Re K, an incapable person in receipt of interim damages awards [2014] NSWSC 1286
[2014] NSWSC 1286
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Supreme Court of NSW
Decision date
2014-09-19
Before
Lindsay J
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Judgment (8 paragraphs)
INTRODUCTION 1In law and practice close, constant attention must be given to the intersection between: (a) litigation for the recovery, at common law, of damages for personal injuries that rendered a person incapable of managing his or her own affairs; and (b) the protective jurisdiction of the Court (and the analogous jurisdiction exercised by the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of NSW, "NCAT", pursuant to the Guardianship Act 1987 NSW) for the protection of the incapable person. 2These proceedings illustrate that point in a case in which, in proceedings for damages at common law, the present defendant, a "person under legal incapacity" (within the meaning of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 NSW, r 7.13) - represented by his mother acting as his tutor (pursuant to UCPR r 7.15) - as a plaintiff recovered several awards of interim damages (under the Civil Procedure Act 2005 NSW, s 82), only the first of which was the subject of orders (made in Protective List proceedings under the NSW Trustee and Guardian Act 2009 NSW, s 41(1)) for protected estate management before the final determination of the Common Law proceedings required: (a)adjustments to be made (pursuant to CPA s 83) to bring the interim payments into account on a final award of damages; and (b)the balance of the damages awarded to the incapable person to be paid into court (pursuant to CPA s 77(2)) pending consideration of an application for further, ongoing management orders. 3Shortly after the first award of interim damages was made in favour of the defendant (the plaintiff in the proceedings numbered 2010/245809 then being contested in the Common Law Division of the Court), the then Protective List Judge (in separate proceedings numbered 2010/413125, related to the current proceedings numbered 2014/215600, in the Equity Division) made notations and orders (with emphasis added) to the following effect: (1) NOTE that the Court is satisfied that the defendant (the plaintiff in the Common Law proceedings) is incapable of managing the sum of $X to be paid to him as an interim payment, in the Common Law proceedings, pursuant to orders made under CPA s 82. (2) DECLARE that the defendant is incapable of managing that sum of $X. (3) ORDER that the said sum of $X be subject to management pursuant to s 40 and s 41(1) of the NSW Trustee and Guardian Act. (4) ORDER that a nominated licensed trustee company be appointed without security as manager of the said sum of $X, on behalf of the defendant, under the order and direction of the NSW Trustee and Guardian. (5) ORDER that the agreed costs of the plaintiff (the father of the subject person) of and incidental to those proceedings be paid out of the estate of the defendant. (6) ORDER that all parties are at liberty to apply as they may be advised on three days' notice. (7) NOTE that it is in order for the Registrar of the Supreme Court to pay to the nominated trustee company the said sum of $X held on behalf of the defendant, the plaintiff in the Common Law proceedings. (8) ORDER that the summons (in the Protective List proceedings) be stood over with liberty to restore on three days' notice. 4For convenience, I refer to these orders as "the foundational management orders", and to the manager appointed by them as "the interim (protected estate) manager". 5The expression "interim manager" is intended, only, to associate the manager with the character of the property under management: an "interim payment" or "interim payments" of damages made under, and governed by, Part 6 Division 5 (ss 81-84) of the Civil Procedure Act. 6Since the interim manager's appointment as a protected estate manager vis á vis the defendant, the only property it has received in that character for the purpose of management has been property bearing the nature of an "interim payment" pursuant to CPA s 82(1). 7What is asked of the Court, now, is a new set of management orders appointing the interim manager to management of the whole of the defendant's estate, including (but not limited to) the balance of the damages awarded to the defendant, on a final basis, in the Common Law proceedings. 8Use of the expression "interim manager" is convenient because it reflects a timeline associated with the course of the Common Law proceedings. In those proceedings there has been need of an interim manager to accommodate interlocutory orders and, now that those proceedings have been finalised, there is need of a "permanent" manager to manage the damages payable, or paid, under the Court's final judgment. 9This terminology is not apt, without explanation, in the context of an exercise of protective jurisdiction. 10In the realm of the protective jurisdiction, no protected estate manager has a legal entitlement to be, or to remain, manager of a particular estate: Holt v Protective Commissioner (1993) 31 NSWLR 227 at 237F-238F; M v M [2013] NSWSC 1495 at [50] (k)-(l). No manager has, in law, a vested interest in continuation of his, her or its management role: Ability One Financial Management Pty Limited and Anor v JB by his tutor AB [2014] NSWSC 245 at [151]-[153]. In that sense, if none other, every protected estate manager holds an office (in the interests of a protected person, inherently revokable) liable to be described as held only for the time being, in the "interim" so to speak. Language which is both convenient and functional in the context of Common Law proceedings cannot necessarily be carried over, without explanation, in protective proceedings. 11The form of the foundational management orders has had an importance (for the conduct of both the Common Law proceedings and the Protective List proceedings) not fully appreciated by all participants in the process leading to the final determination of the defendant's claim for personal injury compensation, and the consequential need for establishment of a protective regime for management of his estate to permit him to enjoy the benefits of that compensation. 12The primary object of this judgment is to review the regime for management of the defendant's estate, with his welfare and interests given paramount consideration in accordance with the general principles required (by both the NSW Trustee and Guardian Act, s 39 and principles governing an exercise of the Court's inherent jurisdiction) to be applied. 13An incidental, but nevertheless important, object of the judgment is to offer to the public (including families of those incapable of managing their own affairs, the profession and those involved in the management of protected estates) an explanation of how disparate legislative provisions (including rules of court) are designed to operate, with flexibility, in a manner calculated to provide protection for an incapable person and, at the same time, freedom for him or her to make decisions, with the benefit of assistance from family, in pursuit of a common law entitlement to damages. 14The necessity for such an explanation arises, in part, from a failure in some quarters to notice, and to appreciate the significance of: (a) the limitation, by reference to s 40 of the NSW Trustee and Guardian Act, of the foundational management orders affecting the incapable person to management of part only of his estate (namely, the initial award of damages of $X) ; and (b) the interplay between s 40 of the NSW Trustee and Guardian Act and ss 77 and 79 of the Civil Procedure Act, governing payment to the manager of the protected estate interim awards of damages after the first. 15Before turning to consideration of particular legislative provisions at play in the present proceedings, the point should be made that the processes of the Court (informed by the purpose served by the Court's protective jurisdiction) are amenable to adaptation to meet the needs of the particular case. 16An exercise of protective jurisdiction is designed to protect a person who, because of an inability to manage his or her affairs, is in need of protection. A primary criterion for decision in exercise of the jurisdiction is whether what is proposed to be done (or not done) affecting the welfare of the incapable person is for the benefit, and in the interests, of the incapable person: NSW Trustee and Guardian Act, s 39; RL v NSW Trustee and Guardian (2012) 84 NSWLR 263 at 285 [96]; Holt v Protective Commissioner (1993) 31 NSWLR 227 at 238B-D and 241G-242A; HS Theobald, The Law Relating to Lunacy (Stevens & Sons, London, 1924), pp 380 and 382. 17In each case, an analysis of what is required to be done (or not done), in the light of what has or may have been done, affecting the welfare of an incapable person requires attention to be given to the facts of the case, including material, antecedent court orders.