Owner's consent
21The Environmental Planning and Assessment Regulation 2000, cl 49(1) requires a development application to be made by the owner of the land to which the application relates, or by any other person with the consent in writing of the owner of that land.
22Access to lot 6 in the strata plan is by way of a bitumen driveway, being common property. The applicants say that the owner's consent was therefore required to be provided by the owners corporation of the strata plan, that the failure to have a statement of owner's consent meant that the Council did not have power to consider the development application and grant its consent, and that such failure is jurisdictional.
23The applicants rely on the judgment of Cowdroy J in Owners Strata Plan 57762 v Pham [2005] NSWLEC 500. In that case a development application was made to install a spray booth inside a factory unit in a strata plan. The application involved an excavation in the floor and refilling the excavation with reinforced concrete to a depth of 2000 mm. It also involved a chimney and air inlet and conduit through the roof. It was an agreed fact that the concrete floor and the roof of the unit comprised part of the common property of the strata plan. The body corporate complained that it had never approved of such work. Cowdroy J held at [32] that the identity of the land is not only revealed by the address shown in the prescribed development application form, and if the development application reveals that an essential part of the proposed development extends to other land, that that other land is also the subject of the application. His Honour held at [35] that the plans accompanying the application showed the excavation of the floor and the vents through the roof, all of which were in the common property, and in the absence of the consent of the body corporate the Council had no power to grant consent to the application.
24The decision of Cowdroy J is understandable in the light of the facts in that case. The proposed development included work which extended beyond the boundaries of the strata lot and included work within the common property.
25In the present case, however, no work is proposed beyond the boundary of lot 6. The development application describes the land to be developed as lot 6 in the strata plan. The development consent which has been issued describes the land to be developed as lot 6 in the strata plan. Moreover, condition 2 of the development consent expressly states: "The development is limited to the use of part of the tourist premises, being lot 6 SP 81554 only ..."
26The applicants rely upon the judgment of Preston J in Chamwell Pty Ltd v Strathfield Council [2007] NSWLEC 114; 151 LGERA 400. In that case the applicant had applied to erect a building for a mixed use comprising both residential and retail uses. The development application included land known as lot D, which was within a residential zone and in which shops were prohibited. The balance of the development site was in a business zone. The plans showed that it was proposed to construct an access to the underground car park with a boom gate and ticket dispenser within lot D, together with travelators linking the ground floor retail space (located in the business zone) to the car park (also located in the business zone) although circulation aisles in the car park were also within lot D.
27The applicant argued that the proper characterisation of those parts of the building in lot D was "roads", being a permissible use in the zone. Preston J rejected the argument. In his Honour's view the physical acts involved the erection of buildings to serve the retail purpose and were subordinate to that purpose. In holding that the use of lot D could not be described as a "road", his Honour said, at [45] - [46]:
A common sense and practical appraisal of the relevant parts of the building in Lot D clearly shows they cannot be described as a road within the ordinary meaning of the word 'road'. Of course, on the driveways, ramps and the circulation aisles in the basement car park, vehicles can pass. So too on the pedestrian ramps, the travelators and in the forecourt area, pedestrians can pass. But, these facts do not make those parts of the building, in the way that they are intended to be used and would be constructed to be used, a road.
The retail customers who drive their cars off Burlington Road down the driveway into the basement car park underneath the building containing the supermarket, collect their parking ticket from the ticket dispenser and park in car parking spaces especially provided for supermarket shoppers no doubt would not consider they had driven on a road since they left Burlington Road. The customers of the supermarket who are wheeling their supermarket trolley laden with goods purchased from the supermarket into the forecourt area and down the travelator especially provided for supermarket customers and their trolleys to their cars parked in the basement car parking spaces for supermarket customers would not describe the route they had passed as a road.
28This case is distinguishable from the facts in the present case. No development is proposed in the common property. The driveway is already in existence and serves the properties within the strata plan. It is a road (which is a permissible use in the zone) in the same way that the access driveway was held to be a "road" in Argyropoulos v Canterbury Municipal Council (1988) 66 LGERA 202. In that case the applicant owned a battle-axe shaped block of land and intended to use it for a light industrial purpose. Although head of the land was within a light industrial zone, the access handle was in a residential zone in which light industry use was prohibited. Cripps J held that the construction and use of a road in the access handle could be properly characterised as being for the purpose of a road, notwithstanding that the vehicles using it would only be proceeding to and from the land zoned and used for light industry.
29In North Sydney Council v Ligon 302 Pty Ltd (1996) 185 CLR 470; 91 LGERA 352, a development application was made for an extension to the North Sydney Club and the addition of residential units above the Club. Access to the Club was by right of way over adjoining land. The development application was not accompanied by the consent of the owner of the adjoining land. The High Court held that, since the development application was made to develop only the Club's land, it was the land to which the application "relates" and on which the specified development is proposed to be carried out. Accordingly, the want of consent of the owner of the adjoining land did not invalidate the application.
30North Sydney Council v Ligon 302 Pty Ltd was applied by the Court of Appeal in Hillpalm v Tweed Shire Council [2002] NSWCA 332; (affirming Hillpalm Pty Ltd v Tweed Shire Council [2002] NSWLEC 17; 119 LGERA 86). In that case a development application was made to subdivide land known as lot 1. The only access to lot 1 was by way of a "proposed right of way 10 wide" over adjoining land and shown on a registered plan of subdivision. The Court noted the requirement that a development application may only be made by, or with the consent of, the owner of the land. The owner of the adjoining land had not consented to the application. The Court held that the application in respect of lot 1 did not "relate to" the adjoining land, and that what land an application relates to must primarily, if not exclusively, be determined by an examination of the terms of the application itself.
31In the present case the development application describes the land to be developed as lot 6 in the strata plan. The Council officer, reporting on the application in a memo to the Councillors and to the general manager on 21 February 2012, said: "owner's consent from the body corporate is not required if common property is not used for the proposal, other than for access". The development consent itself describes the land to be developed as lot 6 in the strata plan. Condition 2 of the consent states: "The development is limited to the use of part of the tourist premises, being only lot 6 SP 81554 ...". Moreover, condition 2A, set out below, was imposed to ensure that all activities are contained within the lot.
32That condition is as follows:
2ALoading within the premises
All loading and unloading is to take place within the curtilage of the premises, that being within lot 6 SP 81554. All driveways and turning areas must be kep clear of obstructions at all times.
33The advice contained in the memo noted at [31] above is entirely consistent with the decision of Cripps J in Argyropoulos. I find that the land to which the development application relates is lot 6 in the strata plan, so that the written consent of the owners corporation was not required.
34In passing, I note that although the written consent of the owners corporation was not supplied, there is nothing in the evidence to suggest that it is opposed to the development. On the contrary, the minutes of the annual general meeting of the owners corporation held on 4 March 2011 show that the following resolution was passed:
Resolved that the owners - Strata Plan 81554 SPECIALLY RESOLVE pursuant to section 47 of the Strata Schemes Management Act 1996 to made an additional by-law in the following terms:
1.owners may permit their tenants to host special occasions where non-staying guests attend a function
2.non-staying guests will depart the function by 10 pm.