(ii) The RTA should have put up appropriate "Water Over Road" signs, especially in view of the fact that they had 10 hours' notice of the hazard.
13 On 1 November 2006 TL served copies of the witness statement prepared for the Coroner. The statements from employees of the RTA contained conflicting information concerning when and where "Water Over Road" signs had been erected on the highway.
14 On 25 January 2007 TL sent a letter which said:
"We confirm that our client intends to pursue the Roads and Traffic Authority as a cross-defendant in the proceedings and is making further enquiries in relation to the potential involvement of further tortfeasors."
15 On 17 May 2007 TL served a report of Mr Jeffrey, geotechnical engineer, which contained material which suggested negligence on the part of the RTA and the Lavis brothers.
16 On 25 May 2007 TL sent a further letter, which contained the following paragraphs:
"We should advise you that the related proceedings for the Estate of Dennison issued in Parramatta District Court, have sought to include the Roads and Traffic Authority as a defendant to the proceedings.
…
We note that you do not seek to pursue any other tortfeasors as primary defendants despite our denial of liability and expert evidence served in support of third party responsibility.
…
We confirm that we will be issuing Cross-Claims in the near future against the Roads and Traffic Authority and other tortfeasors, as has been identified in the reports of Mr Keramidas and Mr Jeffrey.
Albeit that you are now armed with the experts' reports, could you please confirm that you do not intend to issue proceedings against any other tortfeasor."
17 On 7 June 2007 TL sent a letter which included in the following paragraphs:
"We have sought counsel's urgent consideration of parties to be joined and the particulars of pleadings. However, the writer is on leave for one month commencing 12 June 2007, but will endeavour to ensure that the Cross-Claims are filed regardless of my absence.
In order to provide some insight, we enclose a copy of the Statement of Claim in the related matter of Dennison. The construction of the driveway without culvert (which has now been rectified) will also be central to the claims for contribution."
18 On 14 September 2007 TL served a cross-claim on behalf of Allianz joining both the RTA and the Lavis brothers as cross-defendants. On 1 February 2008 Mr Rickard filed an amended statement of claim which joined as defendants the RTA and the Lavis brothers.
19 In response Allianz submitted that it should not be punished for raising a defence of inevitable accident which was reasonably open to it. In that regard, Allianz relied upon Roads and Traffic Authority of NSW & Anor v Palmer (No 2) [2005] NSWCA 140 at [35] where Giles JA said:
"35 It may have been reasonable for the plaintiff in her own interests to join the RTA as a defendant, but I do not think that there was conduct which made it just that the Council, and still less Pioneer, pay the costs payable by the plaintiff to the RTA. Neither the Council nor Pioneer created any circumstances of uncertainty as to who was the proper defendant. They were not obliged to concede liability or make admissions in order to remove the RTA from contention, there being a respectable argument that the RTA was liable, and there is no reason to think that short of effective capitulation by the Council and Pioneer the plaintiff would not have maintained her claim against the RTA. In my opinion, conduct has not been shown such as to make it fair to impose on the Council and Pioneer liability for the costs of the RTA."
20 Allianz also relied upon the Bostik decision. It submitted that the facts in Bostik were almost identical to those in this case. Allianz relied upon the following statement in the joint judgment at [30]:
"[30] … Although it was in Brolton's interest to have Bostik joined in the proceedings, so as to bear a proportionate share of any liability, and whilst it provided Mr Liddiard with such information that it had in its possession in respect of Bostik's role, that is not sufficient to require it to bear the costs of Mr Liddiard's claim against Bostik. The enquiry in the letter and the provision of information in respect of Bostik's role is not an inducement of a kind which was sufficient in this case to warrant making a Sanderson order. There was nothing in Brolton's conduct such as was the case in Gould v Vaggelas which made its conduct unreasonable. No Sanderson order should be made in relation to the costs of the trial."
21 As the above submissions indicate, there was no disagreement between the parties as to the correct principles to be applied. Where they disagreed was in the application of those principles to the specific facts of the case. In that regard, the analysis by the Court of Appeal in Bostik at [29] is of assistance:
"[29] The requirement that a party's conduct is relevant to determining whether a Sanderson order should be made is not a requirement that the party engage in misconduct. Rather, it is whether, given its conduct, it is fair to impose such an order on it. If the only conduct in which Brolton engaged was the inquiry made in its letter of 31 October, there would be no question that that conduct was insufficient to make the Sanderson order sought by Mr Liddiard. Nor would the bringing of a cross-claim of itself necessarily be sufficient. The question in this case then is whether the voluntary provision of the statements of Mr Lynch, Mr Pearce and the investigator's report to Mr Liddiard's solicitors, together with the inquiry in the letter and the bringing of the cross-claim, was such that it is fair that Brolton be made subject to a Sanderson order. In this regard, it should be observed that the statement of Mr Pearce and the investigation report were given to Mr Liddiard's solicitors with Brolton's pre-filing defence."
22 There are differences in the facts of this case to those in Bostik which are significant.
23 The service of the Keramidas report on 24 October 2006 was not made in accordance with any requirement of the District Court Rules 1973. At that time, no proceedings had been commenced by Mr Rickard. The only reasonable inference to be drawn from the service of that report at that time, is that Allianz was seeking to persuade Mr Rickard that it had potentially a good, positive defence, i.e. inevitable accident and that there was another viable defendant, i.e. the RTA.
24 The service of the Keramidas report at that time was intended to create some uncertainty in the mind of the legal advisers of Mr Rickard as to the viability of their claim against Allianz. That would arise if it were found by the Court that the driver of the Holden sedan may not have been able to take adequate avoiding action once he became aware of the presence of water over the highway.
25 Similarly, the service of the witness statements prepared for the Coroner in November 2006, which could only be regarded as conflicting in relation to the positioning of "Water Over Road" signs by the RTA, were also intended to suggest liability on the part of that organization. As with the service of the Keramidas report, there was no obligation under the District Court Rules to serve those statements at a time when proceedings had not been commenced by Mr Rickard.
26 Thereafter, with one exception, the service of documents by TL was in accordance with the District Court Rules and the obligations of Allianz as a defendant. The exception was the service of the statement of claim by the Estate of Dennison, in which the RTA had been joined as a defendant. The service of that document was not required under the District Court Rules and could have had no other purpose than to persuade Mr Rickard to bring proceedings against the RTA.
27 The final matter which distinguishes the facts in this case from those in Bostik was the nature of the defence raised by Allianz. It was not merely a denial of negligence, which would put the plaintiff to strict proof, but it raised a positive defence of inevitable accident, which was supported by the contents of the Keramidas report. This defence, supported as it was by some evidence, gave rise to a risk that if Mr Rickard proceeded only against Allianz his claim might fail altogether.
28 Taking those matters into account, I have concluded that in relation to the claim by Mr Rickard against the RTA, the conduct of Allianz was such that it would be fair to make a Sanderson order in favour of Mr Rickard in respect of the costs of the RTA. For the above reasons, I have concluded that Allianz did actively encourage Mr Rickard to commence proceedings against the RTA and that its encouragement went further than merely serving documents and providing information in accordance with the District Court Rules.
29 The situation is otherwise in relation to the Lavis brothers. The only material which directly implicated them was the report of Mr Jeffrey. At that time proceedings had been commenced by Mr Rickard against Allianz and the service of such a report, albeit in relation to cross-claims brought by the defendant, was still required by the District Court Rules. In the case of the Lavis brothers, the factual background is indistinguishable from that considered by the Court of Appeal in Bostik. I am not persuaded that Mr Rickard is entitled to either a Sanderson or a Bullock order in respect of their costs.
30 That does not end the matter. Allianz also relied upon some discussions which apparently took place on the second and third days of the hearing, i.e. 16 - 17 June 2009 between senior counsel for the RTA and senior counsel for Mr Rickard. The affidavit evidence in support of these discussions came from the solicitor instructing senior counsel for the RTA and the solicitor instructing senior counsel for Mr Rickard. There was no evidence from either senior counsel. Neither solicitor was cross-examined on their affidavits.
31 The evidence on this issue is unsatisfactory. It was expressed in conclusory terms without there being any clear statement of precisely what offer was made and what response was received to the offer. That of itself is sufficient for me to place little weight on that evidence.
32 Even if I were satisfied that an offer had been made by the RTA to Mr Rickard to discontinue proceedings against the RTA on the basis that each party pay his or its own costs, that does not alter the conclusion which I have arrived at in relation to the making of a Sanderson order in favour of Mr Rickard in respect of his claim against the RTA. By this time the trial was well underway and apart from the view, as a result of which I expressed the effect of my observations, the position had not greatly changed as between the parties. There was still a considerable amount of lay and expert evidence which was conflicting, and which needed to be resolved in the course of the hearing. The case against the RTA remained viable.
33 Accordingly, in relation to Mr Rickard, the orders which I will make in due course are that he pay the costs of the Lavis brothers, as agreed or assessed, and that Allianz pay to the RTA those costs which Mr Rickard is ordered to pay in respect of his claim against it.