the underlying construction contract.
30 Counsel for Memocorp argued, correctly, that it is not open to Memocorp to defend the plaintiff's claim against it by putting in issue the debt due by Berem to the plaintiff for which the plaintiff has judgment against Berem. Counsel submit that the plaintiff is now seeking to obtain on a final basis what is the subject of an interim judgment. Memocorp can only defend the claim on the grounds that it has a defence to the debt said to be owed by it to Berem, not on the ground that Berem might have a defence to the claim for which the plaintiff obtained judgment against Berem.
31 In my view this is not a ground for refusing leave. It is simply the result of the policy underlying the Contractors Debts Act that a debt certificate may be issued in respect of a judgment, whether or not the judgment has been given after a hearing on the merits. A "judgment" within s 7 of that Act includes a default judgment. Subsection 7(1A) expressly provides for the issue of a debt certificate after an adjudication certificate within the meaning of the Security of Payment Act has been filed as a judgment in accordance with s 25 of that Act. Such an adjudication certificate also operates only as an interim judgment in the same way as does a judgment entered after failure to serve a payment schedule.
32 In any event, there is no evidence that the liquidators were of mind to dispute the plaintiff's claim of the debt owed to it by Berem. In my view, there is no hardship to Memocorp to be bound by the same position that binds Berem and the plaintiff. If, as Memocorp says, it has a good defence to the claim that it owes Berem money, then it can maintain that defence against the plaintiff. If not, there is no hardship from Memocorp's being required to pay the plaintiff rather than Berem.
33 Counsel for Memocorp also argued that leave should be refused because there is no evidence that notice of the present application has been given to the other creditors.
34 In Re Summit Design v Construction Pty Ltd Austin J, in refusing leave, took into account that there was no evidence that a secured creditor, in that case, and any other subcontractors, had been given notice of the application (at [19]). His Honour added:
" [20] Reflection about the position of other subcontractors reinforces the conclusion that I ought not to grant leave in the present case. One can imagine that if leave were granted now, there would be further applications for leave in the event that there are other subcontractors in the same position as the applicant with respect to its third invoice. The race, that is the race to have access to funds in the developer's hands which otherwise would be paid to the company, would be won by the swiftest. Under the Act the victor, the subcontractor who is first to serve a notice of claim and debt certificate on the developer, receives payment to the potential exclusion of the subcontractors who are not quite as quick. I cannot see the justice of that result. "
35 In this case the liquidators have the task of advancing the interests of creditors. In my view it is not necessary for the plaintiff to have served the application or to have given notice of the application to all of the company's creditors. The liquidators speak for them.
36 There is no evidence that any other subcontractor contemplates making a claim under the Contractors Debts Act. If there be any other subcontractors contemplating such claims then, in order to obtain judgment against Berem, they will need to seek leave to bring an action against it, with a view to obtaining a debt certificate under s 7. It will be relevant to whether leave should be given, in those cases, whether any similar arrangements were negotiated with the liquidators as the plaintiff has negotiated in this case. I do not consider that the possibility of such claims, and it is no more than a theoretical possibility, is relevant to the present application.
37 For these reasons, in my view, the plaintiff is entitled to the leave sought. I make the following orders: