10 The Crown also accepted that were his Honour to have taken into account the aggravating factors in (a) or (b) above, that would also constitute patent error being contrary to what this Court has most recently stated to be the law in Whybrow v R [2008] NSWCCA 270. The Crown submitted, however, that on a proper reading of his Honour's sentencing remarks he did not in fact take the deaths of the young people into account as an aggravating factor (having been informed by the Crown in sentence proceedings that this was an impermissible approach), and did not make a finding that the grievous bodily harm suffered by AnB was substantial. (I note that there was no medical evidence tendered on sentence which identified the nature of the injuries he sustained in any event and the agreed facts makes no reference to the injuries he suffered.) It was also submitted by the Crown that although his Honour referred to the emotional loss resulting from the offences as substantial, and referred to the devastating effect on the families of the young people who were killed, he did not do so in an impermissible way, but did so simply to identify the aggravating factor in s 21A(2)(g) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act and to emphasise that the offences for which the applicant was to be sentenced were serious and that the community was entitled to expect retribution. This, it was submitted, was an approach in accordance with R v Palu [2002] NSWCCA 381; 134 A Crim R 174 where Howie J (Levine and Hidden JJ agreeing) said at [37]:
"The attitude of the victim cannot be allowed to interfere with a proper exercise of the sentencing discretion. This is so whether the attitude expressed is one of vengeance or of forgiveness: R v Glen (NSWCCA, unreported, 19 December 1994). Sentencing proceedings are not a private matter between the victim and the offender, not even to the extent that the determination of the appropriate punishment may involve meting out retribution for the wrong suffered by the victim. A serious crime is a wrong committed against the community at large and the community is itself entitled to retribution. In particular, crimes of violence committed in public are an affront to the peace and good order of the community and require deterrent sentences: Henderson (NSWCCA, unreported, 5 November 1997). Matters of general public importance are at the heart of the policies and principles that direct the proper assessment of punishment, the purpose of which is to protect the public, not to mollify the victim."
11 I am unable to agree with the Crown's construction of his Honour's sentencing remarks. In my view the following passage makes it clear that his Honour's approach to the question of whether there were established factors of aggravation in this case was in error in the way contended for by the applicant. His Honour said:
"The relevant aggravating factors pursuant to s 21A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act , and referred to by the Crown, are also matters which the court ought to take into account in determining the objective criminality involved. One of those factors is that the injury, emotional harm and loss caused by the offences was substantial.