REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
1 Following an investigation into the collapse of the Westpoint group, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), with the consent of the named applicants, commenced two proceedings pursuant to its powers under s 50 of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) (ASIC Act). Section 50 permits ASIC to bring proceedings in a person's name to recover damages caused by misconduct committed in connection with a matter to which an ASIC examination relates. In the action brought by Peter and Ngaire Rikys, the first respondent is Bongiorno Financial Advisers (Aust) Ltd. In the other action, which is brought in the name of Frank and Leonie Bosnjak, the first respondent is Bongiorno Financial Advisers Pty Ltd. The Bongiorno companies had advised clients to invest money in the purchase of promissory notes issued by York Street Mezzanine Pty Ltd (in liq), a company in the failed Westpoint group. The actions allege that the Bongiorno companies had misconducted themselves in and about the giving of the advice to invest to their clients. In the event, the investments proved valueless and the actions are maintained to recover the resultant damages.
2 Each action is a representative action brought under Part IVA of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). The named applicants, as well as the members of the group represented in each action, were clients of a Bongiorno company and invested in the promissory notes. Following protracted negotiations at a mediation conducted by the Honourable Ian Callinan AC QC, these actions, and a number of others that had been instituted following the Westpoint collapse, have been settled. Being representative actions, neither can be compromised without court approval by reason of s 33V of the Federal Court of Australia Act. The parties seek that approval.
3 The nature of the settlement is complicated and must be explained. The reason for the complication is that while, in common with the others, each investor purchased a promissory note in York Street Mezzanine and suffered loss when it turned out the promissory notes were worthless, the investors fall into four discrete groups. This results from events that occurred subsequent to the investments being made.
4 Category 1 comprises group members who entered into a deed of release with a Bongiorno company and received a payment directly in relation to their York Street Mezzanine investment in exchange for releasing Bongiorno from liability. Category 2 are group members who reinvested in York Street Mezzanine on the advice of an unrelated third party and did not enter into a deed of release with a Bongiorno company. Category 3 are group members who entered into a deed of release with Bongiorno and received a payment in relation to their investment in another syndicate, the Paragon Commercial Syndicate, and not their investment in York Street Mezzanine. Category 4 are group members who did not enter into a deed of release with a Bongiorno company or an authorised representative of Bongiorno and did not reinvest in York Street Mezzanine under the advice of an unrelated third party.
5 Turning to the actions themselves, there is considerable overlap in the claims made. It is sufficient for present purposes to give a brief summary of those claims. The principal claim is in negligence. The allegation is that the relevant Bongiorno company failed to properly investigate the risks involved in purchasing the promissory notes and in any case failed to warn that the investment was highly risky. Having regard to the structure of the schemes established by the Westpoint group, an investment was necessarily a hazardous venture. Evidence obtained on discovery indicates that the Bongiorno companies were aware of some of the risks involved but nonetheless recommended the product to their clients. An expert opinion, sought by ASIC, confirms that there was negligence on the part of the Bongiorno companies in many respects.
6 There is also a claim under s 12DA of the ASIC Act that the Borgionro companies engaged in misleading conduct in advising their clients to invest in York Street Mezzanine notes. Particulars are given of the allegedly misleading statements made to the group members. They turn on the appropriateness of the investment and the likely rate of return an investor was entitled to expect. The problem with this type of claim in a class action is the difficulty of establishing that the representations were in fact made to each group member. It is particularly difficult when the misleading conduct is based on oral statements.
7 There are several other statutory claims. One is based on s 945A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) which, in effect, provides that an adviser should only provide advice to a client after obtaining information about the client's personal circumstances and determining that those circumstances make the advice appropriate.
8 Another statutory claim is that the investment was in an unregistered managed investment scheme which, by reason of s 766B, required a product disclosure statement to be given to investors. Here the allegation is that the Borgiorno companies, in breach of s 1012A, failed to provide product disclosure statements to their investors.
9 The facts that underlie the statutory claim are not in dispute. The question that arises is whether the contraventions have caused any loss and damage. That is a difficult issue.
10 Apart from the usual defences (for the most part denials of wrongdoing) the Bongiorno companies assert that each claim is an apportionable claim and they seek to limit their liability accordingly. It seems that only the statutory claims are apportionable.
11 Now, an important feature of the claim in relation to group members is, as the categories indicate, that many members have previously settled their claim. The terms of the compromise were recorded in deeds of release. There is an issue in those cases whether the deeds are binding. The applicants allege that by entering into the deeds the Bongiorno companies breached s 917F(5) of the Corporations Act and that, therefore, the deeds are liable to be set aside. If set aside, any benefits received by an investor pursuant to the settlement may need to be restored.
12 In view of the potential for harm to a group member if the deeds of release were to be set aside, orders were made to ensure that each group member was given detailed information about the nature of the claims brought on their behalf. The number of investors is not great and most of them were able to be contacted. They were also given detailed information about the settlement. It is likely that each group member has a good understanding of what is proposed and how their rights will be affected.
13 The proposed settlement involves the establishment of a fund of $2,559,760 which is to be split disproportionately between the categories of investors. The amount attributed to each category is to be distributed pro rata to the members in that category. There is a differential distribution of the settlement sum between the four categories because the prospects of success of the members in each category differ,. The distribution is intended to reflect the different risks faced by members of different categories.
14 Ms Skreiner, Litigation Counsel in the Chief Legal Office of ASIC, describes how the settlement sum is to be divided:
Category Number of investors Total amount payable to category Percentage of Total Loss to be paid
Category 1 53 $376,341 13.07%
Category 2 25 $860,100 43.39%
Category 3 2 $76,555 44.31%
Category 4 28 $1,246,764 50.92%
$2,559,760 34.21%