The Applicant's Submissions
214 Mr Kintominas submits that it is appropriate to fix a non-parole period with respect to the Applicant but that, in the event that the Court declined to do so, an order excluding the Applicant from making further application for a period of 10 years should not be made.
215 If the Court does not make any other order, the Applicant may not reapply to the Court within a period of three years from the date of the Court's decision not to give such a direction: cl.6(3), Schedule 1, 1999 Act. In the event that the Court refuses the present application, Mr Kintominas submits that the statutory period ought stand, thereby allowing the Applicant an opportunity to make further application in three years' time.
216 Counsel for the Applicant acknowledges that this was a serious case of murder, but submitted that it fell short of a "worst case" and that a finding ought not be made that the offence was a "most serious case of murder" for the purpose of cl.6(4)(b), Schedule 1, 1999 Act.
217 Mr Kintominas emphasised the Applicant's positive history of conduct within prison, and contends that there were features which pointed towards the commencement of a process of reformation and rehabilitation on the part of the Applicant. He submits that a difficulty confronting the Applicant has been the limited availability of appropriate treatment and counselling at Junee Correctional Centre, a matter noted in the reports of Ms Rosen, Dr Lucas and Dr Wong.
218 Mr Kintominas submits that the best way forward is to set a non-parole period to facilitate the process whereby the Applicant could undertake the CUBIT program, which would provide an opportunity for an understanding to emerge of the factors underlying the Applicant's offending. In due course, it would be a matter for the State Parole Authority to determine whether the Applicant should be released on parole in the light of evidence then available. Mr Kintominas submits that this approach would serve the public interest, and the protection of the community, by reducing the risk of reoffending on the Applicant's part.
219 Mr Kintominas submits that, were the Applicant to be required to wait another 10 years before renewing his application, he would have spent over 29 years in prison since he was taken into custody for the murder offence. He submits that the objective circumstances of the murder, although admittedly grave, are not such as to compel a conclusion that anything less than a non-parole period of 30 years would be insufficient to satisfy the demands of justice, irrespective of how favourable the subjective circumstances of the Applicant might be.
220 As the life sentence was set by Hunt J to commence at the expiration of his 1983 sentences (recalculated as 26 October 1990), the Applicant has now served almost 16 years and six months of that sentence, and an order preventing him from reapplying for another 10 years would see him serving some 26 years and six months of the sentence before he could then reapply to have his sentence determined. Mr Kintominas submits that this was getting close to the enforced wait of 30 years applying to prisoners whose sentence had a recommendation that they never be released pursuant to cl.2(b), Schedule 1, 1999 Act. Hunt J had made no such recommendation in this case.
221 Mr Kintominas submits that, in fact, Hunt J accepted that the total head sentence in respect of the other offences for which the Applicant was sentenced "should not be so crippling that there be no hope left for the prisoner for the future". Counsel submits that acceptance by his Honour of that proposition clearly demonstrated that his Honour was not of the view that the crime was so serious as to preclude future release.
222 Counsel submits that sufficient time has now passed for the Court to be in as good a position as it is ever likely to be to evaluate the Applicant's remorse and potential for rehabilitation. Nor can it be said, he submits, that the application is made so prematurely as to offend any public expectation that the formal stigma and denunciation of the life sentence be dissolved too early, given the objective facts of the crime and the views expressed by the sentencing Judge.
223 Mr Kintominas submits that determining the sentence, or at least imposing a non-parole period, will make it more likely that the Applicant would be admitted to the CUBIT program.
224 Mr Kintominas submits that there is sufficient evidence to satisfy the Court that the Applicant's prospects of rehabilitation are reasonably good. He has managed to stay drug free in prison for nearly 20 years. The worst that can be said about his relatively few and minor infractions of prison discipline is that he has, on rare occasions, expressed his frustrations. Counsel submits that it is of great significance that such expressions of frustration have not been accompanied by violence of any kind.
225 Mr Kintominas submits that a significant early pointer to the Applicant's prospects of rehabilitation was his confession in December 1989 to participation in the sexual assault of TI on 13 September 1987. This was an unsolved crime until the Applicant, some 15 months after being sentenced by Hunt J, wrote to police and confessed to the crime. The Applicant claims that he did so as a result of his conversion to Christianity whilst in gaol.
226 Mr Kintominas acknowledges that religious conversion is not, in itself, a matter which can automatically attract favourable consideration on sentence. He submits, however, that what is important and relevant, if it can be demonstrated, is that the Applicant has earnestly chosen henceforth to live and abide by a set of values which involve him accepting that he must not do wrong by other people, and taking responsibility for and accepting punishment for, the wrongs he has done in the past.
227 It was submitted that the Applicant's action in giving himself up for the offence on TI was a marked departure from the way in which he had previously conducted himself, and demonstrated a true and fundamental change for the better. The Applicant's failure to nominate his co-offender, it was submitted, does not detract either from remorse for past conduct, or from the prospect for future rehabilitation demonstrated by the Applicant's acceptance of responsibility for the sexual assault of TI. Mr Kintominas noted that identification of the Applicant's co-offender may have had adverse consequences for him in the prison setting, and that this may serve to explain why the Applicant refused to reveal the identity of his accomplice.
228 Mr Kintominas noted the finding of Hunt J that the Applicant had not been affected by drugs or alcohol at the time of the murder. Although it was suggested, at one point, that the Applicant may invite this Court to come to a different factual conclusion, no such submission was pressed at the end of the hearing. The Applicant did not give evidence on the present application.
229 In any event, Mr Kintominas submits that the Applicant had never claimed that the substances, which he said he had ingested, had provoked a murderous rage on his part. Rather, the Applicant had described to the psychiatrist a dissociative state of mind which appears consistent with heavy amphetamine usage. It was submitted that such a dissociative state of mind may result in the weakening of usual human inhibitions in murdering a fellow human being.
230 Counsel submits that the significance of a potential finding that the Applicant was not affected by drugs and alcohol is that the Court may have more confidence in the proposition that he is unlikely to offend, given his abstinence from drugs whilst in prison.
231 Mr Kintominas concluded that the setting of a non-parole period would provide incentive for the Applicant to undertake appropriate treatment and counselling within the prison system, and that this would be in the public interest.