3 In his written submission in the present issue, the appellant sought costs of both the appeal and interlocutory proceedings at first instance. He contended that such orders should be made upon the basis of the principle that costs should follow the event. The appellant also contended that, notwithstanding Rule 211 of the Industrial Relations Commission Rules 1996 (that all costs are costs in the cause, unless otherwise ordered), the circumstances of this matter warranted that costs be paid forthwith. Reliance was placed on Rule 203 which states that the Court's power as to costs can be exercised at any stage in the proceedings. Citing Surfing Hardware International Holdings Pty Ltd v McCausland [2007] NSWIRComm 285 as authority which illustrated the broad discretion inherent in Rule 203, the appellant contended that costs orders could be made forthwith in this case as the issues relating to bankruptcy and jurisdiction under s 106 were sufficiently self-contained and detached from the remainder of the proceedings. In addition, to not order the payment of costs forthwith would stultify the appellant's ability to pursue the proceedings, and impede the facilitation of legal representation. This, it was contended, was not consistent with the interests of justice.
4 As to the appellant's unsuccessful motion filed on 27 August 2006 to add the appellant as party, it was contended that costs should be in the cause, given the superfluous nature of the motion and the insignificant bearing it had on either parties' costs. In the alternative, it was submitted there should be no order as to costs.
5 The first respondent submitted that it neither opposed nor consented to the appeal by the appellant, and, accordingly, no order for costs should be made against it in the appeal proceedings. The first respondent accepted that costs should follow the event in respect of the first respondent's notice of motion filed on 23 February 2006, which pursuant to order 5 was dismissed by the Full Bench.
6 The second respondent accepted that costs should follow the event in respect of the appeal and the notices of motion filed by the second respondent on 23 February 2006 and 2 March 2006, which were dismissed by the Full Bench pursuant to orders 6 and 7.
7 The first and second respondents submitted that the respective costs as agreed or assessed should be payable by them at the conclusion of the substantive proceedings and not forthwith. The respondents submitted substantially similar arguments in this respect, contending essentially:
(a) that the appellant was an undischarged bankrupt and if he was ultimately unsuccessful in his claim or if costs were made in favour of the respondents, those costs could not be recovered because of that fact;
(b) the appellant would have an unfair advantage if he was able to recover costs forthwith, while the respondents would be deprived of the opportunity to set off the costs order against any future order made in their respective favour;
(c) there were no grounds that warranted the Court exercising its discretion under Rule 203 and ordering that costs be payable forthwith;
(d) because the appellant had also sought an order that costs be payable to him directly, by application of the Bankruptcy Act 1966, in those circumstances, pursuant to s 58(1)(b), any costs payable would be property of the trustee;
(e) in relation to the appellant's unsuccessful notice of motion dated 27 August 2006, the appellant should pay the costs of the motion and due to the bankruptcy, all costs orders should be made at the conclusion of the proceedings.
8 We consider that, with respect to the second respondent, the usual rule should apply and that costs should follow the event, and the appellant should receive his costs with respect to both the appeal proceedings and the interlocutory applications in the Court below in the form of the orders made below.
9 Because of the submitting appearance by the first respondent, no order shall be made against the first respondent in the appeal proceedings, but an order for the costs incurred at first instance on the first respondent's motion should be made in favour of the appellant.