The terms of s 90(1) were mandatory: the Council was obliged to take into consideration relevant matters from the catalogue of matters in s 90(1), and to weigh them up in determining the development application. It had to inform itself sufficiently to be able to take into consideration the matters of relevance to the determination of the development application. With particular reference to para (b) of s 90(1), it had to be aware not only of the impact and the likely harm but also of available protective or mitigating means: so the conditions to be included in the consent were an integral part of the consideration ( Parramatta City Council v Hale (1982) 47 LGRA 319 at 338-9, 340,342; King v Great Lakes Shire Council (1986) 58 LGRA 336 at 384). Taking relevant matters into consideration called for more than simply adverting to them. There had to be an understanding of the matters and the significance of the decision to be made about them, and a process of evaluation, sufficient to warrant the description of the matters being taken into consideration ( Parramatta City Council v Hale at 335-6, 339; King v Great Lakes Shire Council at 384; Currey v Sutherland Shire Council (1998) 100 LGERA 365 at 374-5)…
24 The standard of assessment referred to in Weal by Giles JA was made in the context of judicial review proceedings. Section 79C(1) is necessarily broad in its description of the matters which must be taken into account by the Court in a s 97 appeal. The scope of the issues to be considered in the context of that section must be informed by the case as presented to the Court by the parties, confirmed most recently in Segal & Anor v Waverley Council [2005] NSWCA 310 at [43] - [44], and [93].
25 Brown C has explicitly identified as an issue in [105] - [108] of his judgment the impact of the development on the character of the area. He has chosen to answer it in the context of the Council's current LEP without giving significant weight to draft Amendment 66, as he is entitled to do in exercising his discretion as to which factors ought be given weight. The judgment is criticised on the basis that it fails to properly consider submissions on the character of the area and the impact on the character of the surrounding residential areas.
26 It has been established that a "fine-tooth comb" approach should not be employed when examining s 56A appeals for errors of law (see Brimbella Pty Limited v Mosman Municipal Council (1985) 79 LGERA 367 at 368; Coles v Woollahra Municipal Council (1986) 59 LGRA 133 at 138; Randwick Municipal Council v Crawley (1986) 60 LGRA 277 at 283). The judgment when viewed as a whole clearly suggests the Commissioner was aware of the character of the area and gave it proper consideration. The Commissioner's judgment identified the nature of the area surrounding the proposed development, the number of resident views received and the general nature of their concerns and the Commissioner took a view of the site and immediate locality. The Commissioner has adopted an accepted approach of considering the particular zone where the site is proposed to see if it conforms and has concluded that it does. Given the detailed treatment by the Commissioner of specific issues raised such as traffic, parking, noise and amenity impacts on the immediate neighbours, all of which issues reflect the issues raised by the parties, there is no error of law disclosed in his reasoning.