Ristevski v R

Background facts

1. The facts were agreed for sentencing purposes. His Honour recited these facts in considerable detail in his sentencing remarks.
2. On 4 July 2019, Mrs Matthews, who was 61 years of age, and her husband, had been shopping at Warrawong Plaza and were loading the shopping into the rear of their vehicle. Mrs Matthews had put her handbag on the front passenger's seat and the door was open. Mr Ristevski went to the open passenger door and stole Mrs Matthews' handbag containing her purse with a quantity of cash and various other personal cards, including a number of credit cards, in both her own name and some in her husband's name.
3. In due course, having stolen the handbag and its contents, Mr Ristevski returned to Warrawong Plaza where he proceeded to use various credit cards belonging to Mr and Mrs Matthews. He purchased tobacco to a value in excess of $80. He purchased prepaid Visa and Mastercards, other items of tobacco in multiple transactions, lottery products from a newsagency, gift cards from one of the stores, and instant lottery tickets Each of those transactions was less than one hundred dollars, which meant that the cards could be used by swiping them, without the need for a PIN or a signature.
4. On 15 July 2019, Mr Ristevski went to Woolworths at Corrimal. At about 11 o'clock in the morning, Ms Cox was shopping in the store. She was in the deli section with her leather handbag on the child's seat of her shopping trolley. Inside her wallet were her bank cards, driver licence, Medicare cards and other identification items. When Ms Cox got to the register and went to pay, she could not find her wallet. Whilst she had been distracted, Mr Ristevski stole it. She realised the wallet was gone and that she could not pay for the goods that she had collected in her trolley. In that particular instance, Ms Cox went straight to the Commonwealth Bank, from where some of her cards had been issued, where she discovered that some of her cards had already been used by Mr Ristevski. He proceeded to purchase various items in Coles at Corrimal and at other locations.
5. On 18 July 2019, at the Aldi Supermarket at Fairy Meadow, while Ms Bass was shopping, her handbag, containing her wallet, was stolen by Mr Ristevski from her shopping trolley.
6. Inside the wallet were her Medicare card, American Express card, a credit card with the NAB, a credit card in her mother's name and various other miscellaneous items, together with a quantity of cash of approximately $200. The manager of Aldi contacted the police on her behalf. In due course, CCTV footage was retrieved, which depicted Mr Ristevski committing the subject offences.
7. On 19 July 2019, Mr Ristevski again went to a Woolworths, this time at Warilla Grove. He there stole Ms Beauman's handbag that was sitting on the child seat in the shopping trolley, with her wallet inside. She turned away from her trolley to get some vegetables, for what she subsequently estimated to the police was about three seconds. Mr Ristevski removed the wallet from the handbag containing $600 in cash, three credit cards, a driver licence and Medicare card. Notwithstanding Ms Beauman's estimate as to how long she had her eyes off her handbag, she did not realise that her wallet had been taken. She continued to shop in Woolworths, in due course picked up her handbag and at that stage because it was lighter in weight, realised that her wallet had gone missing and looked through the trolley but could not find it.
8. When arrested on 24 July 2019 at Figtree Grove, police searched Mr Ristevski and retrieved a wallet containing a small resealable bag with a crystalline substance in respect of which he was charged in due course with possession of a prohibited drug. Also in the wallet were two Opal cards in the name of two other individuals. Whilst there are no offences identified relating to how those items came to be in his possession, Mr Ristevski was charged with possession of goods in custody which might reasonably be suspected of being unlawfully obtained.

Ground 1

1. Mr Ristevski does not challenge the fact that he received a 25 percent discount for his plea. Although the ground of appeal is somewhat inelegantly framed, I take the complaint to be that his Honour's reference to contrition and remorse, in the context of awarding that discount, means or suggests that he would in any event have been entitled to a discount of that amount and that his Honour therefore inferentially failed otherwise separately to take these factors into account. Support for the fact that Mr Ristevski was entitled to receive a 25 percent discount can be found in the fact that his Honour specifically refers to him having "pleaded guilty at the earliest opportunity". His Honour does not anywhere else in his remarks on sentence refer to contrition or remorse.
2. The material before his Honour, upon which Mr Ristevski relied, included a professional opinion from Ivanka Manoski, a forensic psychologist. Mr Ristevski was interviewed by her for the purposes of the sentencing proceedings. Ms Manoski's 17 December 2019 report contains the following: "19…From the outset of the interview, Mr Ristevski indicated that he pleaded guilty to the offences and expressed contrition regarding his behaviour. He reported that his offences were motivated by money in order to purchase more drugs….".
3. Mr Ristevski also gave evidence in the sentencing proceedings. The following parts of that evidence should be noted: "Q. Sir, can you tell the Court what sorts of impact your offending in your view would have had on the victims, if any. A. Thinking back, well, first of all, I've invaded their privacy. I took their wallet out of their bag and they had to then cancel cards, licences, Medicare, you know, they must have known that I knew where they lived. Yeah, it's massive and I am genuinely very, very sorry. Q. How do you feel personally about your actions? How did your actions make you feel? A. Not good, not good at all. I don't - you know, when - when I look at the record, I don't like the person that I am and I don't want to live like that. … Q. Mr Ristevski, how did the abuse make you feel from a mental health perspective? I know obviously you've already alluded to the fact that you were having - you had trouble coping with it when you think about it but how did it - can you describe how it made you feel from a mental health perspective? A. Worthless, like I'm - you - you've got no self-worth. I had health issues. I haven't been able to maintain relationships. It's - it's been hard but I'm not trying to take away anything from what I've done, you know, I'm not trying to use - I'm not trying to talk about this now to use it as an excuse. I'm very sorry for what I've done. … Q. And then it was while you were on that bail, about six weeks later, that you committed these offences. A. That's correct, your Honour. Obviously though, I'm not happy about what I've done and I'm - I'm very sorry for what I've done. I - I genuinely have had an assessment done to - to try and better myself. I do know I can't - I can't do that without speaking to the psychologist again of the stuff that has been inside me for 30 years, but I do know that I - I do have to deal with that and I'm just - I know - your Honour, I know that it's there. It's left inside. It probably like a toothache but - and I've many chances. I'm asking for one more."
4. Relevantly in addition, the following submissions were made on Mr Ristevski's behalf: "Your Honour, the second point I want to raise is this issue of Mr Ristevski's implied remorse and its links to his potential rehabilitation. The first and sort of preliminary aspect of a finding in his favour on his point, your Honour, is his pleas. Perhaps more important though are some of his expressions on the issues on custody. Your Honour is in a somewhat unique position, where your Honour has three different examples of or at least three different categories of expressions of insight and remorse. The first, your Honour, is the psychological report at para 19. The author acknowledges Mr Ristevski's contribution and there is no caveat in relation to that opinion, in my submission, your Honour. The second is his oral evidence today, which in my submission was honest. It wasn't contrived on the issue. He wasn't particularly challenged on the issue of remorse based on the things he said, your Honour. The third is the sentence assessment report. Now, your Honour, I accept that the comments of the author aren't detailed but they remain - they're telling, in my submission, as to where - your Honour would be in a much better position than me to assess this sort of thing but it's rare, in my submission, that an author of that sort of report would go to the effort to set out the type of things this author has set out, your Honour, and that includes specifically that Mr Ristevski noted that he was remorseful for what he had done but perhaps more importantly than that, he didn't at any time blame his drug abuse or mental health issues while speaking with his author for his offending behaviour. He held that to one side. He took responsibility for what he had done. He showed insight into how it would have made the victims feel, your Honour. Then when he was asked, 'What might be some of the causal factors for you doing these things', he then turned to the issue that your Honour has just heard in oral evidence, so it wasn't a situation where he was saying, 'You now, I'm a drug addict and this is why I'm doing things'. He's saying, 'I did the wrong thing. I understand how people would have felt', and that's significant in the context of an assessment report, in my submission."
5. Section 21A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act is in the following relevant terms: 21A Aggravating, mitigating and other factors in sentencing (1) General In determining the appropriate sentence for an offence, the court is to take into account the following matters-- (a) the aggravating factors referred to in subsection (2) that are relevant and known to the court, (b) the mitigating factors referred to in subsection (3) that are relevant and known to the court, (c) any other objective or subjective factor that affects the relative seriousness of the offence. … (3) Mitigating factors The mitigating factors to be taken into account in determining the appropriate sentence for an offence are as follows - … (i) the remorse shown by the offender for the offence, but only if-- (i) the offender has provided evidence that he or she has accepted responsibility for his or her actions, and (ii) the offender has acknowledged any injury, loss or damage caused by his or her actions or made reparation for such injury, loss or damage (or both), …
6. It is clear that Mr Ristevski gave evidence that conformed to the requirements of s 21A(3)(i). He had expressed his remorse as well to Ms Manoski, although the limitations on such statements must be taken into account. His counsel made submissions on his behalf which engaged with his expressions of remorse. Even so, apart from the reference to remorse and contrition in the context of the discount for his plea, his Honour gave no discrete consideration to such matters. Mr Ristevski would be entitled to feel that these matters had not been considered, whatever view his Honour may have taken about them. However, to the extent that his Honour appears to have referred to contrition and remorse as supporting Mr Ristevski's early plea discount, it is fair to conclude that he accepted Mr Ristevski's evidence and his counsel's submissions about them.
7. In those circumstances, his Honour might fairly be regarded as having failed to take account of a relevant consideration. That was an error. I consider that this ground of appeal has been established.

Ground 2

1. This ground is unfortunately also formulated in somewhat impenetrable terms. Argument in this Court, however, ultimately clarified Mr Ristevski's contention, which was to the effect that his Honour should have commenced the sentence he imposed on a date earlier than he did. Mr Ristevski's proposition is that if this Court finds error and concludes that a lesser sentence is warranted in law, the appropriate course would be to vary the commencement date of the sentence imposed by Judge Hoy in a different matter, so that the non-parole period for that offence commences 6 months prior to the completion of the non-parole period imposed upon Mr Ristevski by his Honour in these proceedings.
2. This ground of appeal does not in my view amount to a ground of appeal at all, so much as a submission in aid of a lesser sentence if this Court found error and proceeded to re-sentence. Having regard to the view I have formed with respect to Ground 1, I propose to proceed upon that basis.

Ground 3

1. His Honour did not refer to special circumstances at all in his remarks on sentence. That is so notwithstanding the following written submissions made on Mr Ristevski's behalf: "Special Circumstances 79. It is submitted that a finding of special circumstances could be made on the principal basis of Mr Ristevski's recent mental health diagnosis, set out above, Devaney v R [2012] NSWCCA 285 at [92]; Morton v R [2014] NSWCCA 8 at [19]. 80. It is submitted that other bases for a finding include his serious and ongoing drug addiction Sevastopoulos v R [2011] NSWCCA 201 at [84]-[85], his potential institutionalisation Jackson v R [2010] NSWCCA 162 at [24] and the potential notional accumulation of sentences, namely its impact on totality Hezaji v R (2009) 217 A Crim R 151; [2009] NSWCCA 282 at [36]."
2. These submissions were followed up with an oral presentation in these terms: "There may be room for your Honour to find special circumstances, given what has been put before the Court, and the need for further rehabilitation and counselling within the community."
3. The only arguably (oblique) reference to special circumstances in his Honour's remarks is to be found in the final paragraph: "I am not going to say anything more Mr Ristevski, other than the fact that the period of time that you have been in custody, if you have remained drug free, this additional time might assist you to actually for once in your life get to a stage where you are drug free when you are eventually released."
4. As will already be apparent, his Honour maintained the statutory ratio of the parole and non-parole periods of the sentence he imposed.
5. The burden of Mr Ristevski's argument is that his Honour failed to deal with his claim to be entitled to a variation of the statutory ratio because his Honour did not refer to special circumstances in terms or to any submissions made on his behalf on this topic.
6. It is often tempting, for example, in circumstances such as those referred to in considering Ground 1, to conclude that a complete failure by a sentencing judge to refer to a matter indicates that it has not been considered at all. In the present case, it seems to me to be a fair inference from his Honour's admittedly brief comments at the end of his remarks, pointedly directed to Mr Ristevski, that he was of the view that an assumed abstinence from drugs for three years in gaol was likely to be as good as, if not better than, supervision in the community for more than 12 months on parole. Mr Ristevski has an admitted problem with drugs and a criminal history of some magnitude on his own account directly related to that problem. It was in my view open to his Honour in such circumstances to decline to find special circumstances and instead to adopt an approach based on Mr Ristevski's drug rehabilitation in custody (so-called). It was not unreasonable for his Honour to have concluded, as he appears to have done, that the historically uncertain and unpredictable benefits to Mr Ristevski of professional intervention in the community, considering his demonstrated disinclination to attend Oolong House when offered the opportunity to do so, did not persuasively call for a longer period of supervision on parole. Although it may go without saying, having regard to the view I have formed, I do not consider that his Honour failed to deal with the issue of special circumstances in substance, even though he does not refer to the issue in terms.
7. I would reject this ground of appeal.

Is a lesser sentence warranted?

1. Mr Ristevski's submissions below conceded that the victims of his larceny and fraud offences would have been made to feel unsafe, exposed and vulnerable in a public space. He further conceded that the victims had been deprived of both their physical property and electronic funds, also contributing to the feelings just described. The offences were planned, albeit crudely. Mr Ristevski's drug addiction does not reduce his moral culpability. Deterrence and denunciation will usually loom large in sentencing for offences of this type.
2. Even so, Mr Ristevski submitted that his offences fell well below the mid-range and towards "the middle of the lower half of the objective scale". The larceny offences involved the theft of four wallets and their contents, which he contended were not offences of great objective gravity. Mr Ristevski submitted that the fraud offences involved some planning, were largely opportunistic and impulsive and were again related to his drug addiction.
3. His Honour did not provide an assessment of the objective seriousness of Mr Ristevski's offending. The objective seriousness of the combined offending was in my view below the middle range of seriousness for offences of this type.
4. Mr Ristevski maintained in this Court that a lesser sentence should be imposed upon him especially for the reason that the starting point of the sentence imposed by his Honour failed properly to take account of some important matters. The arguments in this Court concerning the sentencing decisions of Judges Haesler and Hoy when dealing with Mr Ristevski on other occasions are complicated and on one view incapable of principled resolution. That is at least for the reason that Judge Hoy's sentencing discretion is not the subject of challenge in this Court. Mr Ristevski submitted that the appropriate course in this Court would be to vary the commencement date of the sentence imposed by Judge Hoy, so that the non-parole period for the offence with which he was dealing commenced six months prior to the completion of the non-parole period imposed on Mr Ristevski in these proceedings.
5. It is not in doubt that starting dates are a matter for the sentencing tribunal. However, Mr Ristevski submitted before his Honour that his sentence should be backdated to around the time he entered pre-sentence custody on 24 July 2019. Mr Ristevski effectively maintained that submission in this Court. He reasoned as follows.
6. The additional offence dealt with by Judge Hoy was an offence of steal from the person contrary to s 94(b) of the Crimes Act. It was committed at Warilla Grove on 21 July 2019. A Court Attendance Notice with respect to this offence was created on 31 March 2020 and was returnable in the Wollongong Local Court on 28 July 2020. As appears above, Mr Ristevski was already in custody by that date. Mr Ristevski entered a plea of guilty to this charge on 1 July 2020.
7. Magistrate Girotto sentenced Mr Ristevski for that offence to 12 months imprisonment with a non-parole period of 6 months dating from 29 August 2022. That had the effect of extending Mr Ristevski's non-parole period in custody by one month over and above the expiration of the non-parole period imposed by his Honour Judge Sutherland in this case. On appeal to the District Court against the severity of the sentence, Judge Hoy imposed the same sentence as the learned magistrate, but varied the commencement date to 29 July 2022. The effect of this adjustment was that Mr Ristevski's overall non-parole period remained the same as that imposed in the present case.
8. Mr Ristevski's concern in this application is that, if this Court were to impose a lesser sentence on him, it would have no direct effect upon his prospect of an early release unless the sentence imposed by Judge Hoy were varied as well. Mr Ristevski submitted that the only inference is that Judge Hoy had something similar in mind when he sentenced Mr Ristevski with knowledge of the sentence imposed by Judge Sutherland and that he was minded not to increase the overall non-parole period.
9. In my opinion, even accepting the force of these arguments, I would not in the exercise of my sentencing discretion arrive at a lesser sentence. I accept that Mr Ristevski's success on Ground 1 draws attention to the issue of remorse and contrition. I also accept that Mr Ristevski's expressions of remorse were genuine. However, as his counsel below indicated, the significance of punishment, deterrence and denunciation in a case such as this cannot easily be discounted. While Mr Ristevski is not to be penalised for his extensive criminal record, it does not engender confidence in his prospects of rehabilitation, which I find are poor. I also consider that the likelihood of him reoffending is high. When sentencing Mr Ristevski, Judge Hoy described him as "a recidivist offender who has an extensive history of targeting elderly and vulnerable women whilst shopping to steal their purses". I consider that description was accurate.
10. Mr Ristevski does not contend that the sentence imposed upon him was manifestly excessive. His position is to contend that this Court would impose a lesser sentence when the factors allegedly overlooked or misunderstood by his Honour are given appropriate consideration. However, I have taken his expressions of remorse and contrition, as well as his argument concerning the date upon which his sentence should commence, into account on re-sentence. In my view, no lesser sentence is warranted.
11. Accordingly, the orders I propose are as follows: 1. Grant leave to appeal. 2. Dismiss the appeal.
12. FAGAN J: The wording of ground 1 does not adequately express the error that the applicant contended for on the hearing of this application. The point was explained in oral argument as follows: "The error that we say his Honour made is that he conflated the matters of contrition and remorse with the utilitarian benefit of the plea. His Honour we say said it expressly, you can see that his Honour says that the applicant was "entitled to a discount of 25 percent on an otherwise appropriate sentence in recognition of the contrition, remorse and indeed practical utility [effected] by such a plea", and remorse and contrition were separate sentencing considerations under s 21A of the Act and that as I read his Honour's reasons is the only time that his Honour made reference to the question of remorse or contrition despite there being quite significant submissions made about that, both in writing and in oral submissions during the proceedings on sentence."
13. I agree with Harrison J that the learned sentencing judge appears to have overlooked the need to give specific consideration to the applicant's expressions of remorse as a factor independent of the 25 percent discount for the utilitarian benefit of the early plea of guilty.
14. I would reject ground 2. I do not accept that the learned sentencing judge misunderstood the effect of Judge Haesler SC's decision in earlier proceedings. It is relevant to this ground to consider the chronology of a series of offences and sentences that preceded the passing of the sentence that is the subject of the present leave application. The chronology shows that no error was made in the respect alleged in ground 2. It also illustrates the persistence of the applicant's offending, which is relevant to whether any lesser sentence would be warranted if the appeal were upheld on ground 1.
15. The relevant chronology is as follows: 7 April 2018: the applicant committed an offence of larceny and another offence of obtaining financial advantage by deception (matter No. H…372). 8 May 2018: the applicant was sentenced in the Local Court at Wollongong for the 7 April 2018 offences. The highest penalty imposed was 9 months imprisonment, commencing on 19 April 2018 (the date of arrest) and concluding on 18 January 2019, with a non-parole period of 3 months expiring on 18 July 2018. An appeal to the District Court was dismissed. 14 August 2018: the applicant was released to parole having served 4 months of the sentence. He was at liberty for only about two weeks before he offended again. 30 August 2018: the applicant committed an offence of larceny and seven offences of dishonestly obtaining property/financial advantage by deception. He was arrested and charged on 5 September 2018 (matter No. H…391). 6 September 2018: the applicant was sentenced for the offences of 30 August 2018 in the Local Court at Wollongong. For each offence a fixed term of 12 months was imposed, commencing on 5 September 2018 and expiring on 4 September 2019. 19 September 2018: the applicant's parole was revoked in respect of the balance of the sentence for the 7 April 2018 larceny (matter No. H…372). He was required to serve in custody the remaining 4 months of that 9 month sentence, from 19 September 2018 to 18 January 2019. 11 December 2018: an appeal by the applicant against the effective 12 month sentence for the 30 August 2018 offences came before Judge Haesler SC in the District Court at Wollongong. His Honour ordered that the applicant be released on bail on condition that he would attend Oolong House drug rehabilitation facility. The appeal was relisted before his Honour for 24 May 2019.
16. The applicant could not be released immediately pursuant to this grant of bail because he was still serving the balance of the 9 month term for the 7 April 2018 offences, following the revocation of his parole. The grant of appeal bail had the effect that, from 11 December 2018, the applicant's custody was no longer referrable to the 12 month sentence that was under appeal to Judge Haesler SC. The only part of that 12 month sentence that was initially served was 3 months and 6 days from 5 September 2018 to 11 December 2018.
17. The further relevant chronological events are as follows: 18 January 2019: the applicant was released pursuant to Judge Haesler SC's grant of appeal bail. The applicant did not attend Oolong House or participate in any other rehabilitation program. He did not answer his bail on 24 May 2019 and a warrant was issued. 4 June 2019: the applicant was arrested and brought back before Judge Haesler SC, who reinstated his appeal bail after one day. Mid-July 2019: the applicant committed the further offences for which he received the sentence that is the subject of his present application for leave to appeal. 24 July 2019: the applicant was arrested for the further offences of mid-July. 27 July 2019: the appeal against the fixed 12 months sentence came on before Judge Haesler SC. The sentence was confirmed. The commencement date was adjusted to recognise time that the applicant had already served under that sentence and part of the period of appeal bail when he was, ostensibly, pursuing drug rehabilitation. The sentence was backdated to commence on 30 January 2019 on the notional basis that 6 months had been served.
18. In arriving at the above decision Judge Haesler SC calculated that the applicant had served 4 months and 20 days of the sentence that was under appeal before him, from 5 September 2018 until his release on bail on 18 January 2019. With respect, that calculation was erroneous. As stated above, only a little over 3 months of that sentence had been served up to the grant of bail on 11 December 2018. The applicant's custody from then until he was released for breach of the appeal bail was referrable solely to the balance of the earlier 9 month sentence for which parole had been revoked. Further, his Honour generously rounded up the time served to 5 months and then added 1 more month for part of the time when the applicant was at liberty and when he was supposed to have been seeking rehabilitation.
19. The backdated 12 months sentence expired on 29 January 2020, so that the applicant spent a further approximately 5 months of that sentence actually in custody, counting from his arrest on 24 July 2019. Adding that to the earlier period from 5 September, he was imprisoned for 8 months and 11 days of the 12 months sentence.
20. His Honour Judge Sutherland SC correctly understood all of this and noted that Judge Haesler SC had: "brought about a circumstance where, notwithstanding the revocations of parole and the various other aspects, [the applicant] effectively served some eight months out of the 12 month term in actual custody."
21. For approximately 5 months from 24 July 2019 when the applicant was arrested until 29 January 2020, his custody was referable both to the 12 month fixed sentence for the 30 August 2018 offences, as confirmed by Judge Haesler SC, and to his remand for the mid-July 2019 offences to which the present application relates. After 29 January 2020, the applicant continued in custody until Judge Sutherland SC passed sentence 28 February 2020 solely on remand for the mid-July 2019 matters. Pursuant to s 24(a) and s 47(3) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, his Honour was required to "take into account" the period of remand. However, his Honour was not bound to backdate the sentence that he imposed in order to give credit for the entirety of the period following the applicant's arrest. His Honour was justified in not giving credit for the first 5 months of the remand, during which his custody was referrable to the completion of the earlier 12 months fixed sentence. In deciding not to give credit for any part of those 5 months, it was relevant that in fact only a little over 8 months of the earlier 12 month sentence was actually served. The commencement date adopted by Sutherland DCJ was open to him and the exercise of his discretion in that respect was not based upon a misapprehension of underlying facts.
22. I would reject ground 2 for those reasons.
23. I agree with Harrison J that ground 3 should be rejected, for the reasons his Honour has given.
24. Notwithstanding that ground 1 would succeed, I agree with Harrison J's conclusion that no lesser sentence than that which was imposed by the learned sentencing judge is warranted. The recent sentencing history of the applicant that I have examined in connection with ground 2 tends to confirm that his prospects of reform are poor and that there is a high likelihood of him reoffending in a similar manner. When Judge Sutherland SC sentenced the applicant in February 2020 he was 46 years old. The offences of larceny and of dishonestly using stolen credit cards that gave rise to the sentences discussed in these reasons were committed when the applicant was aged between 43 and 45. He has been offending repeatedly and incorrigibly in this manner for more than 20 years. Attempts by the courts to persuade him to seek rehabilitation with respect to the abuse of drugs that apparently underlies his conduct have been unsuccessful.
25. Protection of the community is a significant factor supporting the sentence imposed by the learned judge. The offences were all relatively petty but the effect on each victim is not to be underestimated. The amounts of cash stolen were small measured against scale of other crimes that come before the courts but would have been significant to the individuals. The stealing and misuse of credit cards did not result in large losses to the relevant accounts but would have been a significant disruption to the lives of the women whose bags and purses were plundered and would have left them with a sense of vulnerability in going about their ordinary activities in shopping centres.
26. I agree with the orders proposed by Harrison J.

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