HER HONOUR: Before the Court is a Notice of Motion filed for the plaintiff, Richard Churchill, seeking orders granting leave to file a redrafted amended Statement of Claim upon the defendant, the University of Sydney. As that nomenclature, "a redrafted amended Statement of Claim", suggests, the plaintiff's attempts to file and proceed upon a Statement of Claim against the University of Sydney now has a lengthy and somewhat regrettable history. It is appropriate to set that history out, drawn from the undisputed evidence of James Burg in an affidavit of 26 September 2019, together with a more recent affidavit from Clancy O'Donovan of 20 July 2020, and further, from the Court's own record.
In February 2008, the plaintiff was offered and took up a place, as a student in a Bachelor of Dentistry degree, a course offered by the Faculty of Dentistry at the University of Sydney. The plaintiff was excluded from that course in 2011. His claim against the defendant pleaded in negligence, under Australian Consumer Law, and as a request for judicial review, relates to that exclusion.
On 15 June 2018, six years to the day from the date on which the defendant refused the plaintiff an extension of time in which to appeal against his exclusion, the plaintiff filed an incomplete 22 page long Statement of Claim ("SOC"). The incomplete SOC was not served upon the defendant until about 7 November 2018. In the interim, between 15 June 2018 and 7 November 2018, the Court listed the matter for directions on three separate occasions; each date was necessarily vacated.
On 31 October 2018, the plaintiff filed but did not serve a Notice of Motion seeking leave to file an amended SOC. Service was finally effected on the University, as I have indicated, on about 7 November 2018, although without the proposed amended SOC. At a directions hearing on 15 February 2019, the plaintiff was ordered to serve the proposed amended SOC upon the defendant by 19 April 2020, with the plaintiff precluded from proceeding on any amended SOC not served by that date, without leave of the Court.
The plaintiff did not serve the amended SOC as ordered, instead filing a further Notice of Motion on 18 April 2019 seeking an extension of time in which to serve the proposed amended SOC. On 2 May 2019, the Court ordered that the plaintiff file and serve his proposed amended SOC by 3 June 2019, with the plaintiff's motion listed for hearing on 12 June 2019.
A draft amended SOC was served late, on 4 June 2019, by email. It is a document of 124 pages in length. Despite that great length, it was marked as "incomplete". On 12 June 2019, the plaintiff was ordered to provide his proposed amended SOC to the University by 26 June of that year. On the due date for service, the plaintiff sent an email to the court seeking a further extension of time. The time for service was extended to 3 July 2019.
The day before that deadline, on 2 July 2019, by email the plaintiff again sought further time to serve the proposed amended SOC. He was given until 8 July 2019. On that date, the plaintiff emailed a second draft amended SOC which, like its predecessor, was marked as "incomplete". This document ran to some 325 pages.
On 15 July 2019, the plaintiff emailed a third draft of his proposed amended SOC which was some 367 pages in length.
Although the defendant to that point had either consented to extensions of time or neither consented nor opposed such extensions, the defendant opposed leave being granted to the plaintiff to file the third draft amended SOC.
On 6 August 2019, the Court ordered the plaintiff to file and serve a Notice of Motion seeking leave to file an amended SOC and affidavits in support by 10 September 2019. The matter was listed for directions a week later on 17 September 2019. The hearing of that Notice of Motion was ultimately listed before the Court on 18 February 2020.
On that date, 18 February this year, the matter came before Button J. The plaintiff appeared for himself or, as he regularly describes himself, as "a first time self-represented litigant before the Court." As an indulgence to his self-represented status, Button J dealt with the motion on an informal basis. His Honour was able to distil from the voluminous and rather emotionally charged documentation filed to that stage by the plaintiff the three causes of action pleaded by the plaintiff, to which I have already referred, at [2] above.
His Honour identified, for the plaintiff's assistance, some of the perceived problems with the existing process, and enumerated for him features that were important in preparing a statement of claim. His Honour did that, as I understand it, because, as he observed (in the unreported judgment of 18 February 2020), the process filed by the plaintiff to that date was:
"A repetitive document, a document that sets out alleged events not always in chronological order, a document that mixes in less important details with more important allegations, a document that is expressed in emotive terms and a document that in truth in terms of being a useful concise starting point summary of his claim does more harm than good."
With the defendant cooperating in the provision of assistance to the plaintiff at that informal hearing, his Honour made orders by consent dismissing the plaintiff's Notice of Motion and ordering him to provide the defendant a further draft amended SOC by 14 April 2020. Costs were to be costs in the cause.
On 6 April 2020, the plaintiff contacted the defendant asking for its consent to a further extension of time for the service for that document. A three-week extension was granted by consent and the Court ordered the plaintiff to provide the defendant with his amended draft SOC by 5 May 2020.
On that date, the plaintiff sought a further extension and, without opposition from the defendant, the plaintiff was again granted further time, being another week, until 12 May 2020, to file and serve the document.
On 18 May 2020, out of time by six days, the plaintiff provided the defendant via email with a further, now fourth, draft amended SOC, a document of some 277 pages. The defendant opposes leave being granted to the plaintiff to file and rely upon that amended SOC.
The plaintiff was ordered to file and serve any Notice of Motion seeking leave to file the further draft amended SOC by 5 June 2020. He did not do so, again, seeking an extension of the timetable set by the Court.
With the consent of the defendant, the Court again allowed an extension of time until 11 June 2020. The Notice of Motion was provided by email to the defendant on that date.
It is that notice of motion, supported by the plaintiff's affidavits of 29 October 2019, 10 June 2020, and 2 September 2020, that the Court is now considering. The defendant read affidavits of James Burg of 26 September 2019 and Clancy O'Donovan of 20 July 2020 in support of its opposition to leave being granted.
Both parties have filed written submissions, and I have heard additional oral submissions from the parties, both earlier this week in Mr Churchill's case, and today from both parties.
I do not for present purposes pretend to summarise the whole of the submissions that were put to the Court but, in very brief terms, the plaintiff contends that he should be permitted to file his final amended SOC because, he submits, the document is properly pleaded, it is not seeking to commence an action which is statute barred - despite the lapse of time since the events said to give rise to the cause of action - and, it clearly delineates, in the plaintiff's submission, the basis of the claim, which he contends is one of much wider importance than simply an action in his own favour.
Criticising the defendant for opposing a grant of leave, the plaintiff submits that he should be permitted to litigate his claim because, again, in summary form:
"In the wake of a patently unjust permanent annihilation of my hard won anticipated career in professional dentistry, I was left utterly DEVASTATED and indeed have suffered now eight lonely years of devastation, loss, despair and ex-communicated ignominy since."
The defendant submits that the amended SOC is little different to that which Button J rejected in February of this year as unable to serve its purpose. The defendant contends that the revised proposed amended SOC is convoluted and emotional; it mixes argument with allegation; and it is a document wholly inadequate to the task of articulating the case that the plaintiff seeks to advance against the defendant. The deficiencies of the revised proposed amended SOC go further, in the defendant's submission, than deficiency of form and content. There are real questions as to the proceedings being statute barred with respect to both the action in negligence and to the claim under Australian Consumer Law. The same is true; it is submitted, of the claim for judicial review with respect to the seven impugned decisions made by the University. The latter claims, those seeking judicial review, it is submitted, have no utility, in any event.
[2]
Determination
In determining the application from the plaintiff, it should firstly be observed that, after two years and almost four months of proceedings before the Court, at some expense to the defendant and the community, this matter has not been able to progress beyond the stage of filing a settled SOC which the Court and the defendant can proceed upon; that want of progress is despite numerous directions hearings and orders made by the Court, and one hearing already before a judge of this Court in February of this year.
The lack of progress is itself to be viewed against a background of events at the heart of the claim the plaintiff seeks to make, which, in large part, occurred around a decade or more ago.
Despite that lengthy delay and the many indulgences afforded to the plaintiff, the plaintiff's revised proposed amended SOC that the Court is asked to grant leave to Mr Churchill to file, is a document that bears little or no resemblance to a statement of claim initiating a civil action in this or any other court.
A statement of claim is the document central to litigation of this type. It should clearly and specifically state the relief sought and include the material facts, but not the evidence by which the facts are to be proved. Importantly, pleadings should be as brief as the nature of the claim permits.
What is required was considered by Johnson J in McGuirk v University of Sydney (2009) NSWSC 1424 at [21]-[29]. To very broadly paraphrase his Honour, the function of pleadings in a case such as this is to state with clarity the case that must be met by the defendant. In this way, pleadings serve to define the issues for decision and ensure the basic requirement of procedural fairness that a party should have the opportunity of understanding and being able to meet the case against it.
The issues defined in the pleadings provides the basis upon which evidence may be determined to be admissible or inadmissible at any ultimate trial on the ground of evidence.
Whilst it is important that a party have every opportunity to plead an arguable case against a defendant, the defendant must also have an opportunity at an early point in the proceedings to be properly apprised of the case against it. A proper pleading is of fundamental importance in assisting the Court to achieve the overriding purpose set out by s 56 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) of facilitating the just, quick, and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings.
In circumstances where there is an application for leave to amend pleadings, the Court must have regard to considerations of case management and of cost and delay. The need for clarity, precision and openness in the conduct of litigation and the responsibility of the parties that flows from that is the duty to assist the Court to further that overriding purpose to which I have referred, as set out in s 56.
It is important that material facts are stated in such a way that the defendant can understand the materiality of the fact, that is, how they are material to a cause of action, and explicitly to relate the facts that are pleaded to the specific causes of action.
Pleadings which do not meet those requirements are sometimes described as "embarrassing". Again, to broadly paraphrase Johnson J in McGuirk from [30]-[35], a pleading is embarrassing where it is unintelligible, ambiguous, vague, or too general, so as to embarrass the opposite party who does not know what is alleged against it.
The "embarrassment" in the context of litigation refers to a pleading that is susceptible to various meanings, where alternatives are confusingly intermixed, where irrelevant allegations are made, or where material facts are couched in expressions which leave difficulties or doubts in recognising, piecing together, or understanding what is referred to.
In a case where the pleadings are held to be embarrassing, the appropriate remedy is to strike the pleading out. Rule 14.2(8) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules provides for that to occur, and pleadings that are not compliant may be struck out as an embarrassment.
It is not the function of the Court to draw or settle a party's pleadings. The Court is confined to the function of ensuring that pleadings are within the Rules and fulfil the functions for which they exist.
The plaintiff's redrafted proposed amended SOC suffers from a number of flaws, in my view, which require that it be struck out.
The relief claimed is difficult to understand. Whilst it is clear the plaintiff seeks monetary damages for what he asserts is the loss of a commercially valuable opportunity, presumably that of practising in dentistry as a qualified dentist, it is couched in such a way that it does not assist the defendant or the Court in addressing the matter. An example suffices to illustrate the point.
The relief claimed by the plaintiff at prayer 5 is:
"Exemplary damages for the carefully planned and executed conscious wrongdoing of the defendant in contumelious disregard of the plaintiff's rights and welfare and for its imperious conduct constituting inter alia the use of arbitrary and outrageous statutory power."
I have read that prayer a number of times, placed it in its context, but I still find it almost impossible to understand.
In his pleadings and particulars, the plaintiff refers to what he says are "the primary facts". These primary facts are articulated in language which is anything but factual, and which serve only to obscure the material facts. For example, the plaintiff gives as a primary fact "the plaintiff's triple task trial by ordeal BDent II RRCA reassessment nightmare"; further, "Faculties for PPD demerit point penalty 11th hour death blow manoeuvre".
The language is emotional, derogatory of the defendant's agents, it utilises underlining and bold text regularly, and it repeats a number of phrases which are, to me, as unhelpfully dramatic as they are meaningless. Again, some examples illustrate the point.
I have referred already to the "triple task trial by ordeal reassessment nightmare" that the plaintiff has articulated as a fact. That is further outlined in the pleadings:
"Thus, on the third last day of the 2009 University calendar, with the vast majority of their colleagues already two weeks into their holiday break, just eight unsuspecting, callously targeted BDent II students were each in turn summoned to an individual interview with Dr Bhutada where only now, some 15 days after initial vague notice, they were finally informed of the true nature and gravity of an unprecedented triple task trial by ordeal BDent II RRCA reassessment nightmare to be imposed upon them over just four days from Tue 12 to Fri 15 January 2010. The defendant faculty's deliberate 11th hour late notice thus served to isolate, marginalise and very effectively deprive of ANY support, be it academic, peer, SRC advocacy or counselling, these eight unsuspecting, unfortunate BDent II students, including the plaintiff, upon whom this ordeal was unjustly foisted."
Again, that is a paragraph that I have read on a number of occasions and I cannot understand how it is that the "eight unsuspecting unfortunate BDent II students" have any relevance whatsoever to this claim.
Further, in relation to the same "triple task trial by ordeal", the plaintiff pleads:
"Plaintiff's radiology reassessment week interview with Dr Bhutada at lunchtime on Wed 16 December 2019, the plaintiff walked home from SDH, in between his barrier remediation sessions, to discover that his fiancée, who had come home early from work, was in the early stages of what would be a devastating, protracted miscarriage and, ultimately, the loss of their third unborn child.
Acutely grief stricken and in a state of shock from their traumatic shared loss, the plaintiff then had to return to SDH for the first time for the afternoon barrier remediation session, followed by his allocated LS barrier reassessment appointment with Dr Bhutada at 3.30pm. It was here and under these personally tragic circumstances that he learnt for the first time the true scale and full summative gravity of Dr Scott's hitherto clandestine intentions for the Jan 2010 radiology reassessment week. He finally learnt, some fifteen days after vague, bare minimal notice of a radiology reassessment during the barrier reassessment week, that it actually comprised schedule of three reassessment tasks to be imposed over four days from Tue 12 January to Fri 15 January 2010, a satisfactory in all three tasks being MANDATORY to PASS in order for any of its eight victims to PROGRESS to BDent III 2010 the very next Monday 18 Jan 2010".
Similarly, that is a paragraph I have read on a number of occasions. It is not clear to me whether the plaintiff is raising some liability of the University for the miscarriage tragically suffered by his fiancée; it is not clear to me what the relevance of the "eight victims" is and, indeed, who those eight victims may be other than the plaintiff. In short, the paragraph, like many of those that precede and follow it, is incomprehensible to the overall claim.
The plaintiff persistently refers in the pleadings to the "triple task trial by ordeal" feature of the matter as:
"An eleventh hour do or die triple task trial by ordeal nightmare, unprecedented in the eleven year lifespan of the BDent program, which suddenly turned on its head what had hitherto been years of established convention in terms of the faculty's summative assessment and thus progression implications of the BDent II radiology RCA AND which now put the plaintiff and seven fellow students under immeasurable extra stress and anxiety, having abruptly placed their progression to BDent III in serious jeopardy at the very end of an already all-consuming year."
A further example from the pleadings follows.
"Such was the faculty's resolve to halt the plaintiff's progression to BDent III 2010 it ALSO soon became evident at the 5 Feb 2010 paper viewing session that YET AGAIN, as occurred in the marking of the BDent II 2009 RRCA OSCA reassessment I for 25 September 2009 the denominator, that is, total mark for the exam, had been altered upwards after the fact, this time from 106 to either 112 or 113. The effect of this manipulation, now on a progression-critical RRCA OSCA exam was to LOWER all eight students' true final grades by 3 or 4%, which, albeit by itself enough to ensure the plaintiff's failure, was inflicted in his case IN ADDITION to the illicit alteration downward of the numerator of his score, that is, from 66 to 62 as detailed above. This second after the fact manipulation of the plaintiff's true exam result FURTHER REDUCED his final grade to only 55 per cent, which denied him even any last resort prospect of a conceded pass feasible only from the 59 per cent grade and thus irretrievably sealed his state RESULTING IN HIS OVERALL FAILURE of BDent II 2009 and consigning him to the appallingly unjust, utterly devastating imposition of an ENTIRE repeat year of BDent II throughout 2010."
I have read the revised amended statement of claim a number of times now and I find it impossible to delineate and distil from it a proper basis of claim. The proposed document is not a statement of claim. It is an emotional diatribe, a bitter tirade, a broadside, even a jeremiad. It is not a document upon which the defendant can be permitted to understand the case brought against it or make its defence. It is not a document that can assist the Court in ensuring that the proceedings are dealt with quickly and cheaply, as well as justly. It is not a document that the plaintiff should be granted leave to file.
[3]
Leave to re-plead
The next question then is whether the plaintiff should be allowed yet further time in which to redraft and replead his case.
The plaintiff submits that he should be given such an opportunity if the Court is not satisfied with his existing redrafted SOC because, he submits, his claim is a valid one, and any defects that may be present in the form of his claim are defects for which he is not to blame and over which he had no control.
The defendant by contrast argues that the plaintiff should not be permitted to redraft a fresh statement of claim because no cause of action has been disclosed to date and, doing the best that one can to understand what the plaintiff complains of, no legitimate claim can be discerned.
There is a very real question as to the application of the limitation period. The mischief of which the plaintiff complains seems to have commenced during the course of the plaintiff's second year of his Bachelor of Dentistry studies, that is, in 2009, when he was graded "unsatisfactory" in a competency assessment for radiology. There was a further opportunity of assessment apparently allowed to the plaintiff in January 2010 but he was also graded as unsatisfactory in the course of that further reassessment opportunity. The plaintiff appealed against that grade seeking special consideration, but the unsatisfactory grade was confirmed on 10 February 2010.
The plaintiff discussed the matter with the Dean and was permitted to participate in a further reassessment process, but the plaintiff is not happy about the outcome of that further reassessment process. He made what he describes in the revised proposed amended statement of claim as a "final appeal to the Dean" in respect of the unsatisfactory grade for radiology, but the appeal was rejected. That was followed by an appeal filed by the plaintiff to the Student Appeals Body, an appeal which ultimately did not give the plaintiff the outcome he sought. There were communications between the plaintiff and various bodies of the university, including the Student Appeals Body and the Student Affairs Unit, concerning extensions of time with respect to an appeal, but in the interim the plaintiff was recommended for exclusion from the Bachelor of Dentistry degree course.
On 12 December 2011, the Acting Associate Dean required that the plaintiff show good cause as to why he should be allowed to re-enrol in the degree program. On 9 February 2012, the Dean rejected the plaintiff's response to the show cause notice. All of these are decisions about which the plaintiff complains and in relation to which he seeks judicial review.
During the course of the appeal process and in the course of seeking extensions of time in which to appeal the plaintiff must have become aware, as at the latest by 25 May 2012, that his appeal period had expired. Arguably, that date is the latest date from which any claim runs. That decision itself, the confirmation that the appeal was closed and would not be reconsidered, is one of the decisions against which the plaintiff seeks judicial review.
There is every reason to conclude that the plaintiff's claim, insofar as it can be discerned, is out of time and simply cannot be brought as a consequence of time limitations. In my view that is the appropriate conclusion to draw on all of the material before the court, that this action, even if it has any substance, is statute barred. Even if the claim is not out of time, as Mr Churchill contends, the pleadings insofar as they can be understood advance claims which in my conclusion are simply not available as a matter of law.
The claim in torts for negligence, which also seems to incorporate references to contract and other matters, insofar as I have been able to understand it, appears to be a complaint that the applicant, as a particularly vulnerable student, having regard to his greater age than his fellow students, was owed by the University a duty to provide him with additional tuition and academic support to ensure that he was able to meet the requirements of the course. As pleaded, I had understood the complaint made by the plaintiff to be that because of his particular vulnerability owing to his age, and to what should have been, he contends, inferred, that he would have "concomitant life difficulties" as a man of more mature years than the typical student, he should have been permitted to comply with a lesser academic standard than other students.
The plaintiff in oral submissions advised the Court that that was not his complaint and he did not seek to assert any duty of the University to afford him a lesser academic standard. He confirmed, however, that his complaint included a claim that the defendant was negligent or failed to meet its duty to provide him, as an older student, with a greater level of academic support than was available to other students. Simply stating that claim to any reasonable mind must highlight the complete absence of merit from which it suffers.
Necessarily, academic standards and the level of academic support must be equally available to all students. There is no basis upon which any university could or should be required to conclude that an older student is owed a higher obligation for the provision of increased or more significant academic support than is a younger student. Younger students can also have difficulties in their personal lives which can have an impact on their capacity to study and complete their courses. Any such difficulties can be approached on a case by case basis by any university but, in my view, this Court should clearly reject any contention that an older student, whether offered a place on the degree course at the last minute or not, is owed any greater burden of tuition and academic care than is any other student. All students must be treated equally. In that sense the claim in negligence in my view is one which has no merit and could not be advanced. There is no precedent for it, and it is simply unsustainable.
The claims which are advanced by the plaintiff under the Australian Consumer Law also suffer in my conclusion from a fundamental difficulty. A university is not, in my conclusion, an institution which is engaged in trade or commerce when assessing students' work. The decisions of which the plaintiff complains, decisions relevant to his assessment and then pursuit of appeals against that assessment, is not conduct which could be characterised as "conduct in trade or commerce." Further, it is in my conclusion no business of a court to determine how a university is to carry out and effect an assessment process relevant to students. I accept the defendant's submissions in that regard. Those claims under the Australian Consumer Law in my conclusion have no prospect of success.
The application for judicial review is one to which time limits apply and I have already referred to that. If, however, one sets aside that issue and considers the merit of the application for judicial review of the decisions the plaintiff identifies, in my conclusion there is no merit in the request for judicial review.
The course of which the plaintiff was a student no longer exists. There would be no capacity for the court, for example, to quash the relevant decisions, and make an order that they be reconsidered with a view to readmitting the plaintiff to the relevant course. That simply is not a course which is open. There is in that regard no utility at all in pursuing the matters of judicial review. That, of course, is on the basis that the decisions of which the plaintiff complains are amenable to judicial review, even setting aside the issue of time limitations.
In making decisions as to the assessment of students and, in particular, the assessment of the plaintiff, in making decisions as to the determination of appeals and the question of extensions of time in which to appeal, the university was not, in my conclusion, exercising a public power which is amenable to judicial review. In short, judicial review is, in my view, out of time, has no utility, and is, in any event, simply not available.
On that basis none of the claims that the plaintiff raises and seeks to prosecute before the court are claims which have any prospect of success.
Even if they did, there are discretionary questions that arise and they are principally questions that relate to the extraordinary delay in bringing these proceedings. Mr Churchill submits that he should not be penalised for delay because he is a first time self-represented litigant in the Supreme Court, because he was burdened with the role of being a full-time carer for his 87-year-old mother who is very ill, because he has himself suffered from illness in the course of these proceedings and the period leading up to his commencement of these proceedings, and because other features over which he had no control, such as a heatwave in December 2019 to January 2020, had an impact on his capacity to prosecute his claim. He submits that the delay has not and could not prejudice the defendant.
It is clear on the evidence that the defendant has been greatly prejudiced already and that prejudice could only increase if this proceeding was permitted to go forward. On the evidence, some of the witnesses who, it seems, would be critical to any defence mounted by the defendant, are dead. Others are no longer associated with the University, and whether they can be located and secured as witnesses is not known. Even if they can be, the memories of witnesses for events which have occurred in some instances, relevant to the conduct complained of, over a decade ago, must necessarily have been adversely affected by the passage of time. There is real prejudice to the defendant in permitting this matter to go forward, even had I concluded it has merit and prospects of success. I have of course concluded that there are no prospects of success.
I am conscious that disposing of these proceedings without permitting the plaintiff to replead and potentially to have his claims fully aired is a decision that must be taken only after cautious and careful consideration. The test to be applied by a court when considering such an outcome generally is that a claim is obviously untenable or cannot possibly succeed, or where it is manifestly groundless or manifestly faulty to a degree where that conclusion does not permit of argument.
For a court to cut off access to its processes to a plaintiff the case must be a very clear one and there must be a high degree of certainty about the ultimate outcome of the proceedings were they allowed to proceed to trial in the ordinary way. I am, as I have said, very aware of those authorities and very conscious of the degree to which the plaintiff asserts he has been emotionally and psychologically affected, as well as financially disadvantaged. If there were any basis upon which further time might be allowed to permit the plaintiff to frame a claim in a way in which it could go forward, I would make the orders to permit that to occur. But having read through the many, many, hundreds of pages, many of those more than once in an endeavour to understand them, I can see no legitimate basis for these claims.
If they were to proceed I think the only outcome would be that the plaintiff would be left liable for what would likely amount to many tens of thousands of dollars in legal costs. He will already be liable for some legal costs. Permitting this matter to go forward could only ill serve the plaintiff by leaving him open to very significant amounts of money sought against him by way of legal costs.
Understanding the gravity of the decision which would preclude access to this court for the plaintiff, I have nevertheless concluded that that is the only proper way to dispose of this matter. I propose to make the following orders:
1. Leave to file a further amended statement of claim is refused.
2. Leave to replead a further amended statement of claim is refused.
3. The statement of claim filed in this court on 15 June 2018 is struck out, and the proceedings are dismissed.
[4]
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Decision last updated: 02 October 2020