Robertson v R

Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW)|2017-08-11|Before: Simpson JA, Harrison J, Davies J

The applicant's personal circumstances

Evidence was put before the sentencing judge in the form of a Pre-Sentence Report and a psychological report. The applicant's father also gave oral evidence. A number of references were provided. The applicant himself did not give evidence. From this material, the following emerged.
The applicant was born in July 1996. He was therefore 19 - almost 20 - years of age at the time of the offences. He had no prior convictions. His background was unremarkable. He lived with his parents and two older sisters, all of whom were in employment. There were no family issues. The applicant completed the Higher School Certificate in 2014 and began a double degree course in Business and Commerce at the University of Western Sydney. He did this at the urging of his mother, who is an accountant and who wanted him to take up the profession so that he could involve himself in the family business, as she did. The applicant did not complete the course but began an accounting course at TAFE, which he also did not complete. He has had employment as a process worker in a medical manufacturing company.
As a teenager, he began using alcohol (which did not appeal to him) and then drugs. He became a regular user of MDMA, and later occasionally used LSD. His drug use escalated, and he, on occasions, lost time from work as a result. He became involved in drug supply by initially buying drugs for his own use, in bulk in order to save money, and then to sell to friends and acquaintances.
After his arrest the applicant was released on bail, initially subject to three times weekly reporting conditions, and to a curfew. The reporting condition was subsequently deleted.

The proceedings on sentence

The positions of the parties at sentencing were clear-cut. Counsel who appeared for the applicant advanced two main propositions. The first was that the activities of the applicant did not amount to "trafficking to a substantial degree". (The significance of this will become apparent in due course.) The second was that, even if it were held that the applicant's drug dealing did constitute "trafficking to a substantial degree", it was open, nevertheless, for the sentencing judge to consider imposing a sentence to be served by way of an intensive correction order ("ICO"), as provided by s 7 of the Sentencing Procedure Act.
Some discussion took place concerning a longstanding line of authority dealing with sentencing offenders who had engaged in drug dealing "to a substantial degree". The position of the Crown was that the applicant was engaged in "trafficking drugs to a substantial degree", and that, therefore, precedent and principle demanded that he be sentenced to a term of imprisonment. It therefore submitted that an ICO would not be adequate punishment. It submitted that issues of general deterrence "loom large". Counsel for the applicant did not demur from the proposition that, if it be found that his drug dealing was substantial, then the course of authority in this Court did indeed indicate that a sentence of imprisonment should be imposed. His contention was, first, as to whether the preliminary finding, that the drug dealing was substantial, should be made. Even if it were, he contended, a sentence of imprisonment to be served by way of an ICO lay within the available sentencing options.

The Remarks on Sentence

The sentencing judge recounted the facts of the offences and the evidence concerning the applicant's personal circumstances in a manner that has not attracted criticism. He accepted the evidence of the applicant's father that the applicant had ceased drug use. He was satisfied that the applicant was genuinely remorseful. He considered the applicant's prospects of rehabilitation to be excellent, and that he was unlikely to reoffend. Relevantly to the grounds of appeal, he said: "An important issue in this sentencing is to determine whether or not it is established beyond reasonable doubt that the offender was supplying drugs in a substantial way. If so the general principal [sic] is that unless there are exceptional circumstances a sentence of full time imprisonment should be imposed. That principle is long standing in this State and in that regard I refer to Forti v R [2016] NSWCCA 127. While it is not a principle enshrined in the statutory provision, I do not consider that what was said in EF v R [2015] NSWCCA 36 which I was taken to during submissions, detracts from the authority of that principle. See in that regard R v Ejefekaire [2016] NSWCCA 308. What constitutes substantial involvement in the supply of drugs is a matter for evaluation in the individual case. Here I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the Offender was engaged in the supply of drugs in a substantial way."
He gave reasons for reaching that conclusion. The reasons included the content of the text messages which resulted in the charges of drug supply in May and June. It is plain enough that his Honour drew, from the content of those exchanges, an inference that the applicant had engaged in supply on other occasions. No point has been taken on this application in relation to that inference, or the effect that it may have had on the finding of substantial dealing.
Later in the Remarks on Sentence his Honour is recorded as saying: "I referred earlier to the general principle that where someone has been supplying drugs in a substantial way, absence [scil - absent] exceptional circumstances, a sentence of full time custody should be imposed. The Court of Criminal Appeal has not as far as I am aware said what does amount to exceptional circumstances. But cases such as Smaragdis v R [2010] NSWCCA 276 make clear that the case must be truly exceptional before a sentence other than full time imprisonment is to be imposed. In particular I have regard to what was said at paragraph 31 of that decision, that the authorities have made it clear that a plea of guilty, remorse, an intention not to re-offend and proven rehabilitation in relation to an Offender's drug use, even where such circumstances can be in combination described as strong, are not matters of mitigation constituting an exceptional reason for departing from the general principle, unless the aggregate of circumstances point to the case being one of real difference from the general run of cases." He concluded, expressing some regret, that: "… [the applicant's] subjective case does not make out a case that is one which has a real difference from the general run of cases this Court sees for this type of offending and is not truly exceptional." He expressly stated his view that: "… the offences are too serious to deal with them by way of an Intensive Correction Order or a suspended sentence."
The sentencing judge accepted, nevertheless, that the main purpose of the applicant's involvement in drug supply was to fund his own habit. He assessed the objective gravity of the offences as "well below the mid-range level of objective seriousness". He accepted that the applicant was genuinely remorseful, but considered that both general and personal deterrence had "a real part to play" in the sentencing exercise.
In recognition of the applicant's early pleas of guilty, he allowed a 25 per cent reduction in the sentence he otherwise would have imposed.

The application for leave to appeal

Four grounds of appeal were proposed. They were formulated as follows: "Ground One The applicant submits that the learned sentencing judge misapplied the principle that exceptional circumstances are ordinarily required if an other than custodial sentence is to be imposed. Ground two The content of the wrong principle is that exceptional circumstances or a special subjective standard are necessary in order to enliven section 7. Section 7 is not subject to Clark's case. Ground three The applicant submits the learned trial judge failed to take into account a relevant and material consideration (section 7 of the [Sentencing Procedure Act]) in all of the circumstances, in accordance with established principles of statutory construction. Ground four The applicant submits the sentence is manifestly excessive in all of the circumstances."
The substance of the application, as I understood it, was that the sentencing judge wrongly excluded from consideration the possibility of imposing a sentence of imprisonment to be served by way of an ICO, with the result that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive.
Section 7(1) of the Sentencing Procedure Act provides as follows: "A court that has sentenced an offender to imprisonment for not more than 2 years may make an intensive correction order directing that the sentence be served by way of intensive correction in the community."

Submissions on behalf of the applicant

The submissions on behalf of the applicant were brief. They asserted that, in the exercise of the sentencing discretion, the sentencing judge "adopted a two-tiered approach which failed to take into account all of the circumstances consistent with the instinctive synthesis approach". It was also submitted that the sentencing judge was in error, in that the approach he took assumed that the applicant could not be dealt with by way of an ICO unless exceptional circumstances had been established. In support of the proposition that that constituted error, reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in EF v R [2015] NSWCCA 36. Since the sentencing judge approached the exercise on the basis that exceptional circumstances had to be demonstrated before a non-custodial sentence such as an ICO could be imposed, he failed to take into account a material consideration: House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40.

Submissions of the Crown

The Crown did not address the grounds of appeal directly. That is not intended to be a criticism. The Crown took that course because it had identified the error in the Form 1 offence, and acknowledged that, as a result, the sentencing process miscarried (through no fault of the sentencing judge). That circumstance necessitated the Court proceeding to set aside the sentence and exercise the sentencing discretion afresh: Kentwell. The focus of the Crown's submissions was on the resentencing exercise that this Court was obliged to undertake.
In addressing that exercise, the Crown relied on the authorities to which the sentencing judge referred, concerning the asserted need for offences of substantial drug dealing to be met with custodial sentences. I will return to this question below.

Consideration

That an ICO may, in appropriate circumstances, be an available sentencing option, even in cases of drug supply, is established by the decision of this Court in EF, to which the sentencing judge referred. The circumstances in EF were not dissimilar to those in the present case (although EF's personal circumstances were more powerful). EF's counsel had omitted to make any submission concerning the availability of an ICO, with the result that the sentencing judge did not give that option any consideration.
Delivering the principal judgment of the Court, Schmidt J said (at [42]) that the failure to consider imposing a sentence to be served by way of an ICO was "plainly unjust and contrary to the requirements" of s 5 of the Sentencing Procedure Act, and demonstrative of error, and that whether an ICO should have been imposed was "an important consideration" but one to which no attention was paid.
In this case it is plain that the sentencing judge did not entirely overlook the possibility of proceeding by way of an ICO. It was expressly put to him and expressly rejected by him. He rejected the submission in the briefest of terms, saying only that the offences were too serious to be dealt with in that way, or by a suspended sentence. It seems to me that his Honour adopted that position because he regarded the statement of "principle" that he had earlier set out as determinative of the process. Indeed, when referring to the "principle" he said that he did not consider that the decision in EF "detracted" from it.
In my opinion, that was erroneous. EF is clear authority that an ICO may be imposed, even in cases of drug supply, and ought to be given full, fair and genuine consideration. In this case it was not, because of the view his Honour took of previous authorities in this Court. A realistic sentencing option was discarded.
I was satisfied that the sentencing judge erroneously took the view that previous authority of this Court precluded the imposition of a sentence to be served by way of an ICO. On that basis, as well as by reason of the error identified by the Crown, it became necessary to set aside the sentence imposed and resentence the applicant.

Resentencing

The starting point in any sentencing exercise begins with s 5(1) of the Sentencing Procedure Act which provides: "A court must not sentence an offender to imprisonment unless it is satisfied, having considered all possible alternatives, that no penalty other than imprisonment is appropriate."
Sentencing must be undertaken in the light of the statement of purposes of sentencing in s 3A of the Sentencing Procedure Act. That section provides: "3A Purposes of sentencing The purposes for which a court may impose a sentence on an offender are as follows: (a) to ensure that the offender is adequately punished for the offence, (b) to prevent crime by deterring the offender and other persons from committing similar offences, (c) to protect the community from the offender, (d) to promote the rehabilitation of the offender, (e) to make the offender accountable for his or her actions, (f) to denounce the conduct of the offender, (g) to recognise the harm done to the victim of the crime and the community."
In my opinion, this was a case in which the imposition of a sentence to be served by way of an ICO would have been appropriate. An ICO is a sentence of considerable severity. It is a sentence of imprisonment (although the fact that it is to be served in the community introduces a substantial degree of leniency). It is subject to stringent statutory conditions, as well as other conditions that may be imposed to suit the circumstances of the individual case. It involves a minimum level of community service, and potentially intrusive supervision. The full regime may be found in the Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Act 1999 (NSW) and the Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Regulation 2008 (NSW), and is spelled out in some detail in R v Pogson; R v Lapham; R v Martin (2012) 82 NSWLR 60; [2012] NSWCCA 225.
The circumstances that I considered warranted recourse to an ICO were the applicant's youth at the time of offending, his prior good character, the evidence of virtually complete rehabilitation, and the relatively low level of trafficking established in the evidence.
Were it not for the following circumstances, I would have favoured orders granting leave to appeal and allowing the appeal only so far as necessary to order that the sentence imposed (or what remained of it) be served by way of ICO. However, by reason of the passage of time, there were obstacles in the way of taking that course. First, the applicant had served a little over 4 months of the 10 month minimum term imposed. Second, there are delays in the process of imposing an ICO because, by Pt 5 of the Sentencing Procedure Act, it is necessary that an offender in respect of whom consideration is being given to an ICO be referred to the Commissioner for Corrective Services for assessment before a final order is made. The experience of this Court is that, generally, assessment reports cannot be prepared in less than six weeks. If that course were to be taken, it would then be necessary for the applicant to return to this Court for final orders, or for the Court to remit the matter for sentencing in the District Court. A question of the custody (or bail) of the applicant would arise. I was persuaded that, given these circumstances, to investigate the possibility of an ICO was now impractical. Accordingly, I joined in the orders set out above.

Additional remarks

In stating what he called "the general principle", that is, that offences of drug dealing to a substantial degree will necessarily be met by sentences of imprisonment, the sentencing judge was reflecting a long line of decisions of this Court, to some of which I have been a party, and of some of which I have been the author.
On reflection, I have come to the view that the statement of "principle" calls for re-examination. (In fact, I doubt whether it can properly be called a "principle". It may more accurately be called a judicially imposed constraint on the exercise of the sentencing discretion.)
The origin of the "principle" is frequently traced to a 1990 decision of this Court, R v Peter Michael Clark (Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW), 15 March 1990, unreported). (This is the decision to which reference was made in Ground 2 of the proposed grounds of appeal.) The statement in Clark itself made clear (without detail) that the general proposition derived from previous decisions. What Hunt J (as he then was) said was: "This Court has, on occasions too numerous to mention, emphasised that sentences involving a substantial general deterrence are to be imposed on drug traffickers, and it has indicated that only in exceptional circumstances will a noncustodial order be appropriate."
Two years later, his Honour (by then Hunt CJ at CL) returned to the theme. He repeated the remark in Clark, saying: "In Regina v Peter Michael Clark (15 March 1990, unreported), this Court repeated previous statements made by it that sentences involving a substantial deterrence are to be imposed on drug traffickers, and that only in exceptional circumstances will a non-custodial order be appropriate. That case was concerned with the supply by the person concerned to a number of different people over a period of time, although not upon a profitable commercial basis. The point which was made was that custodial sentences were normally required, whether or not a profit had been obtained, for 'trafficking alone in any substantial degree'. The word 'trafficking' clearly carries with it the connotation of supply on more than one occasion." (R v Bardo (NSWCCA, 14 July 1992, unreported))
The statement in Clark was made in the context of the rejection (by a majority of that Court) of a submission that the "principle" was restricted to circumstances in which a profit had been (or, presumably, was intended to be) made. That, in turn, derived from an earlier decision of the court, R v Michael John Hayes (1987) 29 A Crim R 452. It is notable that, although in Hayes the majority held that the sentence imposed (which was a sentence of full time imprisonment) was manifestly inadequate, there is, in that judgment, no statement to the effect that, in every case of drug dealing to a substantial degree (absent exceptional circumstances) a sentence of imprisonment must, or ought to, be imposed.
Nevertheless, it may be accepted that examination and analysis of sentencing practices establishes that, where the facts of an offence demonstrate drug dealing "to a substantial degree", a sentence of imprisonment will ordinarily be imposed. Moreover, recognition of the serious social implications of drug dealing (reflected, if in nothing else, in the maximum prescribed sentences) suggests that, in the ordinary case, a sentence other than imprisonment will fail to meet sentencing objectives.
The statement in Clark has been endorsed on countless occasions. In 1998, Priestley JA, with whom Abadee and Kirby JJ agreed, described the statement in Clark as one that had been repeated in a series of cases and described it as a statement "about which there is no room for debate": R v Cacciola (1998) 104 A Crim R 178 at 182. In a later passage (in what was an extempore judgment), having stated his view that the Crown appeal in that case should be dismissed (in the exercise of the residual discretion to dismiss a Crown appeal, notwithstanding that error is established), Priestley JA said: "In doing so the intention is that the policy of the Court, as I have been saying more than once, as shown in Clarke [sic] and the long series of succeeding cases, should be followed. It should also be recognised that the Court regards that policy as a continuing one which the Court will continue to seek to enforce." (at p 184)
In R v Carrion (2000) 49 NSWLR 149; [2000] NSWCCA 191, without explicitly endorsing or even referring to the "principle", a five-judge bench upheld a Crown submission that none of a series of matters advanced as justifying a sentence of imprisonment to be served by way of periodic detention "was capable of constituting exceptional circumstances which would justify the imposition of a sentence other than full time custody". It may be taken that their Honours accepted the anterior proposition, that, other than in exceptional circumstances, substantial drug dealing offences should be deal with by way of sentences of full-time imprisonment.
In R v Saba [2006] NSWCCA 214 Handley JA, with whom Hoeben J (as he then was) agreed, said: "17 This Court has consistently held that drug trafficking requires the imposition of a sentence of full time custody unless there are exceptional circumstances. Although this principle predates the decision in R v Clarke [sic] … that case is commonly cited for this proposition …"
In R v Wen Fei Gu [2006] NSWCCA 104 Howie J, with whom Grove J and I agreed, said: "27 It was my opinion the sentences were manifestly inadequate. There has been a consistent line of authority in this Court that has made it quite clear that, unless there are truly exceptional circumstances present, a full-time custodial sentence ought to be imposed wherever the offender has been substantially involved in the supply of prohibited drugs: see R v Blanco (NSWCCA, unreported, 22 October 1987). It applies whether or not the offender has made a profit from the supply of drugs and a profit is an aggravating circumstance: R v Clarke [sic] …"
In R v Gip; R v Ly (2006) 161 A Crim R 173; [2006] NSWCCA 115 McClellan CJ at CL referred, with apparent approval, to both Clark and R v Bardo (NSWCCA, 14 July 1992, unreported).
In Fayd'Herbe v R [2007] NSWCCA 20, Adams J, with whom Price J agreed, and Howie J partially agreed, reviewed a number of the previously mentioned authorities and said: "22 … Casting sentencing options in terms of exceptions (though frequently done) strikes me as unnecessarily emphatic. To state what should be done in the usual case or normally should be done should be sufficient and accords appropriate respect to the importance of the exercise by the primary judge of his or her judicial discretion. Be that as it may, I think it must be concluded that the weight of decisions of this Court favours the Clark line of authority which, to my mind, is correctly summarised in the passage above quoted from the judgment of Howie J in Gu."
In R v Pickett [2010] NSWCCA 273 (with the concurrence of Fullerton and R A Hulme JJ) I said: "63 It is well established that drug dealing 'to a substantial degree' will, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, demand a sentence of full-time imprisonment …" I repeated that (with the concurrence of Hoeben and R A Hulme JJ), in Zahrooni v R; Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Zahrooni [2010] NSWCCA 252 at [29].
In Smaragdis v R [2010] NSWCCA 276 Fullerton J, with whom R A Hulme J and I agreed, said: "30 As this Court has repeatedly emphasised, when sentencing offenders who have supplied drugs to any significant degree, the general principle is that the imposition of a full-time custodial sentence is necessary to reflect the need for general deterrence (even where the quantity of drugs involved reduces the objective seriousness to below mid range), and that only in the exceptional case, where the applicant's subjective circumstances can be shown to mitigate the objective gravity of the offending in such a way as to distinguish it from the general run of cases, will a non-custodial sentence be appropriate."
This is by no means an exhaustive list of decisions of this Court to the same effect. It is unnecessary to lengthen these already lengthy reasons by reinforcing the hold that the statement in Clark has taken. It is, however, to be observed that, in each case, in calling for full-time custodial sentences, the author necessarily excludes from consideration any of the non-custodial alternatives, such as ICOs or suspended sentences.
There have, however, been some notes of caution expressed, and there are indications that some members of the Court have experienced some discomfort or disquiet, perhaps at the absolute nature or the imperative tone of the statements, or perhaps at their prescriptiveness.
The passage cited from Cacciola was not all Priestley JA had to say on the subject. He added (at pp 183-184): "… the fact remains that what has been said in Clarke [sic] is something that this Court continues to consider is the proper approach to sentencing, always bearing in mind the need to consider every convicted person's case on its own merits and in its own circumstances. … Speaking of policy I reiterate what I mentioned before that the sentencing rule which emerges from Clarke [sic] and later cases is a continuing rule … although the sentencing Judge must, in the end, always exercise his or her own discretion, but the sentencing policy or rule is not to be neglected." (italics added)
In R v Gip, Rothman J said: "41 The statement of principle by this Court in R v Clark (or likewise, the explanation in R v Bardo [NSWCCA, 14 July 1992, unreported]) is not a legislative enactment. It ought not be the subject of analysis in the same way as a statute. As the passage cited by McClellan CJ at CL from R v Clark makes clear, it is the involvement in general supply of drugs to others that is the concern of the principle which favours custodial sentences. As such, the term 'drug trafficking' or 'trafficking' ought not be given rigid definitions, or subjected to the same scrutiny to which we subject 'supply' and 'deemed supply' in the [DMT] Act. Nor should the Court constrain itself by an overly technical approach to a sentence to be imposed."
In Youssef v R [2014] NSWCCA 285 the sentencing judge had expressly acknowledged the "long line of authority, commencing with the case of R v Peter Michael Clark". McCallum J, with whom I agreed, referred to the passage from Clark, and said: "30 The principle stated in Clark (described in the headnote as 'the policy laid down by the Court of Criminal Appeal) states the existence of a requirement, in the circumstances delineated by the Court, to establish exceptional circumstances in order to obtain a non-custodial sentence … Similarly in Bardo [NSWCCA, 14 July 1992, unreported], the language of the judgment suggests that, where a person is involved in trafficking in any substantial degree, the court is 'bound' to find exceptional circumstances before considering other than a custodial sentence …"
However, her Honour commented: "32 The proposition approved by the majority in Clark, asserting as it does the existence of a constraint devised by the Court of Criminal Appeal on the exercise of the sentencing discretion of judges, may warrant reconsideration in light of the remarks of the High Court (in a different context) in Hili v R; Jones v R [2010] HCA 45 at [36] to [38]. However, the correctness of the decision in Clark was not raised in the present appeal and in any event need not be determined."
In a concurring judgment in EF (see above) I referred to the judgment of Howie J in Gu and said: "10 … Decisions to that effect are legion; one of those is R v Clark … Nothing in any of those decisions obviates the need for sentencing judges to consider the circumstances of each case individually, including the availability (in a practical sense) of alternatives to full-time custody. The starting point of this exercise is s 5(1) of the [the Sentencing Procedure Act], which forbids a court sentencing an offender to impose a term of imprisonment unless satisfied, after consideration of all possible alternatives, that no penalty other than imprisonment is appropriate. See the discussion in Hili v The Queen; Jones v The Queen … (specifically concerning sentencing of federal offences, but equally applicable to sentencing under the Sentencing Procedure Act)." I then referred to the passages from Cacciola that I have extracted above, in which Priestley JA had somewhat diluted or moderated his otherwise absolute statements.
In Forti v R [2016] NSWCCA 127 (a decision to which the sentencing judge referred) Basten JA, with whom Rothman J agreed, referred to the "principle" without expressly endorsing it, but cautioned against the use of the term "exceptional circumstances" as if it were a statutory prescription requiring definition. It is, his Honour said: "20 … no more than a handy phrase covering a range of factors which may provide guidance. Further, what constitutes 'substantial' involvement in the supply of drugs and whether such activities may be described as 'trafficking' are matters for evaluation in the individual case."
However, in R v Ejefekaire [2016] NSWCCA 308, this Court, constituted by Gleeson JA and Fagan and N Adams JJ, appeared to reaffirm the "principle". After referring to my remarks in EF their Honours said: "61 … The Court does not take her Honour to have intended by this statement that the long-standing principle that exceptional circumstances must be established before a person who supplies prohibited drugs to a substantial degree is to avoid a sentence of full-time custody is no longer good law."
It will be seen from the above that the language varies from case to case. Some judges (Hunt J in Clark, Priestley JA in Cacciola, Handley JA in Saba, Howie J in Gu, Fullerton J in Smaragdis) employ language of mandate (although Priestley JA was also at some pains to place emphasis on the need for attention to be given to the individual circumstances of each case, and the individual discretion of each sentencing judge). All, it is true, also recognise that "exceptional circumstances" might permit departure from the "principle", without identifying the kind of exceptional circumstances that might qualify. Other judges, more cautiously, use language reflecting recognition of sentencing practice.
What has consistently been stated as a "principle" is (in my opinion), no more than and is properly to be seen as a conclusion drawn from a history of sentencing in respect of relevant offences. Without legislative authority, it could not be more. The decisions upon which the "principle" is based are entitled to significant respect as the result of considered decisions and the experience of sentencing judges and appellate courts. Sentences imposed in the past, in relevantly similar circumstances, can and do provide significant guidance to sentencing judges. But they give rise to no binding precedent: The Queen v Pham (2015) 256 CLR 550; [2015] HCA 39 at [29]. They are not statements of principle. Far less are they prescriptions for sentencing judges. The High Court has, more than once, used the metaphor of a "yardstick" constituted by prior sentencing decisions against which a sentencing judge may measure a proposed sentence: see Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357; [2005] HCA 25 at [31]; Hili v The Queen; Jones v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 52; [2010] HCA 45 at [54]; Barbaro v The Queen; Zirilli v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 58; [2014] HCA 2 at [41].
It is amply established that sentencing judges may, and should, have regard to historical patterns of sentencing in respect of particular offences: see Wong v The Queen; Leung v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 584; [2001] HCA 64 at [6] and [59]-[60]; Markarian at [44]; Hili at [54]; Barbaro at [41]. That is seen as an aid to consistency in sentencing, something that promotes confidence in the criminal justice system: Wong at [6]-[10]. What is sought is not "numerical equivalence" but consistency in the application of principle (Hili at [48]; Pham at [46]-[47]).
There are, in the judgments of the High Court of Australia, many statements concerning the exercise of the sentencing discretion. Invariably, the judgments maintain the primacy of the sentencing discretion of the individual judge, and the need in that exercise to balance a complexity of sometimes competing or contradictory factors that exist in the individual case.
Dinsdale v The Queen (2000) 202 CLR 321; [2000] HCA 54 was an appeal from the Supreme Court of Western Australia, concerning sentences imposed on the appellant for sexual offences against a child. The Supreme Court had allowed a Crown appeal against what was held to be the manifest inadequacy of the sentence. The High Court unanimously allowed an appeal from that decision although different reasons were given, by Gleeson CJ and Hayne J in one judgment, Gaudron and Gummow JJ in another, and Kirby J in a third.
At [68] Kirby J, commenting on the asserted inconsistency of the sentence imposed with other sentences, said: "It is true that both by the applicable statute, and by the common law, a primary duty of judges on sentencing is to give due weight to the objective seriousness of the offence … Penetration, including digital penetration, is an invasion of the privacy and dignity of the child that will commonly call for a custodial sentence to be served. But there is no absolute rule. Each case must be judged on its own facts. The adoption of a blanket rule would itself be an error of sentencing principle. A discretion must be left to permit those with the responsibility of sentencing to take into account the peculiar circumstances of the case, any exceptional circumstances affecting the prisoner, and in some cases the prisoner's family, or some feature of the matter that reasonably arouses a judicial decision that a measure of mercy is called for in the particular case." (italics added, internal citations omitted)
That was a case in which the relevant Western Australian statute required a sentencing court to eliminate less serious sentencing options before imposing a more serious one. The Court of Criminal Appeal had begun asking whether the case was of a type that called for imprisonment, and then asking whether it was appropriate, either out of mercy, to aid rehabilitation, or for other "good and sufficient reason" to order the suspension of the sentence.
That, Gleeson CJ and Hayne J held, was to "invert the order in which the statute requires a sentencing judge to consider matters" (at [11]-[13]).
The task of a sentencing judge was stated by Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ in Wong at [75], in the following terms: "75 … the task of the sentencer is to take account of all of the relevant factors and to arrive at a single result which takes due account of them all. That is what is meant by saying that the task is to arrive at an 'instinctive synthesis'. This expression is used, not as might be supposed, to cloak the task of the sentencer in some mystery, but to make plain that the sentencer is called on to reach a single sentence which, in the case of an offence like the one now under discussion, balances many different and conflicting features." (italics in original)
In Markarian (at [37]) Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ quoted from the decision of Gleeson CJ (when Chief Justice of NSW) in R v Gallagher (1991) 23 NSWLR 220 as saying (at 228): "It must often be the case that an offender's conduct in pleading guilty, his expressions of contrition, his willingness to co-operate with the authorities, and the personal risks to which he thereby exposes himself, will form a complex of inter-related considerations, and an attempt to separate out one or more of those considerations will not only be artificial and contrived, but will also be illogical." Their Honours went on to say, quoting from Wong: "37 … So long as a sentencing judge must, or may, take account of all of the circumstances of the offence and the offender, to single out some of those considerations and attribute specific numerical or proportionate value to some features, distorts the already difficult balancing exercise which the judge must perform." (italics in original)
In Wong, the High Court had under consideration a judgment of this Court, in which "guideline sentences" in respect of a particular kind of drug importation (which were of course, federal offences) were promulgated: R v Wong; R v Leung (1999) 48 NSWLR 340; [1999] NSWCCA 420 ("Wong (1999)"). (By Pt 3 Div 4 of the Sentencing Procedure Act, such judgments are now expressly authorised in respect of offences against the law of NSW, but those provisions were not then in force, and, in any event, do not apply to the sentencing of federal offenders.)
Prior to the enactment of Pt 3 Div 4, "guideline judgments" had been introduced in NSW in R v Jurisic (1998) 45 NSWLR 209. They were said to have: "… a useful role to play in ensuring that an appropriate balance exists between the broad discretion that must be retained to ensure that justice is done in each individual case, on the one hand, and the desirability of consistency in sentencing and the maintenance of public confidence in sentences actually imposed, and in the judiciary as a whole, on the other." (at p 220, per Spigelman CJ)
Spigelman CJ went on to say that guideline judgments perform a limited role, and are not binding "in a formal sense" (at pp 220-221). The advantage of guideline judgments, the Chief Justice said, lies in their flexibility. They make provision for the special or exceptional case. There is recognition that they serve sentencing objectives beyond denunciation and deterrence, such as rehabilitation. They allow a sentencing judge to respond appropriately to all the circumstances of a particular case (at p 221).
The judgment in Wong (1999) (in this Court) promulgated a range of guideline sentences in relation to the importation of specified quantities of drugs, applicable to persons low in the hierarchy of the importing organisation. Spigelman CJ, who delivered the leading judgment (at [142]), emphasised that the range of sentences had been determined primarily on the basis of existing sentencing patterns, and was intended to be non-binding. His Honour was also explicit that, in particular cases, sentencing outside the range may be appropriate ([141]).
Notwithstanding that, and notwithstanding the disclaimers in Jurisic, the High Court unanimously condemned the approach to sentencing represented by the use of prescriptive guidelines. Gleeson CJ acknowledged the value of consistency in sentencing (at [7]-[11]). Nevertheless, his Honour held (at [31]) that the formulation of guideline sentences went beyond an attempt to identify sentencing patterns, and would have the effect of constraining the sentencing discretion. That was inconsistent with s 16A of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), the equivalent in Commonwealth law of s 21A of the Sentencing Procedure Act.
Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ, in a joint judgment, held that the process was directed, not to the principles upon which a sentencing judge should act, but to the resultant sentences; it therefore gave no guidance as to what may make a particular case "typical" or "exceptional" (at [45], p 602). Although their Honours recognised that there can be value in sentencing courts having regard to previous decisions, that is so only if: "59 … accompanied by an articulation of what are to be seen as the unifying principles which those disparate sentences may reveal."
Their Honours did appear to approve a statement by Doyle CJ in the Supreme Court of South Australia (Police v Cadd (1997) 69 SASR 150) in which he had said, in respect of a particular class of offending (driving while disqualified) that the punishment should "in the ordinary case" be imprisonment "but the circumstances of the offending or the offender or both may dictate some less severe form of punishment" (at [61]). Their Honours went on to demonstrate that in that decision "the real content of the guidance lay in the reasons which were given for the stated conclusion", and that the reasons gave guidance as to what was meant by "ordinary", and the criteria that should be applied in exercising the discretion in sentencing an offender for the offence in question (at [62]). Their Honours concluded: "63 … What is to be noted is that the Court articulated the reasons which it had for disposing of the appeals before it by reference to the principles which informed those dispositions. It is those principles which properly guide future sentencers."
At [77] their Honours referred to "the complexity of the sentencing task", saying: "… A sentencing judge must take into account a wide variety of matters which concern the seriousness of the offence for which the offender stands to be sentenced and the personal history and circumstances of the offender. Very often there are competing and contradictory considerations. What may mitigate the seriousness of one offence may aggravate the seriousness of another. Yet from these the sentencing judge must distil an answer which reflects human behaviour in the time or monetary units of punishment."
At [82], referring to a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada (R v McDonnell [1997] 1 SCR 948) their Honours distinguished between "the judicial and the legislative function" (something Rothman J alluded to in Gip).
At [83] their Honours said: "For the reasons that have already been given, the guideline stated in the present matters was intended to have prescriptive effect. As was said in McDonnell, it was to be treated as if departure from it would evidence an error of principle by the sentencing judge. Again, for the reasons given earlier, there is an important distinction between a court articulating the principles which do, or should, underpin the determination of a particular sentence and the publication of the expected or intended results of future cases. Articulation of applicable principle is central to the reasoned exercise of jurisdiction in the particular matters before the court. By contrast, the publication of expected or intended results of future cases is not within the jurisdiction or the powers of the court." (italics added)
There are, in the Clark (and the cases following) formulation, two value judgments. The first is quantification - whether the drug trafficking is "to a substantial degree". The second is whether there exist "exceptional circumstances" justifying departure from the otherwise mandated sentence of full-time imprisonment. Neither "drug trafficking to a substantial degree" nor "exceptional circumstances" is defined. In Smaragdis the Court identified circumstances that it said will not (apparently ever) constitute "exceptional circumstances". That was a judgment in which I concurred, a concurrence which I now consider may have been ill-founded.
I question whether it is a mistake to regard a history of sentences with respect to a particular class of offences as prescriptive of sentences that must be imposed for offences of that class in the future. Those sentences are, as was spelled out in Hili, a yardstick, a useful point of reference. In particular, it may be a mistake to prescribe that offences of drug dealing "to a substantial degree" must, absent "exceptional circumstances", be met with a sentence of imprisonment. That is a pronouncement that, it appears to me, crosses the boundary between identifying the "unifying principles" to be applied in any sentencing decision and imposing an unlegislated judicially created constraint on the sentencing discretion.
First, there is no statutory warrant for any such prescription. Second, the prescription fails to define "drug dealing to a substantial degree". Third, the prescription fails to define what might constitute "exceptional circumstances". Fourth, the prescription fails to identify the source of the exception.
One issue in Hili was what was perceived to be a "norm" in relation to the proportion between a non-parole period and a head sentence in respect of sentences imposed for federal offences. The High Court unanimously rejected the proposition that such a "norm" should dictate sentencing decisions. Inter alia, the majority (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ) said that references to the "norm" were "necessarily misleading" if they distracted attention from the applicable statutory provisions (in that case, Pt 1B of the Crimes Act 1914). They were misleading if they distracted attention from the relevant sentencing considerations (see [38]). In particular, their Honours said that such references would mislead: "… if they suggest that the offender must demonstrate some special circumstance to warrant departure from a set, mathematically calculated, relationship between the time to be served in custody and the head sentence." (at [38]) The Court said: "It is wrong to begin from some assumed starting point and then seek to identify 'special circumstances'."
This was what McCallum J referred to in Youssef. The observations are readily adaptable and applicable to the prescription that offences of a particular category must be met by a particular form of sentence, unless "exceptional circumstances" are demonstrated.
An analogy may also be drawn with the decision of the High Court in Kentwell. In that case, the appellant had, in this Court, sought an extension of the time prescribed for filing an application for leave to appeal against sentence, on a specific ground. Extension of time was governed by statutory provisions. An earlier decision of this Court (Abdul v R [2013] NSWCCA 247) had held that, in the determination of such an application, the Court was required to ask itself whether refusal of the application would occasion substantial injustice. Such a test was not to be found in the relevant statutory provisions.
The High Court held ([31]) that it was an error to introduce into the application such an additional test. At [45] the High Court said that this Court wrongly confined its discretion by applying a test which required that the applicant demonstrate substantial injustice if the application were refused.
The task of a sentencing judge is to impose a sentence that is just in all of the circumstances, those circumstances including the objective gravity of the offence in question, together with the personal circumstances of the offender, and any mitigating circumstances. Nowhere in the legislative regime is there any direction that, in sentencing in relation to drug offences, a sentencing judge must first determine to impose a sentence of full-time imprisonment, and then to examine the case for "exceptional circumstances". Such an approach, in my opinion, comes dangerously close to the forbidden "two-stage sentencing": Wong at [74]-[76], Markarian at [37].
Any sentencing exercise must begin with the applicable legislation governing sentencing, either general or in the particular case. So much was stated by the majority in Markarian at [26] in relation to appeals alleging error of principle, but it applies equally to the first instance sentencing exercise. It was also at the heart of the decision of the High Court in Wong. In this case the relevant legislation is, first, those provisions of the DMT Act that prescribe the maximum applicable sentences, and, second, the Sentencing Procedure Act, in particular s 3A (stating the purposes of sentencing), s 5 (requiring a court to consider all possible alternatives before imposing a sentence of imprisonment) and s 21A (stating, non-exhaustively, relevant sentencing considerations). The majority in Markarian went on to say: "27 Express legislative provisions apart, neither principle, nor any of the grounds of appellate review, dictates the particular path that a sentencer, passing sentence in a case where the penalty is not fixed by statute, must follow in reasoning to the conclusion that the sentence to be imposed should be fixed as it is. The judgment is a discretionary judgment and, as the bases for appellate review reveal, what is required is that the sentencer must take into account all relevant considerations (and only relevant considerations) in forming the conclusion reached. As has now been pointed out more than once, there is no single correct sentence. And judges at first instance are to be allowed as much flexibility in sentencing as is consonant with consistency of approach and as accords with the statutory regime that applies." (emphasis added, internal citations omitted)
Section 5(1) of the Sentencing Procedure Act is couched in mandatory terms. A court must not sentence an offender to imprisonment unless satisfied, having considered all possible alternatives, that no sentence other than imprisonment is appropriate. I recognise that a sentence to be served by way of an ICO is a sentence of imprisonment, but there is nothing in s 5 that directs a judge, having decided that no alternative to imprisonment is a viable option, then to exclude from consideration any non-custodial means by which the sentence may be served.
Yet the formulation in Clark, and the cases that have followed, effectively dictates, in cases of drug trafficking, non-compliance with the mandate of s 5. Alternatively, it dictates the conclusion that the sentencing judge must reach in the consideration of "all possible alternatives" to a sentence of imprisonment. The formulation operates (and the present case shows that it is taken to have been intended to operate) as a direction to the sentencing judge to reach only one conclusion in relation to the s 5 mandate. The NSW legislature has provided, in ss 6, 7 and 12 of the Sentencing Procedure Act, for sentences of imprisonment of stated length to be served (where the sentencing judge considering it appropriate) other than in full-time custody. Those options cannot be airbrushed out of consideration by judicial prescription.
Section 66 expressly provides that an ICO may not be made in respect of certain sexual offences. There is no such exclusion provided in relation to drug trafficking offences.
The mandate of s 5 may be seen to be of limited direct relevance in the present case, because the only realistic option, other than a sentence of full-time custody, advanced to the sentencing judge was an ICO. As mentioned above, an ICO is one of the means by which a sentence of imprisonment may be served. That is, it was accepted (realistically, in my opinion) that, inevitably, the sentence to be imposed on the applicant would be one of imprisonment. However, what may be properly be seen as directives in the pronouncements outlined above go beyond s 5. In their uniform references to "full-time custody" or "full-time imprisonment" they effectively direct sentencing judges, in every substantial drug trafficking case, not to consider alternatives such as ICOs, suspended sentences (Sentencing Procedure Act, s 12) or home detention (Sentencing Procedure Act, s 6). This appears to me to be wrong in principle, and to go beyond the judicial role and trespass upon the legislative function.
The Court in Ejefekaire was correct in its assumption that, in EF, I did not intend to say that "the longstanding principle … is no longer good law". To have done so would have been presumptuous. What I did - and do - intend to do was question whether what was called a "longstanding principle" was ever good law. It seems to me that the peremptory terms in which Clark and the cases following are expressed are incompatible with the proper exercise of a judicial sentencing discretion, and incompatible with a number of statements made by the High Court. But that is a matter to be decided on another occasion, either by this Court (possibly constituted by five judges), or by the High Court.
There is a further consideration. Clark was decided in 1990, at a time when sentencing was generally left to judges, subject, of course, to prescribed maximum sentences. In 2002 a significant change was made to the legislative sentencing regime. Section 21A was inserted into the Sentencing Procedure Act. It bore the heading "General sentencing principles". Sub-section (1) stated: "(1) In determining the sentence to be imposed on an offender, a court must impose a sentence of a severity that is appropriate in all the circumstances of the case." Sub-section (2) went on to state relevant considerations.
Later in that year, s 21A was amended. Curiously, sub-s (1) was omitted. In its place, the following sub-section was inserted: "(1) General In determining the appropriate sentence for an offence, the court is to take into account the following matters: (a) the aggravating factors referred to in subsection (2) that are relevant and known to the court, (b) the mitigating factors referred to in subsection (3) that are relevant and known to the court, (c) any other objective or subjective factor that affects the relative seriousness of the offence. The matters referred to in this subsection are in addition to any other matters that are required or permitted to be taken into account by the court under any Act or rule of law." As indicated in sub-s (1), sub-ss (2) and (3) set out, respectively, the aggravating and mitigating factors that are required, where known, to be taken into account. Sub-section (4) provided that the court was not to have regard to any such aggravating or mitigating factor if it would be contrary to any Act or rule of law to do so; sub-s (5) provided that neither the aggravating nor mitigating factors required the court to increase or reduce the sentence for the offence.
This provision is the statutory counterpart of Pt 1B of the Crimes Act 1914 under consideration in Hili. The provisions of s 21A do not support a judicial gloss on the sentencing discretion. In Bui v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (2012) 244 CLR 638; [2012] HCA 1 the High Court rejected a proposition that a judicially developed gloss on Pt 1B of the Crimes Act 1914 could be accommodated (see [19]).
The practical consequences of what I have said (if accepted) should not be overestimated. When sentencing judges are freed of the judicially imposed constraint, they must, nevertheless, give full and proper consideration to the guidance they will obtain from past sentencing decisions, providing a "yardstick" against which to measure any proposed sentence. In practice, it is likely that this will result in a conclusion that (absent some unusual circumstance) a sentence of imprisonment ought to be imposed. But, as EF and the present case show, and as Priestley JA recognised in Cacciola, there will be exceptions, and sentencing judges should not be constrained by the language of mandate to disregard available sentencing options.
In this respect, it does not seem to me that the provision that "exceptional circumstances" might justify departure from the "principle" dilutes the effect of the otherwise prescriptive statements.
HARRISON J: I agree with Simpson JA.
DAVIES J: I have had the advantage of reading the judgment of Simpson JA in draft. Her Honour has set out the factual background and the submissions made. My reasons for joining in the orders made on 11 August 2017 are those set out in her Honour's judgment at [35] to [44].
I have also read her Honour's Additional Remarks at [45] to [106] of the judgment. I agree with her Honour's analysis of the authorities and her conclusions at [101] and [104]-[106].

DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 23 August 2017

Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Regulation 2008(NSW)

2006] NSWCCA 214 R v Wen Fei Gu [2006] NSWCCA 104 R v Wong; R v Leung (1999) 48 NSWLR 340; [1999] NSWCCA 420 Smaragdis v R [2010] NSWCCA 276 The Queen v Pham (2015) 256 CLR 550; [2015] HCA 39 Wong v The Queen; Leung v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 584; [2001] HCA 64 Youssef v R [2014] NSWCCA 285 Zahrooni v R; Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Zahrooni [2010] NSWCCA 252 Category: Principal judgment Parties: Liam Robertson (Applicant) Regina (Respondent) Representation: Counsel: R Webb (Applicant) B Baker (Respondent)

HEADNOTE [This headnote is not to be read as part of the judgment] On 4 April 2017, the applicant was sentenced in the District Court following pleas of guilty to four counts of the supply of prohibited drugs, pursuant to s 25(1) of the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 (NSW) ("the DMT Act"), which prescribes a maximum penalty of imprisonment for 15 years for the offence. The sentencing judge imposed an aggregate sentence of imprisonment for 20 months, with a non-parole period of 10 months, and stated the indicative sentences that would otherwise have been imposed. The applicant was arrested on the morning of 10 June 2016 for the offences. He was observed sitting in the driver's seat of a parked vehicle with two other males. He was in possession of a small plastic bag which contained cannabis (this possession gave rise to the first of three counts to be considered by the sentencing judge on a Form 1). In the vehicle was a safe containing 23.36 grams of MDMA and 19.9 grams of psilocin, a prohibited drug. Possession in these amounts was deemed to be for the purpose of supply (DMT Act, s 29). Following his arrest, the police examined the applicant's mobile telephone, discovering text messages between 30 and 31 May, and 30 May and 4 June, in which the applicant agreed to supply small quantities of psilocin to persons. The possession of the MDMA and psilocin gave rise to the first two offences, while the text messages gave rise to the second two offences of supplying prohibited drugs. The sentencing judge was asked to take into account three further matters listed on a Form 1 (Pt 3, Div 3 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW)), one of which was, purportedly, an offence against s 16(1) of the Poisons and Therapeutic Goods Act 1966 (NSW). The Crown advised the Court of Criminal Appeal that the Form 1 was erroneous in that the s 16(1) count was based on possession of a substance which is not a restricted substance, and should not to have been taken into account in sentencing. Therefore, the Crown conceded that leave to appeal must be granted, and the applicant resentenced. The sentencing judge accepted that the applicant was remorseful, had ceased using drugs and had good prospects of rehabilitation. At the proceedings on sentence the Crown submitted, in conformity with a long line of authority often attributed to R v Peter Michael Clark (Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW), 15 March 1990, unreported) that the applicant had engaged in "trafficking drugs to a substantial degree" and that, absent "exceptional circumstances", precedent required that he be sentenced to a term of imprisonment. The applicant contended that no finding should be made that he had trafficked in drugs to a "substantial degree", and, even if that finding were made, a sentence of imprisonment to be served by way of an intensive correction order ("ICO") was available to the sentencing judge. The sentencing judge considered that the facts did show drug trafficking to a "substantial degree", and that he was therefore bound by the line of authority that required full-time imprisonment in cases "trafficking drugs to a substantial degree", and that there were no "exceptional circumstances" justifying departure from that "principle". He rejected a submission that the applicant be permitted to serve his sentence by way of ICO as provided by s 7 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act. The applicant applied for leave to appeal on the grounds that the sentencing judge had misapplied the principle regarding "trafficking drugs to a substantial degree". Further, the applicant contended that serving a sentence by way of an ICO was not precluded by the line of authority starting with Clark and that an ICO was a relevant consideration that the sentencing judge ought to have considered. In resentencing the applicant, the Court held, in accordance with EF v R [2015] NSWCCA 36, that an ICO was an available sentence, and the sentencing judge's consideration that authority precluded imposing an ICO was erroneous. Accordingly, and having regard to the fact that the applicant had already served 4 months' imprisonment of a 10 month term, the Court resentenced the applicant to a fixed term sentence of 12 months' imprisonment to be suspended pursuant to s 12(1) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act upon the applicant entering into a bond to be of good behaviour for 12 months. Significant additional remarks were also made in the reasons for the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal concerning the rigidity of the application of the line of authority that decisions that, absent exceptional circumstances, a sentence of full-time custody must be imposed in cases of drug dealing to a substantial degree. Consideration was given to various judgments of the Court of Criminal Appeal and the High Court regarding the discretion of sentencing judges, and constraints on that discretion, particularly the use to be made of historical sentencing patterns. Simpson JA, with whom Harrison and Davies JJ agreed, expressed doubt, without determining the matter, as to whether the peremptory nature of the "longstanding principle" attributed to Clark is compatible with judicial sentencing discretion. Held Per Simpson JA at [1] (Harrison J at [107] and Davies J at [108] agreeing) granting leave to appeal, allowing the appeal, and resentencing the applicant: (1) The Form 1 on which the applicant was sentenced was erroneous, containing an offence not known to law. (2) The sentencing judge erred in holding that precedent required that "trafficking in drugs to a substantial degree", absent "exceptional circumstances", required him to impose a sentence of full-time imprisonment. His Honour's failure to give full consideration to the imposition of a sentence to be served by way of ICO was erroneous. Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999, ss 5 and 7 considered; House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40 considered; EF v R [2015] NSWCCA 36 applied (3) The error on the Form 1 and the failure by the sentencing judge to have regard to the availability of an ICO necessitated resentencing the applicant. Kentwell v The Queen (2014) 252 CLR 601; [2014] HCA 37 applied. Consideration (4) The "principle" that offenders who are found to have "trafficked in drugs to a substantial degree" should be sentenced to full-time imprisonment in the absence of "exceptional circumstances" may be incompatible with judicial sentencing discretion: at [45]-[106]. Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999, s 21A considered; R v Michael John Hayes (1987) 29 A Crim R 452 considered; R v Peter Michael Clark (Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW), 15 March 1990, unreported) considered; R v Gallagher (1991) 23 NSWLR 220 considered; R v Bardo (NSWCCA, 14 July 1992, unreported) considered; R v McDonnell [1997] 1 SCR 948 considered; Police v Cadd (1997) 69 SASR 150 considered; R v Jurisic (1998) 45 NSWLR 209 considered; R v Cacciola (1998) 104 A Crim R 178 considered; R v Wong; R v Leung (1999) 48 NSWLR 340; [1999] NSWCCA 420 considered; Dinsdale v The Queen (2000) 202 CLR 321; [2000] HCA 54 considered; R v Carrion (2000) 49 NSWLR 149; [2000] NSWCCA 191 considered; Wong v The Queen; Leung v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 584; [2001] HCA 64 considered; Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357; [2005] HCA 25 considered; R v Wen Fei Gu [2006] NSWCCA 104 considered; R v Gip; R v Ly (2006) 161 A Crim R 173; [2006] NSWCCA 115 considered; R v Saba [2006] NSWCCA 214 considered; Fayd'Herbe v R [2007] NSWCCA 20 considered; Hili v The Queen; Jones v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 52; [2010] HCA 45 considered; Zahrooni v R; Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Zahrooni [2010] NSWCCA 252 considered; R v Pickett [2010] NSWCCA 273 considered; Smaragdis v R [2010] NSWCCA 276 considered; Bui v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (2012) 244 CLR 638; [2012] HCA 1 considered; Abdul v R [2013] NSWCCA 247 considered; Barbaro v The Queen; Zirilli v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 58; [2014] HCA 2 considered; Youssef v R [2014] NSWCCA 285 considered; The Queen v Pham (2015) 256 CLR 550; [2015] HCA 39 considered; EF v R [2015] NSWCCA 36 considered; Forti v R [2016] NSWCCA 127 considered; R v Ejefekaire [2016] NSWCCA 308 considered.

Judgment

SIMPSON JA: The applicant sought leave to appeal against the asserted severity of the sentence imposed upon him in the District Court on 4 April 2017 following his pleas of guilty to four counts of the supply of prohibited drugs. The counts to which the applicant pleaded guilty were: (i) one count of supplying 23.36 grams of the drug shortly known as MDMA and commonly known as ecstasy (a prohibited drug) on 10 June 2016; (ii) one count of supplying 19.9 grams of psilocin (a prohibited drug), also on 10 June 2016; (iii) one count of supplying 7 grams of psilocin between 30 May 2016 and 31 May 2016; and (iv) one count of supplying 5 grams of psilocin between 30 May 2016 and 4 June 2016. The offences were all offences against s 25(1) of the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 (NSW) ("the DMT Act"), which prescribes a maximum penalty of imprisonment for 15 years.
Pursuant to s 53A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) ("the Sentencing Procedure Act") the sentencing judge imposed an aggregate sentence of imprisonment for 20 months, with a non-parole period of 10 months, commencing on 4 April 2017. As he was required to do by s 53A(2)(b), he indicated the sentences he would have imposed if sentencing individually for each offence. He stated the indicative sentences as: Count (i): imprisonment for 9 months; Count (ii): imprisonment for 10 months; Count (iii): imprisonment for 8 months; and Count (iv): imprisonment for 8 months.
In accordance with s 50(1) of the Sentencing Procedure Act he directed that the applicant be released at the expiration of the non-parole period, on 3 February 2018.
The sentencing judge was asked to, and did, pursuant to Pt 3 Div 3 of the Sentencing Procedure Act, take into account three further matters listed on a Form 1. These were stated to be two offences of possession of prohibited drugs (80 grams of cannabis, and 95 grams of N,N-dimethyltryptamine) and one count of possession (80 grams) of a prescribed restricted substance, nominated as "Doxylamine". The first two offences were offences against s 10(1) of the DMT Act; the third was, purportedly, an offence against s 16(1) of the Poisons and Therapeutic Goods Act 1966 (NSW). On the present application the Crown very properly pointed out that the Form 1 was erroneous in that the third count was based on possession of a substance which is not a restricted substance. Accordingly that "offence" ought not to have been taken into account in sentencing. On that basis alone, as the Crown conceded, leave to appeal must be granted, and the applicant resentenced: Kentwell v The Queen (2014) 252 CLR 601; [2014] HCA 37.
At the conclusion of the hearing of the application, the Court made the following orders: "1. Grant leave to appeal against sentence. 2. Appeal allowed. Sentence quashed. 3. In lieu thereof sentence the applicant to imprisonment for a fixed term of 12 months commencing today (11 August 2017). 4. Order pursuant to section 12(1) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 that execution of the whole of the sentence be suspended. 5. Direct that the applicant be released from custody on condition that he enter into a good behaviour bond for a term of 12 months." The Court reserved its reasons to a later date.

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