Consideration
60 The IGADF accepted that there was a relevant public interest consideration on each side of the equation (that harm would be done by disclosure of the documents sought and the proper administration of justice would be frustrated or impaired if the documents were withheld), and that the balancing exercise described in Alister v The Queen [1984] HCA 85; (1984) 154 CLR 404 (Alister) is to be performed.
61 The documents sought are documents which, if they exist, arose as a result of the Inquiry. The circumstances in which the Inquiry was initiated and the role of the IGADF are described above and are unnecessary to repeat. Suffice to say for present purposes, that significant steps were taken in its conduct and in the reporting of its findings to ensure confidentiality. Given the basis of the Inquiry was to ascertain whether there was any substance to rumours and allegations of breaches of the Laws of Armed Conflict by elements of the ADF's Special Forces in Afghanistan, the seriousness of the subject matter and the consequent need for confidentiality to enable the Assistant IGADF to conduct his investigation is self-evident.
62 I accept the evidence given by Mr Gaynor in his open and confidential affidavits. The deponent plainly has extensive experience both in the Defence Force and in his role as the IGADF. It is also evident that care has been taken in the preparation of his affidavits. The issues addressed concern matters not wholly within the Court's experience. The experience of Mr Gaynor, particularly over the course of the Inquiry, places him in a special position to assess the damage to the public interest that would arise if the information in question was released. I have taken into account the evidence of Mr Gaynor in both his affidavits, with the confidential affidavit elaborating on the information provided in his open affidavit. Although it is inappropriate to recite the evidence in the confidential affidavit here, it suffices to say that it adds weight to his claim for public interest immunity.
63 Significant weight can be attached to the opinions he expresses about the impact of disclosure of the information sought.
64 Against that background, a number of observations about the submissions and relevant considerations can be made.
65 First, in Roberts-Smith (No 14) I made observations at [69]-[70] as to the nature of the substantive hearing which are relevant here, and bear repeating:
[69] First, as the High Court has recognised, in the balancing of competing interests, the balance may be struck differently in civil and criminal proceedings: HT v The Queen at [33], citing Al Rawi & Ors v Security Service & Ors [2011] UKSC 34; [2012] 1 AC 531 at [101] (Al Rawi). In the context of civil law, the liberty of the subject is not at stake: Al Rawi at [102]. The applicant added to that the necessary consequence for the protection of the public. Although the applicant strenuously took issue with the submission by the IGADF (and a similar submission made by the Commissioner), there is an obvious difference, and its significance to the balancing exercise is self-evident: see for example, Alister v The Queen at 414, 456; Sankey v Whitlam at 42, 61-62.
[70] Although it may be readily accepted that the imputations alleged to have been made against the applicant are of the most serious kind, nonetheless, these are defamation proceedings. Accepting the consequences of the outcome of a defamation proceedings, as described in Carson v John Fairfax at 60-61, nonetheless, liberty is not at stake. Indeed, it could be said that a corollary of the fact that these allegations are serious, is that the public interest in the ability of the IGADF to fulfil his statutory functions in relation to such matters as those that underlie the proceedings is high (as is the Commissioner's ability to investigate such alleged crimes). What can be said is that these defamation proceedings, from the applicant's perspective, are directed to an outcome broader than some civil proceedings in that, as he emphasised, the purpose includes vindication of the applicant's reputation.
66 Second, the 12 current or former SOCOMD members in relation to whom the material is sought by the IGADF Subpoena are each subpoenaed by the respondents to give evidence, and are strangers to these proceedings: Roberts-Smith v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Limited (No 12) [2021] FCA 465 (Roberts-Smith (No 12)). Any involvement they may have had with the Inquiry would have been under the conditions imposed by the IGADF, including the steps undertaken and directions made to ensure confidentiality of the process, as described in the affidavits of Mr Gaynor: see for example [14] above. As to the latter, the directions included, inter alia, that the Inquiry be conducted in private and pursuant to s 21 of the IGADF Regulation, restricting disclosure of evidence or documents given in the course of the Inquiry (and any PAP notice received).
67 Third, the importance of the IGADF's ability to make various orders which ensure the non-publication or non-promulgation of what occurs in an inquiry is self-evident: see Roberts-Smith (No 14) at [73]. The weight to be attached to that fact in conducting the balancing exercise must necessarily depend on the circumstances of the case. As explained in Roberts-Smith (No 14), the application must be considered in a context where Colvin J in Roberts-Smith (No 6) and Roberts-Smith v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Limited (No 8) [2020] FCA 1630 (Roberts-Smith (No 8)) made orders which refused parts of a claim for public interest immunity by the IGADF over some material from the Inquiry sought by the respondents. As a result, the applicant's PAP notice (in redacted form) has been released to the respondents subject to the NSI orders. It follows that any submission as to the public interest in this case must be considered in that context. However, it is not a situation, as the applicant contended, that the IGADF's submission as to the legislative scheme in relation to confidentiality and the importance thereof, was rejected by Colvin J, and therefore the issue "is done and dusted". Rather, the legislative scheme is plainly relevant, but cannot be considered in a vacuum, or at a level of generality which does not recognise the circumstances. Attention therefore must also be directed to issues or additional issues that may arise, in that context, given the material sought. I will return to this topic below.
68 Suffice to say at this stage, the IGADF's submission that there is a difference between what may have been disclosed in a PAP notice as a result of procedural fairness obligations, and disclosure of a transcript of a witness' interview(s) with the IGADF, can be accepted.
69 In addition, it is appropriate in that context to observe that the applicant's significant reliance on the fact that the respondents are only aware of some of these witnesses through the applicant's PAP notice which was compelled to be produced, for the reasons given in Roberts-Smith (No 14) at [88]-[89], does not advance his case. The use to which the respondents have made of any information they obtained from the PAP notice, does not provide the applicant with an entitlement, per se, to the material sought.
70 Fourth, it may be accepted that there was no absolute guarantee or assurance of confidentiality of the evidence given. The Public Inquiry Report records that:
….at the beginning of every interview, witnesses were informed that they could not be given an absolute guarantee of the confidentiality of the interview, as there were circumstances in which other persons who may be affected by their evidence may be legally entitled to know what has been said, but that the Inquiry would endeavour to protect their privacy and confidentiality as far as reasonably and legally practicable.
71 In Roberts-Smith (No 6) at [97] Colvin J described that "this is not an instance where those participating in the Inquiry could be given an assurance that information that they may provide to the Inquiry will be kept private in all circumstances". Colvin J, immediately preceding that passage had referred to there being a prospect the Inquiry Report would be made public (a decision not then having yet been made) and that parties providing information may be called upon to give evidence in any future criminal proceedings. The basis on which the comment was made as to the Inquiry Report is unclear. The evidence from Mr Gaynor on this application is that the Public Inquiry Report is heavily redacted, and he was particularly concerned to ensure the identities of persons who gave evidence to the Inquiry, and the content of their evidence, was not released to the public. That approach is consistent with the evidence of the procedures adopted to conduct the Inquiry.
72 Nonetheless, it may readily be accepted that the types of circumstances in which evidence given by a witness to the Inquiry would be disclosed, is very limited. Indeed, as is apparent from what was said at the beginning of every interview, the only basis identified in the excerpt identified and relied upon by the applicant at [70] above, was the possibility of some disclosure to fulfil procedural fairness obligations. What the witnesses were told would give rise to a reasonable expectation that what they said to the Inquiry would remain confidential except in very limited circumstances; and in that context it would remain confidential as far as reasonably and legally practicable. Although it can be inferred, given the topics the subject of the Inquiry, that the prospect of criminal proceedings (conducted in the public interest) may have been envisaged, the prospect of civil litigation such as this would not be such a circumstance. Particularly, private civil litigation instituted by the person who it is assumed, given that the respondents are calling these witnesses in respect to a defence of truth, their evidence is said to implicate. The material sought by this subpoena and the context in which it is sought, is far removed and clearly distinct from the potential need to provide information because of procedural fairness obligations. The material is sought by the applicant in that context, for use by him in his civil proceedings. This is also in the context of the culture deposed to by Mr Gaynor, and the steps undertaken to conduct the Inquiry.
73 The applicant's reliance on the observations of Gordon J in Cadbury Schweppes v Amcor at [29], must be considered in the above context. Indeed, in Cadbury Schweppes v Amcor the context is such that at [30], Gordon J observed:
A cartel claim, by definition, involves collusion between two or more actors. In the same way that it is both inevitable and self-evident that statements of a cooperating criminal conspirator will be used against the non-cooperating conspirators, it must be taken for granted that a cartel participant contemplating a confession to the authorities knows, or should know, that his statements will be used by the authorities to prosecute the other party or parties.
74 The proceedings in Cadbury Schweppes v Amcor were ancillary to proceedings brought by the regulator, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission. As noted elsewhere, each case must turn on its own facts. The position of witnesses in the Inquiry is removed from the particular circumstances considered by her Honour. This includes the statutory context in which the Inquiry was conducted. Relevant also is the evidence as to the difficulties that the IGADF had in breaking down the culture of secrecy, and as to the steps that the IGADF assessed were necessary in that context to put in place a scheme of confidentiality.
75 Fifth, as with the material sought in Roberts-Smith (No 14), the material sought by this subpoena is directed to prior statements of the SOCOMD witnesses to be called by the respondents, because of their reliance on the defence of truth. The potential relevance of this material is directed to the credit of the witnesses. The breadth of the assertions made by the applicant as to the consequences if the public interest claim is granted, must be considered in perspective. It is important to recall, as I recognised in Roberts-Smith (No 14), at [74], and see [45], as a general proposition cases proceed, particularly in the civil context, where the opposing party does not necessarily have prior statements of the witnesses, and that does not result in a trial being necessarily unfair. The applicant's submission as to the significance of the material sought on his ability to cross-examine these witnesses must be considered in that context.
76 Moreover, as noted above, this trial commenced on 7 June 2021. The applicant's case closed on 28 June 2021. The hearing was adjourned because of the Covid-19 pandemic (save for a hearing in the week of 26 July 2021 to take the evidence of the Afghan witnesses). The IGADF Subpoena was issued on 15 July 2021, sometime after the hearing was adjourned. In the normal course of events the respondents' case would have commenced at the end of the applicant's case and would, it can be inferred, have involved the SOCOMD witnesses. These witnesses would have commenced giving evidence thereafter, and obviously at a point of time when this subpoena had not been issued. A number of these witnesses have been on the respondents' witness list for a considerable time with outlines of their evidence served by the respondents in May 2019. Six of these witnesses were identified through the PAP notice as a result of the ruling of Colvin J, and leave to amend the pleadings and to issue subpoenas was granted on 23 April 2021. The applicant had issued other subpoenas to the IGADF at an earlier point in time in respect to different material, including relating to the Afghan witnesses, as reflected in Roberts-Smith (No 14). Although the potential relevance of documents of the nature sought may be accepted, the applicant's submission that the material is critical to him having a fair trial must also be considered in this context.
77 Also as to the applicant's submission of the significance of the material sought on his ability to cross-examine, I note that this type of material from the Inquiry could not be provided in respect to all witnesses who appeared before the Inquiry. For example, any evidence given by witnesses to the Inquiry which falls within the excluded category or further excluded category of documents in Colvin J's judgment has not been produced. Those are described in Roberts-Smith (No 8) at [2], [16] as:
[2] … In doing so, the position of the respondents was that they did not seek production of any information given by Mr Roberts Smith to the Inquiry or any material derived by the Inquiry (directly or indirectly) as a result of disclosure by Mr Roberts Smith (Excluded Category).
[16] … To be specific, public interest immunity has been demonstrated in respect of information of the following kind:
(1) Information acquired compulsorily by the Inquiry from persons other than Mr Roberts-Smith who, in the reasonable assessment of the IGADF by relevant officers, may themselves be the subject of future criminal processes.
(2) Information acquired by the Inquiry derivatively (directly or indirectly) from persons other than Mr Roberts-Smith who, in the reasonable assessment of the IGADF by relevant officers, may themselves be the subject of future criminal processes.
(3) Responses to the Inquiry from Mr Roberts-Smith that restate or indicate any of the matters in (1) or (2).
(Further Excluded Category)
78 Those categories can include any prior account or interview of a witness. For example, material relating to the applicant and other potential witnesses, including key witnesses to be called by him, is excluded. This is the basis on which the respondents describe that the production of the material sought will result in an information asymmetry between the parties in respect to the Inquiry, with the applicant being put in an advantageous position. That would appear to be the inevitable result if the material sought is obtained. Leaving aside any suggestion of unfairness between the parties, that such material could not be produced in respect to all SOCOMD witnesses in the hearing, puts into perspective the bold submission by the applicant that the absence of this material would result in the Court being misled.
79 In this context, finally, I also note that, as the IGADF submitted, in so far as the applicant contends his ability to cross-examine these witnesses is dependent on the material sought, there is a "wealth of documentary material" before the trial Court that relates to events the subject of the hearing. In this regard, Roberts-Smith (No 12) at [39] describes some of the large volume of material received by the applicant (at that time) as a result of subpoenas issued to the Department of Defence, in relation to mission dates and events in the respondents' particulars of truth, including mission plans, after action reports, aerial imagery, photographs, audio transcripts and other military documents. This simply illustrates the types of material that can exist and that cross-examination would not be conducted in a vacuum.
80 Sixth, contrary to the applicant's submission, the material sought in relation to the SOCOMD witnesses cannot simply be characterised as analogous to that of the Afghan witnesses, considered in Roberts-Smith (No 14). Although there may be some aspects which could be said to be similar, there are significant differences. The SOCOMD witnesses are current and former ADF personnel, the very persons whose confidence and trust the Office of the IGADF was and is most directly concerned with fostering. The ADF is the regulated community for whom the IGADF is an "integrity officer" and on whom the IGADF relies in the discharge of his statutory mandate. Their participation in the IGADF's processes is essential to facilitating the performance by the IGADF of the statutory functions assigned. Any evidence given by the SOCOMD witnesses to the Inquiry was in the statutory context, the procedures in place to ensure confidentiality and directions given, as described above. The differences in the nature of the witnesses to which material is sought informs the basis of the claim for immunity, and the weight to be attached to various aspects thereof.
81 The applicant's submission that the release of the material sought will not further undermine the IGADF because the interviews were provided in respect to the Afghan witnesses, fails to take account of the significant differences between the nature of the witnesses, the statutory context, the circumstances of the Inquiry, and the context of the culture of silence deposed to by Mr Gaynor.
82 Seventh, the IGADF also submitted that unlike the Afghan witnesses, none of the SOCOMD witnesses are giving evidence voluntarily as each has been subpoenaed by the respondents to attend: cf Roberts-Smith (No 14) at [71]. This was contrasted to the Afghan witnesses who gave evidence voluntarily, with no subpoenas being issued. It was submitted that in those circumstances, this is not a case where persons have invited scrutiny of their earlier testimonies by voluntarily participating in civil litigation between private parties.
83 The position of the witnesses as to giving evidence is not entirely clear. Certainly the witnesses have been subpoenaed, but it is not uncommon for that to occur, and as said by the applicant, is reflective of good practice. A subpoena is issued to ensure a witness attends court, and can be issued even if a witness is cooperating. As the applicant correctly submitted, the position that because a witness has been issued a subpoena they are not giving evidence voluntarily, cannot necessarily be assumed.
84 That said, some insight as to the circumstances in which at least some of these witnesses are giving evidence can be gained from the reasons in Roberts-Smith (No 12), where Besanko J considered the application for leave to issue the subpoenas in respect to Persons 24, 40, 41, 42 and 43. It is plain that those persons only became known to the respondents as a result of the receipt of the redacted PAP notice as a consequence of the orders by Colvin J. The respondents wished to call these persons as witnesses, and therefore were seeking leave to issue the subpoenas to secure their attendance. The application was opposed by the applicant in respect to these witnesses. At the time of the application the respondents, including their legal representatives did not have contact details for these persons and had not been able to contact them: Roberts-Smith (No 12) at [30]. It can be inferred in all the circumstances, that the issue of the subpoenas were necessary to secure their attendance. The involvement of these witnesses in these proceedings has occurred as a result of a party obtaining a court order compelling their attendance.
85 In this context, I note also the applicant's submission that the Court does not know what, if any involvement the witnesses have had in the outlines of evidence that have been filed (which only relates to Persons 1, 2, 14, 16, 18 and 67). This submission was made in a context where in respect to an earlier application, as the applicant identified, one witness (Person 4) made a representation that he had not spoken to the respondents before they served an outline of evidence from him. In Roberts-Smith (No 12) there is some discussion as to the outline of evidence of Person 18, as the respondents made an application to file an amended outline. It is apparent that the original outline of evidence filed in relation to Person 18 was "on the basis of information the respondents and their legal representatives had from confidential sources and witnesses": Roberts-Smith (No 12) at [42]. A reading of the reasons makes it plain it was filed without involvement of Person 18.
86 Given the above, it may be readily inferred that at least some of the witnesses have not been involved in the preparation of the outlines of evidence filed in their names by the respondents, and that, at least in respect to some of the witnesses, the respondents have sought and obtained leave to issue subpoenas to secure their attendance to give evidence in the substantive hearing, having had no contact with them. The respondents were unaware of Persons 24, 40, 41, 42 and 43 until they had been provided with the applicant's PAP notice, and were not involved in these proceedings until subpoenaed by the respondents. They are involved in these proceedings by actions of the parties.
87 The applicant submitted that in any event, the attitude of a particular witness to the giving of evidence at the hearing is beside the point, as scrutiny is invited by the act of a party (and not the witness) calling a particular witness to advance that party's case. Although the scrutiny does result as a consequence of the party calling the witness, the context in which the witness is involved in the proceedings may impact on the public interest on the production of the documents sought. I note that in respect to the Afghan witnesses, the applicant advanced that a relevant consideration was that the witnesses were giving evidence voluntarily, without a subpoena being required: Roberts-Smith (No 14) at [50].
88 Eighth, the IGADF submitted the SOCOMD members who participated in the IGADF's inquiries may be assimilated to that of "whistle-blowers or informers". In Roberts-Smith (No 14) at [23], I observed that the authorities recognise that, in order to perform their statutory functions and discharge the responsibilities conferred on them by Parliament, regulators and other administrative bodies depend on members of the regulated community or the public more broadly to report allegations, complaints or other concerns: see, for example, Australian Securities and Investments Commission v P Dawson Nominees Pty Ltd [2008] FCAFC 123; (2008) 169 FCR 227 at [48]-[50]; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Prysmian Cavi E Sistemi Energia S.R.L. [2011] FCA 938; (2011) 283 ALR 137 at [194]-[195]; R v Meissner (1994) 76 A Crim R 81 at 89; Spargos Mining NL v Standard Chartered Australia Ltd (No 1) (1989) 1 ACSR 311 at 312.
89 Contrary to the applicant's submission, it is not as simple as, or dependent on whether a witness volunteered to cooperate, initiated a complaint or was summonsed to give evidence pursuant to a compulsory power. That said, placing a label on these witnesses does not assist.
90 The submission that these witnesses can be viewed as "informers" is also in the context of Mr Gaynor's evidence as to the culture of silence, and the impact that had on the conduct of this Inquiry. This material sought is evidence of current or former SOCOMD members given to an inquiry about the conduct of other such members where, if that evidence was given, exposed conduct that could amount to wrongdoing. Given the topic of the Inquiry and the circumstances in which it was conducted, including the culture of silence (and the perceived consequences for persons providing information, as explained in Mr Gaynor's evidence) the SOCOMD members who cooperated with the Inquiry could properly be regarded as in a position akin to an informer. So much is apparent if one considers the rationale behind the concept of protecting informers, which includes that sources of information would dry up, authorities would be hindered in fulfilling their functions and those informing may suffer adverse ramifications as a consequence of doing so. That the applicant is now aware of the identities of these witnesses or even, if it be the case, that the applicant has some information as to what they told the Inquiry, is not the end of the matter. That said, some of the considerations in relation to informers (for example, the consequences of revealing their identity) may have less application. Although in this instance, unlike the Afghan witnesses, the identities of the SOCOMD witnesses are protected, with the use of pseudonyms being adopted accordingly.
91 The applicant relied on observations in Haydon v Magistrates Court (SA) [2001] SASC 65; (2001) 87 SASR 448 (Haydon), referring in particular to the observations of Doyle CJ at [30] as follows:
I agree with the observations of Brooking J that the general expressions used in some of the cases should not be taken as intended to be precise assessments of the quality or significance that material must have before disclosure will be required. I am content, with respect, to adopt the approach that Brooking J adopted (the other members of the Court agreed) in Jarvie, after his review of the authorities. He said (at 90):
"But it seems to me that the overriding need for a fair trial must mean that in no circumstances can the identity of a witness be withheld from a defendant if there is good reason to think that disclosure may be of substantial assistance to the defendant in combating the case for the prosecution."
Even this statement provides no more than a general guide. It is perhaps helpful to add that the fact disclosure of an informer's identity, or of information provided, might be of some assistance will not be sufficient. To require disclosure on this basis would be to undervalue the importance of the public interest in non-disclosure. This is made clear by the reasons of some of the members of the High Court in Alister. In Alister, the fact that the relevant material might provide material which might bear on the credit of a key witness for the prosecution was not enough for the Court to order disclosure. It was not known whether the material would have the suggested effect, and even if it did there was other material confirming the relevant witness's evidence, and that other material would remain even if the credit of the relevant witness were demolished: see (1984) 154 CLR at 438 Wilson and Dawson JJ, at 454-455 Brennan J. However, as to the decision in Alister, it is important to bear in mind that that case was primarily concerned with the question of whether the Court should inspect the relevant documents, and that the observations referred to were made without knowledge of the contents of the documents. It is also relevant to bear in mind that each case will be different, and one must be careful about converting observations made in a particular context into hard and fast rules. Thus, I respectfully agree with a further observation that Brooking J made in Jarvie at 91:
"There is no reason why, in a strong enough case, the necessary substantial prejudice [to the defendant] could not consist in the inability to gather and use material bearing on the credibility of a witness for the prosecution of some importance where the credibility of that witness was really in question."
(emphasis in original)
And see [33], [36]-[40].
92 Haydon involved a subpoena issued in criminal proceedings, as did the cases referred to in the passage cited above. Those observations must necessarily be considered in light of that, for the reasons explained above at [65].
93 The applicant emphasised two aspects of that passage. First, that each case must be decided on its own facts. That is self-evident. Second, this is not a case where there is some other material that exists in relation to a matter which would stand to prove a particular allegation, even if the credit of a witness was demolished. That submission appears to rely on the reference in the passage cited to the circumstances in Alister. It is plain that reference was not creating some general rule, but rather described the circumstances of that case. That said, it appears from the pleadings although in respect to some events one person is referred to, in respect to others, more than one is subpoenaed to give evidence. I note that a claim for public interest immunity in Haydon was upheld at that stage, where his identity had been revealed to the persons who had the most interest in learning it: see for example, Haydon at [23], [25] and [124]. Haydon was a very specific factual circumstance and illustrates that the relevant public interests and the weight to be attached thereto is dependent on the particular circumstances of the case.
94 In this context it must be recognised that the SOCOMD witnesses have been subpoenaed to give evidence, although under pseudonyms and no doubt with portions in closed court. At that time their evidence of the events will be known, at least to some. That the applicant already knows the identity of these persons and at least the general nature of the anticipated evidence (as inter alia, he possesses some outlines of evidence, or there may be reference in his PAP notice for procedural fairness purposes). That said, as noted earlier, this is different from the nature of the material now sought.
95 Ninth, the applicant's submission that production of the material sought will not cause any erosion of confidence in the IGADF because it will not be as a result of any want of opposition by the IGADF to that outcome, must be considered in the context of this hearing as described in the preceding paragraphs. It was said by the applicant that the IGADF's submission as to prejudice which would be caused by the release of the material is misconceived because of the existence of the NSI orders. Leaving aside any issues about necessary amendments to the orders, although the fact that material might be kept securely, or be dealt with in closed court might be seen to address some aspects of concern, it does not address all the public interest issues that arise, including, but not limited to, those referred to below. That it may not be public in the general sense subject to any risk of disclosure, does not cure the issues that arise. Moreover, although tempered because of the matters raised in [48], even discussion of such matters in closed court includes the applicant, the person, who it is assumed, given the respondents are calling the witnesses, the evidence relates.
96 Finally, as I observed in Roberts-Smith (No 14) at [73]:
As a general proposition it can be accepted that the use of compulsory processes to circumvent the effect of such directions undermines the effectiveness of those directions and, in turn, erodes the degree of assurance that persons cooperating with IGADF inquiries derive from the existence of the direction-giving power.
97 I am constrained in what can be said as to aspects of the claims given the confidential nature of aspects of the evidence. Suffice to say for present purposes, the bases of the claim for public interest immunity identified by the IGADF do arise in the circumstances of this application. Those matters of particular significance in the public interest in favour of the claim, given the nature of such inquiries and the seriousness of the issues being investigated, that the witnesses are current or former ADF personnel, the context in which any evidence was given and the nature of these proceedings, include that the release of the Interview Transcripts (if they exist) would tend to undermine the IGADF. This is in a context where the material sought is in relation to private civil proceedings instituted by the person who it is assumed, given that the respondents are calling these witnesses in respect to a defence of truth, their evidence is said to implicate. The material is sought by that person for his use by him in those proceedings. As explained earlier at [78], this is where such material, if it existed, could not be provided in respect to all witnesses in the hearing.
98 This is also in the context where there were difficulties in breaking down the culture of silence, and actions taken to overcome that in order to conduct the Inquiry. The steps taken to gain the trust of persons, and the consequences that had on the IGADF's ability to conduct this Inquiry are described by Mr Gaynor. The undermining of the IGADF relates not only to the ADF personnel who gave evidence in this Inquiry, but undermines the IGADF's ability to conduct further or future inquiries. The importance of the function of the IGADF is readily accepted. It adversely impacts his ability to fulfil his statutory function. In the circumstances of this case, I do not accept the applicant's submission that there will not be any erosion of confidence in the IGADF because if it is required to produce any material it will not be as a result of any want of opposition by the IGADF to that outcome. Moreover, the applicant's submission that release of the material would not affect the ability of the IGADF to conduct an inquiry because if a witness is issued with a notice to give evidence before an inquiry, they would turn up and "then it's a given they're there to tell the truth", fails to recognise the culture of silence and the impact that has and how this Inquiry evolved, as succinctly summarised by Mr Gaynor in the passage recited at [18] above. Persons summonsed to give evidence in an inquiry could have no confidence in any assurances given by the IGADF (in a context of a culture of silence) as to the handling of information if it can be provided as a result of a subpoena in civil proceedings, potentially initiated by a person who was also a subject of an inquiry, for use by that person. Trust and confidence of ADF members in the ability of the IGADF to carry out its function would be eroded. This would impact the IGADF's ability to conduct future investigations.
99 Against that background, in brief confidential reasons I address certain submissions advanced by the applicant in closed court.
100 Those matters have been considered in the balancing process. Balancing all the relevant considerations in this case, I am satisfied that if documents which fall within the terms of the subpoena exist, the balance weighs in favour of non-disclosure on the basis of public interest immunity. On the evidence before me, the IGADF has established his claim for public interest immunity.