Amendment to the Crimes Act, 1900
57 At the time Mr Page was sentenced, the maximum penalty under s27 of the Crimes Act was life imprisonment. The Act was amended in 1989. The maximum penalty was reduced to 25 years imprisonment. It was submitted that Mr Page was entitled to the benefit of that change, in accordance with s19 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, 1999. That section is in these terms:
"19. Effect of alterations in penalties.
(1) If an Act or statutory rule increases the penalty for an offence, the increased penalty applies only to offences committed after the commencement of the provision of the Act or statutory rule increasing the penalty.
(2) If an Act or statutory rule reduces the penalty for an offence, the reduced penalty extends to offences committed before the commencement of the provision of the Act or statutory rule reducing the penalty, but the reduction does not affect any penalty imposed before that commencement.
(3) In this section, a reference to a penalty includes a reference to a penalty that is expressed to be a maximum or minimum penalty."
58 It was submitted that the sentence, once redetermined, cannot exceed 25 years. The sentence, moreover, must date from the first remand, 13 April 1976. Even were the crime viewed as a worst case, requiring a head sentence of 25 years, the term would have expired on 12 April 2001. A non parole period, set at three quarters of that term, would have elapsed after 18 years 9 months.
59 The Crown, in its submission, rejected that view. It drew attention to the words of exclusion in s19(2), namely, "but the reduction does not affect any penalty imposed before the commencement", that is, before the commencement of the Act which reduces the penalty for the offence. The penalty of life imprisonment was imposed in 1976. The Act reducing the penalty to 25 years imprisonment did not commence until 1989. Mr Page, accordingly, was subject to "an existing life sentence", as defined by para 1 of Schedule (1) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, 1999. It was open to him, under clause 2(1) of the Schedule, to apply to the Supreme Court for the determination of a term, and a non parole period. In its determination of that application, the Supreme Court was obliged to have regard to the matters in clause 7(1)(a) to (d), and may have regard to "any other relevant matter" (cl 7(1)(e)). The Court may then dispose of the application in one of the ways identified in clause 4, namely:
"4. Determination of application
(1) The Supreme Court may dispose of an application in relation to an existing life sentence:
(a) by setting a specified term for the sentence together with a non-parole period for the sentence, or
(b) by declining to set a specified term for the sentence but setting a non-parole period for the sentence, or
(c) by declining to set a specified term for the sentence and declining to set a non-parole period for the sentence."
60 The Crown did not oppose the determination of Mr Page's sentence, by fixing a non parole period, perhaps coinciding with that imposed by Howie DCJ (31 January 2003). The Court should, however, in accordance with clause 4(1)(b), decline to set a specified term (cf R v Lanigan (CCA, unreported, 31 August 1992).
61 Mr Craigie SC, appearing for Mr Page, answered the Crown's argument by drawing attention to the nature of the Court's task in the redetermination of a life sentence under Schedule (1). The Court, when redetermining an existing life sentence, stands in the position of the sentencing Judge. The person applying for redetermination is sentenced anew. Accordingly, the sentence is imposed after the commencement of the Act which reduces the penalty. The exclusion in s19(2) therefore has no application.
62 Certainly there are passages in the cases which are capable of suggesting that the task of redetermination is akin to sentencing anew. Carruthers J (with whom Campbell and Ireland JJ agreed) in R v Dennis (CCA, unreported, 28.10.92) said this (referring to s13A Sentencing Act, 1989, which has been replaced by Schedule (1): (at 7)
"Further, it must not be overlooked that when a judge is exercising the jurisdiction vested in the Court by s13A, the judge is undertaking a sentencing exercise."
63 In R v Purdey (1992) 65 A Crim R 441, Hunt CJ at CL said this: (at 444)
"... the fresh sentencing exercise required by s13A so far as the crime of murder is concerned is in essence no different to that which would have been undertaken at the time of the original life sentence had the penalty prescribed then been (as it is now) wholly at the discretion of the judge."
64 I believe the better view is that s19(2) has no application to an "existing life sentence". The penalty, life imprisonment, had been imposed before the commencement of the legislation which reduced the maximum to 25 years imprisonment. Having said that, the Court, in redetermining a sentence, cannot ignore the change in the law. It is a matter relevant to the sentencing discretion. It would be unfair were it otherwise. In Samuels v Songaila (1977) 16 SASR 397, King J said this: (at 420-21)
"If Parliament were to reduce a penalty, it might appear that Parliament had judged the former penalty to be harsher or unjust and therefore intended that the harshness or injustice should not be continued even in relation to offences already committed."
65 In R v MJR (2002) 54 NSWLR 368, Spigelman CJ made the following comment: (at 373)
"Section 19 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 and its predecessor reflects a principle of perceived fairness applicable to maximum and minimum penalties, which it is appropriate to adopt for other aspects of the exercise of the sentencing discretion."
66 I believe, therefore, that I have jurisdiction to select the appropriate alternative in Schedule (1) clause 4(1), even though more than 25 years has elapsed since Mr Page was remanded in respect of this crime.