Outline of the parties' submissions
- The plaintiff submitted that the use of the driveway that will result from the proposed development is not excessive, noting that the easement expressly confers on the plaintiff as the dominant owner a full and free right to go, pass, and repass over the driveway to and from the dominant tenement, at all times and for all purposes. The plaintiff further submitted that the proposed development does not unreasonably interfere with the reasonable use of the servient tenement by the defendant, emphasising that safety issues relating to the exit of vehicles from the Pacific Highway onto the driveway, and the entry of vehicles from the driveway onto the Pacific Highway, are matters for the consent authority and are not relevant to questions of unreasonable interference. The plaintiff submitted that the defendant's refusal to provide its written consent to the making of the development application is therefore substantially interfering with the plaintiff's enjoyment of its rights under the easement. The plaintiff accepted that the defendant's provision of written consent for the making of the development application would not constrain the defendant in any way from opposing the granting of development consent on such grounds as the defendant may choose to mount its opposition to the proposed development.
- The defendant submitted that the Court should not grant the mandatory injunction requiring it to provide written consent to the making of the development application for four reasons.
- First, the defendant submitted that the development application is materially inconsistent, incorrect, misleading and confusing. In oral submissions, counsel for the defendant went so far as to describe the development application as "incoherent". It was submitted that the development application fails to describe the proposed development sufficiently for the Court to understand what is the substance of the development application that the Court is being asked to order the defendant to consent to.
- Somewhat inconsistently with that submission, the defendant also submitted as part of its designated first reason that the proposed development is unworkable because the passing bay proposed to be constructed on the plaintiff's land is of insufficient width to allow two cars to pass one another. It was submitted that the defendant is entitled to refuse to consent to the making of a development application that is "deficient" or "won't work".
- The plaintiff submitted that inconsistencies between some of the documents comprising the development application were the result of the revision of certain plans and other documents to address issues that had been raised by the Council during its assessment of the application, that this was a common occurrence in development application processes, and that the inconsistencies identified by the defendant did not entitle it to refuse to consent to the making of the development application. The plaintiff further submitted that the defendant is not entitled to refuse to consent to the making of the development application on the basis that it disagrees with certain contents of the documents comprising the development application, which the defendant characterises as inaccurate or misleading. The plaintiff submitted that the defendant is entitled to raise all of those matters in opposition to the granting of development consent, after it consents to the making of the development application.
- The second reason advanced by the defendant was that the development application is for a development that would increase traffic over the driveway to an extent that would constitute excessive user and/or an unreasonable interference with the defendant's rights in respect of the driveway on its land. The defendant submitted that this was demonstrated not by the experts' assessment of the increase in the number of vehicle trips over the driveway that will be generated by the proposed development, but by the very fact that the plaintiff itself has recognised that the increased traffic will require a widening of the driveway where it joins the Pacific Highway, and has therefore incorporated the passing bay into the development application.
- The third reason advanced by the defendant was that the proposed development would unreasonably interfere with its own reasonable use of the servient tenement by managing the increased vehicular traffic on the driveway that is the subject of the easement in a way that requires all vehicles travelling along the driveway towards the Pacific Highway (including vehicles driven by occupants of and visitors to No. 184) to leave the driveway on No. 184 (the servient tenement) and pass onto the proposed passing bay on No. 186. It was submitted that the terms of the easement do not contemplate that the occupants of and visitors to the servient tenement would be precluded from using any part of the driveway on the servient tenement. It was submitted that the defendant is therefore not infringing the plaintiff's rights under the easement by declining to consent to the making of the development application in respect of a development that would preclude the defendant from using that part of the driveway on its land for vehicles travelling in the direction of the Pacific Highway.
- The defendant also submitted that the proposed development would unreasonably interfere with its own reasonable use of the servient tenement by requiring pedestrians passing between the apartment building on No. 184 and the Pacific Highway to use a pedestrian pathway to be constructed on No. 186, rather than using the existing driveway on No. 184. Moreover, the defendant complained that the development application does not explain how pedestrians using that proposed pathway would access No. 184 from the pathway. The revised landscape plans show landscaping along the edge of the pathway that the defendant submitted would effectively preclude pedestrians from accessing No. 184 from the proposed pathway. It was submitted that the terms of the easement do not contemplate that the occupants of and visitors to the defendant's land would be precluded from using any part of the driveway on the servient tenement. It was submitted that the defendant is therefore not infringing the plaintiff's rights under the easement by declining to consent to the making of the development application in respect of a development that would preclude the pedestrian residents of and visitors to No. 184 from using the existing driveway on the defendant's land to access the Pacific Highway.
- The defendant emphasised that both the proposed passing bay and the proposed pedestrian pathway will require new, enduring property rights to be conveyed from the plaintiff by way of easements over those parts of its land for the benefit of the defendant's land. The defendant submitted that no such easements can be created or registered without its consent, and that it cannot be compelled to consent. It was submitted that the question whether the defendant will consent to those proposed easements must be resolved before the defendant could be ordered to consent to the making of the development application. Counsel for the defendant submitted that the development application process would otherwise be "moot" because, ultimately, the defendant would not consent to the transfer of the easements for its benefit that are required to implement the proposed development.
- The defendant submitted in opening that, insofar as the proposed easements concern the passing bay, resolution of the question whether the defendant will consent to the proposed easements requires this Court to resolve the issues raised by the defendant about the proposed passing bay design, which it contends presents an obvious and clear safety risk. The defendant further submitted that, as a matter of discretion, this Court should not order the defendant to consent to the making of the development application that raises such safety risks. In closing submissions, however, counsel for the defendant expressly abandoned any suggestion that this Court should adjudicate issues of public safety in these proceedings. In my opinion, that concession was correctly made. [15]
- As I have already mentioned, the plaintiff submitted that the proposed development would not give rise to excessive user or unreasonable interference by the plaintiff with the defendant's use of the servient tenement. The plaintiff accepted that the defendant cannot be compelled to accept the transfer of new easements benefitting No. 184 over those parts of No. 186 that are shown in the revised architectural and landscape plans as the passing bay and pedestrian pathway. The plaintiff submitted that uncertainty about whether the defendant will accept those proposed transfers does not entitle the defendant to refuse to consent to the making of the development application, and does not constitute a reason for this Court declining to order the defendant to provide that consent if it is otherwise satisfied that such an order should be made. The plaintiff accepted that the defendant is entitled to raise any objections to the proposed new easements in opposition to the granting of development consent. The plaintiff also accepted that one potential outcome of the development application is that the LEC, exercising the powers of the consent authority in the Class 1 proceedings, might grant development consent conditional upon the defendant consenting to the transfer of the proposed easements and the registration of those easements. If the defendant then refused to consent, it would be incumbent on the plaintiff to apply to modify that condition if it wished to proceed with the development for which consent had been granted.
- The fourth reason advanced by the defendant was that the development application is incomplete and ineffective because it was made without the defendant's consent that is required by clause 23(1) of the EPA Regulation. It was submitted that the plaintiff therefore lacks the status of an "applicant", and that there has been no "determination" of any development application, within the meaning of s 8.7 of the EPA Act. It follows, in the defendant's submission, that the Class 1 proceedings were not "lawfully commenced". Whilst the defendant accepted that the plaintiff's development application would become effective if the defendant were now to provide its consent to the making of the application, and that this would confer on the plaintiff the status of an "applicant" within the meaning of s 8.7 of the EPA Act, the defendant submitted that the plaintiff then would need to commence fresh Class 1 proceedings. The defendant submitted that the plaintiff was out of time to do so because more than six months has passed since the date on which the plaintiff was notified of the Council's refusal of development consent. Counsel for the defendant suggested that, if the defendant now provided its consent to the making of the development application, that would "in some way revive" the decision made by the Council to refuse development consent, so that there would be a determination from which the plaintiff could appeal under s 8.7 of the EPA Act. However, it was submitted that this "revival" would occur retrospectively, with the consequence that the six month limitation period under s 8.10 of the EPA Act commenced to run on 22 September 2023 and has already expired. It was submitted that this problem renders the present proceedings futile because, if this Court were to order the defendant to provide written consent to the making of the development application, the plaintiff would be time-barred from commencing fresh Class 1 proceedings appealing against the Council's refusal of consent for the proposed development. It is implicit in these submissions that the defendant contends that the existing Class 1 proceedings must be dismissed by the LEC for want of jurisdiction.
- In response to those submissions of the defendant, the plaintiff relied on the judgments of the Court of Appeal in Botany Bay v Remath and Al Maha.
- This is a convenient point at which to record that the plaintiff objected to the evidence of Mr Pavlovic, and the expert evidence of Ms Marshall-Evans, on the grounds of relevance. The plaintiff nevertheless adduced Mr Brodie's expert evidence responding to Ms Marshall-Evans' report, and relied on the joint report of the two experts. The evidence to which the plaintiff objected was admitted subject to relevance. As will become apparent below, the evidence of Mr Pavlovic, Ms Marshall-Evans and Mr Brodie has been relevant to delineating between existing public road safety issues on the one hand, and questions of whether the proposed development would result in excessive use of the easement or unreasonable interference with the defendant's rights on the other hand. That distinction has been relevant to the disposition of many of the defendant's grounds of opposition to the relief sought by the plaintiff in these proceedings in accordance with the applicable principles summarised at [42] above.